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A high school Biology II classroom was observed daily in order to study 
students' conceptual change in evolution of life. The conceptual frameworks of four 
student participants were documented and the patterns of conceptual change were studied 
closely throughout the full school year. Data collected included open-ended and 
structured individual interviews, student journals, daily classroom observations, field 
notes, and pre- and posttests. All 68 student interviews (17 per student) were recorded, 
transcribed, coded, and sorted to find patterns of conceptual change. Additional 
interviews were conducted with the teacher, parents, principal, and high school 
counselor. The researchers' interpretations were shared with the student participants and 
teacher to ensure that the voices of all research participants were heard.
The finding of this multi-case study of conceptual change include:
1. Conceptual change about evolution of life can occur in one of three patterns: 
(a) holistic, (b) fragmented and gradual, and (c) dual constructions.
2. Conceptual change can occur with little corresponding change in belief. The 
Darwinian theory o f the evolution of life, in its modern form, can be 
understood but not accepted.
3. The most influential factor inhibiting conceptual change toward a more
scientific framework is not belief, but the learner's feelings of disturbance 
and conflict as learning occurs.
4. Certain critical issues, called threshold questions in this study, seem to be 
central to conceptual change. An example threshold question is "How could 
two different species stem from one original species?"
5. Conceptual change is often based upon the idiosyncratic, extra-logical 
assessment of competing conceptions.
6. Often, the change o f one conception allows a sequence of changes to occur in 
the learner's overall conceptual framework. Overall, this study demonstrates
ix
that many conceptions in this area are closely interwoven, so that a change in 
one conception requires a gradual blending and modification of related 
conceptions.
7. The actions of a learner's conceptual ecology are found to vary with each 
individual. The participant’s orientation toward academic work, 
epistemological approach to scientific knowledge, belief in evolutionary 
theory, and approach to scientific topics play integrated roles in controlling 




A student sitting in a biology class in rural Louisiana asks his teacher what he 
perceives to be a simple question, "Tell me about alligators." The teacher stops and 
looks out the classroom window furrowing her brows in puzzlement. What should she 
tell the student? Should the question be approached taxonomically, and the student 
informed about the classification of the alligator as both a vertebrate and a reptile?
Should the question be approached physiologically, and the student informed about the 
unique cardiovascular structure of the alligator? Or should a reproductive approach be 
used, with an explanation of the evidence for maternal care shown by these unique 
reptiles and the insight this may provide a paleontologist in her studies of dinosaur 
artifacts? Given much reflection, the responses stretch out endlessly. The student 
shakes his head muttering that the teacher is daydreaming.
In his collection of essays entitled Toward a New Philosophy of Biology. Mayr 
(1988) eloquently describes the cause of the teacher's bemusement. Biology is an 
inherently complex science. This complexity stems from the multiple layers of 
explanation made possible by very different disciplines which exist under the umbrella of 
biology. Reproductive biology, taxonomy, physiology, ethology, anatomy, ecology- 
these disciplines represent a small fraction of the many theoretical frames studied by 
biologists. Faced with this fragmentation and complexity, it is not surprising that a 
layperson approaching this field resorts to rote lists as a means of acquiring a small 
fraction of knowledge. Unfortunately, such knowledge usually remains isolated and 
fragmented as the student is unsuccessful in constructing links between diverse 
knowledge claims. For such a student, biology is seen as a body of established facts to 
be learned in class, having little application to the natural world. As has been argued by 
a host of biologists (Dobzhansky, 1973; Mayr, 1976, 1988) and science educators 
(Cummins & Remsin, 1992; Good et al., 1992; Settlage, in press), the theoretical
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framework provided by evolution provides a means of tying together the many 
disciplines found in biology to form a single, coherent, and fluid science. The respected 
geneticist and theorist Dobzhansky aptly described the importance of the evolutionary 
theory in his now-famous quote, "Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of 
evolution" (1973, p. 125). Biologists and biology educators think the understanding of 
evolution is crucial for a student to synthesize and integrate diverse biological concepts.
It is widely recognized that the manner in which we teach science is in need of 
revision. In 1989, the American Association for the Advancement of Science suggested 
that the goal of science educators should be the preparation of scientifically literate 
students. Literacy in a science involves an understanding of a core of all-pervasive 
principles of that discipline and the ability to apply these principles in situations in and 
out of the science classroom (Wandersee, 1991). The core principles o f biology include 
information (genetics), energy flow, organisms, and evolution (AAAS, 1989). Thus, a 
biologically literate student is one who can apply these core concepts in the consideration 
of any biological topic.
Unfortunately, despite the recognition of the importance of evolution in the goal 
of biological literacy, Shankar and Skogg (1993) suggest that biology teachers do not 
emphasize this topic in their classes and many even avoid mention of this unifying 
theory. This core principle of biology is not being adequately taught in our nation's 
schools. While my past work has investigated the means through which instruction can 
be changed and directed to achieve the goal of biological literacy (Demastes & 
Wandersee, 1990), this study has a different focus. Given that a thorough 
understanding of evolution is necessary in order to be biological literate, how does such 
understanding come about? The purpose of this study is to investigate the manner in 
which students construct a conceptual framework for the theory of evolution.
Many science educators now understand learning to involve the active 
restructuring of knowledge (Duschl & Gitomer, 1991). The conceptual change theory of
Posner, Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog (1982) represents an attempt to model this 
restructuring process. This theory uses the model o f Kuhn’s (1970) scientific revolution 
as a basis for understanding the process of holistic conceptual change within the learner. 
Conceptual change is understood to be directed by the learner's rational evaluation of the 
new conception. Additionally, the learner's conceptual ecology (Toulmin, 1972), a 
fundamentally organizing system of conceptions, is said to influence the change that 
occurs.
Smith, Blakeslee, and Anderson (1993) explain that meaningful learning entails 
the construction or reconstruction of a conceptual framework for a topic. A conceptual 
framework includes all of the interlinked conceptions a learner has about a particular 
topic. Thus, all new information is understood by the learner in terms of her/his pre­
existing, overarching conceptual framework. In this theoretical framework, conceptual 
change is seen as the structural adjustments the learner makes to the overarching 
conceptual framework based upon new experiences, information, or concepts the learner 
encounters. Unlike rote learning, the meaningful learning which results from conceptual 
change will allow the learner to not only recall information, but also to describe, predict, 
and explain natural occurrences (Smith et al., 1993). Using this understanding, how can 
we measure if conceptual change has occurred? It would seem that simple information 
questions would not provide educators an adequate measure. Instead students should be 
asked to describe, predict, and explain natural situations.
I selected the conceptual change theory because of its fruitfulness as a model of 
the learning of major, organizing conceptions, and I perceive evolution to be such a 
conception. However, as a theoretical base, the conceptual change theory is also in need 
of further refinement, modification, and validation as has been suggested by Strike and 
Posner (1992). Therefore, the overall purpose of this work is twofold: to understand 
how students construct a conceptual framework and to determine the particularities of
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this construction when evolution is the content investigated. (See Figure 1 for a 
summary of the research.)
Research Questions 
The research questions of this study include:
1. What is the nature of the process of conceptual change of evolution?
2. What factors facilitate or prohibit conceptual change?
3. What is the nature of the interface between students' conceptual frameworks 
in evolution and their conceptual ecologies?
4. What are the limits o f the conceptual change theory in the description of 
conceptual change in evolution?
Definitions
For the purposes of the study, the following definitions will be used:
1. Belief will be defined in its relationship to understanding. Belief and 
understanding are both forms of knowledge which may overlap. But when 
these two types of knowledge differ, understanding includes knowledge 
which has an academic component, and belief includes knowledge which is 
taken on faith in a supernatural agent (Pajares, 1992).
2. Belief system is a set of organized and interconnected individual beliefs.
3. Biological evolution is a theoretical framework which describes the various 
processes which can lead to the genetic change in a population of organisms 
over time.
4. Classroom discussion refers to any formal or informal oral treatment of a 
topic by more than two participants.
5. Reflexivitv in research refers to the actions of the research participants 
changing the methods and analysis of the research as well as the actions of 
the research/researcher changing some state of the participants.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
What is the nature of the process of 
conceptual change in evolution?
World View
Nature is observable and 
knowablc.
Science is one way of knowing 
the world (Moore).








What factors facilitate or prohibit 
conceptual change?





What arc the limits o f the 




r Current conceptual change theory is limited in scope: 
New descriptions o f actual patterns o f conceptual 
change should be made for other content areas:
High school students can learn evolutionary theory: 
Belief docs not assure or prohibit understanding 
Knowlcdcc claims
Conceptual change in evolution follows wholesale, gradual, 
and dual patterns: Reading, integrated instruction, and 
interviews facilitate conceptual change:
Different aspects o f conceptual ecologies control 
conceptual change 
Data Transformations
•Think aloud interviewing, in-depth interviewing, 
structured interviewing, and mode validity 
arc qualitative research techniques 
•Variable species, selection pressure, and 
mutation arc aspects o f evolutionary theory 
•Conceptual change theory (Posner ct al.) requires learner’s 
perception of intelligibility, plausibility, and
fruitfulness o f the new conception Events
Participant’s self-descriptions: Participant's analysis o f  evolutionary and genetic events: 
Responses to pretest and posltcst questions and explanations o f  answers: Oral and written 
responses to interview questions: Instruction in evolution: Participant observation
Interview transcription, coding, and analysis:
C-map analysts: Categorization o f  student's 
pre and posltcst exam responses: Comparisons of 
interview participants' exam with whole class exam 
lis&QOl
Audio and video tape o f interview: Field notes and field 
journal o f  interviews and observations: Pre and 
posltcst responses: C-maps
Figure 1 





Constructivism is understood to be a model of learning by some science 
educators and a doctrine of education by others (Suchting, 1992). Constructivism 
involves the construction of meaning by an active learner as newly formed concepts are 
connected to the learner's prior knowledge in an attempt to understand her/his world.
The foundational understanding is that learners construct their knowledge from 
experience with the world, with individuals, and within cultures. The child as an active 
participant in construction of her/his own learning radically differs from the behaviorist 
approach which proposes the learner as a relatively passive receiver of information.
This is a very broad description, requiring constructivism to serve as the basis for 
a wide range of theories. This range was the focus of Cobern's (1991) description of the 
emergence of the constructivist movement within science education. In Cobern's 
account, constructivism can be divided into personal and contextual categories.
Cobern (1991) traces personal constructivism as an initial branch from Piaget's 
work. This theory focuses on the actions of the learner during knowledge construction. 
Cobern states that research using personal constructivism centers around the actual 
construction process used by the learner. It asks: How does the learner construct 
knowledge? One mechanism by which personal constructivism can be carried out is that 
described by the conceptual change theory. This theory of learning forms the basis for 
the my proposed research.
A second category Cobern names in his analysis of constructivist research is 
contextual constructivism. Contextual constructivism is bifocal; the focus is not solely 
on the student's knowledge construction, but also on how that construction is affected by
6
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the learner's life situation. It asks: What is the social contribution to learning? Learning 
is analyzed within the cultural context of the learner. Contextual constructivism also 
influenced my research as I observed the participants in their classroom and as I studied 
the influences behind the teaching which was carried on in this classroom. These 
activities were carried out in an effort to understand the process through which learning 
is negotiated within the Laboratory School setting.
Conceptual Change Theory
The proposed research also draws on the theory of conceptual change as 
proposed by Posner et al. (1982). The authors view their theory as describing the 
methods by which conceptual frameworks are constructed and modified. More 
narrowly, the conceptual change theory describes the process by which a learner captures 
new concepts, restructures existing concepts, or exchanges concepts from one set to 
another. This theory uses the model of scientific theory construction as a basis for 
understanding the process of conceptual change within the learner. This theory deals 
primarily with central, organizing concepts, and explains that conceptual change can be 
elicited when learners recognize the shortcomings of their present understanding and are 
shown a more intelligible, plausible, and fruitful alternative. Within this model, the 
learner's conceptual ecology is of fundamental importance in controlling the process of 
conceptual change. This ecology, as described by Toulmin (1972), includes the 
learner's epistemological commitments, metaphysical beliefs, and knowledge outside the 
field. In their original description (Posner et al., 1982), the actions o f the learner's 
conceptual ecology are, at best, ambigous. Aspects of my research represent an attempt 
to define the actions of the conceptual ecology on the process of conceptual change.
The conceptual change theory as it defines the growth of one learner's conception 
is situated within the constructivist theoretical basis, initially extending from personal 
constructivism. Despite its genealogy, contextual constructivism may eventually have 
important insights for the conceptual change theory, introducing the impact of affective,
linguistic, and social domains in the production of conceptual change. Such an 
introduction may serve to make the conceptual change theory a more descriptive theory 
of learning.
Alternative Conceptions
The conceptual change theory emphasizes the importance of students' prior 
knowledge in instruction decision making and implementation. Such emphasis was 
begun with the work of Ausubel (1968) with his emphasis of prior knowledge in the 
process of learning, and was continued by Driver and Easley (1978). This foundation 
helped science education change from its exclusive focus on learners' cognitive and 
logical structures to examining the content of learners' understandings. In recent 
decades, investigations into students' prior knowledge have flourished. Wandersee, 
Mintzes and Novak (in press) have identified 2,400 such studies in the field of science 
education.
One obvious difficulty seen as a reader approaches this field is the tremendous 
diversity of terms currently used in science education to describe students' prior 
knowledge. These terms include misconceptions, alternative conceptions, prescientific 
conceptions, naive conceptions, children's science, and intuitive beliefs (Hills, 1989).
As mentioned earlier, each term implies a slightly different epistemological base. Both 
Good (1991) and Wandersee et al. (in press) express the need for a convergence in terms 
within this area. The historically prominent and popular term, misconception, implies 
that there is little heuristic value to students' conceptions and suggests that they exists 
simply as something to be corrected. The importance conceptual change theory places on 
students' knowledge precludes this choice. Good (1991) has suggested the term 
prescientific conceptions because this term applies only to science, is appropriate to both 
adults and children, and avoids the negative connotation of misconception while 
conveying the extra-scientific nature o f the conception. Unfortunately, prescientific
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conceptions, cannot reasonably be used to refer to conceptions constructed within a 
science classroom. Therefore, this term is potentially very restrictive.
In a similar vein, in their review of research in this area, Wandersee et al. (in 
press) suggest use of the term alternative conceptions, justifying this choice based both 
on its prominence in the literature and on its tacit meanings. Alternative conception 
implies an experience and contextually based, rational explanation. The authors explain 
that such a term potentially provides for more intellectual respect for the students' 
learning and represents an attempt to better understand students' views and their 
intellectual difficulties. In an extension, while alternative conception describes students' 
understanding of a concept, alternative framework refers to a complex organization of 
linked conceptions.
The issue of terminology for the understandings students have of scientific 
phenomena remains unresolved. For the purposes of this study, terms which signify a 
lack of emphasis on the instructional power of these conceptions will not be used. 
Instead, alternative conceptions will be used because o f the broad meaning embeded in 
the term and its reference to the heuristic nature o f students' conceptions.
Findings from a survey of experts in the field of alternative conceptions suggest 
that science education should integrate studies within a content area, and the field should 
move forward to descriptions o f conceptual change. Additionally, these experts explain 
that an understanding of the cultural dimensions of students' conceptions is now required 
(Wandersee et al., in press). This proposed research will follow both suggested 
pathways.
Studies on the Learning of Evolution 
Mayr (1976) described six world views that were widely held by scientific circles 
before Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection (1859). The conceptions 
restructured by the requirements of Darwin's theory included: (a) a young earth, (b) an 
earth undergoing both catastrophes and long periods of no change, (c) teleological
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change, (d) creationism, (e) view of species as individuals without variation 
(essentialism), and (f) anthropocentrism. While many of the original conceptions were 
undergoing significant changes before Darwin's work, the formulation and acceptance of 
the theory of evolution by natural selection eventually forced a widespread restructuring 
and acceptance of different conceptions within the scientific community. The theory of 
evolution as mechanized by natural selection requires conceptions of: a) an old earth, b) 
an earth undergoing gradual changes, c) change of a species through origin in a random 
occurrence acted on by natural selection, d) common descent of organisms, e) a view of 
species as a collection of variable individuals, and f) a view of humans as existing within 
the biological realm. These modified conceptions are necessary components of a 
scientific understanding of evolution and have been the focus of much of the research 
done in students' understandings of evolution.
Facets o f Students' Conceptions of Evolution
Adaptation
The conception of adaptation is one facet of a scientific understanding of 
evolution. However, Lucas (1971) describes that the term adaptation can have several 
meanings in biology, which often are not well articulated to students. Lucas explains 
that adaptation can refer to immediate physiological changes in an individual, to 
characteristics of an organism which suit it to the environment, and also to the process in 
which a population is modified to greater fitness with respect to its environment. Rarely 
do students have this metaknowledge, and so cannot differentiate between the various 
uses of the word adaptation. Lucas' ideas (1971) are supported by the work of Kargbo, 
Hobbs, and Erickson (1980) who explained that the students studied (ages 7-13) often 
do not distinguish between non-heritable characteristics which are adaptive and 
characteristics which are inherited in a population. The high school students in studies 
by Renner, Brumby, and Shepherd (1981) and Hallden (1988), as well as medical 
students in a study by Brumby (1984), used adaptation in an individual sense of
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proximate change in response to environmental changes. Earlier work by Brumby 
(1979) demonstrated that medical students understood adaptation as a positive process 
resulting from need rather than the end-result of a selection event.
Clough and Wood-Robinson (1985b) attempted to identify common belief 
patterns of 12-16 year old students in the area of biological adaptation. Developmental 
changes of students in the study were addressed by repeating the interview two years 
after the initial encounter. This study documented an increase in the number of older 
students who held a scientific conception of adaptation. The authors attributed this 
improvement to both teaching and students' development. However, the study further 
supports the description of adaptation as a difficult area in the study of biology and 
documents a very strong trend toward teleological explanations of adaptation. Students 
viewed adaptations as caused by some purpose or design. Anthropomorphic 
explanations were also given as the cause of many adaptations. In these cases 
adaptations were cited as a conscious and deliberate response to need. The authors 
emphasized that such anthropomorphic expressions may reflect semantic difficulties, 
instead of difficulties in the underlying meaning. Finally, Clough and Wood-Robinson 
(1985b) stressed that students seldom make links between intraspecific variation and 
natural selection.
The research cited above is important in that the understanding students have of 
adaptation is central to their overall conception of evolution (Deadman & Kelly, 1978).
In fact, many students use adaptation as their sole explanation of evolution (Hallden, 
1988). While it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between the various facets of 
evolutionary thought, the findings of Bishop and Anderson (1990), Greene (1990), and 
Demastes, Good, Sundberg, and Dini (1992) show that the use of only a rapid form of 
adaptation undergone by an individual will have serious ramifications for other portions 
of the students’ understandings of evolution.
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Time Frame
Another facet of current evolutionary thought is the time interval in which 
evolution occurs. This was explored in a study by Renner, Brumby, and Shepherd 
(1981). In this study, the high school students studied could not differentiate between a 
2 million year and a 200 million year time span, two radically different time periods. 
Other findings included: less than 5% of the students had an adequate grasp of evolution 
and could provide an adequate explanation for extinction, 44% attributed the death of the 
dinosaurs to proximal causes of water and food loss, and adaptation by the dinosaurs 
was seen as a rapid change of an individual caused by a changing environment. 
Teleology and Anthropomorphism
One of the world views undermined by Darwin, and one that hinders a 
construction of a scientific understanding o f evolution, is that o f teleology. The most 
common usage of teleology in relation to biological understandings is that of evolution 
being directed to an end or shaped by an ultimate purpose. In his investigation of 
teleological explanations in biology, Jungwirth (1975a) found that even agricultural 
majors in the third year of their university education used teleological explanations of 
evolutionary phenomena on a multiple choice exam. This finding is supported by other 
researchers (Clough and Wood-Robinson, 1985b; Lawson & Weser, 1990). However, 
Hallden (1988) reminds us that such statements are difficult to analyze from written 
explanations.
Through highlights of debates between science educators and philosophers of 
science, Jungwirth (1975b) pointed out that the issue of teleology is not a 
straightforward one for educators. He described the close relationships between 
anthropomorphic and teleological explanations and between functional and teleological 
interpretations. Jungwirth (1975b) explained that teleological explanations are common 
in biology teaching because of their value as heuristic devices. This is supported by 
Hallden (1988) who reports that intentionality is often seen in biology textbooks.
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While his earlier work suggested teleology and anthropomorphism as a problem 
created by poor teacher education, Jungwirth (1977) provided empirical support for this 
suggestion through comparisons of science education researchers, scientists, teachers, 
and preservice teachers. Science education researchers found teleological and 
anthropomorphic statements to be undesirable for study by biology students, while the 
teachers and scientists were less aware of the dangers of such statements. Preservice 
teachers were absolutely unaware of the existence of the problems of teleological and 
anthropomorphic statements. Each group had difficulties in distinguishing between these 
two types of statements.
One of the most comprehensive studies of teleology and anthropomorphism is 
found in the work of Tamir and Zohar (1991). In this research, shortcomings of the 
previous studies were remedied through the use of individual interviews with the 15-17 
year old students studied. The authors determined that 30% of the students understood 
plants in anthropomorphic terms while 62% of the students understood animals in a 
similar manner. A higher majority, 71%, used teleological reasoning with respect to 
evolution. The authors explained that nonteleological statements were typically 
combined with a rejection of anthropomorphism, and teleological explanations were used 
to express a functional understanding of organism.
Teleology differs from many of the other conceptions discussed in that it could be 
more applicable to many other situations than other aspects of the individual's declarative 
knowledge. Teleology may have a great impact upon the construction of a scientific 
conception of evolution. This is a hypothesis that has yet to be supported or refuted by 
empirical evidence. My study attempted to explore through the use of student 




The logical structure of the discipline of biology would indicate that an 
understanding of evolution is based on an understanding of genetics. There have been a 
number of studies which investigated students' conceptions of genetics. An early study 
based on interviews by Kargbo et al. (1980) indicated that a majority of the students, 
regardless of age, understood that all environmentally induced characteristics are 
heritable. The authors concluded that students' conceptions did not follow a 
developmental pathway, but altered according to their experiences. However, 
conceptions of probability regarding phenotypes of offspring were said to improve with 
the age of the students. The authors suggested that children develop two conceptual 
frameworks regarding inheritance, one constructed in school, and the other constructed 
in the course of everyday experiences. In novel situations, the students often use the 
latter structure for understanding.
In a later study of students' conceptions of inheritance, Clough and Wood- 
Robinson (1985a) used interviews involving prediction, explanation, and follow-up 
questions. The researchers found that many first-year, secondary school students have 
extensive conceptions of inheritance although they have not yet studied the subject. 
Students in the study typically discussed the biological phenomenon on a phenotypic 
level, excluding genetic explanations. Students viewed the timing of fertilization as 
determining inherited features and equated genetic dominance with phenotypic 
characters. Of most importance to conceptions of evolution, students viewed variation 
within populations as stemming from developmental defects. Between 40% and 50% of 
the students throughout the age range understood phenotypic changes as heritable.
Albaladejo and Lucas (1988) explained that the concept of mutation is 
fundamental in both genetics and evolution. They describe the English use of mutation 
as a technical term, while in the Catalan language, "mutacio" (mutation) has a wider 
usage, including any sudden change. Albaladejo and Lucas (1988) determined that in
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Catalan, mutation is associated with many types of change, including puberty and 
metamorphosis.
Demastes et al. (1992) suggested that students' understandings of Mendelian 
genetics often fail to help them understand evolution. This echoes an earlier finding by 
Hallden (1988) who explained that instruction into Mendelian genetics does not provide a 
means o f understanding evolution's mechanisms. Like Clough and Wood-Robinson 
(1985a), Demastes et al. (1992) documented a failure by university students to 
incorporate genetics into explanations of how populations of organisms change, even 
though instruction into genetics lead the unit on evolution. Such an omission was 
partially explained by Longden (1982). Using in-depth interviews with high school 
students having difficulties in genetics, Longden (1982) found two factors which 
inhibited understanding: (a) the precision of the language of genetics coupled with less 
than explicit teaching techniques into this language, and (b) the use of symbolic 
representation and mathematics. He suggested that students are involved only with the 
surface mechanics of genetics and so fail to understand the underlying significance of the 
process.
The research demonstrates that students have well-developed conceptions of 
inheritance which are formed from their out-of-school experiences. These conceptions 
invariably conflict with scientific conceptions and are often used by students to 
understand the world. Logically, one would think that a scientific conception of genetics 
is fundamental to a construction of a scientific conception of evolution, a judgment which 
guides the sequence of instruction in a large number of classrooms. Again, this logical 
assessment is not well supported by the research. The position of genetics in the 




Several studies have focused on students' conceptions of one mechanism of 
evolution, natural selection. Brumby's work (1984) explored university students' 
conceptions of natural selection at the university level using both written questions and 
structured interviews. The results o f the Brumby study demonstrate that students 
proficient in science leave school using the Lamarckian view of evolution; that is, 
evolution occurs because of need. Brumby (1984) explained that many students describe 
adaptation as a loss of function through disuse. Others see a change as affected by the 
environment, with change gradually unfolding in the offspring. Brumby (1984) reported 
that students confused the various biological meanings of adaptation by failing to 
distinguish between those changes within the individual and those changes seen in a 
population. This was described as "intuitive Lamarckism" (p. 499), and the author 
explained that this conception was far more than a simple error to be corrected. After the 
course in biology, these medical students still had their intuitive misconceptions, coupled 
with a poor ability to communicate their conceptions about natural selection. These 
results are supported by earlier work with a similar group of students (Brumby, 1979). 
Only 18% of these first year medical students who had previously studied biology could 
correctly apply a process of selection to an example of evolutionary change.
Summary
Students' alternative conceptions regarding the mechanisms of evolutionary 
change (i.e., genetics, adaptation, mutation) have been the most well studied aspect of 
evolution education. Many of these studies concentrated on a small facet of the entire 
conceptual framework for evolution. However, no single study has attempted to 
integrate these diverse findings in an attempt to understand the process through which 
related conceptions are constructed. One of the purposes of my research is to integrate 
these findings in order to better understand the process o f conceptual change.
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Entire Frameworks
Another avenue to understanding students' conceptions is to look at the students' 
conceptual framework for the whole of evolution, instead of focusing on a single facet of 
evolutionary thought. Such a general approach has the potential for providing a means 
of integration of previous research. An early example of this approach is seen in the 
work of Deadman and Kelly (1978). Longitudinal interviews were completed with boys 
ranging from 11 to 14 years of age. The interviews explored the students’ understanding 
of evolution and heredity in a variety of contexts. The data from these interviews were 
used to provide a description of the students' alternative conceptions of the various facets 
of evolution.
Deadman and Kelly (1978) explain that the students in this study typically 
associated evolution with primitive life forms, but they did not use evolution to establish 
relationships between different taxa of organisms. Adaptation was central to all the 
boys' explanations of evolution. However, it is interesting to note that the students 
explained that evolution was driven by naturalistic forces (driven by the needs or wants 
of the animals) or environmentalistic forces (driven by physical changes in the 
environment). None of the boys had a sound understanding of natural selection, and the 
concept of chance rarely was prominent in their explanations. Deadman and Kelly 
(1978) concluded by stating the major difficulties in teaching evolution lie in the 
students' naturalistic and Lamarckian interpretations and their inadequate understanding 
of probability. Such conclusions may be unnecessarily pessimistic. The importance of 
early research in the broad topic of evolution is the identification of areas for further 
investigation (conceptions of adaptation, natural selection, chance). But in these early 
studies, extensive interpretation is not possible, as little supporting research evidence 
exists. For these reasons, the Deadman and Kelly (1978) study is an important initial 
investigation into students' conceptual frameworks of evolution, but the conclusions 
were premature.
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In a later investigation of students' conceptions of evolution, Hallden (1988) 
used participant observations and verbal and written responses to assess high school 
students' conceptions during instruction in genetics and evolution. She determined that it 
was difficult to differentiate essays written before and after instruction, but upon close 
examination, more students did use a Darwinian explanation o f evolution after 
instruction. However, students offered these explanations along with other nonscientific 
explanations. Hallden (1988) suggested that, instead of changing their conceptions, 
students simply added another possible explanation to their repertoires. Students failed 
to make a clear distinction between the individual and the species, therefore their use of 
adaptation was ambiguous. Adaptation was used to explain virtually all evolution, and 
single individuals were said to become better and better adapted. For these students, 
individual adaptation was synonymous with species adaptation, and students showed 
little understanding of variation within a species. Hallden (1988) further explained that 
students found the instruction they received to be disjointed and fragmentary, in contrast 
to the logical progression viewed by the researcher. The possibility of this discrepancy 
was suggested earlier by Driver (1981) when she reminded us that the logical order of a 
topic may not correspond to the psychological order of learning.
The Hallden (1988) study has important theoretical implications for the theory of 
conceptual change. In this study, the author reports that students formed new conceptual 
frameworks for evolution, but retained their former conceptions as well. Such 
information becomes important as science education researchers attempt to describe the 
process of conceptual change. Instead of a radical restructuring of presently existing 
conceptual frameworks, the learner may construct alternative conceptions. Holland, 
Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard (1986) suggest a default hierarchy model of cognition to 
explain these alternative conceptions and how they are selected for use within a context.
The findings of Greene (1990) are not so much a description of the components 
of students' conceptual frameworks of evolution, but more a description of how their
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conceptions are related. The focus of this study was to determine if university students' 
written explanations follow a logical progression: not if their conceptions had a logical 
basis, but if their conceptions had logical relations. The four conceptual issues analyzed 
included (a) the use of a population or typological focus, (b) the use o f an open or closed 
change process, (c) the generation of one or many traits, and (d) the use of a selection 
process. By a statistical analysis of the interaction o f these three categories within 
students' answers, Greene (1990) found the alternative conceptions to be logical, if not 
conforming to current scientific thought. Students using a population focus employed a 
closed-change process, students viewing change as directed described little function for 
the selection process, and students using acquired traits did not use a functional idea of 
selection. While informative, the shortcomings of this study lie in the categorization of 
students' responses. The categories were constructed at the outset of the research and 
thereby limited what could be found during the course of the study.
In a related study, Settlage (in press) investigated alternative conceptions of 
evolution in an attempt to identify consistent patterns of conceptual change occurring 
during instruction. Using the Bishop and Anderson (1990) testing instrument (described 
in the following section), Settlage evaluated students' pre- and posttest conceptions of 
the mechanism of evolutionary change. In his analysis of examination responses of high 
school students, need was the most common response category identified. Variation in 
the population was the response category that underwent the greatest change; students' 
use of this category increased in frequency after instruction. The category of mutation 
also underwent an increase of only nine percent. This increase implies that the role of 
random mutation is accessible to students of this age but is not readily constructed. 
Students capable of this construction included those who had previously used the need or 
use category to explain evolutionary events. Settlage (in press) explained that students in 
his study understood evolution to be caused by deliberate intentions of the organisms,
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although instruction did allow students to progress to a more scientific conception of 
evolution.
Summary
While the research of Hallden (1988), Greene (1990), and Settlage (in press) are 
informative, these studies fall short of actually helping researchers construct a better 
model for learning. This shortfall is due to their omission of a strong theoretical base. 
However, the findings of this holistic approach to the mechanism of evolutionary change 
did serve to shape my initial research methods and questions.
Conceptual Change Theory and Evolution
The work of Bishop and Anderson (1990) is one of the most important studies in 
the history of research into college students' conceptions about natural selection. This 
importance stems from its position as one of the first pieces of research which 
investigated students' conceptual frameworks, designed instructional materials to address 
students' alternative conceptions, and then tested the effectiveness of such materials.
The students were pretested, using an exam of both open-ended questions and multiple 
choice, during which the students were also asked about their belief in evolution and the 
extent of their prior coursework in biology. The students were then involved in 
instruction in natural selection. The teaching module used for this instruction was 
constructed from earlier investigations into students' alternative conceptions concerning 
natural selection. This model was based on the theory of conceptual change and was 
designed to allow students to confront their misconceptions in order to build a more 
scientific understanding. After instruction, students were posttested to assess their 
conceptual change.
Bishop and Anderson (1990) identified three areas in which students' 
conceptions of natural selection differed radically from those o f biologists. The first 
issue was the origin and survival of new traits in populations. Students did not 
recognize the processes of increasing variation in genetic material and the process of
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natural selection operating on that variation. Instead students described only one process 
by which individuals of a species change, a change caused by the environment. 
According to the students, the environment exerts its influence on variation through 
need, use and disuse, and adaptation. Bishop and Anderson (1990) explained that a 
major hindrance in the construction of a scientific conception is the inability to 
distinguish between the origin of a trait and selection upon that trait. Another issue 
described by students' alternative conceptions was the role of variation within a 
population. Students placed little importance on the role of variation amoung members 
of a population; instead, evolution was seen to be a change in a trait in a homogeneous 
population. The final issue of students' conceptions of natural selection concerned 
evolution as the changing proportion of individuals with discrete traits. Students viewed 
evolution as a gradual change in the traits themselves and not as an increase or decrease 
in the number of individuals in the population with such a trait.
While most of the students involved in the Bishop and Anderson (1990) study 
had completed at least one year of high school biology prior to the college course, this 
experience had little effect on students' alternative conceptions for any of the issues of 
natural selection. This study documents that university students have a poor 
understanding of how change in a population comes about, of the role of variation, or of 
evolution as genetically changing populations. After instruction, over half the students 
understood these ideas. From these results, Bishop and Anderson (1990) remind us that 
natural selection is far more difficult to understand than most instructors realize and that 
students can change their conceptions when their instructors are made aware of students' 
alternative conceptions and are prepared to confront them.
There have been several studies which built upon the base provided by the 
pioneering work of Bishop and Anderson (1990). The earliest of these derived works 
includes a set of replications carried out in order to focus on and define the limits of 
Bishop's and Anderson's findings (Demastes, Settlage, & Good, in press). These
authors were successful in replicating several of findings of the original study. These 
included: (a) a lack o f an association between beliefs and students' abilities to construct a 
scientific conception during the course, (b) a lack of an association between the amount 
of prior instruction and students' abilities to construct a scientific conception during the 
course, and (c) a very meager movement toward the use of scientific conceptions for 
evolution during the course. However, the second component of this replication study 
did reveal significant increases in students' use of scientific conceptions. However, this 
second replication used a more prolonged instructional strategy than that employed by 
Bishop and Anderson (1990).
The report by Demastes and Good (1993) represents a second study which used 
the Bishop and Anderson (1990) instructional method and testing instrument. This study 
focused on the patterns of conceptual change experienced by college students during a 
nonmajor's biology course. These authors reported that three alternative conceptions 
were found to be held by a large segment o f the students even after instruction. These 
included: (a) a typological species concept, (b) evolution as a change in all individuals in 
a population, and (c) the variation that is acted on by evolution is produced by need. 
Three patterns of conceptual change were documented in this study, including (a) 
movement toward the use of an scientific conception, (b) movement away from a 
scientific conception, and (c) movement between various alternative conceptions.
Demastes and Good suggest that the various patterns of conceptual change seen 
in this study lend support to Duschl's and Gitomer's (1991) criticism of the holistic 
process of conceptual change described by Posner et al. (1982). However, as will be 
discussed, Jimenez's (1992) work suggest that the process o f conceptual change in 
evolution requires a very long time period. Therefore a major criticism of Demastes and 
Good (1993) is the relatively brief period (one semester) in which the process of 
conceptual change was studied.
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The final study building on the work of Bishop and Anderson is that of Jensen 
and Finley (1993). Using the Bishop and Anderson (1990) testing instrument, these 
authors described and evaluated a new method of teaching the mechanism of 
evolutionary change. Termed an intervention, the authors devised instruction that 
recapitulated the events in the development of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural 
selection. While the instruction was not found to be very effective, the authors suggest 
that their instruction should have included events even earlier than Lamarck's ideas of 
evolution. Instead, Jensen and Finely argue, students' conceptions are more closely 
related to the work of Cuvier and Paley than the relatively sophisticated conceptions of 
Lamarck. A major source of criticism of this work and its interpretations involves the 
brief period of instruction and evaluation. Instruction for Jensen and Finely (1993) 
involved only one, two-hour laboratory period. The students' conception were evaluated 
with a pre- and posttest instrument administered over a three week time frame. The work 
of Jimenez suggests that this procedure introduces a very serious flaw into the work of 
Jensen and Finley (1993).
Informed by both the previous descriptions o f alternative conceptions of 
evolution and the importance of reasoning ability within a specific content, Jimenez 
(1992) investigated the conditions necessary to promote conceptual change in evolution 
within the secondary school science classroom. She compared instruction which 
emphasized students' conceptions (the traditional group) with instruction which linked 
students' conceptions with Darwinian and Lamarckian interpretations (the experimental 
group).
Jimenez (1992) described many students' conceptions as relying on need. While 
the results of the groups did not vary on tests of declarative knowledge, students in the 
experimental group better differentiated between historical Darwinian and Lamarckian 
interpretations. Results from posttests administered one year after instruction 
demonstrated that students in the experimental group performed better on questions of
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declarative knowledge and on questions requiring application o f knowledge to a 
situation. For this study, Jimenez (1992) explained that explicit discussion of alternative 
conceptions and theories used in school science are necessary to augment conceptual 
change. Students need to be able to recognize differing interpretations of the same 
phenomenon in order to select the most plausible and fruitful conception.
Summary
The theory of conceptual change as proposed by Posner et al. (1982) has been 
demonstrated to be an intelligible one when applied to the construction o f a scientific 
conception of evolution. It has been shown to be mildly effective as a theoretical base 
for instruction. This limited effectiveness may be more indicative of the nature of 
alternative conceptions in evolution than a reflection of the utility of the theory. Its 
application to this content area is in need for further exploration, as the results found in 
this area may be instructive for many other core concepts of the sciences.
The research base which joined conceptual change theory with evolution 
education played the greatest role in shaping my theoretical base, research questions, 
methods, study duration and goals. The findings of Bishop and Anderson (1990) 
revealed the usefulness of the conceptual change theory as it is applied to the process of 
learning evolution. At the same time, however, the questions left unanswered by their 
study shaped the initial focus of my work. Jimenez's (1992) work made clear the 
expanded time frame required by investigations into conceptual change. Finally, while 
so much is revealed by these studies, there was a need to unify these findings. But such 
a study would require not only a longitudinal time frame, but also a very intensive focus, 
thus necessitating a limited number of participants. My research is an attempt to fill each 
of these requirements.
The Interaction o f Conceptions o f Evolution, Reasoning Ability, and Students' Belief
Systems
Several researchers have attempted to isolate relationships between students' 
conceptual frameworks in evolution with other aspects of their intellectual lives. Most 
prominent in this vein is the work which attempts to correlate students' understanding to 
students' ability to reason. In one o f the first such studies, Lawson and Thompson 
(1988) worked with a group of seventh grade students and determined that their 
nonscientific beliefs were significantly correlated to reasoning skill. All naive students, 
despite reasoning ability, tended to adopt a theory of acquired characteristics. However, 
nonscientific beliefs of natural selection occurred more frequently in the students with 
poor reasoning ability after instruction. Lawson and Thompson (1988) explained that 
the students with poor reasoning ability did not reject nonscientific beliefs after 
instruction because they lacked skill with reasoning patterns necessary to do so.
Students in the study were capable of using both scientific and alternative conceptions, 
the latter when phenomena were subtle, and the former when phenomena were explicit. 
Less skilled reasoners were said to retain nonscientific beliefs, such as a Lamarckian 
understanding of evolution, because they failed to examine alternatives and failed to fully 
comprehend conflicting evidence.
Lawson's and W eser's (1990) study of university students, while supporting the 
importance of reasoning ability, also included one of the most extensive analyses of 
nonscientific beliefs about life. The nonscientific beliefs examined included special 
creation, orthogenesis, presence of a soul, constitutive nonreductionism, vitalism, 
teleology, and nonemergentism. Lawson and Weser (1990) concluded that less skilled 
reasoners, as measured by the Classroom Test of Scientific Reasoning (Lawson, 1987), 
were more likely to hold nonscientific beliefs about life during the pretest, and showed 
the least modification during instruction. These less skilled reasoners were also 
described as being more likely to be only loosely committed to their belief structure.
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The greatest significance of this study lies in the description of the students 
nonscientific beliefs about life. Approximately 40% of the students expressed an initial 
belief in evolution; belief in evolution was shown to increase during instruction. Thirty 
percent of the students at the outset agreed with conceptions of orthogenesis, 70-80% 
with vitalism, and 25% with a teleological expression. The course moved some students 
away from vitalism, making the students more mechanistic, but moved them toward 
orthogenesis.
A similar study was undertaken by Lawson and Worsnop (1992) with a group of 
high school biology students. The authors found that reflective reasoning skills were 
significantly related to initial scientific beliefs and to gains in declarative knowledge, but 
not to changes in beliefs. Prior declarative knowledge was not found to be associated 
with gains in declarative knowledge. Finally, the strength of religious commitment was 
negatively correlated with initial belief in evolution and with change in belief toward 
evolution. The instruction did not result in a group-wide shift toward a belief in 
evolution. The authors state that reflective reasoning skills operate in the "acquisition of 
domain specific knowledge" and that knowledge determines what one believes (p. 165).
This study is vulnerable to the same criticisms as those by Lawson and 
Thompson (1988) and Lawson and Weser (1990) because of the use of the Classroom 
Test of Scientific Reasoning (Lawson, 1987) to assess reasoning ability. With this test, 
learners who were labeled reflective reasoners used hypothetico-deductive reasoning to 
answer questions from a variety of contexts. These reasoning abilities are understood to 
operate in the same manner, regardless of the content. This assumption has failed to 
withstand investigation (Linn, Clement, & Pulos, 1983), and content is now a central 
issue in science education research (Linn, 1987). Because of the difficulties in assessing 
content-bound reasoning abilities, my present study does not include the issue of a 
student's reasoning skills in the construction of a conceptual framework for evolution. 
However, the work by Lawson and Worsnop (1992) does provide some insight into the
27
strength and importance of the students' belief structures in their understanding of 
evolution which was used to design my present research.
In an effort to refine earlier research in student reasoning, Cummins, Good, 
Demastes, and Peebles (in press) analyzed student reasoning in a specific content area: 
island biogeography. In interpretation of ambiguous biological data, students included 
variables of size, distance, and food availability as determining factors for the number of 
species found on various islands. Students in a twelfth grade class used the evolutionary 
concepts of adaptation, extinction, and speciation as much or more than students in a 
ninth grade class or students in a college zoology class. Students in the twelfth grade 
class used the concept of speciation as a variable far more extensively than the previous 
two groups by integrating their understanding of evolution in their evaluation of the 
evidence. This use of evolution as a variable is striking when one considers that the 
teacher of the twelfth grade class emphasized evolution throughout the year. From this, 
Cummins et al. (in press) concluded that reasoning within a biological content is 
improved by an increase in biological knowledge. Reasoning within the content area of 
evolution was found to be enhanced by biological instruction which used evolution as an 
organizing theme.
In an investigation of the relationship between students' use of scientific 
conceptions and their belief systems, Eve and Dunn (1990) found high levels of 
nonscientific and pseudoscientific beliefs in their study of high school biology and life 
science teachers. Like the works cited earlier, (Lawson & Thompson, 1988; Lawson & 
Weser, 1990), the authors explained this adherence to pseudoscientific beliefs, not based 
on religious or regional factors, but based on poor scientific reasoning abilities.
Similarly, Eve and Harrold (1986) suggested that acceptance of pseudoscience occurs in 
individuals with limited abilities to examine evidence and generate hypotheses. This 
study found no statistical relationship between a student's use of a creationist explanation 
of biological diversity and the student's gender, parental level of education, or
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rural/urban background. They did however find a strong relationship between religious 
conservatism and creationist belief. Both studies, while informative in providing a 
description of extrascientific belief structure, did not measure reasoning skills in this 
content area. Therefore, the authors association o f reasoning ability to acceptance of 
evolution can be no more than speculation.
Grose and Simpson (1982) investigated the relationship of several variables with 
university students' attitudes toward evolution. They found that 54% believed in 
evolution, while 19% did not, and 22% were neutral toward the theory. Females scored 
significantly higher on a scale measuring attitudes toward evolution, with a significant 
interaction between gender, the influence of the high school biology teacher, and attitude 
toward evolution. This interaction was due to the influence of the teachers on the female 
students. The influence of the church was correlated inversely with attitude toward 
evolution, but there was no correlation between denominations and students' attitudes 
toward evolution. The biology majors did not score significantly higher than nonbiology 
majors. Because this was the first biology course for 80% of the college students, these 
results suggest that the students' attitudes toward evolution were formed prior to entering 
this course.
The interaction of students' ability to reason and their construction of a scientific 
conception of evolution has been the focus of many studies. Researchers in this area 
report that students who are better reasoners are more apt to hold a scientific conception 
in this area. Their conclusions should be considered, yet further studies in which 
reasoning is considered in the content area of evolution, or even biology, are required for 
a better understanding of this interaction.
Interactions of Students' Conceptions of Evolution 
and the Nature of Science
Because of the volatile nature of the subject of evolution in American society, 
many educators explain that the most appropriate means of introducing this topic is
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through an understanding of the nature of science (Nelson, 1986; Scott, 1987). This 
position acknowledges the emotional concerns of instruction. Such a justification goes 
far in breaking the artificial dichotomy between cognitive and affective domains in 
learning.
In an Australian study of students' conceptions o f the nature of science (Barnett, 
Brown, & Caton, 1983), a set of questions concerning evolution and the philosophy of 
biology were given to third and fourth year undergraduates and graduate students. 
Although all students were passing their biology courses, each performed poorly on 
written, open-ended tests. These students had a very poor, uncritical understanding of 
evolution; two thirds accepted natural selection uncritically, meaning they did not analyze 
the value of the knowledge claims supporting this theory. Other findings demonstrated 
that these students had a very poor understanding of biology as a science. A majority of 
the students understood physics and biology to be basically similar sciences, with half of 
the students explaining that all biological events could be reduced to physical science 
(Barnett et al., 1983).
Through the use o f survey responses, Johnson and Peeples (1987) examined the 
relationships of students' understandings of the nature of science and their acceptance of 
evolution. The responses demonstrated that biology students had a weak understanding 
of the nature of science and were neutral in their acceptance of evolution as a valid 
scientific theory. Acceptance of evolution was found to be significantly related to 
understanding the nature of science. Understandings of the nature of science were poor, 
but did improve with grade level. The authors suggested that a comparison of the scope, 
nature, and goals of science would aid the student in discriminating between science and 
pseudoscience.
The work of Scharmann and Harris (1992) represents an effort to examine the 
effects of a diversified instructional strategy on teachers' understandings of evolution and 
the nature of science, as well as their attitudes toward evolution. The instructional
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strategy tested was one that incorporated foundational content/context, allowed for 
student discussion, resolved conflicts arising in those discussions, and required a 
reflective summary of the course. The group involved in this instruction showed a 
significant increase in both their understanding of evolution and the applied nature of 
science. This was accompanied with an increased acceptance of evolutionary theory by 
the participants.
Scharmann and Harris (1992) confirms the earlier suggestion o f Johnson and 
Peeples (1987) that an understanding of evolution can be associated with an 
understanding of the nature of science. However, the relationship of attitudes to 
achievement is still very unclear. The ability to differentiate between scientific ways of 
knowing and those of other realms may allow the student to relate knowledge of 
evolution to their belief framework, but this may not serve to lessen the difficulties 
students have constructing an scientific understanding in this area. Because of the 
emphasis I placed on understanding the action of the learner's conceptual ecology on the 
process of conceptual change, a large part of my study concentrated on the relationships 
between a learner's belief and academic understanding.
Complicating Factors in Descriptions of Students' Understandings
A great deal of the research carried out in the description of students' 
understandings relies heavily on written or verbal explanation of evolutionary 
occurrences. This trend may be in response to both the complicated nature of research 
into conceptual frameworks and the intricate nature of evolutionary thought. Such 
information is rich in detail and perhaps is a more effective way of providing an accurate 
description; however, such methods are not without their drawbacks. One such 
drawback lies in the nature of the discipline of biology. Biology is a science that requires 
multiple layers of explanation to identify causes. Proximal causes are those that occur 
during the life span of the organism and do not produce a change in genetic information.
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Ultimate causes are those which do effect the genetic information of the species (Mayr, 
1961, 1988).
Cummins and Remsen (1992) stated that university students have very little 
experience differentiating between proximal and ultimate levels of causation, and often 
the students view these explanations as being competing hypotheses. Explanations of 
proximate causes are much more frequent in students' explanations. Why? Biology is 
unique among the sciences in having multiple levels o f causality (Mayr, 1961, 1988). 
Even within biology, courses that stress biochemistry, cell structure, and physiology 
often deal only with proximal causality. Because of the thrust of much of their biology 
coursework and their experiences in other sciences, students have little or no experience 
with multiple levels of causality. In this situation, a student may answer a problem with 
a familiar proximate cause without considering the ultimate causality inherent in the 
problem. Work by Hauslein, Good, and Cummins (1992) determined that college 
students and teachers are less able to switch between levels of causality than scientists. 
Future research must be sensitive to this situation and probe farther to determine if the 
student has a poor understanding o f evolution or if the student fails to recognize the 
necessity of responding to each of the levels of causality.
CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
Rationale for Research Methods
The research questions should guide the choice of methods used in their 
investigation. The goals of my research included describing the process of students' 
conceptual change and achieving an understanding o f how students come to understand 
evolution. These goals required that an ideographic approach be used. Such an 
approach involves the exploration of students' conceptual frameworks on their own 
terms and not in terms of their congruence with some predetermined standard (Driver & 
Easley, 1978). Additionally, a portion of my research was an investigation of the effects 
of context (social and cultural) on the development of students' knowledge. Clearly 
some form of interpretive research, focusing on complexity and context, was required 
for this investigation. The holistic approach afforded by qualitative methods offered a 
more probable opportunity of achieving an understanding of conceptual frameworks of 
evolution than the reductionism made necessary by quantitative methods.
Researcher
Because of my qualitative approach, researcher bias becomes an important factor 
in consideration of the study. My biases shaped many aspects of this study including the 
actual selection of the study content, the scope of the research questions and methods, 
and data analysis.
Biological Bias
My earlier graduate training was in the study of physiology at Auburn 
University. While this previous study may be considered far displaced from the 
consideration of evolution, Auburn's undergraduate and graduate courses in zoology 
were often oriented around the theoretical framework of evolution. Additionally, while 
an undergraduate and master's student, I was required to take separate courses in this 
area. These courses and my major professor shaped the selection of
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my master's thesis, which was a physiological ecology problem, one that investigated 
the evolutionary and ecological significance of various physiological adaptations.
Given this earlier training and my subsequent teaching experience on the post 
secondary level, it is not surprising that I selected to study students' conceptual 
frameworks in evolution. These experiences also shaped the manner in which I 
approached this problem. While I had taught previously, I had not studied teaching. 
Therefore, the process of learning was the focus for my study and teaching was included 
only as it affected learning.
Most notably, this earlier training also shaped the manner in which I approached 
the topic of evolution. At the outset of the study, I considered the conceptual framework 
of evolution to primarily include evolutionary mechanisms. I consider the mechanisms 
of evolution to include the biological processes of natural selection, genetic drift, non- 
random mating, and other similar theoretical constructs. My training as a biologist 
ensured this approach. Secondary to the mechanisms, I considered the products of 
evolutionary processes to also be included in this framework. These products include 
biological adaptations, speciation patterns, and fossil records. My bias is shared by the 
Biological Science Curriculum Study, as shown in their definition of the knowledge 
required for biological literacy. In their list of "essential biological knowledge," BSCS 
(1992, p. 3) lists evolution, including genetic variation, natural selection, and patterns of 
evolution as the components of evolutionary knowledge required to become biological 
literate.
I entered my study using this scientific, mechanistic approach to the theory of 
evolution. However, my definitions for this theoretical construct expanded dramatically 
during the course of the study. The concept map interviews introduced me to the varied 
connections that are possible when the theory of evolution is approached with other than 
a scientific orientation. The student participants illustrated how their conceptions of
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evolution interacted with other conceptions of human evolution, evidence for evolution, 
and the historical development of the theory.
Educational Bias
When my research questions and research methods are compared, a tension 
becomes obvious. While I proposed to use grounded theory to develop my findings, I 
also proposed to investigate the boundaries of the conceptual change theory (Posner et 
al., 1982). How can one use grounded theory when a theoretical commitment has 
already been established? My position within this debate is informed by Kuhn (1970) 
and Toulmin (1972). These philosophers of science have described the actions of a 
researcher's bias on the theories she selects. Even without the articulated bias of the 
conceptual change theory, I would approach the issue of learning from some theoretical 
framework. After all, theories allow us to make sense of the world. It is my position 
that it is far more illuminating to approach a study with firmly articulated biases; thus the 
actions of these biases can then be understood by the researcher as well as the reader. 
Additionally, I have not accepted and applied the conceptual change theory (Posner et al., 
1982) uncritically. Instead, one of my research questions is to investigate the use and 
limits of this theory. While the tension between grounded theory and my theoretical 
background remains, my study represents a negotiation between these two extremes.
The Setting
My study took place in the University Laboratory School during the 1992-1993 
school year. While the school is described in much more detail in Chapter 4, aspects of 
my selection require further discussion. The selection of this school as a site for the 
study has drawbacks. One could argue that I investigated conceptual change in a very 
narrow segment of the population. The students attending this school cannot be 
considered to be representative of the population of the public schools in our area due to 
the requirement for both tuition and transportation. However, previous research 
indicates that conceptual change seldom occurs during instruction on evolution (Bishop
35
& Anderson, 1990; Brumby, 1984; Deadman & Kelly, 1978). My selection of a 
research site was deliberate, based on the uniqueness of the instructor, the students, and 
the curriculum of the class. This class was selected because it provided the best 
opportunity to document conceptual change.
Participants
Many different terms have been used to designate the persons involved in 
research. The choice of terms is important in that it signifies the researcher's intent in the 
study and her relationship with the persons involved. Interviewee implies a passive role 
for the participants. Subject has been selected by many researchers to avoid this 
connotation (Patai, 1987); however, subject implies a structured hierarchy in the 
researcher-researched relationship. The anthropological informant has many 
commonplace negative connotations. Therefore I have chosen participant to reflect the 
active position the teacher and students will have as they simultaneously participate in 
and shape the research. Seidman (1991) suggests that this term signifies an active 
involvement which occurs in extended interviewing and a sense of equity in the 
researcher-participant relationship.
Previous research into students' conceptual frameworks of evolution in which I 
have been involved was carried out with a group of college nonbiology majors. This 
choice was made because of my attempt to replicate the earlier work of Bishop and 
Anderson (1990). However, use of this group for this research is problematic. On a 
practical level, it would be difficult to work with a select group of college students 
throughout the semester as the attrition rate in these classes is considerable. More 
importantly, my previous research describes a student population whose conceptual 
frameworks of evolution have remained relatively unchanged during instruction, similar 
to the results of Bishop and Anderson (1990). Therefore, I could not be assured of 
identification of conceptual change working with this group. For this study, the focus of 
my research was a group o f high school students, their parents, and their teacher.
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The Teacher
My research was conducted in Ms. Hurston's Biology II class. The decision to 
work with this group is based upon the characteristics of its teacher: (a) she has been 
involved in past biology education research (Cummins et al., in press); (b) she is a 
national award winning teacher who is active in the National Association of Biology 
Teachers as well as the Louisiana Biology Educators Association; (c) she uses evolution 
as the unifying theme of her biology classes and realizes the implications and benefits of 
such an approach (Dobzhansky, 1973); and (d) she attended a workshop at Louisiana 
State University during June, 1992 which dealt with the teaching of evolution.
In this Biology II course, evolution was taught both as a distinct unit and 
integrated throughout the course. (See Chapter 5 for a description o f the course 
curriculum.) This is not an advanced placement biology class, but is considered by the 
teacher to be a capstone class which integrates the knowledge from many of the sciences 
as suggested by the National Research Council (1990). The students in this class 
typically were eleventh and twelfth graders who selected this class as an elective. The 
work of Cummins et al. (in press) reports that past students in Hurston's classes were 
capable of using evolution as an explanation of ambiguous biological evidence. Based 
on the results of this past study and the characteristics of this teacher, I felt it was likely 
that 1 would be able to document conceptual change within selected students in her 
classroom.
The Students
The selection of interview participants always introduces the element of self­
selection as these individuals must be willing to participate in the study (Bogdan & 
Biklen, 1992). The selection of individuals was based on principles of purposeful 
sampling in which maximum variation was sought (Patton, 1989). During the first 
month of observations, the instructor and I were involved in assessing the maximum 
range of individuals who constituted the class. However, we were purposefully
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sampling for five students we felt would undergo conceptual change. This sampling 
technique served to limit my findings and this limitation will be further discussed in 
Chapter 6 and 7. Based on Hurston's and my assessment, I invited nine selected 
students to participate in the more in-depth aspects of the study. The assessment of the 
maximum range of students included factors such as gender, family background, 
educational background, religious beliefs, and familiarity with biology. While much of 
this information was known by Hurston, I also administered a science relationship 
questionnaire during the first week of my observations in order to elicit additional 
information needed for this decision. (See Appendix A.)
While nine students were selected to discuss their possible involvement in the 
study, only five had schedules which allowed their participation. Of these original five, 
three were girls and two were boys. The initial interview sessions were conducted very 
informally and held at any time the students found to be convenient. Later interviews 
were conducted at an established time during the school week. Unfortunately, after 
interviews had proceeded for over a month and a half, one of the male participants 
withdrew from the study. His stated reason for withdrawal was due to the 
inconvenience of the interview schedule. However, my own assessment was that he had 
begun to find the interviews tiresome. Another participant was not selected to take this 
position because of the time already elapsed. Therefore, I will report the data for four 
interview participants. ̂
1 While the fifth interview participant (Joe) contributed a great deal of data during 
our working relationship, it is my judgment that little of this data was useful in 
answering my initial research questions regarding conceptual change. Our interviews 
seldom touched on my research topics and instead remained steadfastly focused on the 
social aspects of student life at U High. Use of Joe's data, while illuminating in some 




As a means of attaining a more defined understanding of the students' lives as the 
context for their conceptual frameworks, I interviewed the parents of the four students 
participating in the in-depth interviews. Information provided by the parents during our 
discussion conducted in March of 1993 provided valuable insight into how the students' 
conceptions, personalities, and their attitudes toward science have been affected by their 
families. The high school principal and high school counselor also participated in one 
open-ended interviews. These hour-long interviews were informal, and were conducted 
at a time and place at the participants' convenience.
Gaining Access
My first approach to gaining access into the classroom was through the 
instructor. We were previously acquainted through graduate classes and joint 
involvement in research. We had meetings in the spring before the beginning of the 
school year in which I expressed my interests, and we discussed tentative plans for the 
research. After gaining her consent, I approached the principal o f the laboratory school 
in the summer before the research to gain administrative approval. This approval 
required my completion of a research request form and submission of my research 
proposal, each returned to the principal of the school.
Sources of Data
Patton (1989) argues that having multiple sources of data is one of the intrinsic 
characteristics of qualitative research. White and Gunstone (1992) discuss the limited 
understanding resulting from only one means of probing into students' conceptual 
frameworks. Wandersee et al. (in press) and Brumby (1984) explain that much of the 
previous work done in the area of students' conceptions has relied solely on paper and 
pencil tests which may produce a very slanted picture of the students' understanding of 
science topics. To counter the problems of previous research in this area and to provide 
adequate means of triangulating the data, I employed multiple sources of data for each of
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the four participants. While interviews were the predominant method of data collection, 
these were augmented and shaped by participant observation within the classroom and 
collection of artifacts.
Classroom Observations
A portion of my study included observations of daily class activities of the entire 
group throughout the year. My position in the classes and in the school was a 
participant-observer. As discussed by Bogdan and Biklen (1992), this role is actually a 
fluid continuum. This was also true in my study as my role as a participant observer 
represented a constant balance between participation and observation. In some instances 
I acted as a teacher. On two occasions when Ms. Hurston had to be away from the 
classroom I was responsible for the class. I also presented two lessons, one on concept 
mapping and another on speciation patterns. During laboratories students would 
approach me for help when Hurston was otherwise engaged. I escorted students on field 
trips and acted as an adult chaperon. I also acted as a student participant as the students 
whispered humorous comments to me during or after class and during the laboratories 
when I participated alongside students in their small groups.
The other side of the continuum was the complete observer. This typified my 
early observations in the classroom as I watched quietly from the back of the classroom 
while taking constant notes. A t all times I strove to be nonjudgmental and 
nonauthoritarian except in cases when the class was left expressly within my control. 
However, it must be noted that even my most detached observations affected the 
participants' behaviors. Often I knew students were making comments deliberately so 
that I would hear them. Throughout the study, I was a source of interest to the students 
as they asked me questions, looked over my notes for that week, and watched to see 
what I would choose to write about.
I observed the class for the entire year for a variety of reasons. The first is that I 
felt I needed lengthy observations to allow the establishment of a comfortable rapport
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with the students needed for successful in-depth interviewing. Observations limited to 
only the teaching of evolution could have distanced me from the students to such a 
degree that they could not become comfortable during our interviews. By mid-year, I 
felt I had established a comfortable relationship with almost every member of the class. 
Students often made efforts to talk to me before, during, and after classes. These 
students would bring to my attention things they thought I would be interested in, both 
on a personal and research level.
In addition to the rapport established, understandings gained from the participant 
observations were needed to answer research questions such as a description of the 
activities which catalyze conceptual change and the degree of compartmentalization of 
students' biological knowledge. My observations in the classroom also shaped the 
selection of the students to participate in the interview, the content of the interviews, and 
selection of artifacts for analysis.
Interviews
Interviewing was the most important means of data collection used in my study. 
West and Pines (1985) describe interviews as one of the best approaches to use in 
discovering students' conceptions. Seventeen interviews were conducted with each of 
the four student participants. These numerous interviews were essential to the research 
in that they allowed me the opportunity to describe and then verify and clarify my 
descriptions of the students' understandings (Hutchinson, 1990).
The interviews conducted ranged from very structured to very open-ended, a 
selection dictated by the specific content in question. Typically, interviews begin in a 
very open-ended manner, with later sessions becoming more structured as the researcher 
develops more specific questions from the data (Seidman, 1991). However, I conducted 
interviews reminded of the suggestion of Lythcott and Duschl (1990) that the key to all 
successful interviews is providing the participant as much freedom of expression as 
possible.
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The open-ended interviews allowed me the opportunity to understand how 
students negotiate meaning in the area of evolution. This is a very contextual, specific 
understanding. The structured interviews allowed the opportunity to develop 
descriptions of students’ conceptual frameworks with great mode validity; that is, the 
descriptions generated are a reflection of many modes of investigation (White & 
Gunstone, 1992). Additionally, these structured interviews provided an opportunity to 
gather comparable data ffom all the students to allow comparison across individuals. 
Thus, both types of interviews were integral to the goals of my research. (See Figure 2 
for a time line of the student participant interviews.)
The instructor, the four students, the parents of these four students, the high 
school principal, and high school counselor were interviewed. Interviews with the 
individual students occurred about once a week, during a pre-established period within 
the school day. Their lengths varied from as short as 20 minutes to as long as 45 
minutes per session. The interviews with the teacher were conducted opportunistically 
throughout the course of the study. The parents were interviewed once toward the end 
of the study. The principal and counselor were interviewed one time during the initial 
months o f research. Insight from informal discussions with other students in the class, 
the student teacher, and other science education teachers were also used to provide 
another dimension to the description of the teacher observed in this study.
Open-Ended Interviews
For the open-ended interviews, I used an interview guide for reference and 
prompting, although I never strictly adhered to these guides (See Appendix B for specific 
questions.) As suggested by Seidman (1991) the initial questions in the open-ended 
interviews were very broad, and later questions narrowed as I attempted to describe and 
verify the participants' conceptions. The research areas explored during open-ended 
interviews ranged from areas as diverse as students' personal characteristics, attitudes 
toward religion, and ideas of schooling, to the more science oriented such as conceptions
42
of mutations, species, and patterns of evolution and students' attitudes toward 
pseudosciences. (See Table 1 for a list of open-ended interview topics and Appendix B- 
1 for a sample of interview questions.)
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Figure 2
Timeline of the student interviews and the interviews used for the three conceptual
frameworks
Table 1
Subject of open ended interview sessions with student interview
participants
In te rv iew  Sym bol S u b je c t
1-1 School: Personal Information: Teaching
1-2 Evolution: Mutation: Science/Biology




1-7 Holidays: Religion: Family Habits
1-8 Biology: Evolution as a Biological Theory: 
Evidence for Evolution: Application for 
Evolution
1-9 Age of Earth: Successful Species: Comparison 
of Species: Predictability of Evolution
I-10 Natural Selection
1-11 Boundaries of Science, Religion, Philosophy
1-12 Biblical Interpretation
1-13 Species: Understanding of Evolution
1-14 Adaptation: Mutation
1-15 Personal Characteristics: View of Research 
Process




The open-ended interviews with the parents of the four student participants were 
conducted to better understand the family context o f the students. Questions asked of the 
parents were selected to elicit their attitudes toward school and science. These interviews 
were conducted towards the end of the study, after I had a well defined description of the 
participant. Then, the parental interviews were used to verify and clarify my 
conceptions. (See Appendix B-2 for a sample of the parental interview questions.)
An open-ended interview with the school principal and counselor were conducted 
to better understand the school's impact on the activities of the classroom and the types 
of knowledge valued by the administration. The issues included (a) administration 
standards, (b) the school's student body, (c) college trajectory of students, (d) parental 
involvement, (e) curricular issues, and (f) her/his views toward science education. (See 
Appendix B-3 for a sample of the principal and counselor interview questions.) 
Structured Interviews
Each of the four students participating in the interviews was involved in 
structured interviews similar to the clinical interviews discussed by Lythcott and Duschl 
(1990). Structured around the student's explanation or production of a graphic, these 
interviews were planned to enhance the description of the student's conceptual 
framework of evolution and to document and describe instances of conceptual change. 
Because understanding is too complex to be adequately described using any one 
technique, a variety of techniques were used to probe students' understandings (White & 
Gunstone, 1992). A list of the types of structured interviews and the subject of those 
interviews can be found in Table 2.
Concept mapping
The most valuable set of structured interviews involved the use of concept maps. 
Concept maps were used to allow the student to express her/his understanding of 
evolution before, during, and after instruction. Concept mapping was particularly useful 
for this study in that its use went beyond the expression o f information and allowed the
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students to express their knowledge, which Wandersee (1989, p. 6) describes as an 
"organized body of meaningful concepts which is a product of inquiry."
Table 2
Subjects and types of structured interview sessions with student interview participants
In terv iew  T ype S u b je c t S y m b o l
Concept Map Understanding of Evolution CM-1
Concept Map Process of Evolution CM-2
Concept Map Process of Evolution-Seed Terms CM-3
Interviews about Instances Biological Natural History-Recent IAI-1
Interview about Instances Evolutionary Patterns: Speciation LAI-2
Interview About Instances Patterns of Evolutionary Changes IAI-3
Prediction Interview Mutation PI-1
Prediction Interview Genetics PI-2
Sorting Task Process of Evolution ST
Word Sort Description of Evolution WS
Drawing Natural History D
Bishop and Anderson Test 
(1985) Process of Evolution T
Concept maps are the schematic representation of concepts situated in a 
framework of propositions (Novak & Gowin, 1984). The graphic representation of a 
concept map is based on a hierarchy of related concepts linked by propositions which 
articulate the concepts' relationships. While this tool is a powerful way for students to 
negotiate meaning, it also can be used to externalize the student’s thinking. Novak 
(1990) explains that concept mapping is a very sensitive means of measuring changes in 
a student's knowledge structure. The combination of clinical interviews with concept 
maps is a versatile and useful investigative technique into conceptual change (Wallace & 
Mintzes, 1990). My selection of concept maps as an assessment tool was based on this 
strength.
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The maps do not represent knowledge linearly which would limit expression to 
the logical structure of the knowledge. Instead, concept maps are organized 
hierarchically and ideally fan out in a web-like fashion. Thus, concept mapping reflects 
the psychological structure of the knowledge (Wandersee, 1990). It is this characteristic 
that provides its power of expression.
Concept mapping is effective in displaying the student's understanding of the 
relation between the concepts of a wider discipline by focusing on structure and linkages 
etween concepts. This technique is also valuable in that it avoids much of the confusing 
effects o f students' differing vocabulary and writing styles (Novak & Gowin, 1984).
The students in the biology class were involved in concept mapping early in the year 
when a science education researcher, Jim Wandersee, presented a lesson on concept 
mapping. Two additional day s were used for students to practice this technique under 
my direction. Although this teaching tool was not heavily used by the teacher, Ms. 
Hurston, each of my four interview participants indicated that they had used this study 
technique in many of their previous science classes.
In my original proposal, I had suggested that the first mapping session would be 
used to allow students to use any terms they felt were appropriate in mapping their 
understanding of evolution. In subsequent mapping sessions, I proposed the use o f five 
seed terms dealing with the concept of evolution with the students adding any additional 
concepts to their map (Trowbridge & Wandersee, in press). The five seed concepts to be 
included in the later interviews were (a) evolution, (b) natural selection, (c) population, 
(d) change, and (e) mutation. Seed terms were used to insure a common basis for the 
maps which were useful in comparing understandings over the course o f the year and 
comparing different students' understandings. Asking students to add their own terms 
also served to add to concept mapping's inherent ability to allow for variation in the 
expression o f students' knowledge.
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Thus, originally I proposed to have three maps from each student over the course 
of the study. However, as is the case with qualitative work, my participants changed my 
original plans. In my first concept mapping interview, I asked the participants to map 
their "understanding of evolution." (This type of concept map was given the research 
symbol CM-1.) After looking at these maps, I noticed that one of my participants 
mapped the historical development o f the theory and its anthropological considerations. 
This map was far different from those of the other three participants and also radically 
different from the mechanistically oriented map I would draw. Based on this result, the 
next week I asked the students to map "your understanding for how evolution works." 
(This type of concept map was given the research symbol C M -2.) Additionally during 
mid-year, I asked the students to construct a third type of map given the use of the five 
seed terms. (This type of map was given the research symbol CM-3.) After completing 
the map, the student was asked to explain her/his maps.
Students were asked to construct CM-1 at the beginning and close of the study. 
They were asked to construct CM-2 at three times in the study- at the beginning, the mid­
point, and end. Finally, the seed term map, CM-3, was used only once during the mid­
point of the study. Thus, I used a total of six maps for each student. (See Table 3 for a 
summary of the interview schedule and the research tools used.) (See Appendix C-l for 
a sample of the interview questions used in the structured interviews.)
Interviews about instances
In the second type of structured interview, the students were presented a series of 
pictures and asked questions. Such a technique is referred to by White and Gunstone 
(1992) as an interview about instances. This technique was useful in providing a 
description of the student's ability to recognize or use a concept and has also been helpful 




Schedule of data collection and type of interview method
Interview Session Date Type of Data Collection Used
1 10/6/93 1-1
2 10/13/93 1-2: T
3 10/20/93 1-3: CM-1
4 10/27/93 1-4: CM-2: ST
5 11/3/93 1-5: LA.I-1
6 11/10/93 1-6: IAI-1
7 11/17/93 1-7: PI-2
8 12/2/93 1-8
9 1/12/93 1-9: LAI-2
10 1/19/93 I-10: LAI-3: D
11 5/6/04 I-11:
12 2/2/93 1-12: CM-2: CM-3: ST:
13 2/9/93 1-13: WS: PI-1
14 3/16/93 1-14: LAI-1: PI-1:
15 4/6/93 1-15
16 4/22/93 1-16: CM-1: ST: PI-1:
17 4/29/93 1-17: T: CM-2
Specific areas investigated with this technique included (a) the use of typological 
species concepts, (b) the meanings students assign biological adaptation, (c) their 
understandings of phylogeny, (d) their use of anthropomorphic and teleological 
conceptions of evolution, (e) their species concept, and (f) their conceptions of the 
patterns of evolutionary change. The situations presented to the students in this aspect of 
the study were, in part, suggested by Clough and Wood-Robinson (1985b) in their study
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of children's understandings o f biological adaptations. Students' application of 
evolution to explain some of these phenomena was often used to measure the 
participants' comfort with this theory. (See Appendix C-2 for a description of the 
graphics and a sample of the interview protocol.)
Prediction interviews
A third type of structured interview, prediction interviews, assessed students' 
abilities to predict the outcome of an inheritance event (PI-2) (similar to the work of 
Kargbo et al., 1980) and a mutation event (PI-1). White and Gunstone (1992) explain 
that this technique is more direct than other structured interviews in revealing 
understanding, because it distinguishes between rote and meaningful learning while 
assessing the student's ability to apply the concept. A similar exercise was used by 
Franklin (1992) in his investigation of students' understanding of electricity. However, 
he administered this exercise in a written format, with the students selecting the most 
appropriate answer and justification for that answer.
In this interview, the student was presented with a graphic and an explanation of 
a situation. The student was then asked to form a prediction of the outcome and provide 
a written and then verbal explanation of the prediction. Much of the value of this 
technique was found in the student's explanations of their prediction. The student was 
shown a graphic detailing the outcome of the event and asked to describe what she/he 
saw and to verbally reconcile this outcome with the prediction. This technique had the 
added advantage of making obvious the effects o f theories and beliefs on the student's 
observations of the graphics. (See Appendix C-3 for the graphics used in the prediction 
interviews and a sample of the interview questions.)
Sorting interview
In this fourth form of structured interview, the student was shown a series of 
graphics which displayed the various occurrences in an evolutionary event driven by 
natural selection. The student was then asked to sort these cards in any order that
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expressed her/his understanding of the evolutionary process by using the think aloud 
technique (Smith, 1983). This interview was repeated at the beginning, middle, and end 
of the school year in an attempt to assess conceptual frameworks and to describe 
instances of change. This technique had the advantage of allowing me to investigate 
instances of anthropomorphic and teleological explanations formed by the participant as 
well as investigating the factors the student viewed as necessary for evolution driven by 
natural selection. (See Appendix C-4 for the graphics used in the sorting task as well as 
a sample of the interview protocol.)
Word sort interview
This technique is a derivation of a method used by Hauslein et al. (1992). For 
this structured interview, the participants were presented with a series of eight terms. 
These included: design, drastic, success, need, random, chance, subtle, and order. The 
students were then asked to sort the terms into two groups: terms which could be used 
to describe evolution and terms which could not be used to describe evolution. As with 
all the structured interviews, the participants were encouraged to think aloud as they 
worked. In a derivation from Hauslein et al. (1992), the transcripts from the think 
aloud, and not the actual sorted groups themselves, formed the data for this interview. 
As described in Hauslein et al. (1992), these transcripts provided a means to determine 
the basis from which the participant created categories. These terms were selected to 
measure the participant's understanding of both the mechanism of evolutionary changes 
and the patterns of those changes.
Drawing interview
As White and Gunstone (1992) have argued, there is a great dependence on 
words for most instruments designed to study students' conceptions. To counter this 
over reliance, White and Gunstone (1992) suggest the use of student produced 
drawings. This technique has the advantage of allowing students to express their 
knowledge in a very unlimited manner; thus, the students reveal characteristics of their
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understanding that may be masked through more verbal means. Due to this freedom of 
responses, drawings allow the researcher another mode through which to study students' 
conceptions.
I chose the technique o f drawing to measure students' conceptions of the history 
of life on earth. For this form of structured interview, I asked the participants to "draw a 
time line of the history of life on earth." Not only was this interview used to measure the 
participant's knowledge of the long-term natural history, but this interview was intended 
also to illustrate the taxa with which the participant was familiar. After the drawing was 
complete, each participant was asked to explain her/his time line. (See Appendix C-6 for 
sample interview questions.)
Written Examinations
While the descriptions of changing conceptual frameworks of evolution were 
limited to the four students participating in the interview, the entire class was asked to 
participate in an examination of evolution by natural selection at the beginning and end of 
the study. The exam was written by Bishop and Anderson (1985) and formed the basis 
of my original study. This exam was selected because of the data base created through 
its use in other studies in this area (Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Demastes, Settlage, & 
Good, in press; Jensen & Finely, 1993; Settlage, in press).
The exam consists of multiple choice and essay questions regarding the process 
of evolution by natural selection. (See Appendix C-7 for the exam and a sample of the 
interview questions.) The purpose of this examination was to assess the degree of 
conceptual change occurring within the general class population. Additionally, the four 
interview participants were asked to verbally discuss their explanations in an interview. 
This discussion helped in achieving an understanding of students' teleological, 
anthropomorphic, and typological explanations of biological phenomena as compared to 
their written explanations. Additionally, the students' verbal explanations of their written
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answers may be informative in interpreting other research which uses this same 
instrument.
Artifacts
I used several artifacts from the classroom as additional data sources for the 
description o f conceptual frameworks. These artifacts included:
1. Students’ journal entries discussing the evolution o f humans,
2. Students' journal entries discussing the evolution of the human appendix in 
comparison to the pig cecum,
3. Students' answers to an exam question on extinction theories,
4. Students' homework on the topic of physical patterns in nature,
5. Students journal entries on natural patterns,
6. Students' journal entries on anthropology, and
7. Students' final exam answer describing the theoretical framework of biology. 
These were materials assigned by the teacher for the purpose of teaching; however, we 
both felt that these materials were also valuable research data.
Other artifacts were studied to better describe the school setting and curriculum. 
These artifacts included school notices, brochures, flyers, graduation announcements 
and ceremony programs, and the school yearbook.
Data Collection Techniques
Each source of data previously discussed had to be transformed into actual data 
for analysis. For several sources, such as the written examinations and classroom 
artifacts, this conversion simply required making a photocopy. Other sources of data 
required a more laborious conversion before formal analysis.
Transcripts
Transcripts from audio- and video-taped interviews formed the main body of data 
for my research. For the open-ended interviews which did not require graphics for 
interpretation, the interviews were audio-taped. For the structured interviews, the
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participants were both audio-taped and video-taped. While the audiotapes were used for 
the bulk of the transcriptions, the videotapes provided additional information detailing 
the students' movements as they reacted to the material.
Transcripts were typed on a word processing program in the same manner as the 
field notes, with the verbatim transcripts in the left hand column to leave space for 
analytical comments made during analysis on the right hand side.
Field Notes
Descriptions o f each observation and interview were entered in my field notes. 
These notes contained physical descriptions of the research participants and their 
behavior, my behavior, the activity in question (through verbal and graphic means), 
along with a description of the verbal and nonverbal communication occurring during the 
activity. Bogdan and Biklen (1992) refer to these notes as "the written account o f what 
the researcher hears, sees, experiences, and thinks in the course of collecting and 
reflecting on the data in a qualitative study" (p. 107).
The actual description in the field notes were made in one column on the left hand 
side of the page. The right hand side of the page was reserved for analytical comments 
made at the time of observation, or later as data were continually analyzed. This 
structure served as an attempt to isolate description from obvious interpretation, although 
I acknowledge that the observations themselves were often influenced by my on-going 
interpretations. While notes were made during the participant observations and the 
interviews, the field notes were elaborated and entered into a word-processing program. 
The field notes served to reconstruct events and to record as much detail as possible.
Field notes were particularly important for the study of the classroom as they 
were the major source of data for this aspect of the research. The field notes were also 
kept for the interviews which served as another source of data in addition to the 
transcripts of the audio and video recordings.
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Field Journal
The field journal involved a narrative description of the activities of the research 
day. This narrative was more personal than the field notebook. Here the emphasis was 
on my biases, feelings, ideas, and attitudes. Initial analyses were often recorded, as 
were descriptions of events that went very well or very poorly. A picture o f my 
subjectivity was formed from this narrative. This picture allowed me to reflect on the 
effect of my subjectivity on the data collection and analysis and thus allowed a clearer 
understanding. Additionally, the journal provided an informal means o f reflection on the 
method of data collection and analysis, my attitude toward the research and participants, 
and any ethical problems that arise (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992). Because the data 
collection was shaped by the on-going analysis, the insight gained from my field journal 
was fundamentally important. The ongoing analytical comments made in these journals 
were invaluable as I attempted to reconstruct my analysis during the latter stages of the 
study.
Analysis
The analysis of data was carried out in a manner described by Glaser and Strauss
(1967) in their discussion of grounded theory. Development of a grounded theory
includes an interpretive analysis accomplished by defining or isolating theories and
concepts directly from the detailed data centering on the participants. By using the
grounded theory approach to qualitative study, the intent is not to prove predetermined
theories, but to generate theories from the data and to provide supporting evidence. The
researcher attempts to analyze the data with a minimum of previous assumptions and
instead looks for trends and patterns to emerge from the data. Hutchinson (1990)
provides an excellent explanation of the strengths of analysis based on grounded theory:
Grounded theory offers a systematic method by which to study the richness and 
diversity of human experience and to generate relevant, plausible theory which 
can be used to understand the contextual reality of the social behavior, (p. 127)
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Because the researcher attempts to make inferences solely on the basis of trends 
seen in the data, elaborate theories constructed by the researcher beforehand may well 
interfere with the discovery process. To eliminate this problem, many researchers advise 
a minimum of literature review by the researcher until the actual research process is 
underway (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). However, as I have argued earlier, each researcher 
carries a bias into a project and the data collection and analysis are influenced by those 
biases. The researcher cannot avoid relying on common sense knowledge and prior 
conceptions. With this in mind, Hammersley and Atkinson (1989) advise that biases be 
explored and well documented so their effects can be understood and the data analyzed in 
the best manner possible. Bogdan and Biklen (1992) suggest that "Good researchers are 
aware of their theoretical base and use it to help collect and analyze data" (p. 33). I agree 
more with the latter opinion, and, for that reason, I included a literature review and a 
description of my initial areas of interest in the research proposal.
A fundamental requirement of the grounded theory approach is making inferences 
from observations. Instead o f attempting to explain observations from a preestablished 
governing law, an attempt is made to link observations into a pattern, to provide 
explanations for the pattern, and then to construct an intelligible frame or theory.
Because of the nature of inferences, the theories constructed need to remain closely tied 
to the subject and generalizations for entire groups may not be possible (Geertz, 1973).
The benefits of basing analysis on grounded theory as described by Richer 
(1975) and Glaser and Strauss (1967) is due to its inductive basis. Grounded theory has 
the potential of moving beyond current theories or paradigms by producing theories 
which may provide more useful insight into the situation studied (Stem, Allen, & 
Moxley, 1982). Additionally, such analysis is ideally suited to form initial description 
and explanations of complicated situations (Hutchinson, 1990). These characteristics 
make grounded theory well suited for the case studies needed in science education (Stake 
& Easley, 1978).
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My analysis began through the formulation of substantive codes that described 
pieces of data. These substantive codes were often the actual terms the participants used 
or were terms I felt were descripdve of the pattern. Because o f this latter category, how I 
make sense of the world influenced my selection o f items assigned to a particular code 
(Bogdan & Biklen, 1992). All data were assigned a code in order to break the data into 
small, understandable pieces, such as students' attention seeking behaviors. Afterwards, 
I read the data many times and assigned the substantive codes to larger categorical codes, 
such as classroom power relations. In turn, the data were read to assign substantive and 
categorical codes into theoretical constructs, such as the extreme importance the students 
placed on academic knowledge. These constructs were formed from the combination of 
data, knowledge gained from the literature, and my knowledge from the outside world. 
The process of coding began at the outset of data collection.
During coding, memos were attached to various codes offering my tentative 
theoretical ideas concerning the particular code. Because coding occurred throughout 
data collection, it shaped my opinions and so shaped the data collection. This reflexivity 
allowed me to search for data that provided examples of proposed codes and to check my 
emerging understandings with the research participants. The process of specified data 
collection is referred to as theoretical sampling. These very directed questions insured 
construct validity of the inferences made from the data. Additionally, this directed 
process of data collection insured very dense data for each theoretical construct.
Toward the end of the study, I began to sort all the data that supported or 
explained the most prominent theoretical constructs. Glaser and Strauss (1967) refer to 
these prominent theoretical constructs as basic social psychological process, and Glaser 
(1978) refers to them as the main theme in the data. This sorting began the formal 
process of theory generation as I attempted to apply meaning provided by these 
prominent theoretical constructs to the larger body of data. The process defined the data 
which do and do not apply, thus establishing the limits of the emerging theory.
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Another essential part o f the analysis process involved participant verification of 
my emerging theories. As I began identification of themes, I discussed these theoretical 
constructs with Hurston and each of the interview participants. Their ideas were used to 
verify or modify my original analysis. In a small number of instances, my views could 
not be aligned with that of the participants. In these cases, both the participants' and my 
own analysis appears and the reasons for the possible discrepancies are discussed.
Analysis based on the grounded theory approach is concurrent with data 
collection. This allows additional data to be gathered to answer research questions as 
they arise and allows the researcher to establish the construct validity of her/his emerging 
theories. However, data analysis continued months after the data collection ended and 
far into the time of formal writing.
I analyzed the data from each student separately. However, at the outset of the 
final reading, I summed each area mentioned by the students about the theoretical 
framework for evolution. These conceptual areas were placed in a template describing 
each participant's conceptual framework for evolution. In order to document conceptual 
change, the participants' conceptions for each aspect of this framework were described at 
three intervals during the research process. The interviews involved for each of these 
three intervals can be found in Figure 2.
I analyzed the data from each student separately, and then compared my 
understandings of the individual students in a componential analysis. This procedure 
allowed me to develop an understanding of each student on an individual basis. 
Afterwards, the comparison of individuals allowed identification of patterns that were 
common throughout the individuals involved in the study. Thus, componential analysis 
allowed the initial steps from contextual understanding toward generalization of insight 
constructed from the study. We must recognize that this is only a tentative step toward 
generalizability that must be further investigated through other research.
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Time Frame of Study
As shown in Figure 2 and Table 3, the data collection extended throughout the 
1992-93 school year. This duration was necessary for me both to establish a close, 
working relationship with the participants and to provide an opportunity for a 
longitudinal study of conception change. Arzi (1988) has critiqued current research in 
science education and explained that short term studies do not relate a full understanding. 
She calls for more longitudinal studies which follow the same subjects over an extended 
time frame.
Ethical Issues
Stacey (1988) and Lather (1986) have illuminated the inherent difficulties in 
traditional relationships between the researcher and the participants. They argue this 
relationship as typically conceived is exploitative and serves to reproduce the power 
relations of the larger society. While this reproduction is problematic on moral grounds, 
the theoretical underpinnings of qualitative research also make this traditional relationship 
less than appropriate. Munro (1991) argues that the intersubjective process of meaning 
making demands that this relationship be collaborative and reciprocal.
In an effort to make this a collaborative relationship, the participants in this study 
shaped both the actual scope o f the study and the methods I used. Additionally, I shared 
my analysis with each individual before dissemination of the study and invited their 
comments on the interpretations included in writing of the dissertation. Their comments, 
although minor, were incorporated into the analysis. In very few instances did their 
analyses firmly conflict with my own; although when this did happen, both views were 
reported. (See Chapter 4.)
Seidman (1991) explains that the in-depth interviewing process has the potential 
of being particularly damaging for the participants when the topic of inquiry is to be 
situated in the life of the participant. Such a process is likely to raise sensitive issues at 
the same time that it provides a large body of description. Such description may allow
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identification of the participant, even though the identity of the participant is to be 
disguised. This last concern is particularly important, because the vulnerability of those 
involved in the research cannot be discerned ahead of time. Because o f these concerns, I 
used informed consent forms for each of the participants to detail what their 
responsibilities were in the research and to clarify their right to withdraw from the study 
at any time. These forms were signed for the students by their parents or guardians. 
Although University Laboratory School students have agreed to participate in all research 
when they enrolled, I felt this additional step helped ensure the voluntary nature of the 
students' participation.
In an effort to maintain confidentiality, I used pseudonyms for each participant in 
the study and masked the name of the school itself. The pseudonyms were used in all 
my notes, journals, and transcriptions so even an outside reader of the rough transcripts 
would be unaware of the participants' identities. I was the only person involved in the 
bulk of the transcriptions, although a professional transcriptionist was employed for a 
small percentage of this work. Her participation was agreeable to the research 
participants.
Reflexivitv
In the ethics section I discussed the issue of reflexivity. Because of the nature of 
qualitative research, the voice of the researcher cannot be separated from that of the 
participants. This point has been well documented in the literature in discussions by 
Munro (1991), Roman (1989), and Stacey (1988). But in turn, the notion of reflexivity 
also implies that the voice and actions of the participants cannot be separated from the 
role typically held by the researcher. This relationship is easily seen in the methods used 
in this research. Ms. Hurston, the teacher, suggested and provided many of the research 
instruments used in this study. She also played a large role in the selection o f research 
participants and in on-going data analysis. Hers were not the only efforts that changed 
the focus and methods of my study. As has been described, the results of one concept
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mapping session with a student participant demonstrated for me the narrowness of my 
understanding of a scientific conceptual framework for evolution. Thus, this student 
radically expanded my research scope.
As will be discussed in Chapter 6, this reflexivity is not limited to the 
participants' alteration of my methods and analysis. As will be seen, my efforts 
substantially changed the nature of the participants' learning, so that these students 
experienced more conceptual change than their classmates. Thus, my actions as a 
researcher changed the experiences of my participants. Given this relationship, it would 
be difficult to defend a description of this study as naturalistic, because, not only did I 
observe, I also modified.
PREFACE TO 
THE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION CHAPTERS
The focus of this study is the conceptual change which occurred in four Biology 
II students in the topic of biological evolution. However, it is important to know how 
the learning of these four interview participants compares with that of their classmates. 
In addition, to better understand the conceptual change that is described, the learning 
of these students should be situated within the teaching practices of their Biology II 
course as well as the culture of the classroom in which this learning took place.
Toward these ends, the results and discussion are reported in three chapters. Chapter 4 
is a description o f the classroom culture. Chapter 5 is a description of the teacher and 
her teaching practices. This chapter also specifically addresses the means through 
which evolution was taught. Finally, Chapter 6 is the most important for the purposes 
of this study. Here, the conceptual change is described, both on a whole class basis and 




No educational event exists in a vacuum. It is created and influenced by its 
larger cultural context. Even though the focus of my study was the process of learning 
of four particular students, much of their learning occurred in a classroom. And this 
classroom has a culture. Culture is not a language, a style of dress, or a unique social 
practice. Instead I understand culture to be the ever-changing context in which an 
individual makes sense (Geertz, 1973). To describe a culture is, in part, to describe 
how meaning is negotiated by the members of a group. Thus, culture can be explicit 
knowledge as well as tacit, nonverbal knowledge which is continually taught, learned, 
and modified by group members (Clifford, 1986). To understand culture is to 
understand the knowledge that a group values. Therefore, it is important to provide for 
the reader a description of the culture in which my study takes place.
My work focuses on the students of one biology class. The understandings I 
have gained center on the culture of this class as it is situated in the larger high school.
I have attempted to represent the themes through which I came to understand the 
school. However, in an attempt to refine my understandings, I had the students of this 
class comment on a early draft of this chapter. My initial understandings have been 
altered by the students' perceptions, and their comments are interwoven with my own. 
Through this process of description, reflection, and refinement, I hope to achieve a 
richer description, one that reflects my views and those of the participants.
This chapter begins with a description of the school, both through physical and 
administrative lenses. Afterwards, the biology classroom and the class participants are 
described. These descriptions are designed to give the reader a basis from which to 
understand the themes that follow. Finally, the themes that I found to be important are 
iscussed along with the students' reactions to my descriptions. I came to recognize 
three themes as important factors in the culture of this class. These are (a) Talking
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discussed along with the students' reactions to my descriptions. I came to recognize 
three themes as important factors in the culture of this class. These are (a) Talking 
Academic, (b) A Small Town School in an Urban Setting, and (c) the Myth of 
Uniformity. These three themes are interwoven and, as will be seen, the action o f one 
theme often mediates the actions of another. I propose no sharp distinctions that would 
be easily recognizable to a reader who visited my study site. But I hope through my 




To any passerby, the University Laboratory School easily blends into the rest 
of the university campus. Situated beside the law school library and facing a row of 
fraternity houses, the laboratory school lies on the fringes o f the university grounds.
The school is constructed of familiar beige bricks used in many campus structures, 
several of them showing some green algal growth in the face of Louisiana's sub­
tropical climate. There is a large yard surrounding the school, its grass uniform except 
where it is shaded by the large, lush oaks similar to those found throughout this part of 
the deep South.
A visitor can walk from the university campus and enter the side of the school 
by following a pathway in the grass trampled by innumerable College of Education 
students over the years. The handrails lining this side entrance were yellow at one 
time, but now metal peeks through, worn by the passage o f many hands. For a portion 
of the school year, the glass side door leading to the high school wing was broken, and 
the cracked glass was held in place with gray duct tape. When I first entered the school 
in the fall semester, I was greeted with a familiar atmosphere of schools-a building kept 
a little too cold in the summer and a little too hot in the winter, floors typically free of
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debris but always in need of a mop, lockers filled to overflowing at times with books, 
papers, notes, and tennis shoes.
But as I look closer, I notice that this school hallway differs in several ways 
from others I have walked. On any given day, backpacks line the walls with no one 
present to guard their contents. Many times I notice official looking notes addressed to 
specific students taped onto the lockers. Unattended students pour over exams in the 
hallways.
These differences fade as I watch the activity between class periods. Then, just 
like many high schools, the hallways are filled with talking, laughing, singing students. 
I can hear students making contact before the next period-the seniors making plans for 
lunch off campus, younger students darting in to buy an off limits candy bar from the 
vending machine. Often younger students chase one another, falling short of actually 
bolting through the hallways. Teachers, though not obvious in this short time of 
student freedom, can be seen lingering near their doors and occasionally looking out at 
the activity.
The majority of the higher grade levels classes are held within the same two 
story wing of the laboratory school. This allows maintenance of a distinction between 
the upper and lower grade levels. The students refer to the ninth through the twelfth 
grades as University High, or more casually, U High. This sense of a separate identity 
is reinforced by the small number of younger children seen in the high school's 
hallways, and the rule prohibiting the older students from using the younger hallways 
as a passage out of the building.
History and Administration
The University Laboratory School was first opened in 1915, under the name of 
the Demonstration High School. Its initial purpose was to provide teacher and college 
student education in high school teaching methods and to provide facilities for teaching 
practice. Throughout the intervening years, additional grade levels were added. The
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Laboratory School is a department in the College of Education at the university. 
Funding for the school comes from both student tuition and state "minimum foundation 
funding" appropriated to the university. Thus, the laboratory school is a member of the 
university system and is not formally associated with the parish school system. This 
relationship is reflected by the Laboratory School's schedule, which corresponds to that 
of the university and not to that of local public schools. In its current form, the 
University Laboratory School has a maximum population of 760 students attending 
kindergarten through grade 12. Each grade level has a constant number of 70 students, 
composed of 35 males and 35 females. Approximately 10% of the student population 
of the school includes members of minority groups.
Typically, anywhere from 600 to 1000 applications are received for the 
estimated 85 to 100 openings. Most openings are for kindergarten and ninth grade. 
Once students have applied, they are placed into established demographic and 
educational categories. This information is then given to a central committee on the 
university's campus, and this committee makes the decision as to which students to 
accept. The student selection process is partially guided by a goal of a diverse student 
population. The school's enrollment at each grade level is held constant to maintain the 
15:1 student teacher ratio.
Another attempt to maintain the greatest diversity within the student population 
is that no entrance examination is given to students before admission. However, 
several aspects of the school make attaining this diversity problematic. Perhaps the 
most limiting factor is the tuition, which approaches or surpasses (depending on the 
grade level) two thousand dollars per school year. Additionally, the transportation 
requirement also serves to narrow the population of students who can attend. While the 
Principal expressed a desire to have a population more congruent with the city's 
population, constraints in operation prohibit such diversity. In spite of the school's
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efforts, there remain fundamental differences between the students at the Laboratory
school and the city's population:
Principal: Now one difference in our population and and [sic] other 
public school's population is that we have tuition and they [families] have 
to provide their transportation. So that does make our population a little 
bit different from [the] parish's. Ah, our students often come from 
families who value education more and are out looking for an alternative.
So that is a built in factor we can't change b u t . . .  we don't seek out just a 
certain kind of s tuden t.. . .  Ah, we do tend to have a little bit higher level 
of motivation. (P 76)
The Laboratory School fills a number of formal roles. These include student
education, teacher education and preparation, educational research, in-service
presentations, and serving as a "model school" demonstration center. However, as the
principal points out:
P rincipal: The goals of this school include only one goal that relates to 
the students that go here. We have, you know, we will do the best job 
that we can educationally for the children that are here. . . . But that's only 
one of the [roles] of the school. (P 75)
The Biology II Class
Physical Appearance
Ms. Hurston's Biology II class has helped to fulfill several of these roles. In this
class Hurston simultaneously educates students in biology and one student teacher in
science teaching as she participates in educational research. This Biology II class is
held on the bottom floor of the U High wing. When I first entered this class, I knew
immediately that this was a biology classroom. Encircling the room on three sides are
laboratory benches. Those benches and the walls beside them are covered with
biological educational materials-things that are alive, things that depict life, or things
that are remnants of that life. Aquaria serving as cages for mice and other rodents line
one wall. Beside these cages are dried carapaces of horseshoe crabs. Across the room
1 can see bones from cows, shells from tortoises, a hornet's nest, microscopes, and
aquaria housing small fishes. An androgynous model of a human torso stares at me, its
organs and musculature exposed. As I probe, I find one plastic container filled with
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debris and containing a colony of meal worms-a favorite laboratory animal of biology 
teachers everywhere. Toward the front of the room is a large aquarium which until 
recently had held an adult grouper and a plecostomus. (To the sad dismay of many of 
the students who had grown up with them, these fishes died at mid-year.) The aerator 
for this tank is somewhat loud. This constant gurgling and the sounds of mice and 
gerbils moving in their cages are strangely soothing in this biology classroom.
Covering the walls of the room are posters. These posters advertise famous 
zoos or depict endangered species and others explain animal classification systems (i.e., 
"The Animal Kingdom," "Protists"). I attended class for several days before I noticed 
the alligator head hanging over the doorway to the teacher's office.
The rectangular room is lined on one side by windows overlooking the front 
yard of the school. While these windows can let in a great deal of light, they also allow 
for long dreamy glances during Louisiana's massive thunderstorms. The desks, 
arranged in four rows, face the teacher's desk and blackboard in the front of the room.
A television, overhead projector, and video recorder are in the front right comer. A 
space in the back of the room bounded by a set of long collection drawers remains free 
for lab preparation.
In many ways the classroom reflects much of the rest of U High. It is orderly, 
but worn. The light green paint on the walls is somewhat faded, but little of it can be 
seen because of all the classroom materials. Nothing in the class stands out as new 
except for an occasional poster or graphic found along the walls. The wood on the 
students' desks has uneven grooves etched by age, wear, and students' pens. However, 
like the larger school, it holds the promise of much activity. The obvious wear seen in 
this room signifies that these materials have been used by hundreds of other students. 
For me, the combination of biological materials, worn desks, mice, and blackboards is 
immediately comforting. This room reminds me of many other rooms in which I 
learned to love biology.
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A Typical Class Period
On a typical school day, I enter this room just before fourth hour at 10:30 A.M. 
Ms. Hurston is already here, walking about the room, and setting up laboratory 
materials in the back. I speak to her quickly and take one of my usual places behind of 
the rows of seats. Hurston is a middle-aged woman, with short brown curly hair that is 
graying at the temples. She is wearing jeans, a red checked shirt, brown leather flats, 
and a large gold necklace. Often her jewelry takes the shape of animals such dolphins, 
salamanders, or frogs. The overall effect is of a casual neatness. Hurston is animated 
as she speaks. When she is deeply involved in an explanation, she stands in front of the 
class and takes off her brown reading glasses and waves them around her head as she 
looks at a student. Her speech remains the same whether it is directed to a student, a 
class, or an adult. She speaks rapidly, and her meanings are punctuated with humor, 
cynicism, laughter, and quick smiles. She often can be seen placing a hand on top of 
her head as she thinks through an answer to a student's question.
Joe Ellen sits beside Ms. Hurston who is reading over a calendar. She is 
Hurston's education student. She is working on her Master's Degree in biology 
education and is interning with Hurston for the year. Joe Ellen is a small woman in her 
mid-twenties. She is the only member of the class who is of African-American 
descent. She typically wears her straight black hair pulled off her face. Joe Ellen's face 
is very animated, and she both smiles and frowns quickly as she speaks surprisingly 
fast given her Mississippi accent.
Just before the first bell rings, Ms. Hurston places a Farside cartoon on the 
overhead. Then she sits behind the large front desk and looks over her reading or 
quickly grades some papers. Students begin entering the room from the front door 
soon after the first bell rings. The first students to enter are usually Bob, Calvin, and 
Jean. These juniors place their books in their favorite seats in the back of the room and 
walk back up to the front to make friendly conversation with Ms. Hurston and Joe
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Ellen. As the other students enter, they walk toward their desks, but few of them sit. 
Instead, most stand and talk with their classmates. Day after day, most students return 
to the same desks although no seating has been assigned.
Soon the second bell rings and the kids come closer to their desks, many o f 
them sitting down. Hurston asks the students all to have a seat so that Joe Ellen can 
take the roll. This movement is accomplished with a little talking. There are 12 juniors 
and 11 seniors in this class. Ten of these students are boys and 13 are girls. There was 
one more girl in the class who left at the end of the first semester, while explaining that 
her academic schedule threatened to overwhelm her.
The formal class begins with Hurston reading the "What is it?" question that is 
written on the side of the front blackboard. Each day the question changes, and it is 
accompanied by the answer to yesterday's question. After Hurston reads the question 
loudly to the class, several of the students call out possible solutions. These 
suggestions can range from comical to very well thought out.
After this brief discussion, Hurston launches into the topic for the day. The 
topic for discussion is an article on dinosaur extinction that the students read yesterday. 
Many students respond easily to Hurston's open-ended questions, often calling out 
answers without being formally recognized by the teacher. During the class-wide 
discussions, most students are attentive, even if they are not overtly participating.
There is little side talking between students, with the exception of a nucleus of 
juniors who sit together in the back, left-hand side of the room. This group includes 
Bob, Jean, Philip, Raistlin, and Calvin. I came to refer to them as the "trio+2" in my 
field notes because their actions so often drew my attention to their corner of the room. 
Most side talking that occurs in this class can be traced back to this group. Listening to 
their conversations, I could often hear them make references to the material the class 




As my research focused entirely on this class, I considered the larger school 
only as it affected the students of this class. In regard to some points, I view the two, 
classroom culture and school culture, as synonymous. But I am sure this was not 
always the case. Class culture and school culture are profoundly related, but they 
should not be equated on a wholesale basis. In many ways, Ms. Hurston and this 
particular group of students had their own means of negotiating meaning. These ways 
were certainly affected by the school context, but my emphasis will be on the 
classroom. The next section will explore the major themes I have come to recognize as 
important in understanding the culture of this biology class.
Talking Academic
One of the fundamental themes through which I understand this class is termed
Talking Academic. Borrowing from Lemke's (1990) book, Talking Science. I use
Talking Academic to refer to the ease and frequency with which these students
assumed the mannerisms and implicit habits which characterize current academic
discourse. For me, these habits are best signified by the use of academic language,
both in verbal and written communication. Another characteristic of current academic
discourse is an acceptance juxtaposed with questions, that is, Talking Academic
includes an acceptance of the importance of the formalized knowledge of school along
with a questioning attitude toward this knowledge.
An example of Talking Academic is signified by an excerpt from a whole group
discussion held early in the school year during the unit on dinosaur extinction. Here,
the teacher asks the students to compare various aspects o f the natural sciences:
Hurston: So how does paleontology differ from the here and now of 
biology?
[The students do not hold up their hands in response but rather they call 
out answers from their seats.]
Jesus: It's a new science.
Calvin: Because they have more recent discoveries, with new technology. 
Anne: No, but they discover new things in chemistry all the time though, 
like new elements.
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Jean : Yeah, like Calvin said, they get one piece of evidence and that
changes everything.
Philip: It's not a new science but an evolving science.
G rady : They have to work on clues; they can't go out and test things.
It's more guesswork. They can't be sure of what they know.
H: So they operate more like detectives?
Bob: It could be the most misleading science. They can't check things.
Other sciences have a a lot of facts behind it.
(F 62)
This is one of dozens of such discussions. These are characterized by the teacher 
asking the students to draw from several areas o f their knowledge. The students' 
participation is voluntary. A reading of the transcript reveals that the students are 
listening and thoughtfully responding to one another's comments. These students are 
participating not in a closely directed dialogue, but they are learning to participate in an 
academic conversation. They are Talking Academic.
I have identified three emergent codes students use in the process of Talking 
Academic: expectation, com petition, and innovation. The first of these, expectation, 
is readily apparent. U High is considered to be a "college prep school" by almost all of 
its students. The large number of courses available providing advanced placement 
credit in colleges and opportunities for concurrent enrollment with the university 
signify the U High's role in preparing its students for college. The school is successful 
in this regard. The guidance counselor explains that 95% of all seniors enter four-year 
colleges or universities.
In a survey, each of these students in the Biology II class expressed their 
expectation of attending a university after graduation. The majority indicated out-of- 
state universities as possible choices. Sixteen of the 24 students in this class indicated 
in a survey that they wanted to become doctors, veterinarians, scientists, or engineers. 
Others were planning for careers in law or business. (These expectations may not 
simply originate with the school, but also from these students' families.) Almost all 
students come from homes where at least one parent has a college education. These 
students have an educational legacy to plan, prepare for, and expect a college
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education. One sign of this preparation is the very regular daily attendance of students
in Ms. Hurston’s class. These students expect to succeed in academics. Of the four
students I asked, not one had seriously considered what they would do for a living if
they did not attend college.
A second code in the theme o f Talking Academic is the code of com petition.
Late in the school year I spoke with Tyler, one of my four interview participants, about
the ranking system for students:
SD: What's your class rank?
Tyler: I'm like . . .  or something like that.
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes] Ahm, it’s important to me I think to know that you all 
know that. Why do you think that you know that here?
T: 'Cause it's so competitive here.
SD: Yeah?
T: 'Cause everybody's so smar t . . . .
T: But my class number, it used to kind of matter, like when we first 
started getting our transcripts and seeing what number we were. Yeah, it 
matters. You want to be higher than your friends. [Small laugh]
SD: So you talked about it? Y'all actually sort of talked about your class 
rank?
T: Well you know you get your paper with it on it and, you know, you 
say, "What’s yours? W hat's yours?"
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes]
T: You always wanted, well I do want to be higher than my friends. (C 
252)
Tyler is not alone in her sense of academic competition. Students in this class
constantly compare grades when papers are passed out, with some of the junior boys
gloating if they received a grade higher than their friends. Frequently I could hear
students sharing their overall grade point averages, ACT, or SAT scores with one
another. I was surprised as I listened to casual conversations to find that these students
knew the names of many students throughout the other schools in the parish who
excelled in a particular subject. Why is there such a strong sense of competition in
these matters? Another interview participant expresses this:
M eredith : Grades really, really mean a lot. Ahm, I found that out, that 
stuff like, [if] I had a 4 point, instead of a 3 .977 ,1 probably would have a 
[university] scholarship. (A 273)
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The code o f competition also surfaces in the actual form of classroom
discourse. Often discussions in Ms. Hurston's class become student debates. In these
"debates," as they are described by Lemke (1990), one student directly responds to a
comment made by another. These debates typically include the overt participation of
the boys in the class. While girls are not vocal in these sessions, several can be heard
participating from time to time. (For an expanded discussion of the effects of gender in
the classroom, see the section on Discussion Participants in Chapter 5.) Here, one
student tries to discredit a statement made by another:
[Ron, a shy junior, has taken his turn in reading his critique of a scientific 
journal article standing in the front of the class. As soon as he finished,
Philip, a junior boy sitting in the back of the class, raises his hand quickly, 
wagging it in the air.]
Hurston: Yes, [addressing Philip] you have a comment?
Philip: Yes. This is for Ron. Did they use the sampling technique 
described in the article o f yesterday, like the 1-10 technique?
Ron: (Long pause) I don't know.
Philip: [Long pause, with eyebrows raised and hand to chin] Did they 
use anything?
H: [Looking at Philip] What were the other techniques, Philip?
[He hesitates, gives an exaggerated shrug, and the entire class erupts in 
laughter.] (F 164)
I recall this as being a humorous exchange. Philip often initiates these sessions when 
others are presenting their ideas to the class. Like this one, his comments are often 
accompanied by exaggerated gestures-the raised eyebrows, hand to chin, a lowered 
voice, and a dramatic pause before speaking. He not only has learned to participate in 
academic discourse, but he also has learned this lesson so well he can mock its 
characteristics. The teacher plays an essential role in this mockery by making Philip 
the real brunt o f the humor. Over the school year, I came to anticipate such mocking 
sessions during student debates whenever the students were festive. While these 
sessions had a variety o f participants, none could carry them off with Philip’s comical 
aplomb.
The final code in the theme of Talking Academic is innovation. The 
administration, faculty, student body, and parents have come to anticipate innovative
74
teaching to occur in this setting. This is provided structurally through the formal
requirements for a teaching position at the Laboratory School. These requirements
include a master's degree or higher, a state teaching certification, and at least three
years of teaching experience. In addition to these formal requirements, the current
principal has some specific characteristics in mind when selecting teachers:
Principal: I'm looking for people who I sense will work well with 
students, and work well with parents, and will work well with the college.
I'm looking for people who are very creative. I'm looking for people who 
want to be something else rather than just a good, average teachers. . . .
I’m looking for people who, who want to be leaders.. .  .And very much so 
people who are ah self sufficient.. . .  If I ever hire someone and the only 
way that, that they will do their best work is if I'm checking on them 
frequently or supervising them pretty closely, or visiting them frequently, 
then I've hired the wrong person. I'm looking for self starters.. . .  I don't 
hire Indians, I hire Indian chiefs.
(P 77)
The result of this selection process has formed a faculty that has received substantial 
state and national recognition for excellence in teaching. Two teachers have been 
named Presidential award winners for Excellence in Teaching Science. Three teachers 
were named Presidential award winners for Excellence in Teaching Math. One teacher 
was named Discover Magazine's Science Teacher of the Year.
The codes of expectation, com petition, and innovation each relate to the 
theme of Talking Academic. There is an interaction with each of the cultural forces 
underlying these codes. This interaction provides a synergy so that the education 
received by any student is enhanced by the students around her/him. This is a complex 
relationship: the same students who help one another academically are also in 
competition academically. This is not a school where poor performance is a form of 
cultural currency. As Ms. Hurston states, "It's not cool necessarily to be the dummy 
that sits back in the back of the room." (P 66) Instead, excellence in education, the 
ability to Talk Academic, is noticed, envied, and sought after. However, after reading 
the first draft of this chapter, Grady a senior boy, provided some additional insight into 
the theme of Talking Academic. He explained that at U High "there is a fine line we
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I students] walk between talking academic and talking 122  academic. There's this real 
subtle line, a window. You can't be stupid, but you can't take yourself too seriously 
either.” (5B 322)
Toward the end of the school year, the students became tired. This was
particularly true for the seniors.
Tyler: [Tonight] I have about 500, 000 physics problems to do and I 
have a big unit English test on about 5 stories plus romanticism and 
existentialism and all that. And I haven't looked at any of it, any of i t . . . .
And I'm not going to stay up late. I don't care. At this point I don't care.
Who cares? Why even care? It doesn't make any difference. (C 244)
Even for these students, there are obvious emotional limitations to what they want to
accomplish in school. Like most social realities, the synergistic quality o f U High is
not a constant state.
A Small Town School in an Urban Setting
SD: Since I've been here I've gotten a real flavor, this [U High] is almost 
like ah a neighborhood school used to b e . . . .
Principal: Or a small town school.
SD: Yeah, yeah.
Principal: Well it is in some regards, and it's not in others. [Murmuring]
Well, I guess you could say that we're trying to be a small town school in 
an urban setting. (P 72)
The previous conversation with the principal identifies the second theme 
through which I understand U High. This theme, being a small town school in an urban 
setting, allows me to understand much of the social interactions of the students and 
teachers in this class. What is meant by "being a small town school?" For me, this 
includes a strong sense of community juxtaposed with a strong sense of the 
independence.
With each of the four sets of parents I spoke with, community or a sense of 
"family" was cited as an important attribute of U High. Several students, one in 
Hurston's class, have parents and grandparents who attended the school. Certainly, a 
community atmosphere is enhanced by the small size of the school. Having so few 
students, the principal knows them "by names and faces instead of numbers" and this
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knowledge can be used for "keeping kids on track." (P 71) Teachers too are well
acquainted with their students by often having the same students for various courses
during their high school years. This year Ms. Hurston had previously taught the juniors
in their Biology 1 class. Brian discusses the positive results of this relationship:
Brian: When you get to know the teachers b e tte r,. . .  it is easier for 
them to instruct you when they know what you're looking for." (B 3)
The stability of the student population has a considerable influence in creating a
sense of community. Students in Ms. Hurston's class know one another very well.
Many students have attended the same school since first grade. After reading the first
draft of this chapter, Jean, a junior girl in this class, suggested that I had omitted a key
aspect of the school's community. She explained that there is a great deal o f interaction
between students of various grade levels, "We (juniors and seniors] all get along and do
stuff together." (5B 322)
The school attempts to foster this relationship by arranging several school
events. These events include a retreat for the senior class held in the fall, a "spirit" day
when each grade works together with one other grade for a service project for the
school, and a winter formal which is held on the school grounds and includes all
members of the high school. This close relationship translates into different classroom
behaviors. Students in Hurston's class were often very tactile, touching one another on
the shoulder as they spoke and playing physical games before the beginning of class.
Another result of this sense of community is described:
Hurston: I think that in many cases they [the students] are very open to 
kids coming in. I don't think they necessarily shut them off. I don't, I 
know I don't see it from the students' perspective, but I don’t think it's as 
bad as a lot of people make it out to b e . . . .  I don't see this school being 
that cliquish. I see the kids as being basically pretty friendly. (H 66)
In part I agree with Hurston's assessment. In laboratory situations, while students had
favorite group members, these groups were fluid with group members often changing.
Students seem to talk with everyone, although to some class members with more
frequency than others. Students who didn't seem to be exceptionally close knew a lot
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about one another's personal lives. However, from the students' perspective, cliques are
an obvious part o f schooling:
Tyler: It [this school] focuses a lot on social, social things. If you are 
not you know, if you are not in the cool group, then you are pretty much 
nowhere.
SD: So it is cliquish?
T: Yes! (C 254)
After reading an early draft of this chapter, the students initiated a discussion
about the cliques at U High. Some students, like Tyler, felt that cliques were a major
social force at U High. Other students disagreed. While the "strength" of cliques is a
very relative judgment, I feel some meaning came be made from this conversation.
Grady pointed out that students who have attended U High all their lives, like Tyler,
felt that students in different social groups were very isolated from one another.
However, students who have transferred here, such as Ginger and Stephanie, felt that
the cliques at U High were relative mild to others they had seen. Ginger explains that
"The cliques interact with each other here a lot more than at other public schools." (5B
324) In the end of this discussion, we decided that it was probably true that the
students’ social groups at U High were not as strict an isolating mechanism as is true in
other schools. However, students had differing perceptions of these groups based upon
their histories in other schools.
The community atmosphere of the school is contrasted to the emphasis placed
on the independence of the individual. Hurston explains that one factor she
particularly likes about U High is the independence it fosters in its teachers.
Hurston: I like that you have a lot of control over what you teach.
You're allowed the freedom to do what needs to be done and teach the 
way you need to teach. (P 42)
One parent explained to me that the school also attempts to foster this development of
the individual in its students. This was one of the reasons that all four of her children
attended the Laboratory school:
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Parent: I thought it [Laboratory school] gave a sense of self esteem .. .  .
I think this school is very good about giving children, all children who are 
good at different things, a feeling of self esteem. (B 306)
Toward the end of developing the individual, the laboratory school has a "point
system" established. In this system, no one student can hold an inordinate number of
leadership roles in the school. While this system is controversial, even its opponents
agree that is has the attribute o f allowing all students the chance to develop leadership
skills.
There is an interesting tension between the community and independence aims
of the school. In this passage, Tyler explains that while she is part of a community of
students, she feels she must be able to give something back, to reciprocate:
Tyler: You ask your classmates to help you [with math homework] and 
it's just kinda', "Can you help me please?" [Laughs.] I feel so guilty.
'Cause nobody wants to help people that don't know anything. You 
know? (C 9)
One of the end results of this "small town school" atmosphere is a feeling of
responsibility which develops in the students and their parents. While the recognition
of responsibility is typically thought of as a positive trait in a teenager, it also can take
the form of harsh criticism when the teaching does not meet the degree of innovation
the students expect.
SD: The seniors really feel like they can . . .  have a hand in getting rid of 
someone [a teacher they disapprove of]?
H urston: Yeah. That's a perception that you know the administration 
[strongly disagrees with] when they hear. . . . But the seniors really think 
they do have that kind of power and they will make every effort to do that 
if they think the situation warrants it. (P 28)
So the theme of "being a small town school in an urban setting" is composed of
the interrelated codes of community, independence, and responsibility. These themes
serve to describe many of the social and political actions of the participants in the class
and their orientation to the school.
The Myth of Uniformity
SD: Do you still like it here [U High]? Or?
Tyler: It's too small.
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SD: It's too small.
T: Yeah. So. [Pause]
SD: And that smallness bothers you because you don't get to meet 
anybody new?
T: I don't know what it is. I don't know what it is. You don't get to see 
what's really out there. . . .
SD: How do you think [other] schools would be different from this 
school?
T: You get to be with so many different kinds o f people.
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes]
T: And to see what it's really like out there.
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes] Do you think it's kind of left you ill-prepared for ?
T : Ah, I mean, it probably hasn't. It seems like I. You're just so 
enclosed and you don’t experience the real world. So I don't know. It’s 
just so sheltered. (C 3)
The final theme through which I understand this school is that of Uniformity. 
Despite the stated goals of the administration, this uniformity is best reflected in the 
student population in terms of racial and class makeup, family background, appearance, 
goals and classroom behavior. Most students in Ms. Hurston's class are Caucasian and 
two girls are of Asian descent. This makeup is an accurate reflection of the student 
population of the high school. However, this racial makeup is far different from that 
of the surrounding city. Additionally, there is a uniformity in class backgrounds of 
the students. As Meredith explains, students at U High "come from, you know, middle 
to upper class families." (A 274) This perception is echoed by Tyler who explained to 
me, "there are no lower class families here." (C 258) It is obvious from the principal's 
"Indian and Indian Chiefs" comment found in the Talking Academic section, that the 
administration, like many of the students here, is not overly familiar with working with 
marginalized student populations.
But perhaps the most striking example of uniformity is in the appearance of 
the students. Their styles of dress are remarkably constant. For a large part of the year, 
most of the class wears shorts, tee shirts, and tennis shoes. Only during the coldest part 
of the winter does this uniform change to heavier clothes. Fall brought out black and 
yellow U High letterman jackets. (Although these jackets seemed more for show as the 
junior boys wore them in the already too warm building.) Some students always wear
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long pants, typically jeans, but they are in a minority. On any given day the "look" of
the students in this class is extremely casual. Students who fall outside of the informal
"dress code” are "talked about." One example of this is seen in Ms. Hurston's class,
When Brian and a classmate began to wear unusual leather sandals they were given the
nicknames of Moses and Jesus. Tyler explains the social pressure that maintains the
uniform appearance of the students:
Tyler: We all seem to be alike. That's because of the pressure. If you 
wear something different, if you wear something different, it's like 
everybody talks about i t . . . .  People notice that kind of stuff. Anything a 
little bit different. . . .  Yeah, if you get, if you dress up, people are like 
"What are you looking nice for today?" (C 260)
After they read the first draft of this chapter, several students expressed
dissatisfaction with the meaning they took away from this section. Priscilla, a
thoughtful junior girl, explained that the reason the students looked very similar was
due more to their shared middle-class backgrounds than the operation of some social
pressure. She reasoned, "I don't wear these polos [shirts] because somebody makes me.
I wear them because they’re comfortable. Nobody goes shopping and thinks about
what people are gonna' say." (5B 323) A brisk discussion followed her comments.
Grady explained that while Priscilla may not feel pressured, other students may. But he
went on to point out that the homecoming queen this year was a girl considered to be
the "strangest dresser in her class." (5B 323) There was no consensus drawn from this
debate, simply the notion that the social pressure operating in U High is not felt
universally.
Perhaps due to this relatively homogeneous student population, the day-to-day
activities o f the school are also characterized by uniformity. As Brian expresses, "It's
pretty much the same everyday." (B 266) While this aspect of the school is
simultaneously bothersome to Tyler, as signified in her words which opened this
secrion, it is attractive to many of the parents which send their children here:
SD: Why did you send your children to the laboratory 
school? . . .
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Brian's mother: Stability. Once a kid gets ah in there, it's like they're 
part of it and they are there as long as they chose to be. I wanted a 
situation where my kids could get to feeling like they were knowing 
where they were going and they had a future and it wasn't going to change 
every three, four, five years or whatever. (B 306)
Other parents remarked that they chose U High because it reminded them of the
schools of their past-small, familiar, and safe. Stephanie's parents chose to send her
here only after they were disturbed by the tall wire "cage" that surrounded a near-by
magnet school.
Perhaps it is the voice of the parents that provides the most insight into this 
theme of uniformity. The members of U High's community are attracted to uniformity 
in the face of what they perceive as the tumultuous conditions of education found 
elsewhere in the city. U High becomes to these parents a school where their children 
can complete a "top notch" education in safe, familiar surroundings. As described by 
Tyler's words:
Tyler: We're sheltered here. I mean we have, it's like we have this one 
way of thinking. [Pause] And we're supposed to kinda' think that way.
(C 259)
Like Tyler, other students seem to struggle with the sense of Uniformity. It is 
the struggle which makes the theme of Uniformity more myth than substance. When I 
invited the students to select their pseudonyms that would be used in this study, 
students replied with names such as Jesus, Juanita, Moses, Raistlin, and Ferde. Some 
of these are the names the students used in their foreign language classes, and some 
names are nicknames. But the students chose to be known in the study through these 
names. I feel that this selection signifies an attempt to be seen as something other than 
homogeneous and monolithic. These names are markers of the students' struggle to be 
individuals.
Another marker of the students' desire to be individuals is seen in their 
classroom efforts. A small group of students does not always meet up to the standards 
others expect. Meredith explains that not all students at U High are trying to obtain the
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best education possible for them. Many are willing to "come to school everyday and 
you know, do nothing, or do the bare minimum." (A 273)
If some part of my description fails to allow the reader a useful understanding 
of the students in Hurston's Biology II class, it is on the topic of student individuality.
In our discussion of an early draft of this chapter the students' most serious concerns 
had to do with this topic. As might be expected, they perceived the members of their 
class as being distinctly individualistic. Several students in the group pointed out that 
my description failed to underscore that individuality. One student mentioned that they 
each have very different personalities and personal interests. Priscilla reminded me 
that while the students all have similar professional goals, they have different reasons 
behind the quest for these goals. The discussion reawakened me to the knowledge that 
while generalizations can be useful, they often do the analyzed group a disservice.
Summary
Principal: Ah, if you're going to be around here for a while, the kids 
would pretty much look like regular kids. They’re not exceptionally 
mature for their ages. . . .  They don't all do the right things at the right 
times. They're not all doing the best they can academically. We have a 
good spread of th a t . .  . and an interesting group of kids. (P 71)
In some respects I now agree with the principal, I can see a great deal of
diversity in these students. But that recognition came only over time, after a great deal
o f study. Initially, I did view this Biology II class as a monolithic group of smart,
ambitious, middle-class, and motivated students. But through watching the class and
talking with students, I did begin to recognize them as individuals. I can now see that
this group of individuals have some commonalties.
What does this group of students have in common? What is the culture of this
class? Many practical implications of that culture will be discussed in the next chapter.
But some of the more universal characteristics include the value the students place
upon academic knowledge, academic practices, and the processes of education. Much
of this value may actually be the result of the students' goal of obtaining a particular
83
kind of profession as a result o f what they perceive as proper schooling. The students 
value the individual in her/his attempt to gain academic knowledge, but that 
individualism is tempered with a recognition of the need for the individual to make 
contributions to the greater community. Students learn, but students should help others 
to learn. Additionally, students are responsible for helping keep U High a place where 
this optimal learning can occur.
CHAPTER 5
THE TEACHER AND HER TEACHING PRACTICES 
The Teacher
The teacher's office is located off the front of the classroom. The small office is 
crowded with school material interspersed with more personal effects. The room 
contains an enormous amount o f books stacked in piles on the floor, the desk, and 
falling out of over-crowded book shelves. These include a mixture of practical biology 
classroom texts and catalogues ( biological supply catalogues, Gerbils. and Project 
2061: Science for All Americans') interspersed with literature (such as Eco-Fiction. A 
Sand Countv Almanack Then I notice the desk. It is difficult to see its surface because 
of the volume of papers it holds. On the walls surrounding the desk, pictures are 
arranged showing Hurston's own children and many of the children she has taught.
The office reflects much o f what I think of when I think o f Paula Hurston: 
children, biology, entertainment, hustle. She is a woman of diverse interests and 
abilities. She feels that one of her strengths is her ability to "access a lot o f th ings.. . .  I 
have the ability to pull from a lot o f different areas." (P 45) This ability to draw from 
different disciplines stems, in part, from Ms. Hurston's wide educational experiences. 
Her undergraduate degree was in biology and chemistry. Later, she became 
simultaneously certified in science education and received her Master's Degree in this 
area. She is currently working on a second master's degree, this one in natural science, 
by taking one evening course each semester.
Even while teaching and working toward a degree, Paula remains very involved 
in professional organizations. She has been on the board o f the National Association of 
Biology Teachers. Associated with this organization, Paula has been the regional 
coordinator and state representative for the Outstanding Biology Teaching Award and 
has been involved with the long-range planning committee. She is also a member of
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the Louisiana Science Teacher Association, and she was a founding member for the
Louisiana Biological Educators. In additional to these organizations, Paula often
presents papers at professional conferences and workshops. She has participated in an
internship sponsored by the Howard Hughs Medical Institute by working with a
zoologist during the summer months. She was selected to attend an outstanding
biology teacher's symposium sponsored by National Science Foundation. She often
provides workshops in biology teaching techniques for other teachers in the parish.
More closely related to this study, she participated in an evolution education workshop,
and she attended the Evolution Education Research Conference during the year of the
study and published in the proceedings (Good et al., 1992).
When one considers all of these activities, a picture o f a very motivated, well
informed, and "driven" teacher emerges. (P 45) Ms. Hurston goes beyond the
minimum amount of work expected of her and seeks additional experiences because:
Hurston: I'm always learning something new. That's one of the, the 
exciting things, that I'm always provided the opportunity to learn about 
new things, and the impetus to leam about new things, and the reason to 
go and learn something new. . .  . And that's what keeps me alive and 
keeps my teaching from being [she moves her hand in a straight line].
(P 43)
Ms. Hurston acknowledges that she is simultaneously "laid back" and "driven." 
In my observations in the classroom, she continually has a friendly demeanor. In her 
discussions with students, she often sits on top of the front desk swinging her legs in a 
carefree fashion. She decorates her classroom for almost all holidays, and she brings 
small treats for the students, typically candy which they all quickly consume. At 
Christmas she wore an elf hat and a red nose. In our many conversations, Paula is 
talkative, helpful, and full of amusing stories.
It is difficult to adjust this leisurely picture with the other in which Paula is in 
constant motion. But aspects of both these portraits of Paula are there, intermingled: 
the presence of one feature making the other more effective in the classroom. How is 
this constant pull sustained?
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Hurston: I’m busy enough in my own little comer of the world that I, I 
don't go out [of the classroom]. I don't sit in the lounge a lot. I just 
never have got that kind of time. . . .  I have always read while I was 
eating lunch. And maybe that is such an ingrained habit that I feel real 
stressed out if I don't read something during the day. I do find I have to 
have a little time by myself during the day. Or I just, just really (sighs).
I love people, I like being around people, but I need a little bit of alone 
time sometimes during the day to keep me mentally healthy. (P 29)
One way in which the dichotomy of driven and being laid back asserts itself is
in Paula's fluid teaching style. She is always looking for:
Hurston: A better way to do it. I'm always changing things. So you 
know, every time I leam something new, that means that goes in, and 
other things get rearranged. (P 100)
All of my experiences watching Paula Hurston in the classroom made explicit
her love of the ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in the discipline of biology:
Hurston: It's kinda neat to think that there are realms that we don't yet 
understand and know about. (P 3)
She is also a woman who is firmly committed to the project of teaching:
Hurston: [Teaching] has an impact on a lot of people's lives, and you 
can have a real positive influence on kids. You can impact their lives in a 
lot of ways. I like the challenge involved. There is a lot more challenge 
to teaching than just about any other job I know of. (P 43)
Hurston: Teaching consumes me, it really does. I spend a tremendous 
amout of my time out of the classroom thinking about the classroom, 
doing things related to the classroom, learning about things for the 
classroom. (P 100)
Hurston's Teaching Philosophy
Paula Hurston's general views and beliefs about teaching are deeply rooted, and
she articulates them in a somewhat fragmented fashion. However, there are themes
which continually emerge as she talks about teaching. These themes reflect her beliefs
of effective teaching and theories of student learning.
Close Student Teacher Relationships
Ms. Hurston's first concern is maintaining a close relationship with her students.
Hurston: How do kids leam? . . . You know, I've always said that you 
can't teach them anything unless you can get them on your side. That's 
why I think teachers fail, because they do this big authoritarian, "You'll 
learn this because I said you'll learn this." So you [the teacher] have to
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get out o f the adversary role [with the students]. We're not adversaries, 
we're on the same side. We're working for the same thing. (P 61)
Building close relationships with her students is very important to Ms. Hurston, and
she feels that it is this skill, "the ability to see from their perspective," that she learned
from raising her own three children. (P 63)
Students' Interest
Intimately tied to this close relationship, Hurston explains that students must be 
interested in what is studied in order to leam. Hurston feels that she too should be 
interested in the topic in order to transmit that enthusiasm to the students. She "trades” 
on her close relationships with students to introduce them to the topics of biology. (P 
23) Additionally, she attempts to present topics in a manner that is relevant and 
important to the students lives. She discusses real world applications of biology so that 
students can come to understand the value of information. Hurston understands that 
real learning, "not just memorization," is fostered only in the presence of students' 
interest. (P61)
Prior Knowledge and Developmental Level
Hurston views prior knowledge and student cognitive development to be
important controlling factors of learning.
H urston: [Students] learn by experiencing it [the topic] and by tying it 
to their own personal experience. They have to have a knowledge base 
to base their learning on. (P61)
She adds a Piagetian twist to this Ausubelian explanation, "They learn it when they are
ready to learn it and not before." (P 61) Based on this hybrid learning theory, Hurston
explains that even for seniors, topics should be introduced from the "ground up."
H urston: You've [the teacher] got to make connections for them [the students]. 
You can't get too simple. Labs and activities and experiences. I use the same 
things with elementary school kids, middle school kids, and high school kids. 
And they learn different things at different levels. I always feel like I'm judged 
on how basic I can make [a topic 1. (P 61-62)
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Critical Thought
After watching a lesson on mitosis, Ms. Hurston spoke with the student teacher in
charge o f the presentation. She suggested that the student teacher would benefit from a
change in the focus and goals of her teaching. Instead of emphasizing 20 important
facts, Ms. Hurston suggested that she should emphasize a very small number of
important concepts, "because if you're lucky you might teach those two or three things."
(P 21) By decreasing her emphasis, Ms. Hurston believes this allows the students:
Hurston: to turn it around all different directions and look at 
it. . . . Then they own it. Then they can do something with it. That's what 
I consider to be critical thinking skills, the ability to look at it, turn it 
around in all angles, and figure out what to do with it. (P 64)
Hurston's understanding of critical thought as the goal of instruction is very
similar to the description of meaningful learning provided by Smith, Blakeslee, and
Anderson (1993). These authors define meaningful learning of science as "coming to
understand scientific ideas as they are used for their intended purposes, including
description, prediction, and explanation of phenomena in the natural world." ( Smith et
al., 1993, p. 111). Hurston's "figure out what to do with it" includes the applications of
scientific knowledge as described by Smith et al. (1993). Such applications require that
the student go beyond the rote learning of material to application of that knowledge.
While Hurston does not use the specific term, she is teaching for meaningful learning in
her students.
Classroom Atmosphere 
Toward these ends and in keeping with her close relationship with the students, 
Ms. Hurston does not establish herself as the authority in her classroom. Instead she 
views her role as "a facilitator, a motivator, a coach not a player." (P 49) She feels this 
gives her students the greatest freedom to investigate different aspects of a science topic. 
It is through these investigations that she feels students come to "own" knowledge.
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Ms. Hurston believes that her equitable relationship with students places upon
them the responsibility for their own learning. She expects the students to be active
participants in class: she delights in a talkative, active class.
H urston: I love it when they get to picking and arguing with each other 
and challenging each other on a fairly serious level. (P 33)
Ms. Hurston fails to understand students who do not take part. She explains that student
side "talking doesn't bother me nearly as much as being quiet." (P 36) Because of this,
she constantly manufactures situations, laboratories, discussions, or debates that will
foster the participation of more of her class.
Just as students are responsible for their own learning, they too are responsible
for their behavior in the classroom. Unlike many teachers, discipline is not a topic Ms.
Hurston dwells on.
H urston: I guess I trade on my relationship with the kids for discipline.
Ah, they recognize that I am always fair with them, that I am always 
sensitive to their problems or w hatever.. . .  And because of that, I guess I 
trade on it, in that I then expect for them to treat me fairly, and with respect.
(P 23)
She acknowledges that discipline is not a large factor for any classroom in U High. This 
situation is magnified in her classroom where talking and movement are encouraged and 
discipline is "not to be worried about." (P 21)
Hurston designs her classes to promote student participation. This participation 
includes student interactions with materials, with the teacher, and with other students.
While such classroom activities are congruent with the conceptual change teaching 
practices as described by Smith et al. (1993), the application of the conceptual change 
label to Hurston's teaching would be artificial. While familiar with the conceptual 
change theory as described by Posner et al. (1982), Hurston did not consciously design 
her teaching using this theoretical framework. But it is noteworthy to mention that 
Hurston has an intuitive recognition of the importance of student-student and student- 
teacher dialogues in the learning process. She recognizes that a student must relate 
her/his new knowledge to pre-existing knowledge, and this relation at times requires a
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wholesale change of the student's prior conceptions. Hurston's teaching centers on the 
effectiveness of student dialogue in this process of change. While she does not cite 
Vygotsky's social learning theory, she has a recognition that much "real” learning is a 
social act. Thus, I am hesitant to label Hurston's teaching. However, many of her 
teaching practices can be understood when conceptual change is understood to be a 
social construction.
Hurston's Conception of a Good Teacher
H urston: Uhm, a good teacher is just anyone who can inspire kids to care 
about learning something. Ah, not necessarily in the classroom. I mean, a 
good teacher is anybody who can forge the kind of relationship with kids 
that makes then either care about learning, or want to learn, or learn 
something unwillingly even. You know, it's. [Sighs] It gets beyond, far, 
far, far beyond content, into attitudes and you know the whole thing about 
wanting to iruike people into life-long learners. Make them care about 
things. Make them care about learning. Anybody who can accomplish that 
is a good teacher. (P 99)
The Biology II Course
Teacher's Description of the Course
Ms. Hurston has been engaged in science education research in the past. A
portion of the students studied by Cummins (1991) were enrolled in Ms. Hurston's
Biology II course. For this earlier dissertation, Hurston wrote a description of her
course, and much of this description continues to hold true:
My major goal in planning my science course was to develop a 
curriculum to meet my dual objectives of preparing students for scientific 
careers and of developing scientific literacy in all students.. . .  The usual 
Biology II course is a repeat of biology I on a high level, an anatomy and 
physiology course, or an AP biology course which is again biology I on a 
higher level. They all emphasize very structured, fact-based content with 
a lot of rote memorization. A number of researchers in science education 
have decried this type o f teaching, stressing instead the need to teach 
critical thinking skills, process skills, cross-disciplinary information, and 
scientific literacy. The AAAS’s Project 2061 incorporates many o f the 
goals which I had included in my classes, and I was very pleased to 
discover the correlation. They stress understanding key concepts, being 
familiar with the natural world and with technology, and having a 
capacity for scientific thinking, knowing the strengths and weaknesses of 
science as a human enterprise, and using scientific knowledge and way of 
thinking in an interdisciplinary world. This fills the needs for both 
science and non-science majors in college, and for those who don't want 
to go to college as well. The National Research Council's Fulfilling the
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Promise states that "The time has come to stop designing curricula by the 
process o f serial dilution, in which the high-school course is a thin version 
of the college course, and the middle-school course is a thin version of the 
high school course" They suggest that the AP biology course "may not 
the soundest educational experience for students" who take a second 
biology course in high school. They recommend either a course in 
experimental science or what they call a "capstone" course. This course 
would include several modules which would integrate science and society 
issues and focus on current topics of interest. The students would brain 
storm and research the problems and write reports giving alternatives, 
conclusions, and recommendations. They see the benefit of this course as 
"the educational reward to students in discovering interdependencies, 
complexities, dilemmas, ambiguities, and the need to synthesize 
information in designing solutions to society's problems" as well as 
developing "skills in reading critically" and giving "understanding that 
scientific inquiry is open-ended and that studying science is not simply 
reading and memorizing." I was really thrilled to read this, because that 
is exactly what my Biology II course is designed to do.
I began developing this course [seven] years ago. It has evolved 
over the years and continues to do so, and I include some input from the 
students on possible topics. The basic structure of the course includes an 
exploration into what science really is and how it is carried on, including 
experimental design, problem-solving activities, brainstorming, critical 
reading and thinking skills, library and reference skills, and laboratory 
skills and techniques. . . .
The class is rarely dull, and I'm not always sure which students 
will respond to which experiences, but they all find something which 
turns them on during the year. It's very important to set the tone from the 
first that they can express themselves freely without fear of being laughed 
at or put down by the other students or more subtly put down by the 
teacher. Sometimes the discussions get heated because they develop 
rather passionate views on the issues but with little 'monitoring' hurt 
feeling and anger can usually be avoided. I consider my students to be 
well on their way to scientific literacy, and they love it! (Cummins, 1992, 
pp. 165-172)
Hurston's Goals for the Biology II Course 
Hurston explained that she used many different instructional methods because 
she had several distinct goals for her students. She identified seven goals which 
influenced both the scope of her course and her teaching methods. These goals 
include: (a) to expose the students to the methods and goals o f science, (b) to expose 
the students to the relationship of science to other disciplines and to other aspects of 
their lives, (c) to expose the students to topics of biology they might not have 
previously encountered, (d) to nurture students' interest and excitement in science, (e) 
to make the students scientifically literate, (f) to enhance students' abilities to critically
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read, analyze, and question the findings of science, and (g) to familiarize the students
with common laboratory techniques.
Which of these goals were more important in Ms. Hurston's course? The
answer to this question varied with the unit being studied. Perhaps the two most
influential goals of this course were the development of a sound understanding of the
nature of science and the development of the students' abilities to think critically about
methods and findings of science. Hurston was very concerned with helping students
construct a firm understanding of the nature of science; that is, "the realities of how it
| science] really does work and fit into their worlds." (P 15) She also fashioned much
of her teaching around the goal of critical thought.
H urston: That's what the whole course is designed to do anyway is to 
teach them how to look at things and think about them. (P 18)
Instructional Units 
The course stretched over 151 days from the beginning of school until the 
seniors began their final examinations. (The course extended one week past this time 
for the juniors, but this period of instruction was not included in the analysis as the 
posttesting for the research had been completed.) Of the 151 days, the class was 
engaged in testing during seven days. The remaining 144 days were set aside for 
instruction. Approximately one and a half of these 144 days were used in testing for 
my research and student discussion o f my research.
As shown on Figure 3, there were nine major instructional units in Ms. 
Hurston's Biology II course. However, Hurston's instruction did not proceed directly 
from one of these major units to another. Instead, these nine units formed the skeleton 
of the course, and total instruction devoted to these units included only 103 days of 
instruction. The remaining instructional time was directed toward topics outside of the 
instructional skeleton. These tangential topics were typically addressed through 
means of a laboratory or an outside speaker. Instruction in these topics seldom
Teaching Units
Year beginning (August 14, 1992) 























Teaching time line: The amount of class time spent in each major teaching unit and 
number of instructional episodes in evolution
extended more than one or two days in succession. Additionally, Ms. Hurston often
revisited topics weeks or months after the students' first introduction to the unit.
Figure 3 also oversimplifies Hurston's class in another way. Close
consideration of the instructional topics reveals the blending of units. For example,
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while several days were devoted to the discussion of the current conception of the 
nature of science, the unit devoted to dinosaurs and theories o f dinosaur extinctions 
represented another means of demonstrating how science works. Therefore, the first 
two units of instruction were closely interwoven, and it is difficult to separate precisely 
where one unit ended and the second began. With this in mind, Figure 3 can be seen as 
a rough generalization of the instructional topics of the course and their relative time 
spans. (Appendix D includes an outline of the actual teaching materials used 
throughout the school year.)
The first unit focused on the nature of science. For five days, the students 
participated in laboratories, read news articles, and watched videos. Hurston's 
intention for this unit was to acquaint students with the procedures o f science, both in 
experimentation and argumentation. Additionally, an analysis of pseudoscientific 
topics was designed to help students begin to recognize the range and limits of 
scientific explanations.
The second unit focused on dinosaurs-their behaviors, their evolutionary 
beginnings and descendants, and the various theories of their extinction. For 10 days 
the students studied dinosaurs through class discussions, videos, and readings taken 
from an assortment of books, newspapers, and science magazines. During this unit 
students saw how scientific theories currently in use have undergone revisions and 
modifications. This unit stressed the tentative nature of scientific theories. By the end 
of the dinosaur unit, students were discussing the merits and disadvantages of many 
theories still currently under debate within scientific circles. In Lemke's (1990) words, 
the student were learning to "talk science." Hurston designed this section to allow 
students to understand the implicit rules of science and scientific argumentation. So 
while the focus of the unit was dinosaurs, this material provided an excellent medium 
though which students could get a glimpse of science currently "under construction."
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The material selected for this unit stressed that science is a human endeavor, often 
accomplished by ordinary people who are intensely interested in a particular subject.
Throughout the year, portraying the current conception o f the nature of science 
was a guide post of Ms. Hurston’s class. Within each unit, the methods of inquiry and 
the products of that inquiry were analyzed by the class. This focal point was more 
obvious in the beginning two units, but later units clearly emphasized the nature of 
scientific inquiry as well (anthropology and evolution). So while the description of the 
following units will not stress this focal point, the emphasis of the nature of science 
was never omitted in Hurston's teaching.
One of the last aspects of the unit on dinosaurs included readings on dinosaur 
behavior. Hurston introduced students to the means scientists use to study behavior 
through fossilized remains, tracks, and traces. This discussion led easily into methods 
employed to study the behavior of living organisms. Through the use of many videos, 
journal readings, and laboratory experiences (both in the classroom, at home, and at the 
local zoo), students became familiar with the practices of the study of animal behavior. 
This unit occupied 19 days of instructional time. While the unit on animal behavior 
stressed the different methods through which primate behaviors are described, the 
various theoretical bases behind the behaviors were not emphasized. Much of the 
research the students studied included the voluminous work of Jane Goodall with the 
chimpanzees in Africa. Because of the nature of this and related research, many 
students became keenly familiar with the basis of primate behaviors and with humans' 
relationships to the other primates.
During the animal behavior unit, class-wide discussions established that most 
of the students had begun to recognize the striking parallels between the behavior of all 
primates, including humans. From this common recognition, Hurston launched into 
discussions of animal rights and animal conservation. This short unit lasted seven days 
and was begun with a discussion of the value of zoological parks. Several videos were
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used to portray the benefits and drawbacks of the use of animals in experimentation. 
The bulk of the unit centered on student preparation for a two-day debate in which they 
had to argue for or against the use of animals in experimentation, education, industry, 
entertainment, and trapping.
The following two units were designed to prepare the students who were 
planning on pre-medical college educations. The first was a unit on genetic 
techniques. This six-day unit was centered on a three-day laboratory exercise in DNA 
electrophoresis. Students were given prepared DNA samples which they differentiated 
using gel electrophoresis. The materials for this laboratory were provided through the 
university, and the students were videotaped by the local public television station as 
they completed the laboratory exercise. Hurston related this technique to the concept 
of DNA cloning by the use of another exercise which had students participate in 
"mock" preparation of DNA clones for viral vaccines.
The anatomy unit was also designed explicitly for the many pre-medical 
students. For this 10-day unit, the students participated in dissection of a fetal pig led 
by Joe Ellen, the student teacher under Hurston's instruction. Hurston explained that 
this exercise allows students to gain experience in dissection and to decide if they 
enjoy this type of activity. Although the students were not required to dissect, each 
chose to do so. Students worked in groups of three as they dissected several organ 
systems. The students were responsible for the anatomy of these organ systems but not 
their physiology. The unit culminated in a laboratory practical and journal entry.
Evolution was the next unit following anatomy. Because Hurston's instruction 
in evolution is a focus of this study, this unit will be described in much greater detail in 
a following section.
The unit of microbiology techniques required 21 instructional days and was the 
longest unit of the course. Although this was a fairly comprehensive laboratory 
treatment of microbiology, only laboratory techniques were stressed; other aspects of
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the discipline were not addressed. During this unit students gained many of the 
laboratory skills they would need in a college course in microbiology, including media 
preparation, sterile transfer technique, slide preparation and staining, and bacterial 
culturing practices. They also complete a series of tests on a group of stock cultures. 
These data were used by each laboratory group in the identification of a bacterial 
unknown which was the culmination of this unit. Hurston views this as an important 
unit because college microbiology courses often do not allow students ample time to 
refine their laboratory skills. She has designed this unit to allow her students a "head 
start" in this area. The identification of the unknown required the students to use 
reasoning skills to determine one answer based on their voluminous data.
The unit on anthropology comprised the final 15 days o f instruction. Again, 
this was a laboratory intensive unit, focusing on the methods o f physical anthropology 
as they are used to explain tentative evolutionary relationships of early humans. 
Students learned techniques which enabled them to determine the gender, age, and 
approximate size of an individual based upon measurements taken from skull and 
skeleton. The students also learned the applications physical anthropology has for 
forensic science, and they visited two forensic laboratories in the area. The unit 
culminated with the students proposing a human lineage based on four skulls by using 
both the techniques and theories they learned throughout this section.
As mentioned previously, while Figure 3 shows the nine major units of 
instruction, many other topics were addressed in the class. A scientist from the 
university visited for three days and helped the students with a neurophysiology 
laboratory. The students learned the basics of the physiology of vision through another 
laboratory experience. The topic of human behavior was addressed through a set of 
readings, and the students were responsible for completing their own experiments in 
this area. Throughout the year, the Ms. Hurston continued to emphasize the methods 
used in science through a series of laboratories designed to explain the fundamental
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principles of scientific sampling, control groups, and data analysis. Even though nine 
major units of instruction were identified, many more topics were addressed in a more 
limited or fragmented fashion.
Instructional Methods
Ms. Hurston's instruction is very student centered, with the students expected to
take an active role in the instruction on an almost daily basis. In a randomly selected
sample of 20 instructional days, the main lesson activity relied on small group work for
55% of the days, the main lesson activity relied on individual group work for 30% of
the days, and the main lesson activity relied on whole group work for 15% of the days.
These statistics are congruent with Hurston’s description of the course as "an
exploration into what science is and how it is carried on." (Cummins, 1992, p. 172)
While she emphasized small group work, Hurston used several methods of
teaching in her Biology II course. On any given day, typically two or three teaching
methods were employed.
H urston: I’ve got so many different goals and things that I want to, to 
accomplish with the kids that I bounce around from thing to thing just 
trying to accomplish different goals. You know, I don't see anything 
wrong with being somebody different everyday. (P 49)
However, some methods were used more frequently than others, and the most
common or prominent teaching methods will be discussed in this section. Table
4 compares the most prominent instructional methods and their frequency of use.
Class Discussions
If we consider discussions to include any oral treatment of a topic, whole class 
discussions were used virtually every class day. This frequency is not reflected in the 
statistics for the main lesson activity because these statistics reflect only the main 
activity for a day. While discussions were rarely the main lesson activity for an 
instructional day, they were frequently employed by Hurston. The average whole class 
discussion was eight minutes in length and typically five or six short, whole class
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discussions were held per week. Occasionally discussions were omitted from class 
activities, but only when an activity was continued from a previous day.
Table 4
Type and amount of use o f the most prominent instructional methods in the
Biology II course
Instructional Method Number o f Uses
Audio-visual Presentations 20





The most common discussions held in Ms. Hurston's room included teacher 
exposition, structured triadic dialogue, loose triadic dialogue, and student cross 
discussions. These categories are taken from Lemke's (1990) analysis o f science 
classroom discourse. In this analysis, Lemke (1990) describes teacher expositions as 
an explanation given in the form of a monologue. In a triadic dialogue, the teacher 
asks a question, calls on a student to answer the question, and then proceeds to 
evaluate the
student's answer. For the purposes of Ms. Hurston's class, I have further divided 
triadic dialogue into structured and loose categories. A structured triadic dialogue has 
several steps:
(a) the teacher asks a question,
(b) the student gains the teacher's attention either through raising hands or
calling out,
(c) the teacher recognizes the student,
(d) the student calls out the answer, and
(e) the teacher comments/evaluates the student's answer.
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For the purposes of my study, a loose triadic dialogue may have only steps a and b.
The more formal steps are omitted in this type of discussion. The final common 
discussion in Ms. Hurston's classroom was a student cross discussion. In this 
exchange, the students speak directly to one another in reference to the class material 
with the teacher acting as a moderator or as an equal participant in the discussion.
The most commonly used type of discussion was a loose triadic dialogue.
Although this type of discussion is informal, these discussions were often very 
successful in providing a comprehensive treatment of the topic The success of these 
discussion was due to a high degree of student participation and engagement. Hurston 
felt her classes were very active in this type of discussion because of the friendly 
classroom atmosphere in which students could "express themselves freely without fear 
o f being laughed at or put down" by the teacher (Cummins, 1992, p. 172).
The structured triadic dialogue was used less frequently by Ms. Hurston. This 
more formal activity type was used infrequently, normally during periods of low 
student engagement, (e.g., on the Friday of Homecoming). Hurston used this activity 
in an effort to focus students on the material under discussion. On the occasions when 
Hurston felt constrained into using this formal structure, she explicitly asked the class 
the source of their distraction. They would talk briefly about this, (e.g., a very difficult 
test in another class), and then the discussion would revert back to biology.
Hurston used a teacher exposition format of discussion to present procedural 
information for a laboratory or other exercise in the beginning of a class period.
However, even within these guarded conditions, Hurston’s monologue often changed 
rapidly into a structured triadic dialogue. An example of this change was seen in her 
presentation of the working of an autoclave in the microbiology laboratory. Hurston 
began the explanation using straight exposition which required no input from the 
students. Within three minutes of this presentation, Hurston soon changed the format 
asking questions such as:
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Where would I put the water?
What's the water for?
What’s the steam for? (F 504)
Once again, we see Hurston's attempts to remove herself from a position of extreme 
authority in the classroom while she engages the students in the classroom 
presentation.
The final commonly used discussion strategy was student cross discussions.
These cross discussions involved students responding directly to another student in a 
whole class discussion. Often, these cross discussions would take the form of one 
student arguing with a point made by another student. These debates have been 
described in the earlier section on classroom culture. In the cross discussions, Hurston 
served as a moderator, ensuring that the participants' comments could be heard by the 
entire class. The following is an example of a student cross discussion/debate:
Hurston: What did you think of Jane Goodall's video ["So Like Us"]?
Grady: It was a side show. She choreographed the whole thing to fit her
little script.
Calvin: Yeah, she did that a little. But she also showed that the chimps
can feel what we feel.
Bob: But can they? Can they feel what we feel?
Philip: I don't think we should be [slowly] anthropomorpholizing [sic]
them.
Hurston: What?
Philip: I don't think we should be [slowly] anthropomorphizing them.
Calvin: I wonder if they can think ahead? Can they plan things like?
Priscilla: Yeah, we say that. I mean they showed that the gorilla could.
(F 197)
The significance of this discussion is that students were addressing one another, not 
Hurston. This was a true cross discussion, with the students in an equal position of 
authority as the teacher. Lemke (1990) remarks that teachers "often will tolerate 
student cross discussion, but they do not encourage it." (Lemke, 1990, p. 56) This 
statement is not true of Hurston class. Instead, she designs her teaching to nurture 
these moments.
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Hurston's use o f discussions reflect her goal of nurturing critical thought in her 
students, her emphasis of the procedures o f science, and her reluctance to be the "class 
authority" on a topic. Loose triadic dialogues allow students to quickly suggest 
answers and remove Hurston as the focus of the classroom. The prominence of student 
cross discussion reflects the same tendency toward a student centered/controlled 
approach to dealing with course material.
Types of discussion questions
The most frequent type of question asked by Hurston during discussions was 
open-ended questions which could have many correct answers. Some examples of 
Hurston's questions include:
What does the first article tell you about how scientists work?
(F 40)
What does paleontology tell us about science? (F 61)
What evidence is used for classifying organisms? What about DNA? (F 96)
Should we institute a genetic screening program at our hospital?
(F 359)
If I want to know how many meal worms I have in this pan, how do I find out?
(F 312)
The reliance on open-ended questions differentiates Hurston's class from many 
other science classrooms where students are required to recite definitions and factual 
information. Like her reliance on loose triadic dialogues, the use of this questioning 
strategy also allows Hurston's students a greater control of classroom material. These 
questions also allow students a greater freedom to use reasoning strategies instead of 
rote learning strategies in the formation of their answers. However, Smith et al. (1993) 
describe open-ended questions as improbable vehicles for eliciting conceptual change.
These authors argue that open-ended questions do not provide an opportunity for 




Discussions in Hurston's class had a core of diligent participants. Four of the
junior boys, Calvin, Philip, Bob, and Raistlin, could always be relied upon to
participate in a discussion. Two additional boys, Brian and Jesus, would volunteer
information if the correct answer was not immediately forthcoming or if the discussion
began to grow tiresome for the rest of the class. These six boys carried the bulk of all
class-wide discussions. If the topic was particularly interesting, another group would
offer responses or ask additional questions. This small group included junior and
senior boys and girls. While discussion were active in Hurston's class, not all students
participated in the conversations. However, most students appeared to be engaged in
the material as it was discussed; they turned their heads to watch the speaker and
occasionally nodding in approval.
During a sampling of 18 different class discussions, 68% of the total class
comments were offered by boys, and 3% of the total class comments were offered by
girls.^ These comments took the form of answers or questions offered in whole class
discussions. These figures correspond to my preliminary assessment that the boys,
particularly the juniors, were much more active in whole class discussions. The
differential participation becomes more striking when one considers that there were
more girls in the class than boys. When I asked Tyler, a senior girl, about my
observations, she commented:
SD: I've noticed that typically girls just don't talk a lot in [Ms. Hurston’s 
class].
2 My analysis of the effects of gender in the classroom is both superficial and 
brief. This state is regrettable in light of the pronounced effects gender had in 
classroom participation. After my initial observations, data collection, and interviews 
focusing on this topic, however, it became obvious that I was ill-equipped to tease out 
the meaning classroom participation, student power structures, and gender relations had 
for my participants. Therefore, I chose to report my initial findings while 
acknowledging that the gender of my participants played a role in learning I have not 
yet come to understand.
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Tyler: Uh, uh. [Yes] It's cause the guys overpower everybody in that 
class.
SD: Is that really what you think?
Tyler: Yes. Because they don't give you a chance. I've, I've, I used to 
want to say a lot of stuff. And I would start saying and every time one of 
those guys would just blurt out 
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes]
Tyler: and I just give up. I don't talk anymore. (C 187)
Tyler's comments should be compared to comments made by Brian (a junior 
boy) and Stephanie (a senior girl). Both of these students had noticed that most of the 
questions were answered by a nucleus of boys, but they explained that this differential 
participation had to do more with the different personalities of the class members than 
any action of gender. Stephanie went on to explain that she will offer answers when 
she has something "new" to offer to the class. Other than this, however, she will 
remain quiet in all of her classes.
Differences in class participation between genders has been researched by 
many science educators. I was unable to investigate the hypothesis offered by Brian 
and Stephanie that students talked more or less frequently because of their personalities 
and not because of their genders. However, I did attend an English class taken by 
many of these same students, to see if the differential participation was due more to the 
subject than some other factor. The same trend held true in English; more boys 
volunteered information than girls. Based on the stable cross discipline results, the 
differential participation may be due more to general cultural influences than the action 
of a subject area.
Linn (1987) suggests that many aspects of the gender differences seen in 
science classes are due to the varied experiences of girls and boys both in and out of 
the science classroom. She explains that many girls have fewer experiences dealing 
with science-related topics out of school, and this differential experience accounts for 
the acceleration of boys in science. However, during my observations it became 
obvious that many girls knew the correct answers during whole class discussions, but
105
chose not to give voice to their knowledge. What is at issue is not a difference in the 
declarative knowledge of boys and girls, but a difference in their willingness to 
participate in whole group activities. It is here that past experiences may play a role in 
shaping the discussion behaviors of girls.
Laboratories
An analysis of the class reveals that it is heavily laboratory oriented. During 
the year, Hurston used 47 laboratories in her class. For the purposes o f this study, a 
biological laboratory exercise is defined as an opportunity for experimentation and 
observations of some aspect o f living organisms or practice of a experimental 
technique. (A list of the laboratories can be found in section 1 of Appendix D.)
Hurston selected the laboratories based on the "extended discretion” approach 
(Leonard, 1980). Using this approach, the laboratories assigned early in the school 
year have pre-established procedures. Laboratories assigned later require the students 
to make more and more decisions in the structure of the laboratory. Hurston's goal was 
to have the students become able to plan and carry out their own laboratory 
investigations. She used the extended discretion approach as a means of "getting way 
from the cook-book lab. You give them less and less guidance, and they have to figure 
things out for themselves.” (P 2)
Virtually all of these laboratory exercises were completed by the students in 
small groups during class hours. However, during the unit on animal behavior, three of 
the laboratories were completed by individual students after school hours, and another 
exercise was completed by the students a field trip to a local zoo. Only three units 
were not accompanied by laboratories; these included units on dinosaurs, evolution, 
and animal rights. But it must be remembered that these three units only accounted for 
only 26 of the total 143 instructional days.
The typical laboratory exercise would begin with the students being assigned to 
read the laboratory instructions the night before the exercise. The next day there would
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be a short teacher exposition/triadic dialogue which would further explain the 
laboratory procedures. Afterwards, the students would divide into small groups of three 
to four members. The small groups, selected by the students, typically consisted of 
students of both genders, and the group members remained relatively constant 
throughout the school year. During the laboratory, Hurston and Joe Ellen remained 
available for students' questions. Laboratory questions were predominately of a 
procedural nature as the students attempted to carry out the exercise. Students were 
required to turn in a set o f questions or a laboratory report completed individually at 
the beginning of the next class day. Afterwards, the exercise would be discussed in the 
form o f a loose triadic dialogue.
Hurston’s reliance on laboratories as a teaching method is congruent with her 
course goals of developing (a) a sound understanding of the nature of science, (b) the 
ability to think critically about methods and findings of science, and (c) a familiarity 
with common laboratory techniques. Hurston also describes the laboratory experience 
as an ideal method in capturing students' interest in the practice of biology.
Videos and Associated Media
Hurston's teaching during several units was dependent on the use of videos and 
other audio-visual media. Hurston used 20 audio-visual presentations as the main 
lesson activities throughout the school year. (A list of the audio-visual presentation 
can be found in section 3 o f Appendix D.)
Typically the audio-visual presentation would be preceded by a short teacher 
monologue. Often, Hurston would stop the presentation to ask the whole class a 
question. Hurston expected students to pay attention during these presentations. For 
example, if she found a particular student's attention to be wavering, she would lightly 
touch the student on the shoulder or whisper in her/his ear. The following day the 
video would be discussed in a whole class setting. On three occasions, the students 
were asked to write a short essay related to the contents of a video presentation.
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Several units were structured heavily around audio-visual activities. These 
units included dinosaurs, animal behavior, animal rights, and evolution. Hurston found 
videos to be an effective means of presenting a great deal of very current information 
to her students. She explained that students can often leam a great deal from such 
presentations as long as appropriate means are selected to ensure their attention. It is 
her opinion that this method has the additional advantage of capturing students' 
attention in a generation that is heavily influenced by the media.
Readings
Because there was not a traditional text used in Hurston's course, much of the 
material was presented in the form of laboratory exercises, audio-visual presentations, 
and student readings. Most the 18 articles the students were assigned to read were 
taken from scientific publications designed for the public, such as Discover. Other 
articles were taken from science teaching journals, such as The Science Teacher, and 
selected essays on natural history, such as Natural Acts. A small number of articles 
were selected from newspapers and tabloids. (For a list o f the readings, see section 2 
in Appendix D.)
Most articles were assigned to be read as homework. The following day 
Hurston would lead a whole class discussion of the article or the students would be 
asked to respond to the topic in the form of a journal entry. Other class periods 
consisted of students selecting articles from publications such as National Geographic. 
Discover, and Omni. The students were to read articles they found interesting and to 
give a summary of these to the entire class. In this way, Hurston found students could 
be exposed both to many different types of current scientific research and their co­
worker's interest in such topics. In other cases, Hurston would read a particularly 
compelling article aloud to the class. She took this approach with some of the passages 
from Jane Goodall's book, Though a Window, and a short story by Isaac Asimov, "The 
Winnowing." Almost all readings were discussed in a whole group setting. These
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discussions often became detailed and combative, with students arguing different 
points made by the authors.
Hurston relied upon these outside readings because, unlike a text-book, they 
provided her the freedom to select topics not previously addressed in the students' prior 
biology classes. This freedom allowed her to select interesting topics and to address 
these topics with articles that she had found to be personally useful. Hurston also 
selected articles based upon their degree of difficulty and sophistication. Student 
readings were selected to achieve the goals of understanding the science content, 
enhancing interest, understanding the nature of scientific processes, and perfecting 
critical reading skills.
Student Journals
Ten student journal writing assignments were made during the school year.
(For a list of these assignments, see section 4 in Appendix D.) Each assignments was 
designed to aid students’ skills in written communication. Hurston explained that 
journal entries require that the students go beyond simple rote learning to critically 
analyze or apply scientific theories. Additionally, journal entries require students to 
integrate information from several different sources.
Additional Activities
After Christmas break, the students were required to turn in a report of a 
science fiction book. In the report, the students were expected to summarize the book 
and analyze the science in the book in terms of its accuracy, plausibility, and scientific 
authenticity. Students also were to describe the social or moral implications of the 
book.
Hurston had several ideas in mind as she assigned the book report. She hoped 
to spark some students' interest in science through their pre-established love of reading. 
She wanted to provide an opportunity for students to integrate and apply their 
knowledge of science in an unusual setting. Most importantly, Hurston hoped her
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students would see the connection science has to other disciplines, such as English, 
politics, mathematics, and economics. This teaching practice thus satisfied one of her 
course goals.
In relation to the goal of recognizing the relationship o f science to other aspects 
o f students’ lives, Hurston placed a Farside cartoon on the overhead at the beginning of 
each day. While this cartoon served as an "attention getter" and provided a light­
hearted topic with which to begin class, she also felt that these cartoons allowed 
student to begin to recognize "the science in common, ordinary, everyday things." (P 
48)
Assessment
The students received many grades in Hurston's Biology II course, many more 
than they received in most of their other classes. Semester grades were determined 
from journal entries, laboratory reports, class presentations, laboratory and class 
participation, and examinations. There were only four examinations administered in 
this course. The first semester had an exam given after the first quarter of classes, an 
examination on the pig dissection, and a semester final examination. The second 
semester had only the final exam.
The examination questions reflect much of Hurston's teaching philosophy and 
goals. (See Appendix E for a summary of examination questions.) Hurston's felt that a 
student's performance on a test should not radically alter her/his course grade. Instead, 
the student's grade was mainly determined by the student's daily performance in class. 
Hurston's questions did not require students to respond with factual information; 
instead they required applications of known laboratory procedures, synthesis of 
theories learned during the course, and critical reflection on the content and methods of 
scientific inquiry. The sole exception to this trend was seen in the anatomy laboratory 
practical prepared by the student teacher.
Teaching Evolution
Hurston views evolution to be the major theoretical framework of biology. As 
such, the theory of evolution was a fundamental theme o f her Biology II course. This 
prominence is reflected in her choice of instructional units for the course. The theory 
of evolution is the essential component of the instructional topics of dinosaurs and 
anthropology. Further, only two units, genetic techniques and microbiology, had no 
specific mention of evolution in their instruction. With the exception of these two 
units, instruction in evolution was integral to all course instruction. (See Appendix F 
for specific details of the instruction in evolution.)
Evolution was taught as a distinct teaching unit at the beginning of the second 
semester. This unit was taught intermittently during 10 days, and a large portion of this 
time included instruction into the various forms of evidence which supports 
evolutionary theory as well as the patterns of evolution seen in the natural world. The 
forms o f evidence stressed by Hurston included microfossils, fossils, and the 
explanation of physical processes as the source of recurring, natural patterns.
As mentioned previously, other units relied heavily on evolution as their 
theoretical basis or in their application. These instructional units included dinosaurs, 
animal behavior, and anthropology. The theory of evolution is inherent to the study of 
dinosaurs. The dinosaur unit required the students to analyze the various theories of 
dinosaur extinction, as well as the proposed relationships of dinosaurs with the reptiles 
and birds. Likewise, evolution is inherent in the study of anthropology as human 
relationships with other primates are investigated. The evolutionary relationship of 
humans to other primates was also investigated by the students in the unit on animal 
behavior. It should be pointed out that this emphasis is not necessarily implicit in the 
study of ethology. Instead, Hurston's selection of primates as her class' main study 
group made evolution a fundamental aspect of this instructional unit as students sought 
to apply the results of research.
I l l
As suggested by the National Research Council (1990), instruction in evolution 
was interwoven throughout the course. Aside from the formal unit, there were 36 
instructional episodes in evolution. An instructional episode in evolution is used to 
refer to any instructional event which focused on or referred to some aspect of 
evolutionary theory. The Biology II course had a total o f 51 instructional episodes in 
evolution. Of these 51, 36 episodes were designed specifically to address some aspect 
of evolutionary theory. The remaining episodes simply mentioned some aspect of 
evolutionaiy theory during the instruction o f another biological topic. Figure 3 
represents the position of each instructional episode of evolution during the semester. 
(See Appendix F for a detailed chart of each instructional episode.)
Aspects of Evolutionary Theory Addressed
Figure 4 represents the most common aspects of evolutionary theory addressed 
in the course. As shown in Figure 4, many segments o f the broad theory o f evolution 
were the subject of instruction, including: (a) historical aspects, (b) evidence for 
evolution, (c) evolutionary relationships, (d) patterns of evolution, and (e) aspects of 
evolutionary explanations. An analysis of the instructional topics revealed that no 
single segment stands out as the most prominent focus of instruction.
Hurston's instructional approach to evolution is of particular interest. As seen 
in Appendix F, the mechanisms of evolution were not emphasized by Hurston. 
Traditional biology classes stress knowledge of mechanisms and omit other aspects of 
evolutionary theory. Instead, Hurston taught evolution much like she taught the rest 
o f her class by stressing knowledge about the theory instead of the actual mechanism 
of the theory. Hurston's course emphasized the (a) application of evolutionary theory 
to diverse biological realms (including an emphasis on humans as evolving 
organisms), (b) the plethora o f evidence found in the natural world for evolution, and
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(c) the means through which evolutionary explanations (as well as all scientific 
theories) can be applied.
Hurston devoted only four instructional episodes toward an examination of 
evolutionary processes. Three of these episodes were discussions, and the fourth was a 
student reading of "Evolution since Darwin" (Rensberger, 1982). One of the three 
discussions centered on this article and occupied an entire class session.
Instructional Methods Used in Evolution Instruction
Table 5 shows the various instructional methods employed by Ms.
Hurston in teaching evolution. Of interest here is the prominence of discussion
as an instructional method. Evolution (emphasizing the mechanisms of
evolutionary processes) is the sole topic in which Ms. Hurston devoted an entire
class session to discussion. There were commonalities between the three
instructional episodes in which evolutionary processes were addressed. Each was
a triadic dialogue, in which Hurston asked very specific questions of her
students and commented on their answers. As Smith et al. (1993) explain, a narrowly
defined question is a more appropriate method for eliciting conceptual change.
Through these dialogues, students are more likely to compare their conceptions with
those of science than they would be in Hurston's loosely structured dialogues based on
open-ended questions. The following is an example of the discussions held during the
unit of evolution:
Hurston: Do we normally have nonrandom mating?
[No answer from the class)
H: In any population, not just humans? Any population, animals or 
whatever? Is there normally random mating?
Joe: Yes.
H: You think animals mate randomly?
J: Yes.
H: Then why do we have sexual dimorphism?
J: What's that?
H: Sexual dimorphism is when there is a different characteristic between 
male and female, and we have sexual selection on the basis of those 
characteristics.
J: Not many things do that.
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H: Why do we have all brightly colored birds and big peacock tails and 
all this sort of things?
J: Reproduction.
P: Reproduction. Random mating?
J: Well, mammals don't do that.
P: Do what?
J: Have big feathers and all.
P: Ah, I see. How about the big antlers and all? (F 458)
The comparison of students' conceptions with scientific conceptions is a necessary 
condition for promoting conceptual change. It is significant that
Table 5
The number of instances in which instructional methods were used in teaching
evolution










triadic dialogues allowing such comparisons were most prominent when the actual 
mechanisms of evolutionary change were addressed.
Other means through which the mechanisms o f evolution were addressed was 
through student reading and a whole class discussion of a reading. Hurston assigned 
the Science 82 article entitled, "Evolution since Darwin," early in the second semester 
(Rensberger, 1982). In this article, Rensberger compares the basic tenants with 
Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection to the theories currently 
employed by science. He also provides a very general explanation for the new
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synthesis created by the linkage of genetics and evolutionary theory. This article is 
brief and written in very informal terms. However, in the four pages, the author 
provides a historical view of the changes of evolutionary theory, discusses current 
controversies that exist within this framework, and describes various theories of the 
scientists working within this framework.
Four days after the reading assignment, the whole class discussed this article. 
Discussion took the form of a structured triadic dialogue. Through her questioning,
Hurston emphasized both the mechanisms described in the article and the newer 
theories that exist within the theoretical framework of evolution. This discussion 
included the mechanisms of natural selection and genetic isolation in their relation to 
speciation. This discussion also included the broader evolutionary theories of 
gradualism, saltation, and punctuated equilibrium. The new synthesis was also 
explained by the students under the direction of Hurston's questions.
(For more detailed information on the instructional methods used for instruction 
in evolution, see Appendixes D and F.)
Student Evaluation
As Tobias (1990) points out, students often interpret the material emphasized on 
an examination to be the material actually valued by the instructor. When Hurston's 
examinations are reviewed, it becomes evident that Hurston understands evolution to 
be the major theoretical basis for biology. On each of the three major examinations, at 
least one question dealt with some aspect of evolution. (One question typically carried 
25% of the grade.) (See Appendix E for a list of the exam questions.)
Summarv-'Thinking Skills in the Context of Biology"
In our casual discussions, Hurston often described a difference she perceives 
between memorizing science and learning science. She explained that, "if you cannot 
apply information, then it is useless." (P 65) She explains that her course is designed 
to:
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Hurston: teach them how to look at things and think about them. I 
[stress] thinking skills in the context of biology. Hopefully at the end of 
[this course] they will be interested enough in biology to want to continue 
learning about the content of biology. And ah, they will know how to do 
that on their own if necessary. So that, whatever comes up that involves a 
biology issue, they will be literate enough to understand, appreciate, make 
commitments or choices. (P 19)
Hurston's course stressed what Dushl (1990) refers to as "knowledge about science"-
that is "knowledge of both why science believes what it does and how science has
come to think that way- instead of "scientific knowledge"-that is the factual
information which results from the process of science (p. 10). Looking over Hurston’s
course, one might argue that often the knowledge about science was stressed to the
partial exclusion of scientific knowledge. To this, Hurston has argued that this course
is designed to be a capstone course, one which allows students an opportunity to leam
the procedural knowledge of science. Knowledge of the scientific procedures allows
them the opportunities to apply their declarative knowledge of the discipline.
While the strong laboratory component demonstrated in Hurston's course might
invite the label of the course as a "hands-on" approach, I would use Duschl's term of
"minds-on." Hurston's Biology II course allowed her students to construct the
procedural knowledge the students need to fully understand the discipline o f biology.
Toward the end of the school year, a senior girl gave this assessment of the course:
Meredith: I've enjoyed it [the course], and I think the things we've done 
were will certainly benefit ah help me 
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes]
M: in the future. You know it's not, it's not like some classes where you 
forget everything you've learned you know?
SD: Okay, so ahm you don't think that’s gonna happen with this?
M: Na, ah. [No]
SD: I wonder why?
M: I just, I think it's the way, ah the way she teaches. A lot, you know 
that you don't, you don't do ah writing down definitions from the book and 
memorize them and spit them back out on a test.
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes]
M: It's not that kind of course. (A 302)
As suggested by Lemke (1990), Hurston structured her class to provide ample 
opportunity for students to talk and write about science. Although she used triadic
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dialogues frequently, in her class these were informal affairs requiring student 
participation and allowing for more student control over the material being presented.
Her course included many laboratory experiences for the students. Like her 
discussions, the laboratory experiences were designed, not to transmit large amounts of 
information, but to foster student questioning of course material.
As reflected by her instructional methods, Hurston informally recognizes 
learning to be a social process, and her classes are designed to nurture student 
interaction and participation in the language and processes of science. A close 
examination of her instructional methods reveals that many do not conform to the 
description of conceptual change teaching strategies as described by Smith et al.
(1993). Hurston depended heavily upon open-ended questions which could have many 
correct answers during the initiation of class discussions. She also fostered student 
debate in her classrooms. Smith et al. (1993) suggest that such questioning strategies 
do not promote conceptual change because students are not required to compare their 
prior conceptions with those of science.
In her effort to elicit student participation and to foster students' interest,
Hurston stressed participation in scientific conversations over the declarative 
knowledge of science. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to label Hurston's teaching as 
based on the theoretical base of conceptual change. Hurston's teaching stressed the 
application of biological theories. In her class, students were expected to apply 
theories they had studied during the present and previous classes. While students were 
not drilled on the content of theories, they were expected to apply these theories to 
diverse biological phenomena. The application of theories for explanation and 
prediction is a necessary component of the development of a greater scientific 
understanding (Anderson & Roth, 1989).
If Hurston's class did not explicitly stress the comparison o f students' theories 
with those of science, her teaching methods did provide a climate in which students felt
comfortable in voicing and exploring their personal understandings of biological 
phenomena. Once again, it becomes evident that Hurston's class is designed around 
promoting the social construction of knowledge. Like the conceptual change programs 
designed by science educators, Hurston understands learning to occur in an open, 
interactive classroom community.
In teaching evolution, as in her course as a whole, Hurston's teaching required 
students to (a) apply aspects of evolutionary theory, (b) compare and comment on the 
merits of various theories within the framework of evolution, and (c) reflect upon the 
links of evolutionary theory to other aspects of biology. Hurston did not stress the 
mechanisms of evolution as much as she did their application. Students were expected 
to discuss implications of evolutionary theory in whole group discussions, small group 
work, and written reports. This socially based approach answers Settlage's (1992) call 
for application of instructional conversations in the instruction of evolution. While she 
did not use conceptual change teaching techniques when teaching evolution, the 
instructional conversations which occurred in classroom discussions were necessary 
tools in promoting the conceptual growth of her students.
CHAPTER 6
DESCRIPTION OF CONCEPTUAL CHANGE IN EVOLUTION
Introduction
In Chapter 6, the final results and discussion chapter, the patterns of conceptual 
change are reported. This description proceeds in an individual fashion as the 
conceptual change of the class and each of the four interview participants is 
independently detailed. Data for each of these five sources are reported, and individual 
trends are tied into the literature. Not until the summary for this chapter are cross­
participant patterns outlined and discussed in light of current conceptual change 
literature and the teaching practices of the participating teacher. This comparison may 
be the most interesting to the reader as the more salient aspects of the findings are 
discussed. The summary section begins on page 272 and is continued in the 
conclusions and implications chapter (Chapter 7).
The Class
The conceptions of members of the entire class are reported as a reference for 
the results of the four interview participants; they provide some insight as to the normal 
patterns of conceptual change of students who were not interviewed on a semi-weekly 
basis. Because the conceptual change of the class is not a major research focus, these 
data are reported briefly, and their implications for teaching are fully discussed at the 
end of this chapter.
The Use o f Scientific Conceptions for Evolution
The pre- and posttest conceptions o f all o f the students were measured using the 
Bishop and Anderson exam (1985). When the results of this instrument are scored 
using the criteria developed by Bishop and Anderson (1985), the number of students 
who hold a scientific conception are determined. Three conceptual issues central to an 
understanding of the process of evolution by natural selection are examined in this 
scoring method. These issues include:
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(a) the origin and survival of new traits,
(b) the role of variation within the population, and
(c) the nature of evolutionary changes within a population.
Of the three conceptual issues, fewer students used the scientific conception for 
the origin of variation than the other two conceptual issues.
(Table 6 is a comparison of the pre- and posttest findings.) In comparison to a study 
conducted on the neighboring university campus by Demastes et al. (in press), a greater 
percentage of students in Hurston's biology class used the scientific conception of 
mutations as the source of new variation upon entering a nonmajor's biology course 
than college students.
Table 6






Origin and survival of 
new traits
14 43
Role of variation within the 
population
63 42
Nature of evolutionary change 
in a population
45 38
When the second and third conceptual issues are examined, a relatively high 
percentage of Hurston's students were found to use a scientific conception for these 
issues during pretesting. These figures are surprising when they are compared to
similar figures from the Demastes et al. (in press) study where no more than 17% of the 
college students used a scientific conception for either conceptual issue. Bishop and 
Anderson (1990) report that no more than 31% of their students exhibited the use of 
any scientific conception for these three issues. These findings demonstrate that many 
students in Ms. Hurston's biology class had a sound understanding of one or more of 
these issues as they entered the class even though they did not understand all the central 
issues in how evolution is mechanized.
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As Table 6 demonstrates, the early promise of these students was not retained 
upon posttesting. While there was a large gain in the number of students using a 
scientific conception for the origin of variation, the percentages decreased for the other 
two conceptual issues. Although each of these posttest figures is higher than those 
reported for the college students in Demastes et al. (in press), this study documents an 
overall declining percentage o f students using a scientific conception for two of the 
conceptual issues. Such a declining percentage has not been reported in other similar 
studies.
Patterns of Conceptual Change 
One of the drawbacks of using the Bishop and Anderson (1985) method of 
scoring is that only students' use of scientific conceptions is measured; it does not 
reflect their use of alternative conceptions for a conceptual issue. Because of this, 
many patterns of conceptual change which may be occurring are masked. In order to 
learn more from the pre- and posttest, a scoring method described by Demastes and 
Good (1993) was employed. In this method, students' conceptions are categorized and 
analogous pre- and posttest conceptions are compared so the pathway of conceptual 
change can be described. The scoring system documents the most prominently-used 
conceptions for three conceptual groups in a conceptual framework of evolution. (A 
conceptual group refers to all of the conceptions which refer to the same phenomenon.) 
Students' Conceptual Frameworks
When the students' conceptions were categorized using the Demastes and Good 
(1993) scoring method, these conceptions were found to be very similar to those 
described in a variety of similar studies (Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Demastes & Good, 
1993; Settlage, in press). Similar to Bishop's and Anderson's (1990) evolutionary 
issues, the three conceptual groups described in this study included (a) the species 
concept, (b) the unit of evolutionary change, and (c) the origin of variation.
Comparisons of the students holding conceptions in each of these groups are shown in
Figures 5, 6, and 7.
Conceptual group 1-species concept
The most frequently used conception in this group was the typological species
concept. A large percentage of the students failed to recognize the variation that exists
within a population of organisms. Instead, these students understood a species to be a
large group of organisms which have similar traits (the typological species concept):
Jean : [In reference to the evolution of speed in cheetahs] As their prey 
became more specialized, all of the cheetahs may have needed to run 
faster to catCi food or escape. (Pretest #7)
Tom  Ian: [In reference to the evolution of blindness in cave 
salamanders ] Because of their living in caves with no light their eyes 
were not necessary and they gradually stopped working in all of the 
salamanders. (Pretest #8)
This conception becomes more clearly defined when one looks at its scientific
counterpart, the variable species concept:
Bob: [In reference to the evolution of speed in cheetahs] There were 
probably a few cheetahs which could run extremely faster than the 
others. These faster ones could catch prey easier than the others, 
therefore allowing them to survive. The slower ones would die off 
leaving only the fast ones to breed. (Pretest #7)
(For a comparison o f the pre- and posttest percentages of students holding conceptions
in this area, see figure 5.)
The trend for students to use the alternative conception of a typological species
concept has been documented by other researchers (Bishop & Anderson, 1990;
Hallden, 1988). Its prominence, both in this study and the literature, indicates that this
is a fundamental conception that prevents construction of a scientific conception of
natural selection. As shown in Figure 5, more students used the typological species
concept during posttesting. However, many students did use the scientific
understanding of the variable species concept.
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Distribution of students' pre- and posttest conceptions for 
conceptual group 1-species concept 
Note. The percentages do not always equal 100 because alternative conceptions 
that were not held by a large percentage of the class were not reported.
Conceptual group 2-unit of evolutionary change
The unit of evolutionary change contains the second major alternative 
conception seen in the students, the conception that evolution of a trait occurs in all 
members of a population. This conception is closely related to the typological species 
concept. Students using the typological species concept to discuss evolution are 
constrained into explaining that all members of the homogeneous population evolve. 
Because of the close relation of these two concepts, the same data sources were used to 
identify the conception that all members of a population evolve and the typological 
species concept.
Susan: [In reference to the evolution of speed in cheetahs] As time 
went on the cheetahs began to have shorter mucles [sic] in their legs 
which made them better runners. Also the land may have changed and 
they could have better conditions to run in. (Pretest #7)
Stephanie: [In reference to the evolution of speed in cheetahs]
Gradually the cheetahs developed stronger legs. Having food as an
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incentive, the cheetahs ran faster and gained stronger muscles in their 
legs that were passed on to the offspring. (Pretest #7)
Two other conceptions were identified that are related to the one described
above. The first of these is the idea that evolution is the change of a trait found in one
individual. The population or species is not considered by students using this
conception. This was not a common conception in the group o f students and the
number of students using this conception dropped noticeably during posttesting:
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Figure 6
Distribution of students' pre- and posttest conceptions for conceptual group 2-
unit of evolutionary change 
Note. The percentages do not always equal 100 because alternative conceptions 
that were not held by a large percentage of the class were not reported.
Calvin: In reference to the evolution of blindness in cave salamanders]
Since it was dark, there was no need for sight, so he lost this sight and 
probably developed more enhanced smell and hearing. (Pretest #8)
The conception of evolution as a change within all members of a population and
the failure to consider the population as involved in evolution can be contrasted with
the scientific conception for this conceptual group. The scientific conception for the
unit of evolutionary change explains that evolution changes the percentage o f the
members of a population with a specific characteristic:
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Amanda: [In reference to the evolution of speed in cheetahs] As the 
population of cheetahs grew the ones who ran the fastest got the food.
So eventually this trait evolved. (Pretest #7)
Brian: [In reference to the evolution of speed in cheetahs] The slower 
cheetahs would die because o f starvation and leave only the fastest.
This would happen generation after generation until the very fastest 
could run 60 mph and his offspring would be the surviving species.
(Pretest #7)
The use of this scientific conception was much more common in this study than in
Demastes and Good (1993). However, there was not a dramatic increase in the use of
this conception during posttesting. (For a comparison o f the pre- and posttest
percentages of students holding conceptions in this area, see Figure 6.)
Conceptual group 3-origin of variation
The third most prominent alternative conception used during pretests was need
as the origin of variation.
Meredith: [In reference to the evolution of speed in cheetahs]
Obviously, cheetahs needed to run faster. Perhaps it was necessary for 
them to catch their prey and to survive. This occurred because of a need 
for adaptation. (Pretest #7)
Meredith: [In reference to the evolution of blindness in cave 
salamanders] Cave salamanders, living in a dark environment, did not 
need to see. Over the years they evolved to loose [sic] this unnecessary 
function. (Pretest #8)
The prominent use of need in students' conceptual frameworks for evolution has
been documented by several other researchers (Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985b;
Deadman & Kelly, 1978; Setdage, in press). The use of need was particularly resistant
to instruction in our students, evidenced by some students' incorporation of the
explanation of mutation into their pre-existing conception of need:
Juanita: [In reference to the evolution o f webbed feet in ducks] The 
mutation was made because they [the ducks] need to swim in water.
(Pretest #4)
Another conception of the source of variation is found in the students who used 
anthropomorphic answers, explaining that variation is produced through a conscious
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decision by the organism. Several students reported that mosquitoes had to "learn" to 
become resistant to DDT. Tyler explains her answer:
SD: I’m just trying to figure out what you mean by learned. You know.
Sometimes
Tyler: They [the mosquitoes] figured out what, what was going to kill
them I guess.
SD: Okay.
T: And what they had to do to not die.
SD: Okay.
T : What they had to do for themselves.
SD: Do you think a lot of animals do that?
T: I think probably so. [C 19]
The use of anthropomorphism to explain the source o f variation is closely 
related to the need conception. Its use simply places another step in the sequence of the 
need explanation. Many researchers in this area have identified anthropomorphism in 
students' answers (Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985b). Brumby (1984) and Hallden 
(1988) indicate that anthropomorphism may be an artifact of habits used in written and 
verbal communication on this topic. Tyler's comments demonstrate that the use of 
learn is not always an artifact of communication. She understood insects to be able to 
consciously modify their behaviors. She was not alone in this conception. At one 
point during the school year, Philip and Calvin came back in the room after class to ask 
Ms. Hurston if ptarmigan's "could decide to change their feathers" from the summer 
brown to the winter white. A segment of students understood organisms to be able to 
consciously change physiological processes. Many students did undergo conceptual 
change away from this conception, but its use was retained by a number of students.
The use/disuse explanation contrasts with the conceptions of need and 
conscious decisions:
Tyler: [ In reference to the evolution of blindness in cave salamanders]
From living in caves the salamanders used very little o f their sight.
From not using their eyes they became nonfunctional. This trait was
passed down to other generations. (Pretest #8)
The use/disuse explanation may be an artifact of the use of commonplace 
expressions to solve problems, but its use is closely related to the conception of need
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(or lack of need) as the source for new variation. Lamarckian explanations have been 
described by other researchers as a prominent aspect of students' explanations of 
evolution (Brumby, 1984; Jimenez, 1992). Few students used this explanation during 
either pre- or posttesting.
Each of the three alternative conceptions for the production of variation can be 
compared to the scientific conception of mutation. The use of mutation is 
fundamentally opposed to the prominent conception of need as the factor in producing 
variation. However, a small number of the students did use this scientific conception 
during the pretest:
Peggy Sue: [In reference to the evolution of speed in cheetahs] A
mutation occurred in one cheetah and he had an advantage over others.
He passed on this mutation, and finally it became prevalent. (Pretest
#8  ) '
In the comparison of the need and mutation conceptions, it should be noted that 
the use of mutation as the source of variation allows the student to separate the process 
of the production of variation from the process of natural selection. In contrast, the use 
of need as an explanation blends these two processes and prohibits the construction of a 
more complex, scientific conception of evolution. The conception of mutation as the 
source for variation demonstrated the greatest increase in student usage from pretest to 
posttest. This contrasts sharply with the findings of other researchers using this test 
instrument (Demastes et al., in press) However, in his work with high school students, 
Settlage (in press) also documents an increase in students' use of mutations as the 
origin of variation. But the gains described in his research were much more modest 
than those seen here. Work by Lawson and Thompson (1988) explains that students in 
high school are not prepared to understand mutation because it is such an abstract 
concept and most students are capable of only concrete reasoning patterns. However, 
the findings of this study demonstrate that the conception of mutation is accessible to 
high school students. (For a comparison of the pre- and posttest percentages of 
students holding conceptions in this area, see Figure 7.)
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Figure 7
Distribution of students' pre- and posttest conceptions for 
conceptual group 3-origin of variation 
Note. The percentages do not always equal 100 because alternative conceptions 
that were not held by a large percentage of the class were not reported.
Pathways of Conceptual Change
Figure 8 shows the most prominent pathways of conceptual change experienced by 
the students in this study. (The conceptual change reported here is limited to the major 
conceptions identified in this study. Therefore, Figure 8 shows only the major 
pathways of conceptual change, but does not report all instances.) In order to interpret 
Figure 8, the direction o f the arrows should be noted. For instance, for the Group 1 
Species concept, two of the students that used the homogenous conception of the 
species during the pretest experienced conceptual change during the span of the study 
and used the variable species conception at the end of the study.
Even with the relatively low degree of conceptual change experienced by the 
students, some patterns emerge. Individual students experienced conceptual change (a) 
away from an alternative conception toward a scientific conception, (b) away from one 
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Note. The numbers indicate the nu mber of students experiencing 
that pattern of conceptual change.
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Figure 8
Pathways of conceptual change experienced by students within three conceptual groups
for the theory of evolution
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away from a scientific conception, toward an alternative conception for a group. These 
patterns of conceptual change are similar to those described for college students in a 
non-major biology course (Demastes & Good, 1993).
Some students holding each of the prominent alternative conceptions did 
experience conceptual change toward the scientific conception. Thus, for each of the 
groupings identified, a small group of students learned to use the scientifically accepted 
conception. However, none o f the students holding the alternative conception of 
use/disuse as the origin of variation group moved toward the scientific conception. 
Instead, students using this conception experienced no conceptual change or moved 
toward another conception.
The second type of conceptual change, from one alternative conception to 
another, was the most common. Some students represented in all conceptual groups 
experienced this type of conceptual change. The third type of conceptual change, away 
from a scientific conception toward an alternative conception, was experienced by 
students in all conceptual groupings. This striking pattern of conceptual change has 
been documented in an earlier study (Demastes & Good, 1993) and will be discussed in 
in the summary of this chapter
Other Aspects of Students' Conceptual Frameworks
The description of conceptual frameworks and conceptual change deals only 
with students' conceptions of the process through which evolution operates. Another 
aspect of students' frameworks for this area is their acceptance of the validity of the 
theory. As students' acceptance of evolution is discussed, it is important to remember 
that there were 12 juniors in this class of 22 students, and each had successfully 
completed Ms. Hurston’s Biology I course the previous year. Hurston describes her 
Biology I course as a thematic approach to biology with evolution as a central unifying 
theme. The seniors, however, had taken biology two years prior to this course and did 
not have Hurston as their teacher. The seniors could recall little of the material this
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past course addressed, and not one of the five seniors I spoke with could recall the topic
of evolution being addressed in any fashion.
One of the questions on both the pre- and posttest asked, "What is your opinion
of the theory of evolution." The vast majority of the students wrote on their belief of
the theory. O f the group describing their acceptance or belief, 92% of the juniors and
50% of the seniors expressed a belief in evolution at the outset of the course. At the
end of the course, 91% of the juniors and 80% of the seniors expressed their belief in
the theory. Simply the number of students responding with a discussion of belief to a
question which asked about their opinion is important. This response signifies students'
perceptions o f evolution as being an area of intense personal conflicts for many people,
as shown in this passage:
Peggy Sue: My opinion of evolution is basically undecided. I believe 
in God, but I do not know enough about the Bible to explain why.
When I hear about people evolving from apes-the facts seem believable- 
so I do not know what to believe!! (Pretest #9)
Also, many more juniors expressed a belief in evolution than did seniors; however, it
must be remembered that these students were a biased sample as they had recently
completed a biology course based upon the topic of evolution and had elected to take
another course from Hurston.
In response to the same question, "What is your personal opinion of the theory
of evolution?," 32% of the students mentioned the issue of human evolution in their
answers during the posttest. This percentage increased on the posttest to 52%. Clearly,
for many of these students, human evolution is an important aspect of their acceptance
of evolutionary theory.
Finally, regarding the same question, several students equated evolution with
the initial creation of the universe/earth. In response to the same question, 14% cited
problems with the validity of the "big bang" as a limitation of evolutionary theory.
This number increased to 33% on the posttest. Just as Fisher (1992) suggests, students
are unaware of the scientific boundaries of evolutionary theory.
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Peggy Sue: I feel that it [evolution] has happened, but I don't believe in 
big bang or anything like that. (Pretest #9)
For many of these students, the over-application of biological evolution caused a
degree of learner dissatisfaction with the theory.
Summary of Class Conceptual Framework 
Many of the students entered this Biology II course using scientific conceptions 
of several aspects of evolution. In this regard, this is a much different student 
population than the college students described in earlier studies (Bishop & Anderson, 
1990; Demastes et al., in press). But it should be remembered that the students of this 
class selected this course as an elective, and the great majority of these students were 
interested in professions closely related to biology or another natural science.
O f all three patterns o f conceptual change documented for this class, the one 
which holds the greatest theoretical and methodological implications is the change 
away from a scientific conception. While the sample size was relatively small, a 
marked number of students underwent conceptual change away from the use of a 
scientific conception in each o f the three conceptual groups. These findings support the 
other description of the students' conceptions provided by the Bishop and Anderson 
(1985) coding system. Many students in Hurston's class experienced conceptual 
change away from the scientifically acceptable explanation. While this movement has 
been documented in a similar study (Demastes & Good, 1993, conceptual change away 
from a scientific conception has not often been described. As a result, many 
researchers fail to consider such a pattern when designing data analysis methods. Such 
patterns indicate that conceptual change may be a much more piece-meal process than 
Posner et al. (1982) indicate. As suggested by Duschl and Gitomer (1991) and 
Nussbaum (1989), conceptual change may often be a fragmented process in which 
conceptions are selected and rejected for reasons other than a rational assessment of 
evidence.
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The three most prominent conceptions held by students before instruction in the 
area of evolution were (a) populations of organisms are homogeneous (typological 
species concept), (b) change in a trait occurs in all individuals o f a population, and (c) 
variation in a population is produced by need. The use of these conceptions changed 
slightly after instruction; most prominent was the substitution of mutation for need as 
the source of variation.
The Interview Participants
The conceptual change of the four interview participants will be described in 
this section. For each participant, this description will include:
(a) approaches the content area of biology,
(b) personal characteristics,
(c) conceptual ecology for evolution,
(d) conceptual framework for evolution at three major points in the year, and
(e) the changes in conceptual framework.
O f these five categories of description, only (c) and (d) require further explanation.
Conceptual Ecology
A conceptual ecology, as suggested by Toulmin (1972) and elaborated by 
Posner et al. (1982), includes the learner's fundamental organizing knowledge which 
controls and modifies further conceptual change. This fundamental knowledge can 
include conceptions, metaphysical beliefs, epistemological commitments, analogies, 
anomalies, and knowledge from areas other than that studied. Knowledge included in a 
learner's conceptual ecology is not easily modified. Aspects o f the conceptual ecology 
bear strong resemblance to what Cobem (1993) refers to as a learner's world view. 
However, I will use the term conceptual ecology because of the theoretical basis of my 
study. The conceptual ecology is the aspect of knowledge most heavily influenced by 
the learner's culture. So it is here that the strongest theoretical ties are found between 
culture and what can be learned.
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The portions of the learner's conceptual ecology that will be described include:
(a) religious orientation,
(b) acceptance or rejection of evolution,
(c) scientific orientation,
(d) scientific epistemology,
(e) view of the biological world.
These were selected because of their prominence during the course of the 
interviews and during data analysis. Data analysis indicated that these specific aspects 
of a learner's conceptual ecology can be very influential in the process of conceptual 
change for the topic of biological evolution.
The first two aspects of the learner's conceptual ecology listed above clearly 
involve belief systems, while the others may not. Belief is a very difficult area to 
study, as no one definition has enjoyed wide acceptance. As Pajares (1992) has 
commented, "It is difficult to know where knowledge has ended and belief began." For 
the purposes of this study, belief will be defined in the following manner. Belief and 
understanding are both forms of knowledge which may overlap. However, when these 
two types of knowledge differ, understanding includes knowledge which has an 
academic component, and belief includes knowledge which is taken on faith.
The learner's religious orientation reflects the degree to which the learner 
organizes her/his life around religious activities, understands the natural world through 
theism, or interprets personal and natural events through a religious lens. This aspect 
of the learner's conceptual ecology can be closely tied to the learner's acceptance or 
rejection of evolution. Acceptance is used here instead of belief so that both 
knowledge systems, belief and understanding, can be included. Students' conceptions 
will be classified in a system described by Nelson (1986). This system describes the 
conceptions of the origin of the earth and biological species as being expressions of (a) 
quick creationism (the earth and all species were created by God a few thousand years
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ago), (b) progressive creationism (lineages have undergone subtle changes after being 
placed on the old earth), (c) gradual creationism (evolution is God's means of creating 
species on an old earth), (d) non-theistic evolution (the issue of God and religion 
should not be included within the limits of scientific discussions), and (e) atheistic 
evolution (there was no God involved in the creation of the universe).
Another portion of students' conceptual ecology includes learners' orientation 
toward science. This reflects the degree to which the learner organizes her/his life 
around scientific activities, understands the natural world through physical and material 
causation, or interprets personal and natural events through a scientific lens (Cobern,
1993). The learner's scientific orientation is also very closely tied to the learner's 
acceptance or rejection of evolution.
Tied to the learner's scientific orientation is the issue of her/his scientific 
epistemology. How does the student view the nature of scientific knowledge? Does 
this view (i.e., realist, relativist, pragmatist) change with the type of knowledge 
considered? What does the student recognize as the boundaries of scientific 
knowledge? How does scientific knowledge intersect with their other means of 
understanding? And more specifically, how does the student view the applications of 
biological knowledge?
The final aspect of the student's conceptual ecology considered is her/his view 
of the biological world. Does the student view nature as fundamentally competitive or 
harmonious?
Framework for Participants' Conceptions 
There are many conceptions tied into any conceptual framework, and 
this situation is magnified for evolution. The theory of evolution is both 
internally complex and interconnected with the learner's belief systems. In an 
effort to systematize the description of conceptual frameworks, the categories 
of conceptions that surfaced in the study are displayed on Figure 9. (As
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Characteristics o f Evolutionary Broau! Evolutionary Theories
Human Evolution Changes
Probability of Occurence Speed Saltation
Compared to Animals Patterns Gradualism
Compared to Primates Random vs Directed Punctuated Equilibrium
Big Bang
Evidence for Evolution Evolutionary Relationships
Fossil Dinosaur and Reptiles Historical Aspects o f  Theory
Dinosaur: Human Dinosaur and Birds Galapogus
Species Concept Darwin
Related Biological Knowledge Larmarck
Physiology M echanism
Genetics Source of Variation Natural History
Unit o f Evolutionary Change Recent natural history
Nature o f Evolutionary Change Historical natural history
Genetic Drift Geological changes
Natural Selection
Figure 9
A template for the summary of participants' conceptual framework for evolution 
mentioned in Chapter 3, these categories were derived from the participants' interview 
data and were not pre-established at the outset of the study.) These categories contain 
both instances of academic knowledge and belief. The descriptions on these figures are 
brief and are provided for the purpose of comparison within each participant over time 
and for comparison between each of the participants.
Brian: Biologist as Scientific Theorist 
Brian was the only male interview participant and the only junior. Brian was 
not one of my original choices for interview participants because he demonstrated a 
reasonably coherent and scientifically accurate conceptual framework for the process of 
evolution at the outset of the course. But after several weeks of effort, it became clear 
that he would be the only male in the class who could fully participate. However, after 
the interviews began, my reservations dissipated. It soon became clear that not only 
did Brian not fully understand all aspects of the process of evolutionary theory, he was 
also very different from my other participants. I came to value the differences between 
my participants as a means of more fully understanding the process of conceptual 
change.
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Brian was a quiet boy who continually had to push his long hair from his eyes 
as he spoke. Each week I had to "draw" him out in order to gain his full participation 
in the interviews. But, his shy demeanor did not signify a lack of engagement. Several 
times during the interviews Brian would draw on our past conversations in order to 
answer a question I asked. Often, he would return to questions asked 30 minutes 
earlier and rephrase his answers. As he "warmed up" to a topic of discussion, he would 
push his hair back more frequently and talk in a very animated 
fashion. Based on these behaviors, I felt I had Brian's full engagement during our 
interviews. The behavior was similar in class. While not talkative, he would volunteer 
answers only if he felt the answer "was not too obvious" and if no one else had 
previously offered the answer. Although he seldom spoke in class, many students 
would ask for his help while studying for an exam.
The most helpful description of Brian's approach biology is as a scientific 
theorist. Brian searched for an overview of what was being studied soon after he 
constructed an understanding of how the process worked. An example of Brian's 
frequent use of theories is seen in this discussion of the exam taken at the end of the 
year:
B: [ Reading] What's your personal opinion of the theory of evolution?
You mean, do I like it or?
SD: Ah, an opinion could be virtually anything. Do you think it's 
useful? Do you like it? Ahm, does it have problems?
B: Ahm, it's not fullv understood.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: But we know it happens. Pretty much. Some people still say is 
doesn't, didn't, but.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: Most people think that it happened. Ahm, there are a lot of good 
ideas out there. Like people have all these theories.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: That go into the theory of evolution. But nobody knows exactly 
what happens every time something changed. You know?
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: But ahm, Gould and Eldredge.
SD: Right.
B: Could explain maybe half of evolutionary changes. And then like, 
what's the latest thing? One of the articles related to the theory.
SD: Ah the Gia theory?
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B: I mean that could explain the unicelluar evolution.
SD: Yeah.
B: Or most of it. I mean because it could also be part of Gould's and 
Eldredge's theory.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: Because that didn’t really explain that much. They just explained 
how one organism goes to another one. Not how two could combine.
(...) So it’s not fully understood. Nobody knows exactly what 
happened every time. But I mean we have a pretty good idea.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) (B 201-203)
In our discussions and his infrequent class comments, Brian seemed to enjoy 
talking and thinking about biology on a theoretical level. He often discussed the merits 
of various scientific theories, and in more unstructured interviews his comments would 
continually come back to an analysis of theories. He explained that he liked biology 
"because it lets you think." (B 43)
Brian's approach to biology, and more specifically, evolution, was to try to 
understand the broad  processes. This approach may have been aided by his substantial 
knowledge of the working of the processes of each theory. As demonstrated above, 
Brian would examine, modify, and replace theories in an effort to explain broad natural 
patterns. He searched for answers to large-scale questions. This approach is not 
surprising when Brian's background is considered. His favorite subject was 
mathematics, and he also enjoyed a university computer programming course. For two 
consecutive years, a mathematics teacher has allowed Brian to work through a text­
book at his own pace, since he found the class too slow and uninteresting. During the 
past four summers, Brian attended a university course designed to continue the interest 
of students gifted in science and mathematics. Brian explained, "I'm happiest solving 
an equation or plugging in numbers to a program." He elected to take Biology II only 
because Ms. Hurston "gives you a chance to think" and it represented one of the few 
advanced science or mathematics courses at U High.
Out of school Brian studied Latin along with his brother. At the beginning of 
the year, Brian hoped to study civil engineering in college, because he wanted to build 
"large things.” But this interest changed to architecture. During the study, Brian was
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continually involved in some type of project, such as preparing a cat skeleton, teaching 
himself origami, or repairing his very old car. He loved puzzles and often would turn 
the illustrated portions upside down in order to make them more challenging.
This view of Brian is somewhat misleading. His mother and Ms. Hurston 
explained that Brian worked with great effort only on topics or projects that interested 
him. Because he hated to write, he continually procrastinated in finishing English 
assignments. He liked group work, "because there's less for me to do." Ginger 
explained, "He's a genius, but he's so lazy." His grades were less than impressive in 
Hurston's class because he often failed to complete assignments. O f the four interview 
participants, Brian was the only one who was not anxious about school, "school is not 
one of the things that worries me." (B 148) His only regular pleasure reading included 
Discover and Popular Mechanics.
Brian's Conceptual Ecology
The most influential aspect of Brian's conceptual ecology was his distinct 
scientific orientation. Brian used traditional rational criteria in his understanding of 
science. In our discussion of the pseudoscientific topics,
(Loch Ness Monster, ghosts, and aliens), Brian explained he didn't "buy into" these
things. He accepted the occurrence of natural phenomena based on the plausibility of
the event and not based on the opinions of authorities.
B: I can look at it and actually see what they say and logically if it can 
be done, or was done. I don't usually look into real formal texts or 
whatever. Like those journals or whatever?
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: I don't look for those but just usually I can look at it and actually see 
what they're saying and logically if it can be done. (B 59)
Brian viewed much of the world in this rational manner and looked for the coherence
and causality of phenomenon. Rationality was a major criterion through which Brian
understood natural phenomena and the events of his personal life.
B: Like my sister said, everything happens for a reason. (...) but I 
don't really believe that. I mean, if something happens, it's, it's because 
you either weren't ready for it or say I mean, there's not a plan ah
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SD: Okay.
B: for the future. I mean, what happens happens and not for any 
reason. Well, for a reason, but not for anything, not for the future of 
anything. (B 71)
Brian's scientific orientation was in congruence with his realist epistemology of
scientific knowledge. As shown in the quote from the previous section for Brian, to
know something scientifically was to "know what happened every time." Brian viewed
science as an attempt to provide answers that are different from those achieved in other
disciplines. "Scientists look to prove something. Not just to give any answer, but to
give the answer." (B 78) Brian viewed scientific knowledge as striving to describe
reality. However, Brain was not a naive realist as described by Grosslight et al. (1991).
He readily conceded that "There's always a possibility that science is wrong." (B 69)
Brian described theories as an explanation that is well supported by the scientific
community but can always be disproven.
B: Like I think it was Einstein, he said it, "It'd take a million 
experiments to prove my theory but only one to prove it wrong." We 
can’t ever be a 100% sure [of a theory] but we can always be relatively 
certain. (B 76)
Brian, like many scientists, simultaneously understood science as an attempt to
understand reality and realized that scientific theories are not a sure reflection of this
reality, but valued theories none-the-less. He recognized that science needs both
theories and facts to operate. But he used the conception that a "theory could become a
fact if you collected enough, amount [sic] of information. To prove it, without a
doubt." (B 81) When Brian explained that he believed in a theory, he actually meant
that he viewed theories as very probable in occurrence. Facts, on the other hand, were
true, authentic reflections of reality. This realist epistemology was also used in his
approach to many other aspects of his life.
At one level of consideration, Brian recognized a distinct boundary between
science and religion.
B: Science really talks about what happens and what causes it to 
happen. And philosophy is more for what reason it happens.
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SD: And how about religion?
B: Religion? Uhm. That, it tries to answer, religion is a, a sort of 
philosophy but like it has, usually has, it usually points toward a greater 
being. (B 203)
However, at some levels, he saw science and religion as overlapping.
B: T was reading somewhere about, it was about astronomy and stuff 
and that how there were a lot of views about the nature of heavenly 
bodies....Like if you consider our solar system as needing to be order 
that, that if you look at it even close, it’s not as ordered as it looks....This 
article was explaining how most of the theories do not support a Divine 
Being or Divine Plan. (B 203)
He viewed the intersection of the two ways of knowing as essential to scientific
progress.
B: 1 mean if you kept them [science and religion] totally separate you 
wouldn't need, you wouldn't learn about either of 'em....I mean, if 
nobody, if everybody just believe in what was written down in the 
Bible....centuries ago, nobody would even try to think about that 
[evolution], (B 204)
While Brian was not a religiously oriented person, he did not reject the 
existence of a "greater being." His personal life and knowledge was not interpreted 
through a religious framework. Along these lines, Brian did not interpret the writings 
of the Bible literally: "the Gospel according to John may be just a novel for what 
anybody knows.” (B 201)
At the outset of the course, Brian ascribed to what Nelson (1986) refers to as a 
non-theistic evolution. For Brian, scientific truths were independent of religious 
assumptions. Additionally, scientific arguments for or against God were logically 
flawed. The existence of God is not something Brian would set out to prove. He 
accepted the plausibility and probability of evolution's operation in the natural world. 
Because of this acceptance and its connections to Brian's scientific orientation, the 
issue of understanding versus belief did not surface during the analysis of Brian's 
interview data. However, this issue will become important for the other interview 
participants.
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Brian's Conceptual Framework for Evolution 
Initial framework
Brian's scientific understanding of the process of evolution and his uses of the 
broader theories of evolution immediately serve to distinguish him from the other 
research participants.
Mechanism.
An understanding of the mechanism o f evolutionary change is central to Brian's 
conceptual framework. When Brian was asked to concept map his "understanding of 
evolution" at the outset of the research, (CM-1, initial), his entire map consisted of an 
explanation for the mechanisms through which evolution operates. (See Appendix G 
for his concept maps.) This initial map closely resembled his map drawn one week 
later in response to the question "How does evolution work?" (CM-2, initial). 
Knowledge of the process of evolution was also the most differentiated aspect of 
Brian's conceptual framework. The focusing on process is well suited to Brian's 
rational, scientific orientation. For Brian to understand a topic, it was very important 
for him to understand how it works.
Brian had a firm, foundational understanding of the neo-Darwinian explanation of 
evolution through natural selection. Major aspects of Brian's understanding of the 
process of evolution were: (a) mutation as the source of variation, (b) variable species 
concept, and (c) evolution as a change in the proportion of a population with a trait. 
While Brian used a scientific conception for these aspects of evolutionary change, there 
were some subtle differences between his conceptions and those of science.
Mutation as the source of variation is significant in Brian's understanding of 
process. In the two concepts maps forevolution, mutation is the second (CM-2, initial) 
and third (CM-1, initial) highest concept in the Brian's hierarchy. Brian's 
understanding of the various aspects of this conception is demonstrated by his 
comments during the sorting task:
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B: You got, your all white. [Selects picture of white rabbits.]
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: And to get any change in color you have to have a change in your 
DNA. [Selects picture of DNA strand.]
SD: Okay So, what is that?
B: This is ah, it's either some matter or some foreign...
SD: What's another name for that?
B: Chromosome, gene.
SD: Okay.
B: And then, this is your changed ones.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: And then you have, do I use these all?
SD: Only if you want to. Use anything you want to.
B: Well, you have your introduction of the predator right here. [Selects 
picture o f predominantly white, fewer brown group of rabbits with 
hawk.]
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: Which thrives on the white one.
SD: Why?
B: Because the brown ones are more camouflaged.
SD: Okay
B: I guess that’s what it's supposed to mean with a brown background. 
[Selects picture of half white, half brown population of rabbits with 
hawk.] And then, as the predators get more and more white ones, the 
brown ones reproduce more.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: So you get this one. And then finally, you get most brown ones and 
hardly any white ones. [Selects picture with predominantly brown 
population of rabbits with hawk.]
SD: Okay Are you happy with that explanation? [He nods "Yes."] 
Pretty happy. Ahm, could any of those things happen at the same time? 
Or does it happen kinda in that progression, like you have it?
B: Well, these pretty much happen. This could happen, this part right 
here could happen hundreds of years before this.
SD: Okay So the production of, of this change in the chromosomes 
B: That, that could've been just been a freak thing.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: That didn't completely die off.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: And then it, it only came to their advantage when there was a 
predator that it gave a disadvantage to.
SD: So, two things are pretty separate in your mind? The production of 
the change and then the action on the change?
B: Right.
SD: Okay.
B: 1 mean it's not like this the hawk or whatever came and changed the 
DNA.
SD: Okay. Or the bunnies did it in response to the hawk?
B: Right.
SD: Could they have done it in response to the hawk?
B: No. (B 65-67)
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This segment of interview demonstrates Brian's use of mutation as the source of 
variation for a population. It also demonstrates Brian's scientifically accurate 
conception of the separation of the production of variation from the action of natural 
selection. Bishop and Anderson (1990) explain this separation as being an essential 
step in constructing a scientific conception for evolution.
Brian's understanding of mutations was scientifically oriented but very
fundamental. While Brian understood mutations to be "some know of damage
or some kind of freak gene put in the something in the chromosome" [B 37], he
had an alternative conception that inbreeding could cause mutation. [B 37]
This alternative conception was also seen in Brian's written answers to the
journal entry for the evolution of humans [Artifact 2], and the answers he
offered in class. Brian realized that not all mutations were beneficial, "nothing
comes of them," but he failed to recognize that many are harmful to organisms.
B: (Writing in reference to the evolution of speed in cheetahs) The 
slower cheetahs would die because of starvation and leave only the 
fastest. This would happen generation after generation until the very 
fastest could run 60 mph and his offspring would be the [species that 
survives]. (Pretest #7)
As demonstrated by this pretest answer, Brian recognized the importance of 
variation in a population to the process of evolution. As he explained, "Diversity is a 
big part of evolution." [B 123]. However, this recognition was not represented in either 
of the concept maps he constructed at the outset o f the study. (See Appendix G for 
these concept maps.) This view is in stark contrast to his own species concept which 
will described in a later section.
The third aspect of Brian's understanding of the process of evolution is his 
conception of evolution as initially involving a small number of individuals in a 
population.
SD: So what's natural selection?
B: Natural selection is what keeps mutated organisms around.
SD: Okay.
B: and also keeps them from being extinct and dying out.
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SD: Okay, and how does that work?
B: It's ah, the mutation, if it's one that works in the environment or 
ecosystem, or whatever, it goes to the whole community. The change 
occurs in the organism itself.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: Like, either a single organism or a couple organisms. (B 50)
Brian recognized that natural selection operates on variation originally present in a
small proportion of the population. He further explained that natural selection worked
through causing the death of unfit individuals:
B: [Explaining a pretest answer] Population o f ducks evolve webbed 
feet because most successful ducks without offspring. I mean, 
unsuccessful died without offspring. It's, that's natural selection and the 
ones that couldn't swim couldn’t get the fish under water. So they just, 
ah, died off. (B 28)
This conception is slightly different from the more scientific conception of natural
selection operating through the differential reproduction of members of a population.
Finally, Brian recognized evolution as changes in a population as opposed to changes
within an individual:
SD: Okay. So when we talk about evolution do we say that an 
individual evolved?
B: Well, we all, like we change individually but we evolve together. (B 
50)
B: An individual can change, but he's not actually evolving. (B 36)
Another conception related to the process of evolutionary change was Brian's
collage understanding of fitness:
[In reference to the pretest question of the most fit lion]
B: Okay, C, Spot [the lion]. He had an adequate number o f offspring 
and was able to change. He was good sized and had no apparent 
vulnerability to infection.
SD: Okay, so ahm, what does a biologist mean when she or he says fit?
Like something is fit...
BR: I mean, if he can cope with what's around it and they can carry 
on....It has to have a number of offspring....They have to be healthy. I 
mean, you can't have it can't have ah vulnerability to little mosquitoes or 
something like that....It has to be able to live a long time. [B 29]
This collage conception of fitness differs from the scientific conception of fitness as
having a high number of successful offspring. The collage conception was used by a
large number of students in the class (54% on the pretest and 38% on the posttest).
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This alternative conception has not been documented in the evolution education 
literature and it differs from the adaptive conception of fitness described by Bishop and 
Anderson (1990).
Brian was different from the other interview participants in that he understood the
importance of geographic isolation in the process of evolution. This knowledge was
reflected in his journal entry concerning the evolution o f humans:
B: 1 believe the important change in our evolution is the tendency to 
stay in a group or tribe, rather than stray to find new females. This 
caused tribes to develop separately, creating probably slight differences. 
(Artifact 1)
The final conception to be discussed under the heading of process is Brian's
understanding of genetic drift as a mechanism of evolutionary change. Genetic drift is
a relatively advanced topic which is not often discussed in the classroom. Despite this,
Brain experienced a conceptual change concerning this topic during the seven
interviews used to describe his initial conceptions. At the outset of our interviews,
Brian had no knowledge of genetic drift:
[In reference to the evolution o f blindness in cave salamanders] B:
Okay, salamanders could have been accidentally placed in a cave 
somewhere, some freak blind ones were bom and stayed while the 
sighted ones left, leaving behind the blinded ones to reproduce.
SD: Okay, so that in your scenario, the sighted ones just walked away?
B: I man, I, I, that's the only way I could see it happening, the sighted 
ones just leaving. (B 33)
However, just 14 days later, Brian's comments while drawing a concept map revealed
the initial construction o f a conception of genetic drift [CM-2, initial).
SD: Okay, could you just read that [concept map] to me? Oh, we, 
we’re missing one. [The term environment was not on his map, 
although he wrote it down in his initial list.]
B: All right. That's one that doesn't always affect it [evolution.]
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: So I'm just gonna' leave it out.
SD: Okay, so you, you put in environment but it doesn't always affect 
it. What do you mean by that?
B: Well there are instances when it doesn't.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: It's just, just by chance.
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SD: Okay, Ahm, so evolution could occur just because of the 
mutations?
B: Right. (B 64)
The passage illustrates that Brian was beginning to understand that evolution could
occur by chance, without the force o f a selection pressure. This is a necessary
conception in the construction of a scientific conception of evolution through genetic
drift. While Brian did not yet have a name for this process, he was constructing the
basis for this conception.
The second major group of conceptions that were evident in the initial interviews
was Brian's knowledge o f the broad theories of evolutionary changes. This
characteristic has been alluded to earlier in the initial description of Brian's approach to
biology. During our discussion of his pretest answers, Brian referred to theories of
gradualism and punctuated equilibrium. He explained that these theories were useful
because they helped explain the patterns of how the more narrow processes (e.g.,
natural selection) operate.
In Brian's initial conceptual framework, evolutionary theory was understood to
explain natural phenomena that occurred after formation of "primordial soup." [B 158]
He understood this "soup" to form when "little molecules got together and just
happened to be able to function." [B 35] Brian did not understand biological evolution
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to describe the original formation of the earth, but instead the formation of life and
subsequent changes in organisms.
Even in the beginning o f the course, Brian had an appreciation of the importance
of evolution in the study of biology:
SD: Ahm, so you think evolution is an important part of biology?
B: Uh, uh. (Yes)
SD: Why?
B: Just because, if you want to study biology, you have to understand 
why it's that way.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: And to understand why, you have to understand how it became that 
way. (B 155)
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In examining these data, the means of data collection should be remembered. The 
student participants and I discussed evolution on a regular basis, so it is not surprising 
to see Brian’s answer to this question, as my presence may have prejudiced his 
response.
History of evolutionary theory.
While Brian had a skeletal knowledge o f the construction o f Darwinian theory 
and the structural theories which came after (punctuated equilibrium, gradualism), the 
history of science was not a major component of his conceptual framework. None of 
the historical hall-marks of evolution found a place in Brian's map or in his discussions. 
The omission of the historical aspect of the theory is not in conflict with Brian's 
scientific orientation. For Brian, knowledge of how natural phenomena works is 
fundamentally more important than knowledge of how that explanation was 
constructed.
Evidence for evolution.
Like the history of evolutionary theory, Brian's conceptions of the evidence for 
evolution were minimally used:
SD: Do you know any evidence that supports evolution?
B: Ahm, well, we know there were other life forms because their bones
are everywhere.
SD: Do you know any evidence that refutes it?
B: The Bible.
SD: The Bible.
B: Well, the, I don't know. Er, some religions don't believe it.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) (B 155)
Unlike many of his answers to other questions, Brian's comments on supporting or 
refuting evidence were brief. It was difficult to gauge his conceptions on this matter, 
simply because it was so difficult to engage his participation in these discussions. It is 
significant that this scientifically, mechanistically oriented student would list the Bible 
as a source of refuting evidence. But because he resolved any difficulties he might 
have had with evolutionary theory long ago, evidence for the theory was not a major 
portion in Brian's framework.
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Nature of evolutionary changes.
Because Brian had a largely mechanistic view of evolution, his conceptions of the 
nature of evolutionary changes are closely tied to his conceptions of process. At this 
point in the year, Brian understood that evolutionary changes in a population require a 
great deal of time to become apparent. However, time did not appear in the first two 
concept maps that Brian constructed (CM-1 & CM-2, initial) so this notion was not 
prominent in his conceptual framework.
During the initial interviews, Brian was constructing a conception of the random 
aspect of evolutionary changes. This change, described in the section on process, was a 
tentative one. As evidenced by his inability to account for a loss of a trait (blindness in 
salamanders), at the outset Brian understood evolution to occur only through natural 
selection driving a population toward the presence o f a trait. This conception 
underwent a change during the fourth and fifth weeks of interviews. (See data in the 
mechanism section, p. 164)
Related to his initial conception of evolution as directional, Brian understood 
evolution as a process that "drives" organisms to a "higher level." [B 38] Brian had a 
vague definition for "higher" as being "more quality." [B 51] In Brian's conceptual 
framework, the notion of "higher" was equated to the role of the scientific conception 
of fitness. Brian was using an Aristotelian view of natural organisms at this point. But 
this conception is so poorly differentiated and loosely tied to Brian's greater conceptual 
framework, it is difficult to classify. In any case, this notion of "higher" is present, 
although not prominent, in Brian's conceptions of the patterns o f evolutionary changes.
Human evolution.
Conceptions of human evolution are often closely tied to the students' 
conceptions of natural history. However, for some of the participants, issues of human 
evolution are so prominent in their conceptual framework, that these two groups have 
been separated. But in Brian's case, the issues of human evolution and his
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understanding of natural history are inseparable simply because Brian viewed humans 
as being animals.
B: Like if we died off, there would be some other organisms that would 
move up in our place.
SD: Live in our place, what does that mean?
B: Well, we've, we could pick this, we could say dominate the planet 
right now.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: So, something else has to dominate the planet, just like the dinosaurs 
did.
SD: Okay. So you kind of see us (humans) in the dinosaurs' place?
B: Uh, uh. (Yes) (B 40)
Not only did Brian have the declarative knowledge o f humans as animals, he used that
knowledge in explanations. In the quote above, Brian equated the ecological position
of humans with that of other organisms. This quote also demonstrates that he viewed
humans as being a species bounded by time and susceptible to natural forces, like
dinosaurs. During a structured interview using a chart showing the pathways of
primate evolution, Brian theorized about various selection pressures operating to make
evolutionary changes within humans. [IAI-1, initial] Because Brian viewed humans as
animals, Brian understood humans to be undergoing evolutionary changes through
natural processes.
Natural history.
Brian had the greatest wealth of knowledge of natural history of the four 
interview participants. He explained that before taking Ms. Hurston's biology class the 
year before, all he really knew of the history of organisms on the earth was "just that 
dinosaurs existed." [B 34] Brian had a vague but scientific understanding of the 
historical record of biological organisms. He had some conception about the great age 
of the earth and knowledge that the physical characteristics of the earth have undergone 
radical changes during that long time span.
Brian's knowledge of the natural history of recent organisms underwent a change 
during the animal behavior section of the course:
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SD: If you could sum up what you've learned from the animal behavior 
section, what would it be?
B: It's made me see animals as organisms rather than magic.
SD: Oh, that's nice. Okay, so what does it mean?
B: That they're actually living things.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: It's not something you can hurl around like a baseball.
SD: Yeah. You've felt about 'em that way before or ?
B: I don't know. The most contact I've ever had with a real animal was 
probably a dog.... I just think of it as it as my pet.
SD: So this whole section has helped you see them more as?
B: More like a dog for itself. (B 46-47)
I understand this passage to signify that the animal behavior section opened up for
Brian an entire framework through which animals are organisms that can be studied
and understood through scientific terms. This knowledge is relatively new and
undifferentiated, however, as evidenced by his response to the interview about
instances using animal graphics.
Brian demonstrated the greatest amount of animal lore of all the student
participants in the interview about instances, but he often failed to draw many
conclusions about the organisms shown [IAI-1, initial]. Most of his responses
consisted of some article of knowledge about the animal pictured or a related animal.
At the outset of the study, Brian was not prone to interpret organisms as assemblages of
adaptations which could be explained or understood. However, he did use the notion of
adaptation in an effort to explain the graphic depicting three species of bears and mused
on why certain color adaptations would be beneficial for the animals' differing
environments. Brian also applied his knowledge of evolution to attempt to understand
the wing structure of a fruit eating bat.
B: I can't tell if that's four or five fingers on the wing.
SD: I don't know where the fourth one is. Does it matter if it has five 
digits?
B: Uh, uh. (Yes) So that it would make it split off later down the line 
than the birds.
SD: Okay. Split off later from what line?
B: What ever it's split off from. (B 114)
Clearly while his knowledge of the bat wing structure is limited, Brian was trying to
interpret characteristics within an evolutionary framework.
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Evolutionary relationships.
In contrast to the importance Brian placed on the presence o f variation in a
population when discussing evolutionary changes, he used a somewhat typological
species concept in discussions that explicitly addressed species concepts:
SD: And what about dogs, are they the same genus or same family or 
what?
B: Dogs are the same species.
SD: Same species? W hat does that mean?
B: That means they're just different breeds.
SD: Different breeds?
B: Like races and stuff.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) So what does it mean to be a species.
B: It means that they have real, they all have to be really similar. Ahm, 
and they all have four legs that they walk on. They have ears, eyes, nose, 
mouth, tongue. (B 85)
Brian simultaneously held two incompatible conceptions, variable and typological
species concepts. But these conceptions were elicited by different cues. Questions
concerning evolution revealed a variable species concept, and questions of other
biological phenomena elicited use o f a typological species concept.
Compatible with his typological species concept, Brian did not recognize that 
different species could not interbreed. Because the Darwinian species concept was not 
used by Brian, in several instances he tentatively suggested that hybridization between 
species could account for the origin of variation. He was not alone in the use of this 
conception. However, when Brian posed hybridization as an answer, it was always in a 
tentative and speculative manner unlike many of his classmates during whole class 
discussions.
Other biological processes.
Brian had a very firm knowledge of Mendelian genetics. He understood DNA to 
be the fundamental "blue print" for a species and this genetic material was usually 
passed in Mendelian terms. In the prediction interviews, he answered in a scientific 
manner, describing the independent inheritance o f the characteristics between 
generations. He even had a sound knowledge of the action of sex-linked
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characteristics. However, Brian's strict Mendelian conception of genetics can be 
contrasted with the more scientific view o f the action of both blended and 
independently inherited traits.
Brian also displayed a functional knowledge of animal taxonomy. He could 
classify animals shown during the interviews about instances as well as explain the 
reasoning behind such classification. This functional knowledge was combined with an 
understanding that such classification should be linked to the organisms' evolutionary 
relationships.
Keeping with his mechanistic view of the natural world, Brian was not
anthropomorphic in his explanations of biological phenomena. Additionally, he would
reject anthropomorphic answers when they were presented to him
SD: Can population make any changes in response to a selection pressure 
just by themselves?
B: No, you can't change the DNA. (B 67)
Related to anthropomorphism, Brian understood there to be a difference between 
behavioral characteristics of organisms and genetic characteristics. In discussions for 
the sorting task, Brain explained that the rabbits could change their behaviors, but they 
could not change their genetic makeup.




Brian's understanding of the mechanism of evolutionary change continued to be 
the most prominent aspect of his conceptual framework for evolution, and many 
aspects of his initial framework were retained through the mid-year period. He retained 
use of conceptions of (a) mutation as the source of variation, (b) variable species 
concept, and (c) evolution as being a change in the proportion of a population with a
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trait. The concept maps he drew at the beginning of the year were not substantially 
different from those he drew at mid-year (CM-2 & CM-3, mid year).
Human Evolution
Humans are animals which evolve 
Humans are primates ______
Evidence for Evolution
Fossils are supporting evidence 





Populational and typological species 
concept
Characteristics o f  Evolutionary 
Changes
Random aspect o f  evolution
Long time required
Drive toward higher organisms
M echanism
Mutation as the origin of variatior
Variable species concept 
Evolution as a change in 
proportion of population 
Collage concept for fitness 
Genetic drift___________________
Broad Evolutionary Theories




Evolution important in biology
Historical Aspects o f Theory
Natural History 
Knowlege of recent natural 
Old, changing earth 
Knowledge o f animal taxonomy
Note. Italics indicate instances of conceptual change.
Solid block indicates academic conception.
Figure 10
Summary of Brian's initial conceptual framework for evolution
However, there were some subtle changes seen in the conceptions in the
mechanism category. The first of these changes was seen in Brian's recognition of the
prospect of harmful mutations. The first concept map he drew during mid-year
demonstrates that Brian's tentative knowledge of the existence of harmful mutations
became enmeshed into his conceptual framework for this aspect of evolution. (See
Appendix G for Brian's concept maps.)
B rian : Some mutations can have real disadvantages to it. And, if it is a 
bad mutation, natural selection will make that individual die. Ahm, 
which would make it not have any offspring which, if it was a separate 
species of whatever, then it would be extinction. (B 213)
Related to this, Brian formed a more structured knowledge of the random aspect
of mutation, "mutations and all that are just by chance, they just happen to fit." (B
169) Through introducing a greater importance of the random aspect of mutations,
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Brian further separated the actions of mutations and natural selection, "Natural 
selection doesn't cause mutations." (B 213) This separation is further demonstrated in 
his answer to the interview about instances session which concerned the production of 
a mutations in bears (PI-1, mid year). In this question, Brian explained that both 
beneficial and harmful mutations were equally likely to occur, even in the face of a 
strong selection pressure.
Brian's collage conception of fitness also underwent a subtle change during mid­
year. In response to the sorting task, Brian explained that the operation of natural 
selection increased the "survivability" of members of a population. [B 214] However, 
it is important to remember that while Brian had an operational understanding of the 
scientific conception of fitness, he did not associate the term "fitness" with this 
scientific conception.
Brian began to question his initial conception of inbreeding as a source of new 
variation during the mid-year period. In a discussion of factors which may affect the 
mutation rate of a population Brian asked, "Does inbreeding actually cause mutations, 
or is does it just allow for recessive traits to appear?" Inbreeding had not been brought 
up in our conversation, although it had been offered by a student as a possibility in a 
whole class discussion that occurred five days earlier. The manner in which this 
question was asked demonstrates that Brian had already begun to answer this question 
for himself.
Evolutionary changes.
The group of conceptions related to the nature of evolutionary changes was the 
second most prominent category o f Brian's conceptual framework during the mid-year 
period. The first change seen in this category was his strong emphasis of the random 
aspect of evolution. This change was described in the preceding section on the process 
of evolution. The employment of the random aspect of mutation resulted in substantial 
changes in Brian's conceptions of the nature of evolutionary changes. While Brian had
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tentatively considered the random aspect of evolution earlier in the year, at mid-year 
this became a very prominent aspect of Brian's understanding of the nature of 
evolutionary changes. The following quote from a discussion of word sort 
demonstrates that Brian had a well defined understanding of the nature of evolutionary 
changes (WS, mid-year):
B: All evolutionary changes are random.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: It goes with chance.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: Random and chance, but the end result can show order. (B 226)
Brian’s conception of the random aspect of evolutionary changes was also 
demonstrated by his selection in the interview about instances o f evolutionary patterns 
(IAI-3, mid-year). In this exercise, Brian selected the phylogenetic tree which had the 
most irregular branching pattern. (B 185)
Related to this conception of randomness, Brian understood evolution to operate 
without a grand, overarching design. Following the class activity in which natural 
patterns were discussed, Brian explicitly rejected the existence of a design or plan 
behind the action of evolution. His rejection fits well with the random aspect he had so 
recently begun to use.
But by saying that evolution followed no plan or design, Brian was not 
suggesting that evolution did not have a purpose (i.e., function). In the questions Brian 
completed for the class discussion of natural patterns he explained, "evolution has a 
purpose, but not intentionally." (Artifact 5) Purpose was understood to be 
"progressions" in an organism from less to more complex, and "moving organisms 
higher on the evolutionary tree." (B 167-168) Supporting this movement, Brian 
explained, "To go from a paramecium to a human being, I call that progress." (B 167) 
Brian's Aristotelian understanding of biological diversity was tempered by his 
recognition of evolution as being a tree (as opposed to a ladder of life).
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While Brian understood evolution as making groups o f organisms more complex, 
this complexity was interpreted as how well they are adapted for their particular niche, 
"parameciums [sic] are pretty perfect for what they have to do." (B 168) There is a 
tension here between Brian's understanding of evolutionary progression and his 
understanding of evolutionary adaptations. At this point in the interviews, this tension 
was not resolved.
Brian understood evolution to be a natural process through which species change
in response to ever changing natural conditions.
SD: Would you say extinction is a failure of a species?
B: Uhm, no, the species didn't fail. The species just wasn't capable, I 
mean it wasn't like a test....But, I don't know, it's just the changing of the 
stuff around 'em.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: So it’s not really a failure, it's just like a change in time. (B 166)
Natural history.
The third most prominent category of conceptions during the mid-year period 
was Brian's knowledge of natural history. When asked about the history of biological 
organisms on the earth, Brian drew a very elaborate, detailed time line. He explained 
(a) the earth was 4.5 billion years old, (b) life required water accumulation, and (c) the 
chance organization of the first organic molecules into simple systems such as 
plasmids. His time line included formation of the first multicellular organism, the 
formation o f of the first plants and animals, and the exploration o f land by the first 
semi-terrestrial vertebrates. He ended the time line with further development of both 
animals and plants. (B 176)
Related to his conception of evolution being the natural result of organisms living 
in a changing environment, Brian understood the earth to be undergoing continual, 
slow change, explaining how plate tectonic theory would account for many of these 
changes.
Another aspect of Brian's natural history knowledge was the distinction he drew 
between instinctive and learned behaviors. He realized that many of the behaviors of
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organisms are genetically determined (instinct), but these could also affect how 
organisms learn. This issue became important as he considered which traits were 
viable options for evolutionary changes.
Evolutionary relationships.
The most definitive change seen in this category o f conception was a change in
Brian's species concept.
SD: Do you think that a species is something that really exists whether 
we put a name to it or not?
B: Well, there's [sic] always organisms that are similar, but they're 
different. And the ones that are similar stay together.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: Well, depending on their nature. But they reproduce together.
SD: They reproduce together? Is that something really important when 
we talk about a species, that they reproduce together?
B: Um. Yes. Cause if it didn't reproduce together, you wouldn't have a 
species. (B 218)
From his formal, typological species concept seen in early interviews with Brian, this 
modified version has emerged. Brian introduced the lack o f breeding barriers as an 
essential characteristic of a species. His last comment in the above quote demonstrates 
that this was a substantial change, with Brian rejecting his earlier conception.
Other biological processes.
Brian's knowledge of genetics underwent a change that may be related to the
modifications of his conception o f process and the nature o f evolutionary changes.
While his early conceptions represented a sound, scientific understanding, these
underwent a further reorganization that allowed for a more sophisticated understanding
of both the random and constrained aspects of inheritance:
SD: Do you think the way you look, is it random or is it ordered?
B: Ahm, I mean, there's, I mean there may be millions of combinations 
that they could have had.
SD: Yeah.
B: Between my mom and my dad. But, they're just specific like if you 
could put 'em all, I mean, you wouldn't be able to list 'em all.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: And they're just random what way. I mean, was the one that grew or 
whatever.
SD: Okay, so it's a combination of 
B: I mean there's a set number.
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SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: But it's random the one they chose out of that. (B 196-197)
Other categories.
The conceptual categories of the evidence for evolution, broad evolutionary 
theories, human evolution, and the historical aspects of evolutionary theory underwent 
no revisions during this period.
See Figure 11 for a summary of Brian's mid-year conceptual framework.
Year-end framework
Natural history.
Conceptions related to natural history were the most prominent group in Brian's 
year-end conceptual framework. As shown in the previous two descriptions, Brian 
retained a well differentiated knowledge of many aspects of natural history. But in the 
interviews conducted toward year's end, not only did Brian have a wealth of knowledge 
of natural history, there were also signs of a growing interest in this area as well.
While Brian continually asked questions during our 17 interviews, toward the end of 
the year most of his questions concentrated on information about various animals.
Some examples of his questions include:
Do female (elephants) have tusks? Do the males? (B 241)
Do African elephants have the bigger ears? (B 241)
Why don't the females have tusks? (B 242)
Can bears move their ears like dogs? (B 250)
These questions not only demonstrate an interest in natural history, I feel they 
signify Brian's expectation that there are causes and results for various 
adaptations. Use of evolution as a unifying theory base allows for such an 
expectation.
Other signs that Brian had begun to use evolution as a means of understanding 
natural history came from a discussion of the graphic depicting three species of beta's:
SD: So do you think they are the same species?
B: Ahm, I don't know. They're related.
SD: Yeah?
B: Uh, uh. (Yes)
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SD: You say that based on just their looks? They look the same?
B: Well it's like the bottom two [a grizzly and black bear] are more 
related than the polar bear.
SD: Is that just because of the size difference or ah the color 
difference?
B: Well their snout and stuff are different....Ahm, probably these two 
separated after both of these ones separated from the polar bear. (B 
249)
H um an Evolution
Humans are animals which evolve* 
Humans are primates*____________
Evidence for Evolution
Fossils are supporting evidence* 
Biblical evidence is refuting 
evidence*
Characteristics o f Evolutionary 
Changes
Conceptual change fo r  random 
aspect o f evolution 
Long time required*
Lack o f  design fo r  evolution 
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Figure 11
Summary of Brian's mid-year conceptual framework for evolution
Another aspect of Brian's conception of natural history was his conception of the 
competitive basis of biological systems. He explained that organisms compete for a 
limited amount of natural resources, "to stay alive and reproduce they need to have 
certain things. They have certain requirements." (B 274) The conception that there
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are natural limits to the number of organisms a system can sustain is an absolutely 
essential one to understanding the process through which evolution works (Fisher, 
1992).
M echanism.
Like the previous descriptions, Brian's conceptions of the mechanism of 
evolutionary change were prominent. He continued to use conceptions of (a) mutations 
as the source of variation, (b) a variable species concept, and (c) evolution as being a 
change in the proportion of a population with a trait.
While these three portions were retained, Brian's conception of natural selection
underwent subtle revisions during this period. Previously, Brian understood natural
selection to operate through the death of less "survivable" individuals. As he
elaborated on his posttest answers, Brian explained how natural selection operated on a
population of ducks:
B: Less successful ducks just died without offspring.. Well. (Pause)
They didn't, they didn't, like the less successful ducks didn't just all die 
one year because all the more successful ducks just took over.
SD: Okay.
B: They, they just eventually got weeded out. (B 295)
While this conception was expressed in very informal terms, there is evidence that 
Brian was beginning to recognize natural selection as a more subtle force than he 
previously had described.
Brian's conception of fitness was still under transition at this point of the year.
He understood that high survivability was important in evolutionary terms, but he had 
difficulty weighing the importance of this characteristics against their "adaptability."
(B 297) Brian explained that if a lion with a higher survivability but low adaptability 
continued to reproduce and the environment of this population changed, the entire 
population could be eliminated. Brian used a population approach to fitness which 
remained at odds with the scientific understanding of this conception.
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On the posttest, Brian remained unable to use a scientific conception of genetic 
drift to explain the elimination of sighted salamanders from the cave population.
While this conception was undergoing changes during the school year, by the end of 
the research Brian had not yet constructed a meaningful scientific conception for this 
topic.
During previous descriptions, geographic isolation played a role in Brain's 
understanding of the process of evolutionary changes. He retained the use of this 
conception as signified by its inclusion in Brian's list of terms for a conception map, 
but this concept did not appear in the formal map. Brian could not find a way to easily 
include this term in his map, so it was omitted. This action represents an important 
research consideration. As can be seen here and in later examples, concept maps 
include only a portion of a student’s conceptual framework for a topic.
The third most prominent aspect of Brian's year-end conceptual framework was 
the group of conceptions describing the nature of evolutionary changes. All the 
conceptions described previously were retained, with one major change in this 
category. Brian began to apply the conception of adaptation much more frequently in 
the final series of interviews than he had previously. By year-end, Brian used a fairly 
scientific conception of adaptations.
SD: What is an adaptation?
B: [Pause] Ahm, an adaptation is a change
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: in the gene structure allowing the organism to be better fit for what
it needs to do.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes). What causes an adaptation?
B: A gene change.
SD: A gene change.
B: A mutation.
SD: A mutation. So an adaptation is caused by a mutation.
B: [Shakes his head yes. ]
SD: But they are not the same thing? You wouldn't use a mutation and
an adaptation the same way?
B: No.
SD: No?
B: Mutations happen all the time.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) And adaptations?
B: Adaptations are mutations that worked. (B 254)
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Brian used two of the three formally accepted explanation for adaptations (Lucas, 
1971), and he recognized the subtle difference between the meanings between these 
terms.
B: Well there are two different kinds of adaptations....The way that I 
was talking about it, is one of them is an actual change in the organism.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: Or you can change your behavior. (B 254)
Another sign that adaptation had become an important aspect of Brian's 
understanding of evolutionary change was the concept map that he drew which focused 
solely on adaptation. This adaptation map was drawn in response to the request "map 
your understanding of how evolution works" [CM-2, year end]. (See Appendix G for 
this concept map.)
Evolutionary relationships.
By the end o f the year, the tentative use o f the Darwinian species concept had
become fairly well established in Brian's conceptual framework.
B: How is a species defined? Is it like organisms can ah recognize each 
other and mate with each other? (B 290)
The manner in which this question was asked signifies that Brian was already
convinced of the answer representing a shift from the far more tentative usage
of this conception seen at mid-year.
Broad evolutionary theories.
Brian's responses during the final series of interviews further demonstrate his
fondness of broad theories. However, his conception for what is included in the scope
of evolutionary theory was under revision at this point.
SD: So when we're talking about organic or biological evolution, do 
you think, what does that term encompass?
B: Ahm, well we know it includes the change in a species.
SD: Okay.
B: I haven’t thought about that before. I guess, if you take the literal 
meaning of the word evolve, you'd have to go from one state to another.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: So, [pause] I guess [pause] I don't know if it would include the 
creation of species or not. (B 278)
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The actual limits of evolutionary theory were not a topic Brian had invested much time 
or energy in considering. Because of this, one question was capable of causing a 
change in his conception for this topic.
The conceptual groups o f the historical aspects o f evolutionary theory, human 
evolution, evidence for evolution, and knowledge of outside biological areas 
underwent no substantial changes from the previous description.
See Figure 12 for a summary of Brian's year-end conceptual framework. 
Summary o f year long conceptual change
As shown in Brian's maps, his emphasis has shifted at year-end to a more holistic 
view of the evolution. While his maps constructed at year-end heavily stress the 
mechanism of evolutionary change, this is not their sole component. Brian 
experienced several instances of conceptual change between this last description and 
that made at mid-year. He began to recognize that adaptations of organisms can be 
understood through the application of evolutionary theory. His view of natural 
selection changed from a somewhat simplistic conception of survival of the fittest 
toward an understanding of differential reproduction. The final series of interviews 
elicited expression of a somewhat sophisticated understanding of the various forms of 
adaptation. While Brian had a firm, basic understanding of evolution at the outset of 
the study, several facets of this conceptual framework became refined during the 
school year. Overall, the pattern of Brian's conceptual change was toward a more 
scientifically acceptable understanding of evolution.
Stephanie: Biologist as Multi-disciplinary Realist 
I selected Stephanie as one of the first of choices for interview participants based 
on her critical attitude and interest in biology. From the outset of the interview 
process, Stephanie made clear to me her skepticism of evolutionary theory. At the 
same time, she demonstrated great interest in the research process, and she offered to 
participate long before I asked for volunteers. Her skepticism and interest were also
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combined with the use of several alternative conceptions in her explanations of 
evolutionary process. Stephanie's case is particularly useful in its implications for the 
actions of a learner’s conceptual ecology on the process of conceptual change.
Human Evolution
Humans are animals which evolve*  
Humans are primates*
Characteristics of Evolutionary 
Changes
Evolution involves random 
changes within constraints*
Long time required*
Lack o f design for evolution*
A more complex, scientific 
conception o f  adaptation
Broad Evolutionary Theories




Evolution important in biology*
Evidence for Evolution 
Fossils are supporting evidence* 





Genetic inheritence as a random 




Mutation as the origin of 
variation*
Variable species concept*
Evolution as a change in 
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Genetic drift*
Harmful and beneficial mutations 
Fitness as an increased 
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Natural selection operates on 
differential reproduction
Historical Aspects o f Theory
Natural History
Connection o f learned and 
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Note. Italics indicate instances o f conceptual change.
* indicates retention o f  conception from previous description.
Solid block indicates academic conception.
Figure 12
Summary of Brian’s year-end conceptual framework for evolution 
Stephanie was a senior girl who sat in the back of Hurston’s Biology II class. 
While she spoke only occasionally to the entire class, I often watched her whisper 
comments to fellow students during whole-class discussions. Like Brian, Stephanie 
volunteered responses in whole-class discussions only if the answer wasn't 
immediately forthcoming from an other student. Our first interviews were difficult 
because of Stephanie’s very direct mode of communication. She offered to answer
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only to the specific questions that were asked: she did not follow tangents arising from 
our conversations. But as the interviews continued, I learned to use Stephanie as a 
valuable resource. Being very precise in her choice of words, she could react in many 
different ways to one question depending on how the question was worded. More than 
once, I found myself correcting my interview protocols for the next week based upon 
Stephanie's tutelage.
The most insightful descriptor of Stephanie's approach to biology is as a multi­
disciplinary realist. Her approach is demonstrated by her comments made before 
drawing a concept map for "her understanding of evolution" (CM-1, initial):
SD: Write down some key concepts that you think you need to explain 
[evolution]....
ST: Okay, I'd put down ah I think this is the name o f it, Origin of 
Species....Okav. let's see, probably the Galapagos islands.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST: Let's see ah. Neanderthal. [Long pause] I can't remember any of 
the scientists' names, but I just know there's some guy 
SD: Yeah
ST: That, the primordial soup thing....[Whispering] Ah, I don't know 
what else to put down. [Long pause] I guess I can put down 
CroMagnon also.
SD: Okay.
ST : And then, the Leakey family. I guess I'm more into archeology 
than biology. [Laughs.]
SD: Yeah, I can see that....
ST : All right. I don't know the term for it, but you know how ah, the 
embryos from the different animals look the same.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : I know there's a term for it.
SD: Ah, ah. Uhm, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny?
ST: That's it.
SD: Okay....You’ve made facial gestures and stuff when you talk about 
primordial soup.
S T : I just don’t think that's right.
SD: You just don't think that's right. What do you think is right?
ST: Well, I'm sort of creationist evolutionist. I'm kinda' both.
SD: Okay.
S T : So, but I just don't think that life could start from a bunch of 
chemical mixing together.
SD: Okay. (Yes)
ST: And, ah, what I once told my friends, then who put all the soup 
together?
SD: Yeah?
ST: [Small laugh] That's just one thing that I've thought of. So I think 
that it's possible that life was created from God and then evolved from 
there. I just don't think that life was created from primordial soup.
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SD: Uh, uh. Is that's something you came up with on your own? . . .
ST: Yeah.
SD: Yeah, you know we've talked about this in some ways before. Ah, 
how do you feel about this, the continuation of the Galapagos and 
Darwin . .  . ?
ST : Oh, well I think that Charles Darwin probably had a lot of good 
points
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : Because I think it's possible that some species developed from 
others or whatever. Whatever it said in his book. But ah, the ontogeny 
recapitulates phylogeny thing, ah, I mean that's interesting. Maybe it's 
meant to be that the development starts the same.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST : I don't know if that's right or not. I haven't made up my mind, 
whether they have truth in that or not. (D 37-45)
When asked to map her understanding of evolution, Stephanie did not approach 
the task as a mechanistic biologist with a dissection of the process, or even as a 
functional biologist with an explanation of patterns which result from evolution. 
Instead, she provided an account of what she felt were the important stages of 
evolutionary theory and the scientists responsible for them -Darwin and the original 
theory, the primordial soup "guy" and his explanation of the origins of life, and the 
Leakey family and their theories of human evolution. Stephanie did not use just one 
way of understanding of world; she used many. Her concept map demonstrates a 
historical/sociological approach to biological knowledge. As she explained, "I don't 
really see any importance to just knowing something just purely scientific." (D 283) 
When I refer to Stephanie as "multi-disciplinary," I mean to say she used the 
knowledge from a variety of disciplines to understand biology.
The second part of Stephanie's descriptor, realist, may be considered problematic 
by many science educators, but I feel the appropriateness o f this term is also 
demonstrated in the interview segment shown above. When I asked about the facial 
expression she made while writing about primordial soup, she responded, "I just don't 
think that's right." Stephanie recognized the existence of a external, physical reality 
that could be described and understood. While Stephanie was a realist, she was not a 
scientific realist: she did not always choose to understand the reality in scientific terms.
168
Instead, she referred to the knowledge of many disciplines and ways o f knowing in 
order to construct her understanding of reality. This is represented by Stephanie's 
reaction to the graphics depicting biological organisms (IAI-1, initial). During these 
interviews she explained, "I'm giving you scientific answers. I think that's what you 
want." This passage indicates that Stephanie understood that there are many ways to 
interpret nature. (D 239)
As suggested by her approach to biology, Stephanie has a wide scope of 
academic interest. She enjoyed studying most disciplines, although English and history 
were her favorites. Mathematics was the only subject Stephanie rejected as being 
difficult, uninspiring, and inapplicable to her own life. Stephanie particularly enjoyed 
biology and planned to pursue a profession in biomedical technology. However,
Stephanie's most ardent interest was in archeology. She studied the subject for several 
years, and had been a docent in the archeology section of the neighboring university. 
However, she decided not to pursue this avenue professionally as she recognized the 
limited positions available in this area.
Stephanie was a responsible student, completing assignments long before they 
were due. Out of school, Stephanie spent much of her time reading. Stephanie's father 
described her as a "voracious reader." [D 307] He explained that, like her mother, she 
would begin one novel soon after finishing another. Some of the titles she read during 
the study included Fountainhead. Jurassic Park. The Kitchen God's W ife. Notes from 
the Underground. Clan of the Cave Bear, and Brothers Karamasov. Her father 
explained that she never limited herself to one area and she her reading always spanned 
a broad area.
In our interviews, I was struck both by Stephanie's literary sophistication and her 
self-assurance. As described by her parents, Stephanie spent a great deal of her life in 
the company o f adults, and she was very comfortable participating in conversations 
with adults. In our interviews, Stephanie was open, interested, and critical. She was
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very comfortable in taking a position and defending it as she looked for the flaws in her
own and other's arguments.
Stephanie's Conceptual Ecology
The most influential aspect of Stephanie's conceptual ecology o f evolution was
her distinct religious orientation. Activities at a Methodist church consumed much of
her free time. Consistently she found the weekly Bible study to be a highlight of her
week. In this Bible study, students came together with a knowledgeable adult for very
in-depth religious discussions. Often Stephanie would recall for me with vivid detail
the discussions of the previous week. This is not to imply that Stephanie's religious
understanding subsumed all other types o f knowledge:
ST: If there's a discussion in one of my classes, I kinda', I'll think about 
it after class, or something will trigger it when I'm walking down the 
street or something, and I'll just think about it. I think a lot o f the 
philosophy that I’ve found just by doing reports for my World History 
class I think about a lot.
SD: Oh, do you?
ST: Uh, uh. (Yes)
SD: You like that sort of thing?
ST : Yeah. I have Bible study once a week, and so that kind sometimes, 
it contradicts what I'm learning.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) What do you do about that then?
ST: I just think about it. I don't know. It's kind hard to, hard to chose 
you know, which is right. (D 151)
When evolution was discussed, Stephanie placed the highest value on knowledge
stemming from her belief system. Stephanie acknowledged that subtle forms of
evolution could occur, but she rejected the conception that humans are the result of
evolution from a ancestral primate. Instead, Stephanie was a biblical literalist in this
regard:
ST: Oh, ah, in church, when they say well God created man, and I think, 
well it's probably true. (D 28)
Stephanie could be classified as a progressive creationist using Nelson's (1986)
classification system because she understood each biological group to be a result of
special creation, although she understood that each group could undergo a progressive
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form of evolution. There is an additional facet to Stephanie’s understanding in this 
regard:
ST : I think that maybe things that are similar, like Neanderthal man, kind 
of evolved into us supposedly. I think, I can see how that could happen.
Just they’re just subtle changes. (D 25)
At the outset of the study, there is evidence of Stephanie's multi-disciplinary 
approach to a phenomenon. Here she was blending knowledge from religion, 
anthropology, and biology to construct a foundation for her acceptance of evolutionary 
process. I found her views to be similar to her parents, as they too understood much of 
nature through a religious framework. However, Stephanie's conception o f human 
evolution differed drastically from her father's who used a more traditional, biblical 
understanding. As the study progressed, the scientific phenomena that Stephanie 
would accept underwent subtle modifications. These modifications will be discussed 
as her frameworks are described.
Related to her strong religious orientation, Stephanie understood the human life
to have a fundamental theistic component:
Stephanie: I think everything happens for a reason .. . .  I think, there's 
probably something I'm supposed to learn from this. (D 56)
But unlike the students described by Cobern (1992), Stephanie did not hold this theistic
or religious view for all of nature, only that which directly impacted humans. For the
majority of the natural world, Stephanie used a mechanistic or naturalistic
understanding.
Stephanie's positive scientific orientation may have provided for her partial use of 
the naturalist world view. She enjoyed studying biology, saying "I think it's fascinating 
to figure out why things are."([D 31) She particularly enjoyed studying the aspects of 
biology that helped her understand the humans, and "What's more important than 
learning about yourself?" (D 32) For Stephanie, for knowledge to be important it had 
to impact on her life, "I don't really see any importance to knowing something just 
purely scientific." (D 283)
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Stephanie approached most of the areas of biology as a scientific realist. She
rejected the existence of many pseudoscientific topics (Lock Ness Monster, aliens)
immediately. In response to questions that clearly have a scientific basis, Stephanie
reacted as rational, scientific realist. However, she was not always a scientific realist:
SD: For something to be true it has to have a scientific basis for you?
ST: Not necessarily. . . .
SD: How do you make that flip flop? How do you know whether to 
analyze things scientifically or through some other means?
ST: Well scientifically if I read about it and there's a fact and they have 
proof on a microscope slide.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : I can go in and look at it. That's different then having somebody say 
"Well this might be the way things are." Then I can just think about it and 
think about what the possibilities might be for accepting something. Or 
ah, what I , what I believe personally. W hether I'm Buddhist or Lutheran 
or whatever. (D 57)
When Stephanie was formally asked about the boundaries between science and
religion, the definitions seemed clear. She explained:
S T : See religion works on faith and science works on fact.
SD: Okay, so what is faith?
S T : Faith is the belief in something even if you can't see it or hear it.
You just have to know that it is. Whereas science doesn't know anything 
until it's proven and written down and made a theory of or something. (D 
201 )
But Stephanie perceived many intersections between the two ways of knowing. 
Stephanie's case study is an important one as it provides an opportunity to describe the 
nature of the intersection between academic and belief based conceptions.
Within science, Stephanie's epistemology was much like Brian's. She was 
typically a scientific realist, understanding the goal o f science to find out the "truth." 
(D 80) But like Brian, Stephanie did not always use a realist understanding of 
knowledge. When she was comparing theories which did not have great personal 
relevance, she had a distinctly relativistic approach. In these conditions, she discussed 
the tentative and contextual nature of knowledge. But also like Brian, when she 
discussed theories with great personal relevance or universally accepted theories, 
Stephanie approached this knowledge as a realist with the understanding that this
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knowledge somehow approximated nature. This fluid epistemological approach, while 
it may be incoherent to those who study philosophy or logic, has been documented 
previously in a group of biologists (Abrams & Wandersee, in press).
For Stephanie, a scientific theory is much like a hypothesis that has been "proven 
and you think that's the truth." (D 80) She explained that if "everyone agreed on a 
theory," it would become a fact. (D 81) This alternative conception fits well with her 
use o f the realist epistemology, in that she views science as a search for universal 
truths.
One attribute of Stephanie's fluid epistemological stance was that it allowed her
to recognize the attributes of theories she did not personally accept. The division
between what Stephanie accepted and what she understood became a large factor in the
conceptual change that was documented.
S T : My personal view is that I kind o f go with creationism. But I can 
see how the theory of the development from one cell could come to be, 
but I just don't really think it would work. (D 71)
Stephanie did not accept scientific knowledge simply because it was presented by
an authority. This position made Stephanie very aware of the ways in which her
knowledge differed from scientific knowledge. She expected to understand scientific
explanations, but she did not always expect to accept these explanations as personal
truths. She drew clear distinctions between personal and academic knowledge, and
therefore these distinctions were relatively easy to document. This is not be the case
for the other participants. While she realized that her understanding of biology was
limited, she was not aware that her academic conceptions differed those of science.
Stephanie's Conceptual Framework for Evolution
Initial framework
S T : I believe evolution is a possibility because of all of the evidence 
that supports the theory, such as Lucy and finding the ancestral bones.
But I don't think, I don't completely believe that man crawled out of the 
sea a million years ago. [Soft laugh] Man may have evolved fully from 
Neanderthals, but not fish or one celled organisms. I don't think just
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because I would decide to live in the ocean that my great grand children 
would have gills. That's pushing the evolution thing too far. (D 24-25)
The above quote is Stephanie's answer to the pretest question, "What is your personal
opinion of the theory of evolution?" This answer signifies Stephanie's (a) recognition
of viable scientific evidence supporting evolution, (b) conception that a scientific
description of evolution includes large scale morphological changes dependent upon a
Lamarckian mechanism, and (c) personal conception that human evolution includes
only subtle changes within hominids. Each one of these individual conceptions are
important in describing Stephanie's initial conceptual framework, however, her
conception of the nature of evolutionary changes was particularly influential and will
be discussed first.
Evolutionary changes.
As demonstrated in her second concept map (CM-2, initial) and the preceding 
quote, Stephanie had two conceptions of evolution. The one that she personally 
accepted was that evolution was a process of gradual, subtle changes that occurred 
within a kind of organism after the initial act of creation. As Stephanie explained, "I 
could see how that could happen. Just because they’re subtle changes. Just adaptation 
to your environment." (D 25)
Stephanie understood that the scientific explanation for evolution to involve a
process of drastic changes that accounted for the original production of life and a
subsequent series of large scale morphological alterations which forced organisms to
"totally change into other creatures." (D 94) Stephanie rejected this group of
conceptions as being implausible:
ST: I think a species can evo lve .. . .  Cheetahs, that a species that just 
kind of grew, evolved into something better. But that whole things 
about the amoeba [evolving into hum ans].. . .
SD: What would you think an evolutionist would say happened to an 
amoeba?
ST: I think that's really pushing the point. You know, when somebody 
says that. But you know they say it happened over millions o f years.
But even then, something had to just make something happen. If I 
didn't have it, I couldn't just grow into something myself. And I don't
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think the amoeba group could have evolved either. They don't, they 
don't have the traits to do that with. I don't see how it could happen. (D
28)
Stephanie had two systems of conceptions of the nature of evolutionary changes, 
the one that she accepted and personally applied, and the one that she understood 
science to hold but she personally rejected. But, as shown in the concept map drawn 
early in the study, Stephanie did understand these two conceptual systems for evolution 
as having a common component o f natural selection. Stephanie personally accepted and 
applied natural selection in her explanations of change in a population. Stephanie's 
conception of natural selection included a driving force in the form of 'the drive for 
survival of a species.'" (D 29) This alternative conception will be further discussed in 
the following section.
Within both systems of conceptions for evolutionary changes, Stephanie had
several alternative conceptions. Like Brian, she used an Aristotelian concept of
evolution as a progression to a "superior" organism:
SD: Do what do you think evolution is? When we say something 
evolved, what does that mean?
S T : It turns into something better. (D 26)
Within her system for the scientific explanation, Stephanie understood evolutionary
changes to involve the progressive changes within a group of organisms, a change that
should logically end with the production of only humans:
[In reference to a graphic depicting a gorilla]
S T : So why did [scientific] evolution stop with that particular gorilla?
Why didn't he evolve all the way up into humans?
SD: Okay.
ST: So I think if this was right [pointing to graphic of hominid 
evolution], then there would only be humans. (D 96)
Stephanie rejected the scientific explanation for evolutionary changes because of 
what she perceived as several weaknesses of the explanation. One of these weaknesses 
described in the quote above was the existence of other forms of life other than humans. 
Another area of weakness was the inability of science to reproduce the initial production 
of multicelluar life:
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S T : But see development from one cell, I just don't see 'cause if that 
happened once then maybe that could happen again. So maybe we 
could see evolution happening over a period of a hundred years or 
something.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST: and we haven't. It's only happened once, and that's why I just don't 
believe that. (D 72)
Stephanie also had difficulties understanding how the scientific explanation of
evolution could account for such "drastic changes" as "how scales changed to feathers.
That's such a difference. I don't see that." (D 95)
Another conception that Stephanie had for this group concerned adaptations. 
Stephanie understood adaptations to be a behavioral or genetic change which occurs 
within a group of organism over many generations. This conception represents an 
instance in which Stephanie's personal understandings coincided with her scientific 
conceptions. While Stephanie used the scientifically accurate conception of adaptations 
as occurring within a population and requiring long time periods, she failed to 
differentiate the many different scientific meanings of the term "adaptation."
Mechanism.
Stephanie had several alternative conceptions related to the mechanism of 
evolutionary changes at the outset of the study. Once again, the analysis is complicated 
as we consider the two explanations in Stephanie's conceptual framework, her personal 
conceptions and her conceptions of the scientific explanation.
Conceptions related to the origin of variation are the most difficult to understand. 
Within her personal explanation for the origin of variation, Stephanie understood 
"interbreeding for dominance" to account for variation. (See CM-1, initial, in Appendix 
G.) She was unclear on this point, explaining that "interbreeding" allows for dominance 
to arise in a population, and "that dominance lead[s] to evolution." (D 70) While one 
might understand her "interbreeding" as a version of in-breeding of a population, 
Stephanie's conception o f interbreeding was more like the scientific conception of 
hybridization:
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ST: Isn't there such a thing like selective breeding? Like if one species 
breeds with another one, then like all the good traits come out? I like 
th a t.. . .  Like if one species has something and the other one doesn't and 
all the ones that have it breed together, eventually the ones that don't, if 
they don't breed enough, then they'll sort o f die out. (D 66)
Stephanie's personal conception for the origin of variation signifies her use of an
alternative conception of a species concept. This conception will be discussed in a
later section.
Stephanie felt obligated to personally use a self-taught conception because she
continually questioned the scientific explanations for the origin of variation:
ST : I don't think the amoeba group could have evolved either. They 
don’t, they don't have the traits to do that with. I don't see how it could 
happen. (D 28)
Such questioning becomes understandable when we consider that Stephanie had a basic
misunderstanding of the conceptions suggested by science. During the pretest,
Stephanie offered the alternative conception of use/disuse as the origin of variation:
[ In reference to the evolution of blindness in cave salamanders]
ST : I said that because the salamanders live in complete darkness, light 
is not a necessity. After many generations of salamanders that became 
blind, the offspring were eventually born without sight.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST: Ah actually, maybe that’s not right. Maybe the ones that originally 
went into the cave became blind and their offspring were bom without 
sight and they became blind and maybe the process just happened 
quicker because they could function without s ig h t.. . .  So maybe 
because they don’t use it, they lose it. (D 23)
However, this use/disuse explanation was tentatively suggested and within five minutes,
she voiced her discomfort:
ST: I don’t know. [Pause] I guess they became blind just because the 
didn't need their sight. But I don't see how that could be passed on. (D 
24)
So while the use/disuse explanation was offered by Stephanie she clearly 
recognized that it was not a plausible explanation.
Stephanie also suggested need as a source of variation:
[Written answer reference to the evolution of speed in cheetahs]
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S T : Gradually, the cheetahs developed stronger legs. Having food as a 
incentive, the cheetahs ran faster and gained stronger muscles in their 
legs that were passed on to their offspring. (Pretest #7)
However, in her oral comments given in the second week of the study, there was
evidence of her discomfort with this explanation:
S T : I have a hard time forming opinions about this. I really don't think 
we can form something just because we need it. (D 15)
It is important to consider that although Stephanie did not find the conception of need
as a plausible mechanism for the production of variation, she understood that to be the
scientific explanation for this phenomena. At this point in the study, Stephanie did not
have another conception to account for the origin o f variation within the scientific
explanation for evolution.
In an interview conducted two weeks later, there was evidence for conceptual
change. In her concept map drawn to explain "how evolution works" Stephanie
included mutation as a mechanism to account for the production of variation [CM-2,
initial].
S T : (Reading her concept map) Development from one cell leads to 
mutation, or the possibility of mutation. Mutation requires necessity. . .
SD: Now what's the function of mutation on that side [of your concept 
map]?
S T : Okay, ah, maybe something developed, like an animal developed 
from one cell and then 
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST : Mutated into something that could survive eas ie r.. . .
SD: Could you describe that a little bit?
ST: Right, okay, ahm if something mutates maybe it's because it needs 
to. For survival. (D 71)
By this point in the year, Stephanie had begun to explore mutation as the source of
variation for the scientific explanation of evolution. However, as was just shown, the
use of mutation was integrated with the pre-existing conception of need as the source
of variation. With this integration, the source of variation and the actual action of
natural selection has been joined (the selection pressure causes the production of the
trait). The use of mutation makes this previously implausible explanation more
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attractive, possibly because the introduction of mutation makes the explanation more 
mechanistic, and therefore more scientific.
It is clear that for both the scientific explanation and Stephanie's personal
explanation for evolutionary change, variation in the original population is an
important component. In her answer given during the interview, Stephanie explained
that cheetahs evolved because:
ST : The ones that could run faster were the ones that were able to eat, 
and the ones that were slow maybe weren't able to catch as much food.
(D 22)
While she was still forming conceptions o f how that variation became present, 
Stephanie realized that to evolve a population must be variable. But I hesitate to call 
this a populational species concept, simply because Stephanie seems to have such a 
vague conception of a species. This was demonstrated by her personal explanation for 
the production of variation as relying upon hybridization between species. While 
Stephanie recognized the importance of variation, this variation was not linked 
specifically linked to a species concept. Stephanie's species concept will be discussed 
in more detail in a later section.
In Stephanie's explanation o f the mechanism of evolution as expressed through a 
concept map, need was used as an essential component of evolutionary change. In 
both her scientific explanation and personal explanation, need served to link the origin 
of variation (either through mutation or "interbreeding") into the process of natural 
selection. Stephanie understood natural selection to be the most important component 
of the process of evolutionary change in both her personal explanation and her 
scientific explanation. Like Brian, Stephanie used the alternative conception of natural 
selection as:
ST: Well the ones that survive the best are the ones that are going to 
survive eventually. (D 22)
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Stephanie understood natural selection as operating through the death o f unfit 
individuals, instead of the more scientifically acceptable conception o f natural selection 
as operating on differential reproduction within population.
Many of Stephanie's alternative conceptions about the mechanism of evolution 
applied to both her personal explanation and her understanding of the scientific 
explanation for evolutionary change. This intersection is demonstrated by Stephanie's 
conception of evolution as changes in the quality of a trait in an entire population, as 
opposed the more scientific conception of evolution being a gradual increase in the 
number of individuals in a population with a trait. Stephanie also used the alternative 
conception of biological fitness as "being able to change, to adapt to any changes." (D 
21) This conception can be contrasted with the scientific understanding of fitness as 
having the greatest number of viable offspring.
The final aspect of Stephanie's understanding of the process of evolution was her
lack of familiarity with geographic isolation as a means of providing for speciation:
ST : If humans were evolved from ah chimpanzees, then all the 
chimpanzees would have evolved into hum ans.. . .  So I think if this [a 
graphic of primate evolution) is right, then there would only be humans.
(D 93)
ST: I just don't think that we evolved from fish. Because then there 
wouldn't be any fish. They would all be evolved. (D 26)
These comments signify that Stephanie was only familiar with veitical patterns of
evolution. Such evolution occurs when one species changes over a great span of time
so that the original species is much different from the most recent species. She had no
conception of evolution as a speciation event caused by geographic isolation and
resulting in reproductive isolation. Because her perplexity with branching patterns of
evolution surfaced during several interviews, it is clear that this was an important issue
for Stephanie as she approached scientific explanations of evolutionary change.
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Human evolution.
The issue of human evolution was a very important aspect of Stephanie's
conceptual ecology of evolution. When asked about her opinion of the theory of
evolution, part of Stephanie's response was:
S T : I believe that man was created by God. There is a possibility that 
God created Neanderthal man and we evolved from them. I definitely 
do not think that my ancestry is from the mud. (D 25)
This response is not surprising when one considers Stephanie's conception of the
patterns of evolutionary change. At this point in the semester, she understood the
scientific conception of evolutionary change as a drive toward "being better"-
something she interpreted as being human. For evolution to be a viable concept for
Stephanie, it must explain human evolution.
Human evolution was Stephanie's testing ground for the theory of evolution, and 
it is not surprising that she gave this aspect of evolutionary thought much 
consideration. She studied anthropology a great deal when she was younger and this 
becomes evident as her first concept map is examined (CM -1, initial). While she 
understood the scientific conception of anthropology as including the evolution of man 
from an ancestral primate, Stephanie personally accepted an altered version of this 
explanation. (See Appendix G for CM-1, initial.)
Similar to the explanation for evolutionary change seen described in a previous 
section, Stephanie's personal conception of human evolution was that God created the 
initial prehistoric hominid, and this hominid underwent subtle evolutionary changes. 
This is an unusual stance for a self described "creationist." This is a case where an 
individual's theoretical commitments (interest in anthropology) allowed for changes 
within conceptions stemming from a belief system (evolution of humans).
Other conceptions of human evolution included Stephanie's understanding of 
humans as "related" to primates and other animals. During the interviews about 
instances (IAI-1, initial), Stephanie readily agreed that humans could be classified as
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animals and as primates. However, it became evident that Stephanie had an alternative 
conception of what was implied by biological "relation."
Evolutionary relationships.
SD: Do you know what the term species means?
ST : Well it's just an order of classification. (D 88)
SD: What would be the purpose of classification? Why do we do that?
ST: To differentiate between animals? (D 117)
Stephanie used the term species and recognized that the evolving populations 
must be variable, but it is not clear if she used a conception of a species that could be 
applied to nature. Stephanie's conception of a species was a taxonomic group 
established by scientists in order to better study natural organisms. I could find no 
evidence that she tried to apply this taxonomic unit to nature or expected this unit to 
apply to nature. While biology teachers may find this to be a troubling alternative 
conception, this "artificial" species concept fits well with Stephanie's personal 
conception of evolution. Because she recognized only small changes within a species, 
she had no expectations that species would be "related" in the same manner as a 
biologist understands organisms are "related." Although Stephanie used the term 
"related" in reference to groups of animals, she meant that these groups, such as 
primates, had groups of similar characteristics. She did not understand this to mean 
that they shared some evolutionary ancestor. Stephanie did not recognize a species as 
being the sole taxonomic group capable of successful reproduction as evidenced by her 
use of "interbreeding" between groups (hybridization). Her conceptions in this area 
become more complex when we consider that Stephanie had an awareness that "real 
distantly" related species could not interbreed.
Evidence for evolution.
Despite the fact that Stephanie often referred to herself as a "creationist," she 
recognized the presence of strong evidence to support scientific evolutionary theory. 
Not surprisingly, the evidence of most importance to Stephanie came from 
anthropology:
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ST: I believe evolution is a possibility because of all the evidence that 
supports the theory. Such as Lucy and finding the ancestral bones. (D 
24)
Stephanie also explained how the species on the Galapagos islands could be considered 
to be evidence for evolution. If Stephanie used a constant scientific realist 
epistemology, based upon her wide prior knowledge I would expect her to react 
favorably to the theory of evolution. However, given her multi-disciplinary approach to 
epistemology and because this aspect of science clashed with a very important aspect 
of her life, religion, Stephanie was in the very unique position of recognizing the 
strengths of evolutionary theory while rejecting the "truthfulness" o f it.
Historical aspects of evolutionary theory.
As discussed at the outset of Stephanie's description, her initial concept map 
contained some historical information. (See Appendix G for CM-1, initial). The 
inclusion o f Darwin, the Galapagos islands, Origin o f the Species, and the Leakey 
family signifies Stephanie's historical/ sociological approach to the theory. It is 
difficult to establish if Stephanie used this historical/sociological approach to other 
biological topics, or if this approach was somehow unique to this theoretical 
framework. But as shown in the previous section, the orientation of her first map does 
not signify a lack of knowledge of the more process oriented aspect of the theory 
content of this theory.
Broad evolutionary theories.
When asked about her opinion concerning evolutionary theory on the pretest, part
of Stephanie's response included:
S T : Some people say that you know, primordial soup and all that kind 
o f stuff. I just don't see that happening. (D 25)
At this point in the year, Stephanie equated the theory of evolution with the formation
of the original organism as well as all other changes that occurred within groups of
organisms. But, as mention previously, her personal opinion of evolution included
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only the very subtle changes that occur within groups of organisms. Stephanie 
understood that the act of formation of the original organisms to be dependent upon 
God. From a biological educators' perspective, it is unfortunate that Stephanie 
expected the scientific conception of evolution to account for original creation, as 
traditionally this field is considered to be outside the boundaries of evolutionary theory 
and within the realm of biochemistry. As such, this topic is seldom addressed in 
biology classes and it is poorly understood by even expert biologists. Because she 
expected tevolutionary theory to make creation understandable in biological terms, she 
was continually disappointed.
It is not surprising to see that Stephanie did not understand evolutionary to be a 
major aspect of biology. Instead her vision of the important theories of biology were 
"anything that has to do with humans, just because that helps us directly." (D 148) 
Because of this expectation of biology, Stephanie failed to understand why the study of 
evolution is important in understanding all life forms.
Natural history.
Stephanie did not have a wealth of knowledge of historical or recent natural 
history. While she recognized the extreme age of the earth, she did not have a 
conception of the vast changes that have occurred during the course of geological 
history. She viewed the earth as a very old, but somewhat stable place. While she did 
display a deeper understanding of the natural history of dinosaurs and early humans, 
she failed to apply the knowledge of dinosaurs in many situations. However, issues of 
human descent were applied continually during our discussions.
Other biological processes.
Like Brian, Stephanie had a firm understanding of the genetic basis of physical 
characteristics. She answered the prediction interviews in a scientific manner which 
described the independent inheritance of the characteristics between generations. Also 
like Brian, she even had a sound knowledge of the action of sex-linked characteristics.
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However, Stephanie's Mendelian conception of genetics can be contrasted with the 
more scientific view o f the action of both blended and independently inherited traits.
Stephanie's firm framework for genetics was also demonstrated by her
introduction of genetic terms into several interviews. In the first discussion o f the
sorting task (ST, initial), she explained that the rabbits' brown trait was recessive and
the white was dominant at the outset. However, as the task progressed and number of
brown rabbits increased in the population, Stephanie explained:
ST: But because the brown ones (rabbits) were surviving, they became 
dominant more and more.
SD: Uh, uh. When you say dominant, is that like a genetic kind of 
dominance or?
ST: Right. (D 76)
Based on this response, Stephanie used the alternative conception that ecological 
dominance is synonymous with genetic dominance.
Given her fundamentally sound usage of Mendelian genetics, her awareness that
physical characteristics have a genetic basis, and her tendency to apply this knowledge,
the early interviews with Stephanie become more confusing. When she discussed the
evolution of webbed feet in ducks, Stephanie explained:
ST: Maybe because they [ducks] are not swimming at all, maybe their 
bones would form differently [without webbing] and that would be 
passed on. I don't think that after you are adult that you can alter it and 
then have it passed on.
SD: But maybe if it’s a juvenile?
ST: Yeah, maybe. (D 18)
This almost Larmarckian explanation for the evolution of the trait of
nonwebbed in ducks, is incongruent with the Stephanie's knowledge
of genetics. This altered explanation, that traits acquired early in life can be passed on,
is not unique to Stephanie and has been documented in high school students in other
studies (Cough & Wood-Robinson, 1985a). But why Stephanie would offer this
explanation is an important question. It suggests that she did not fully apply her
knowledge of genetics to a question that has to do with evolution.
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Stephanie was remarkably anti-anthropomorphic in her answers to interview 
questions, as shown in her explanation, "I don’t think mosquitoes learn anything.” This 
rejection of anthropomorphism implies a certain biological sophistication that was 
absent from many other students in the class.
Like Brian, Stephanie had a functional knowledge of animal taxonomy. She 
could categorize organisms shown during the interviews about instances (IAI-1, initial) 
and explain her reasoning behind this categorization. But, unlike Brian, Stephanie did 
not recognize taxonomic relationships as reflecting evolutionary relationships.




The most substantial changes occurring between initial to mid-year 
interviews were found in the conceptions that describe the mechanism 
of evolutionary change. Stephanie's concept map (CM-3, mid-year) and 
her explanation of the sorting task (ST, mid-year) demonstrate that she 
was capable of using several scientific conceptions of process.
ST : ( Reading her concept map] Evolution is caused by mutation, 
which created change in the population, through natural selection which 
is a theory of Darwin, which is
survival o f the fittest. Darwin coined that, where desired traits are 
passed on. (D 217)
(See Appendix G for CM-3, mid-year.)
Stephanie's conceptions about the origin of variation underwent the greatest
amount of change. As described previously, by the end of the initial interviews,
Stephanie had tentatively proposed mutations as the source of variation. By mid-year,
this conception had become more deeply embedded as demonstrated by her
explanation that evolution "is caused by mutation." (D 217) "I think it's [evolution] all
mutation." (D 186) However, her understanding of mutation was not completely
scientific. Early in the mid-year interviews, she used a conception of mutation that was





Humans are product "primoridal 
soup" and subsequent drastic 
evolution (R)
Humans as product of ssparate 
creation and subsequent subtie 
evolution
Characteristics of Evolutionary 
Changes
Evolution includes drastic 
changes between groups (R)
Evolutionary changes are 
predictable and reproducable (R)
Evolution as progression to 
superior organisms
Evolntioniadudss small, 
gradual changes twftirin a group
Broad Evolutionary Theories
Evolution includes creation of 
first life and subsequent changes
(R)
Evolution Includes only small 
changes within a group
Evolution unimportant in biology
Evidence for Evolution
Anthropological fossils




Rejection of anthropomorphism 
Genetic inheritence as a random 
proccess operating within 
constraints
Evolutionary Relationships
Species is as taxonomic group
Relation describes physical 
similarities
Mechanism
Variation stems from 
Interbreediisgfor dominance
Variation stems from a need (R) 
Tentative recognition o f  
mutation as source o f  variation
Evolving populations are variable




Old, relatively stable earth
Limited knowlege of historical or 
Knowledge of animal taxonomy
Natural selection works through 
death of unfit individuals 
Evolution is a series of vertical 
changes in a population________
Note. Italics indicate instances o f conceptual change.
Shaded block indicates cm aayti& ll jte&ed m  fodHafi 
Solid block indicates academic conception.
(R) indicates rejection o f conception.
Figure 13
Summary of Stephanie's initial conceptual framework for evolution
ST: It just seems that all the evolutionary changes take place because 
there was a need for it. I just don't think we grow something for 
nothing. (D 186)
Just three weeks later during an interview with the bear mutation graphic (PI-1), 
Stephanie began to recognize mutations as a being a random force in evolutionary
process:
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S T : Well mutations doesn't [sicj just happen because you want it too.
It just sort of happens. . .  And so it it's, if  it's beneficial, it's gonna' 
survive and help the species. If it's not, that one's going to die out real 
quick and not reproduce. (D 226)
This represents a massive change from her initial conceptions. Not only did mutations
represent a scientific conception of the origin of variation, but her recognition of their
random aspect served to fundamentally restructure her understanding of the nature of
evolutionary changes. However, the acceptance of the random aspect was not
wholesale, as shown by Stephanie's recognition of the beneficial components of most
mutations. This conception becomes even more complex as we consider that while
Stephanie recognized most mutations as being beneficial, she realized that their
external cause was random, "they just happen." (D 219) Even with the tentative
introduction of the random aspect to evolution, at this point Stephanie had no
conception for genetic drift as a mechanism of evolutionary change.
It is important to note that the conceptual change toward a scientific usage of 
mutation initially began with a link to Stephanie's prior existing conception of need as 
a component of evolutionary change.
By mid-year, Stephanie completely isolated the origin of variation from the 
action o f natural selection. (See CM-1, mid-year, in Appendix G.) She used the 
scientific conception of natural selection as operating on the variation already present 
in a population of organisms. However, Stephanie continued to understand that natural 
selection operates through the death of unfit individuals.
Nature of evolutionary changes.
Stephanie retained the use of many of her initial conceptions about the nature of 
evolutionary changes. While Stephanie understood perfection in terms of human 
characteristics, interviews conducted at mid-year revealed her understanding of success 
for a species. She explained that a successful species was one that "survived a long 
time." (D 167) Curiously, she defined failure of a species to include extinction
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without "giving rise to something else." (D 169) She used this conception when
discussing dinosaurs, explaining that dinosaurs did not fail, because "they say birds
evolved from them. They just sort of changed." (D 169) This comment is an
important one. It signifies a broadening in the scope of Stephanie's personal
conception of evolutionary change.
Previously, Stephanie rejected the drastic changes she understood to be described
by scientific evolutionary theory. Formally, she continued to reject this conception
during the mid-year period. However, she continued to explain that her personal
understanding of evolution included gradual, subtle changes within a group. This was
more that just a rote answer as demonstrated by the graphics Stephanie selected in an
interview about instances (IAI-3, mid-year). When asked to pick the graphic which
best depicted her understanding of evolutionary change, Stephanie selected graphics
that depicted subtle changes within similar organisms. (See graphics 9A and 9D in
Appendix C-2). However, her dinosaur comment indicates a change in what
Stephanie understood to be a "subtle change" and "within a group." Stephanie's
conception of their terms expanded so that she could use and apply the various theories
of dinosaur evolution.
S T : I think maybe crocodiles came from dinosaurs and birds maybe 
came from dinosaurs. I mean, I can kinda' see the connection there.
But I can't see a connection between bacteria and an elephant. (D 182)
In an interview two weeks later, Stephanie began to incorporate this change in her
formal description of evolutionary change:
ST : I guess it [evolutionary change] could be drastic over time if you 
compare the changes between something over 10 million years ago and 
something today. That's a big, drastic change.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : And over a couple of years, there's not drastic change. (D 223)
Stephanie retained use of the conception of evolutionary changes as being 
predictable, but there are signs that this conception was also undergoing modest 
changes during the mid-year period. In a prediction question, Stephanie explained that
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if conditions were constant, a scientist could accurately predict the outcome of an
evolutionary event. However, in the same interview Stephanie explained:
ST: I'd definitely go with random [as being a characteristic of 
evolution],
SD: Random? Why?
S T : Because mutations are random. I think it just affects certain ones, 
just kinda' random. That's also change, it's kind the same thing. . . . Ah,
I don't think there's a real order to it either. I think it's just a way things 
happen. (D 223)
Logically, Stephanie's conception of evolutionary changes as being predictable and 
random are incompatible, but each conception was not only explained by Stephanie but 
also applied in interview situations.
The final conceptual change which occurred for this group of conceptions was
seen in Stephanie's conception of adaptations. During the interviews conducted for the
mid-year conceptual framework, she began to recognize the difference between learned
(proximal) adaptations and genetic (ultimate) adaptations. In response to the bear
graphic concerning possible mutations (PI-1, mid-year), Stephanie explained that
adaptation of burrowing was learned:
ST: I don’t think something in his [the bear's] chemistry mutates and 
makes him do that [burrow],
SD: All right, so?
ST: That's just a behavioral adaptation. (D 225)
Natural history.
Stephanie's conceptions of natural history demonstrate the nature of the interface 
between her scientific knowledge and knowledge based upon belief. When asked to 
graphically depict the "time line of life on earth," Stephanie explained that the earth 
was 4.5 million or billion years old, "but I don't know if it really makes a difference.
It's hard for me to distinguish." (D 179) The only other occurrences she depicted 
were the existence of dinosaurs, the extinction of dinosaurs, and the creation of 
humans. Stephanie's comment, "And that's all you want, just life on earth?" signifies 
that she understood these three events to be the only noteworthy historic biological 
occurrences. We then discussed her graphic:
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SD: What do you think went on in that big hole [between creation of 
the earth and dinosaurs]?
ST : Oh, all the scientist say it was all that primordial soup mess. And 
all like that. And we were formed by a bunch of chemical and little 
cells coming out of the sea.
SD: Uh, uh. (Y es). . .  So what would you say. What do you think 
happened?. . .
ST: It's hard to say.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST: I mean, because we weren't there. And there's no real guarantee to 
find out.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) Uh, but if you had to lay money on it?
ST : But, but judging from the dating of the dinosaur skeletons and the 
estimation of when the earth started, I guess that would be about true.
SD: Yeah?
S T : But we might have an error in finding out the dates.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST: 1,1 think it's probably true. I go with it.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST: Until something else disproves me. (D 180)
Stephanie was beginning to view more favorably the scientific explanation of the
origin of biological organisms. However, based upon the nature of her responses, this
remained an abstract and tentative acceptance. Minutes after this conversation,
Stephanie explained:
S T : Ahm, I sort of think that with evolution and all I think that maybe 
ahm, man was created like how anthropologist say in Homo erectus. in 
walking on all fours.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : And then evolution took place from there. But I don't think that 
everything started with one cell. (D 181)
Stephanie rejected her tentative exploration of a scientific explanation o f the origin of
life. This rejection took the form of a common pattern. Because humans were the
product of a theistic creation, life could not arise in the manner described by science.
Stephanie's conception o f the age of the earth illustrates again the interface
between scientific knowledge and knowledge based on belief:
SD: How old do you think the earth is?
S T : Oh, I've heard so many different things in books I can't remember.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : I think somebody said 4 billion, and then according to the bible it's 
only like, I don't know, like 5, 6, or 10 thousand, something like that.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST: I can't really remember.
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SD: So if you
ST : I'd say closer to the 4 billion.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) Why, why, why would you say closer to 4 billion?
ST: I think it's 4 million, I don't remember.
SD: Why would you
ST : Just because ah, it just seems like well the dinosaur excavations
and stuff. It just seems a lot older. (D 164)
Stephanie understood the earth to be extremely old because she accepted the past 
existence of dinosaurs. This relationship is more illustrative when it is compared to its 
logical counterpoint. Logically, the one might say the earth is old, therefore dinosaurs 
have existed. Instead, the biological information (dinosaurs) is more influential (more 
authentic) to Stephanie than the physical information of the extreme age of the earth. 
The relative weight Stephanie attributes to biological and physical evidence may be an 
artifact of the complex interface between scientific accounts of evolution and her own 
personal understanding, or this may be a common occurrence.
Also illustrated by the previous quote is Stephanie's inability to distinguish 
between billion and millions. This failure has been documented in other students in a 
study by Renner et al. (1981). It is a relatively common situation for a student to be 
unable to recognize the vastness represented by such time scales. As explained by 
Dawkins (1986), this inability may be a large factor in Stephanie's failure to completely 
understand the generation of vast biological diversity through the process of evolution.
Broad evolutionary theories.
Stephanie's use of the broad scientific theories of evolution increased during the 
mid-year interviews. She began to recognize her personal conception of gradual, 
subtle evolution in terms of Darwin's gradualism. She lumped her conceptions of the 
scientific explanation of drastic evolutionary changes with saltation - an idea she still 
fundamentally rejected as implausible. While she included the theory of punctuated 
equilibrium in her concept map constructed in response to "map your understanding of 
evolution," Stephanie could never explain what was meant by this term, simply stating 
that it contrasted gradualism (CM-2, mid-year).
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Other biological knowledge.
Within her conceptual framework for genetics, Stephanie began to use a 
conception of genetic inheritance as being a combination o f randomness and 
constraints, what she referred to as a "random pattern." This relatively sophisticated 
understanding of inheritance signifies a further embedding of the conception of 
randomness into Stephanie's understanding of broad biological processes - a change 
that also occurred within her conceptual framework of evolution.
Other conceptual groups.
The other groups of conceptions, including the evidence of evolution, the 
historical aspects of evolutionary theory, and human evolution, underwent no obvious 
changes from the initial framework. Stephanie's understanding of evolutionary 
relationships also remained relatively stable except for her inclusion o f possible 
dinosaur phylogenetic relationships. This assortment o f theories concerning dinosaur 
lineage continued to surface in Stephanie's interviews, and she used these theories to 
illustrate many of her comments.
Belief system.
Despite the many changes which occurred in Stephanie's conceptual framework
for evolution, her self-characterization remained stable. For a homework assignment
completed during this period, Stephanie referred to herself as a "creationist." (Artifact
4) Stephanie recognized the uniqueness of her situation in her comments on a concept
map she constructed:
ST : I say some things that are contradictory. Because we have facts in 
this area [evolution] , then it kind of refutes this theory or idea 
[creationism], Ahm, it's kind o f weird to have all my theories or ideas 
on this side [toward evolution], when actually I believe this side [toward 
creation],. . .  I'm kind of a combination of both. (D 215-216)
The considerable conceptual change described for this period occurred without a
wholesale change in belief structure. This section provides evidence that academic
conceptual change may occur without a corresponding change in belief.
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See Figure 14 for a summary of Stephanie's mid-year conceptual framework for 
evolution.
Year-end framework
The most prominent components o f Stephanie's year-end conceptual 
framework for evolution can be found in the concept map she drew in response 
to the request, "map your understanding of evolution." [See Appendix G for 
Stephanie's concept map (CM-1, year-end).] This map demonstrates that while 
Stephanie could apply a scientific conception for the mechanism of evolution, 
she still found the historical aspects of the theory to be of importance.
Mechanism.
Conceptions of the mechanism of evolutionary change underwent the greatest
degree of conceptual change. By the end o f the year, Stephanie was capable of using a
very scientifically acceptable explanation o f the process of evolutionary change:
S T : | Writing in reference to the evolution of speed in cheetahs] A 
mutation occurred that allowed a [cheetah] to run faster, and this trait 
was passed on. Since these animals could run faster than others, they 
were able to catch more prey, mates, etc. [Posttest #7]
In this answer there is evidence for conceptions of (a) mutation as the source of
variation, (b) the importance of variation , (c) the action of natural selection. While
many of these conceptions were present during the mid-year period, conceptual change
did continue to occur during this period. The most influential of these changes was
Stephanie's recognition o f mutation as a fundamentally random process.
SD: [In reference to the bear mutation graphic] Which one of them 
1 mutations] is more likely to happen?
ST: I think all of them is [sic] equally as likely to happen.
SD: All of them, why?
ST: Because it's a mutation, it's random! (Her em phasis). . .  So, I mean, 
a mutation doesn't think about what it's going to do.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : It just son of happens. So any of these could happen.
(D 269)
One of the conceptions that was used by Stephanie initially, her understanding 
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posttest interview period. This conception was replaced by the scientific conception of
mutation as the origin of variation.
Despite the conceptual change described above, there was still no evidence of
Stephanie's recognition of the action of genetic drift by year-end. On the posttest exam
question that would have the highest probability of eliciting a conception of genetic
drift, Stephanie gave a vague and uninformative answer:
S T : [Writing in reference to the evolution of blindness in cave 
salamanders] I guess through a mutation in one salamander that may 
have caused lesser sight that evolved to blindness in several generations. 
(Posttest #8)
Stephanie understood that all changes that become established as a means of fulfilling 
the population's need. She had no conception o f evolutionary changes that could 
become established by chance.
As suggested by the omission of neutralist change, need continued to be a 
component of Stephanie's understanding o f process. However, by the end of the year 
she had completely detached the need for a variation from the process responsible for 
the origin of variation:
[In response the the sorting task]
SD: Would the mutation have happened without the hawk showing up?
ST: Yeah.
SD: Okay.
S T : It would have happened regardless. Well, see I think it's like, it 
happens and then it's needed.
SD: Yeah?
S T : Rather than it's needed and it happens. (D 272)
During the last interview, there was evidence that Stephanie did not have a
conception of the pattern of horizontal evolutionary changes or the process that might
be responsible for these changes:
S T : I don't really see how people came from monkeys.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : Because I don't think there would be any monkeys left.
SD: Okay.
S T : It just seems like when something adapts, then the weaker thing 
that it adapted from dies out and gets rep laced .. .  I mean, it's like, if an 
animal is improved, if it evolved into something to help it out. (D 294)
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While she recognized that the scientific community discussed such changes, she could 
not understand the mechanisms through which such evolution could come about. The 
form of evolution personally accepted and explained by Stephanie continued to be 
subtle, vertical changes within a group.
The posttest exam also identified another alternative conception. Stephanie 
explained that an evolutionary change within a population of ducks would result in 
most of the population having a little more webbing than their parents but other ducks 
having the same amount of webbing. This is an alternative conception not previously 
described in the literature. While Stephanie acknowledged that evolutionary changes 
involve an increase in the proportion of the population with a trait, she also recognized 
that the quality of this trait gradually increases in the population.
Nature of evolutionary changes.
The following passage from Stephanie's posttest exam sums up much of her
personal understanding of evolutionary change:
S T : I believe that evolution occurs in small beneficial doses to help a 
species survive, such as the DDT and the mosquitoes, but I am still not 
convinced that humans evolved from one-celled organisms that evolved 
out of the sea. I'm still a creationist, but I also believe that small 
changes that occur in a species through mutation helps that species to 
"evolve and survive." (Posttest #9)
Conceptions shown in this answer include:
(a) her personal understanding of evolution to include small, subtle changes 
within a species,
(b) evolutionary changes in a species are beneficial, thus the random aspect of 
evolutionary changes were not included,
(c) that the scientific explanation for evolution describes vast changes within 
human lineage
O f these three conceptions, the one that may be the most misleading is Stephanie's 
personal understanding of evolution to include small, subtle changes within a species. 
Her use of this formal statement remained constant throughout the scope of the study.
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but the conception it represented underwent many changes. By small changes, 
Stephanie meant over a short period of time a species would undergo very subtle 
changes. These changes may be accretionary over a long period o f time. The phrase, 
within a species, is misleading. (Her use of species has changed over the year, initially 
she used group.) As described in the mid-year framework, Stephanie understood her 
personal explanation for evolution to be congruent with the scientific conception of 
dinosaurs giving rise to birds, and the vertical changes within hominid lineages. But 
she understood these changes to initially occur within a group.
The final change seen in Stephanie's conception of the nature of evolutionary 
changes was seen in her understanding of adaptation. Stephanie explained that "chill 
bumps" were not a form of adaptation. Instead, she explained, "I was thinking more of 
a larger scale adaptation" with a genetic basis. (D 248) Her understanding of an 
adaptation at year end included only evolutionary adaptations, and not the proximal 
changes which occur within an individual organism in response to sudden 
environmental change.
Natural history.
There were few changes in Stephanie's understanding of natural history during
the year-end period. However, another feature revealed in this period was Stephanie's
conception of the natural world as being fundamentally competitive:
SD: When you think about nature, do you think of it as being very 
competitive?
ST : Yes. Ah, like the survival of the fittest and the food chain and that 
kind of thing, all competing to live.
SD: What are things competing for? What do organisms compete for?
ST: Compete for food. Ah, they compete for mates. Every thing that it 
necessary to live, they compete for. (D 267)
As was mentioned with Brian, this conception is an essential one for a construction of a
scientific understanding of evolution through natural selection.
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Broad evolutionary theories.
Stephanie's understanding of the scope of scientific evolutionary theory remained 
unchanged during the study. She understood evolutionary theory to include both the 
origin of life and the changes which occurred within organisms after that creation.
However, her use of other broad theories changed after the mid-year period. 
During the mid-year period, Stephanie compared theories of punctuated equilibrium 
and gradualism, and characterized her own personal views as being more congruent 
with gradualism. But during the interviews at the end of the year Stephanie explained, 
"I just remember the details o f [those theories]. I don't feel comfortable enough putting 
them down." (D 274) Even after those theories were explored and applied by 
Stephanie, she did not continue to use them. These theories did not become a part of 
her conceptual framework for evolution.
Previously, Stephanie did not understand evolutionary theory to be an important 
aspect of biology. However, on her final exam, Stephanie voiced a different 
conception:
S T : There are three extremely important concepts that I think are 
critical in biology: evolution, the study of DNA and genetic 
engineering, and the discussion of scientific ethics. Evolution is 
important because students should be taught the theories of where they 
came from and how they came to be the way they are. It gives a 
strong, firm basis of comparing animals to one another and 
demonstrates that nature is dynamic, not static. Evolution gives the 
student food for thought, and it is easily discussed in combination 
w/other ideas, such as zoology, anthropology, archeology, and even 
geology. It encompasses several scientific ideas. (Artifact 7)
This passage signifies that Stephanie understood evolutionary theory to play an
important role in synthesizing several areas of scientific knowledge. Because this
answer was given in response to an exam question, there is the strong possibility that
Stephanie was expressing her understanding of scientific knowledge, and not the
understanding that she personally accepted and used. But this answer demonstrates
that Stephanie did recognize the broad academic importance o f evolutionary theory.
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Other conceptual groups.
The other aspects of a conceptual framework for evolution underwent no 
substantial changes over the year-end period. Her recognition of the evidence for 
evolution, her stress of the historical aspects of evolutionary theory, and other aspects 
of related biological knowledge were retained.
Belief system.
S T : [Written in response to question about her "opinion of the theory of 
the evolution"] I still believe in Creationism, however, I also agree 
w/evolution to the degree that an animals' mutated traits that is [sic] a 
benefit to the animal will aid its survival and be passed on to offspring 
and allow it to dominate the population though survival of the fittest. I 
still do not agree w/the notion that man crawled out o f the sea millions 
of years ago as an amoeba. I think God created man, and man then 
evolved to his present state. (Second posttest answer #9)
While several aspects of her conceptual framework for biology are represented in this
answer, this quote also speaks to Stephanie's beliefs of evolution. This belief remained
constant throughout the course. She continued to reject what she perceived as the
scientific explanation of the origin of life and of biological diversity. Instead, she used
a progressive creationist understanding by viewing major groups to be a result of
special creation and acted on by a progressive form of evolution. Also reflected in this
quote, Stephanie's belief structure remained oriented around her understanding of
human evolution.
See Figure 15 for a summary of Stephanie's year end conceptual framework for 
evolution.
Summary of year long conceptual change
A noteworthy feature of Stephanie's conceptual framework for evolution was her 
recognition of the conflict between scientific knowledge and knowledge based on a 
belief framework. Stephanie was very concerned with the actuality of evolution and its 
implications for the other aspects of her life. During the scope of this study, Stephanie 
underwent considerable conceptual change in evolution without a corresponding 
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Summary of Stephanie's year-end conceptual framework for evolution
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altered allowing for large scale academic conceptual change. In this regard, Stephanie 
may be unique. While Stephanie would be considered to be a progressive creationist, 
she also used a multi-disciplinary approach to science. This approach allowed her to 
recognize the attributes of evolutionary theory apart from her perception o f its flaws.
As a result of her consideration of the theory, while she continued to personally reject 
the theory, she began to incorporate many aspects of this theory into her own personal 
understanding of subtle evolutionary change.
Tyler: Biologist as Authority Seeker 
Tyler, a senior girl, was one of the original interview participants. This selection 
was based on her use of several alternative conceptions about the process o f evolution 
as well as her perception of a conflict between scientific knowledge and religious 
beliefs. Like Stephanie, interviews with Tyler presented an ideal opportunity to study 
the interface between scientific and religious knowledge.
Tyler was a small, athletic, friendly girl who laughed quickly in all conversations.
Like Stephanie and Brian, Tyler's interview behaviors were much different than her 
classroom behaviors. During interviews, Tyler was talkative and speculative, and she 
followed any tangential topic that arose in conversation. Our talks were comfortable, 
and often she completed my statements or questions. But in class discussions Tyler 
seldom spoke unless called on. I have only three recorded instances in which Tyler 
volunteered an answer in class. Tyler explained that while she was engaged during 
class discussions, she did not enjoy the competitive nature of whole class participation. 
However, this classroom behavior differed when she was in small group situations.
Here she spoke readily, gave directions to her group mates, and often approached the 
teacher with questions.
In our interviews, Tyler often compartmentalized her knowledge; she did not 
commonly attempt to relate different frames of reference. But this process of 
compartmentalization broke down in our interviews as she began to compare her
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personal and biological knowledge. Such comparisons continually resulted in personal 
confusion for Tyler. The following passages demonstrates an instance in which Tyler 
began to synthesize different forms of knowledge about the age, origin of the earth, and 
early natural history. Also prominent in this passage is confusion resulting from this 
synthesis.
SD: How long ago do you think that was [since the existence of 
dinosaurs]?
T : I should know that.
SD: Oh no, not necessarily.
T : Oh gosh! I'm sure I've been told and I've read books.. .  .
SD: Ohm, how long do you think it was between when the earth was first 
created and then the 
T: and then dinosaurs?
SD: Yeah.
T : I think it's probably like [pause] probably like half a million years or 
something.
SD: So like a half a million years? Could you like draw that on a line or 
something? . . .
T : Okay. I want to. Ahm, [pause] and I think there were, I think there 
were bird kinda' dinosaurs.
SD: Okay.
T : [Looking at her drawing] Okay, that's not an airplane, that is a bird.
Ahm. And then dinosaurs pretty much died.
SD: Okay. Make or you can put that on another piece of paper, put 
dinosaurs died. Died. Okay.
T : Okay. And then I think it's like and now it gets confusing. [Laughs] I 
guess, see what I'm thinking of right now is the ah like what I've learned 
like in church.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : and what I've learned in b iology.. . .  I don't know. . . .  I would tell you 
that. [Long pause] I don't know what came before man except there were 
dinosaurs and then I know man was created by God and stuff 
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : That's what I’ve always thought in my h ea rt.. . .  I would say God 
created us.
SD: Okay.
T : [Laughs] Uh, uh. (Yes) Because I don't know about all this other 
stuff.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : That's just what I've always felt that God put Adam and Eve on this 
earth
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : and then from there, all of us.
SD: So all right, where would Adam and Eve come in relation to 
dinosaurs?
T : Well they’re way after them.
SD: Okay. Put a big line.
T : But I don't know about all the evolution stuff now.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
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T: I just don't know what, what to think. I don't know what to put. If 
there were other creatures 
SD: After the dinosaurs?
T : I'm sure there were. . . .
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) Now so how did those other creatures, you know so 
how did the dinosaurs 
T : Come about?
SD: Yeah. And all those other creatures.
(Long pause)
T : Golly! Well, when I think about, man was the first creature created by 
God, so I don't know where they came from. [Laughs]
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : They don't just form.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : Oh Goah! I need to get things straight, don’t I? [Small laugh]
SD: Well, no, you know. This is the time you're working things out. So .
. . man was the first creature created by God, that's from the Bible?
T : That's well yeah, that's what I've always thought.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : I guess I never even thought about where dinosaurs came from. It 
didn't cross my mind.
SD: 'Cause you don't think about dinosaurs in church?
T: No, that's true,
SD: And you don't think about Church when you're in science class?
T : [Shakes her head yes]
SD: Or looking over a book.
[Both laugh]
T: Do you understand what I mean?
SD: Yes, I know. You've never had to put those two kind of different 
ways of thinking together.
T: Together. Exactly.
SD: Do you think they should go together?
T : Yeah. ( . . . )  I do, they, there has to be some kind of explanation for 
them to fit together.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) [Pause]
T: [Whispers] I don't know. (C 171-175)
Tyler explained one cause o f her confusion when considering evolutionary 
theory:
T: No one's ever asked me what I thought. I was just taught about that 
no matter what I thought was right. [Small laugh] But I don't know.
(C 87)
It seems that she had never attempted to integrate her differing conceptions because 
this was not expected of her.
Tyler's approached biology as an authority seeker. When confused, she would 
rely on knowledge already constructed by an outside authority (i.e., texts, the 
researcher) rather than attempt to resolve the conflict on her own. After one mapping
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session on the process of evolution, Tyler became aware both of her lack of knowledge 
and the conflicts between her religious and scientific knowledge and commented, "I'd 
wish I’d like read something on evolution. I'm sorry." (C 71) After one interview in 
which she discussed her confusion about the difference between her scientific and 
religious knowledge, she asked:
T: Can I ask you something?
SD: Yeah.
T : Do you know the answers to all these questions?
SD: Well, you know, there's no
T: Does anybody? ( C 177]
Like the students described by Lawson and Weser (1990), Tyler was easily swayed by 
external opinions and less assured of her own abilities to construct a solution.
Tyler hoped to become a physical therapist, and this is the reason she enrolled in 
the Biology II course. She chose this profession because of her interest in the human 
body. Tyler explained that her favorite academic subject was science, because she 
enjoyed learning about anatomy and physiology. She exercised on a daily basis, 
playing tennis, running on the track team, and working out at a health club.
Other than exercise, Tyler's main activities centered on school work and pleasure 
reading. While she applied herself, Tyler had a pragmatic approach to school work,
"I'll do what I can." (C 3) Given any free time, Tyler exercised frequently and read 
fiction, explaining, "I like real life, good books." (C 5) Tyler got little enjoyment from 
school based reading, and English was one of her least favorite subjects.
Despite her friendly, easy going demeanor, Tyler's mother characterized her as 
being independent and competitive. I think of Tyler as more mature than her 
classmates in that (a) she could examine U High in a manner in which few of 
classmates could, (b) she had firm professional goals, and (c) her approach to school 
was designed to achieve those goals. It is evident to me that Tyler's approach to the 
discipline of biology did not characterize all aspects of her academic or personal life.
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Tyler's Conceptual Ecology
The most influential aspect of Tyler's conceptual ecology was her orientation 
toward science. While Tyler was interested in science, she was most interested in its 
medical aspects:
T : I love to learn about the body and stuff. If I could do anything, I 
would just learn more about hum ans.. . .  What they're made of and how 
diseases, and just how they work.
(C 37)
At the outset of the study, Tyler viewed biology as the "study of the human body" but
this conception broadened during the course o f the study. The remainder of science,
and specifically biology, held less of Tyler's interest. This was reflected in Tyler's
scant knowledge o f biological organisms. In the interview about instances (LA.I-1,
initial), Tyler had no knowledge of the function of flowers in angiosperms:
SD: Ahm, do you know that function of flowers for the plant? . .  .
T : I sure don't. I never even thought about it (a flower) doing anything 
for the plant. . . . Honestly, I’ve always just thought flowers are there 
because they're p re tty .. . .  That may sound real stupid but I've never 
thought about a flower having a function. (C 104)
At the outset of the study, while Tyler was more mechanistic in her approach to
physiology, she had a largely aesthetic view o f the natural world (Cobern, 1993). She
did not view biological organisms in terms of cause and effect but in terms of
aesthetics qualities such as beauty, order, and symmetry. Tyler was capable of
mechanist thought, but this was not her first approach to making sense of the natural
world. Many of Tyler's conceptions of nature changed during the course of the study,
and these changes will be addressed in later sections.
Tyler understood there to be distinctions between the operations o f natural world
and the world of humans. For humans:
T : I think that things happen because they're meant to happen. And I 
think that no matter what happens, everything, like, no matter what 
happens to me, everything is going to turn out f in e .. . .  I'm talking just 
like with humans. With people. (C 70)
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But for the "natural world things are more scientific." (C 70) Clearly, this aspect of 
Tyler’s view of the human/natural world has close ties to her religious belief 
framework.
Like Brian and Stephanie, Tyler was a realist, and she understood science as an
attempt to "talk about what happens in the world." (C 33) But hers was a contextual
realism, as she explained:
T: It's [science] a bunch of knowledge that's all linked together 
somehow, but it's also a process of learning. 'Cause there's never an end 
in science. There's never a final answer. You can always discover 
something new or take a new aspect of it. (C 33)
This conception o f science is contrasted with Tyler's conception of scientific theories
and facts. She acknowledged that theories are "just an idea that somebody gets," a
conception that describes theories as tentative but also makes them equivalent to a
scientific hypothesis. But Tyler understood scientific facts to be a reflection of reality:
SD: Okay, which one has higher standing? You know, what we should 
value? A theory or a fact?
T: Ah, probably a fact.
SD: Why?
T : Because they're true.
SD: Okay, so theories aren't true?
T : Not that they can't be, they might be.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: But not necessarily .. . .
SD: So when you say that something is true, what does that mean?
[Pause]
T : It means that it does happen. It is real.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) It is real. So that, it means that's what really happens 
in the world?
T: Right.
SD: Okay, and you think that we can measure what really happens?
T: Uh, uh. (Yes) (C 84-85)
While she understood some aspects of science to be tentative, its basis is a static truth.
At the outset the study, Tyler understood there to be many conflicts between
scientific knowledge and religious beliefs. She understood them both of them to
represent ways to understand the world, and she was very aware of the conflict
between evolutionary thought and many religious beliefs. This was a conflict that
Tyler had encountered before the beginning of the study:
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T: [Reading her pretest answer] What is your personal opinion of the 
theory o f evolution? And I said, I believe in evolution to a certain 
extent. I also believe in creationism. I believe they came together, but 
I'm not sure of how. So the only reason that I believe in evolution some 
is because many of its points are proven facts.
SD: Okay. Like what points are proven facts?
T: Just, ah, about [pause] how animals have become more developed..
. . I don't know. I don't know much about evolution.
SD: Okay.
T: But it's all confused with what I believe in the Bible.
SD: Can you talk a little bit about that confusion?
T: Yeah. Ah, ah I've heard some evolution theory that like animals, 
monkeys, and apes and stuff were put on the earth and that's how we've 
evolved. From them.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: But then I've also believed that God put us on the earth as man.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: So. But it seems like all these cr, evolution things have, they just 
seem so right. [Laughs] And so scientifically just right that 
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : How can I believe that just man was put on the earth? I don't know.
I believe that evolution did occur. But God had something to do with it. 
[L aughs]. . .
T: Yeah, I've always wondered about evolution.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) Like what have you wondered?
T : I've just wondered what's right. [Laughs] I mean I don't think I'll 
ever know what really, really happened when the earth was created. I 
don't know.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : Just because there are so many questions to be answered. (C 26-27)
Tyler had achieved a partial resolution of her science/religious conflict by 
explaining that evolution occurred, but God had a hand in it. However, the passage 
above contains signs of her continued discomfort. At this point she used a theistic 
understanding of a process of gradual creation (Nelson, 1986), meaning that she 
understood evolution to occur but as a process controlled by God. However, she still 
remained unsure concerning human evolution. She explained that before this class she 
used to think all species except humans underwent evolution, and humans were placed 
on earth by God as an act of special creation. Her dissatisfaction with this explanation 
is seen in her question, "How can I believe that just man was put on the earth?" Early 
in the study, human evolution remained an important unresolved question for Tyler.
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Aside from our discussions of evoludon, Tyler seldom volunteered insight into 
her religious understandings. She attended church on a weekly basis, but because her 
parents were divorced, she attended a variety of denominations. She did not perceive 
her family to be particularly religious, instead she characterized them as very "moral.” 
Tyler explained that she did not use a literal interpretation of the Bible because she did 
not accept the implications of a literal interpretation for the status of women and other 
minorities within society. While Tyler was not aware of her parents' views of 
evolution, it was clear that her mother had great reservations with this topic. In our 
interview, Tyler's mother voiced surprise when I described the scope o f my study as 
she explained, "you don’t want to hear what I think about evolution." (C 297)
Unlike Stephanie, Tyler was not explicit about the differences between her 
personal understandings and those of science, because she had less confidence in her 
scientific understandings and because she recognized scientific knowledge as a source 
of final authority. "The problem is I don't know anything about evolution." (C 48) In 
the description of her conceptual framework, I have attempted to separate Tyler's 
personal and scientific conceptions, but the differences were not as polarized as I had 
come to expect from Stephanie's interviews.
Tyler's Conceptual Framework for Evolution 
Initial framework
SD: When I say something evolved, what does that mean in a science 
class?
T: It means that, I think it means that something was put on the earth 
real crude like, I don't know what the word it.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: And that, through the years, and being in different settings and 
having to deal with different things in the environment, it became more 
advanced. (C 29)
Tyler's early explanation of evolution characterized many aspects o f her 
conceptual framework for this topic. In keeping with her largely aesthetic view of 
nature, this explanation provided no explanation for a mechanism and instead 
emphasized the broad nature of evolutionary changes.
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Nature of evolutionary changes.
As demonstrated by her comments above, Tyler understood evolution to include a 
slow process of change toward a "more advanced" organism. By more advanced, Tyler 
meant an evolutionary change makes the organism uniquely suited "according to their 
needs.” (C 30) This conception of evolution describes production of many different 
organisms.
Tyler also understood evolutionary changes to be slowly and constantly occurring 
through "multiple acts." W hile Tyler could not fully explain what she meant by this 
phrase, she indicated that evolution occurred "several times" during the lineage of a 
group.
In the early interviews, it was difficult to persuade Tyler to express the 
conceptions she personally used to understand evolutionary changes. But during the 
third interview, she explained that the scientific explanation would account for the 
evolution of all organisms from some original biological progenitor. However, the 
conception she personally used was outlined in her concept map. She personally 
understood God to place the original "creatures" on the earth and change the organism 
through multiple acts of evolution, a process which eventually lead to the evolution of 
humans.
As implied in Tyler's description o f evolution as an advancement, "change toward
their needs," Tyler recognized much of evolutionary change to occur in response to the
needs of an organism. The use of need was accompanied by a rejection o f randomness
or chance as a descriptor for evolutionary change.
T: [Discussing the evolution of webbed feet in ducks on the pretest]
Well it just doesn't seem that webbed feet would just be a change 
mutation. I mean, that's kind of a big thing to have in an animal. You 
know what I'm saying?
SD: Big, yeah.
T: It's just, it's one o f their major qualities, it just doesn't seem like it 
would be a chance that they got that. (C 18)
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Finally, she had a vague conception o f adaptation during the early interviews, 
explaining that "Adapt means to find things to do, so you can live better in that 
setting." She drew no distinction between genetic, behavioral, or proximal adaptations, 
but understood all of these to be forms of adaptations.
Mechanism.
As has been described, Tyler used only a very vague conception of the
mechanism of evolutionary change in the early interviews. Explaining that, "I don't
know how it happens," Tyler would describe the nature of the changes when asked
about mechanisms. (C 26) However, when asked to "map specifically how you think
it works," Tyler explained that:
T : The creatures were put on the earth.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : And the fittest creatures survived and advanced and the ones that 
were most fit in the environment kept surviving and the other ones 
pretty much died out and eventually ah, ah, more advanced creatures 
were developed. (C 72)
This answer demonstrates that Tyler used a conception of evolutionary change 
operating through the process of natural selection. But for Tyler, this was an implicit, 
tacit knowledge, and her conception of natural selection was the most important 
component of her understanding of the process of natural selection. This conception is 
different from the scientific conception of natural selection as operating on differential 
reproduction. Instead, Tyler understood natural selection to operate through the death 
of unfit individuals.
Tyler used a collage conception of fitness, like Brian, but she emphasized the age 
of the individual:
Tyler: [Explaining her pretest response to the most fit lion] I put that 
the fittest lion is Ben. . .  . Because first of all his size was just normal. . .
. He was just average and he had the most cubs, and he lived the 
longest. [Pause] And let's see 14 of his children liv ed .. . .  Not 19 or 15, 
but its a good number I guess. . . . And especially because he lived the 
longest. (C 2)
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This collage conception of fitness changed in a later interview to one based on an 
organism's ability to survive. Any animal that could survive is fit, and the most 
"average" animal has the greatest potential to survive.
Congruent with her conception of natural selection as the major process of 
evolution, Tyler had an appreciation of the variation that must be present in an 
evolving populations. While her conception of a species was a group of animals that 
"share the same qualities" she understood this in a moderate fashion, "some of the same 
qualities." (C 90) She also had a conception of species as a variable phenomena, 
"There are a lot of different varieties in a species." (C 91) Despite her scientific 
populational understanding o f a species, Tyler remained unsure o f the taxonomic 
group in which evolution proceeds:
SD: What unit does evolution work on?
T : I would say not necessarily just individuals, but groups of things that 
arealike. (C 31)
Evidenced by her pretest responses, Tyler understood evolutionary changes to 
essential to the improvement of the quality of a trait in a population. She explained 
that evolutionary changes appear as slow increases in an organism's "ability" to meet 
their "needs."
[Pretest answer to the evolution of webbed feet in ducks]
T: I think they probably got more and more webbing, just like they had 
to ad ap t.. . .  So they had to get more and more webbing on their feet.
(C 18)
Despite the extent of Tyler's implicit knowledge of evolutionary process, she
recognized there to be a large gap in her understanding. When discussing the evolution
of webbed feet in ducks, Tyler murmured, "I don’t know how they produce something
in themselves." (C 20) But with additional questions, Tyler expressed some of her
tentatively used conception for the origin of a trait:
T: [Reading her response to the evolution of speed in cheetahs] Okay, 
the earlier, slower cheetahs had to learn to run faster in order to survive.
Those that couldn't change any, did not survive, but those that did 
became faster. Oh this is goofy! [Laughs] But those that became faster
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mated with other healthy cheetahs and eventually through the mating 
cycles, cheetahs have become fast animals.
SD: So explain to me how it happens that cheetahs get so fast.
T: Because they had to learn to catch their prey.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: And they, I guess they had to push themselves to go faster in order 
to get food. . . .  But I don't know if mating with an animal that's also fast 
will make you have a fast an im al.. . .  I don't know if a cheetah that 
learned to run fast to catch its prey, I don't' know if it would have an 
offspring that was faster too.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: I don't know if that's how evolution happens. You know? (C 23-24)
When pressed, Tyler used learning as a source of new variation in the population that 
produced the variation needed for natural selection. However, she was skeptical about 
the possibility of such variation becoming embedded in the genetic basis of the 
population.
When Tyler used learning as a process through which populations evolve, she
was aware of all the connotations of that term:
T : [Reading her response to the pretest question about the evolution of 
immunity in mosquitoes] I put mosquitoes learned to adapt to their 
environment.
SD: Okay.
T : I guess it's like they learned that they had to adapt to DDT because 
in order to live. Then those that survive were, the fittest, the survival of 
the fittest.
SD: Okay, you picked the one that said they learned. What, what does 
that mean when you say that?
T : They, that they figured out what they had to do ah to live.
SD: I 'm just trying to figure out what you mean by learned. You know, 
sometimes
T: They figured out what, what was going to kill them I guess. (C 19- 
20)
Hallden (1988) suggests that students use of learn is an artifact of communication. 
Tyler's comments do not suggest that she was framing a more complex conception with 
a familiar phrase. Instead, she understood that animals, both insects and mammals, can 
learn to change behaviors or physical reactions in order to survive. Learn was an 
accurate reflection o f her understanding. However, while she offered this explanation, 
Tyler recognized the deficiencies of this explanation in terms of the genetic basis of 
evolution.
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Another tentatively used conception for the origin o f variation seen in Tyler's
response was the use/disuse explanation.
T : [Reading her answer on the pretest concerning the evolution of 
blindness in cave salamanders] I said from living in caves, salamanders 
use very little of their sight. From not using their eyes they became 
nonfunctional and this trait was passed down to other generations.. . .  I 
guess if you don't use something it does become dysfunctional.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) Where do you get that idea from?
T : Ah, from us! Just like if you don't use certain parts of you brain, 
you forget all about it. (C 25)
Tyler understood variation to occur because of the need for it, and this accounts
for her rejection of the random aspect of evolution that is introduced through the use of
mutation as the mechanism o f variation:
T: [Reading a pretest answer] I put that they [webbed feet] appeared in 
ancestral ducks because they lived in the water and needed to swim. (C 
17)
T: They [cheetahs] developed in their own ways, according to their 
needs. (C 30)
After Tyler discussed each o f the possibilities for the origin o f variation, she
dismissed their use as a mechanism:
SD: So how did it [sight] go away [in the cave salamanders]? Do you 
have any idea?
T: No, not really. Just from not using it. I don't see, I don't 
understand the real science of how it goes away.
SD: Okay.
T : I don't know how to explain that. I just know from not using it.
[Pause] The function went away and I guess when they had their 
offspring it just didn't work. See, I don't know! [Laughs] I don't 
know, I don't know how it happens! (C 25-26)
Tyler referred to "the real science" of the origin of a trait signifying that she recognized
that her explanations were not scientifically valid. But at this point, she had no other
viable conception, explaining "I really don't know what causes people or things to
change." (C 31)
Before the fourth interview, Tyler was aware of the shortcomings o f her 
knowledge. She realized that she could not scientifically explain the origin of variation 
in a population. But when Tyler was asked to complete the sorting task (ST, initial), 
she began to construct a scientific conception for this phenomenon. (These data are
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reported in detail as this represents the initial construction of an important conception
in evolutionary theory.)
SD: Okay, ah, and each one of these cards represents a different 
generation. Like this is one generation who would have offspring maybe 
and produce another generation. So each one of the cards represents a 
generation of rabb its .. .  .
T : What is that [pointing toward card of DNA model]?
SD: Ahm, this is ahm genetic m aterial. . .  and here's a piece breaking off 
it. . . .
T : Is that a rabbit? [Pointing to a graphic with a rabbit in a hawk's mouth]
SD: That's a rabbit, a dead rabbit.
T : Okay. [Laughs] . . .
SD: What 'cha thinkin'?
T : I'm thinking, "I don't know what to do."
SD: Okay. Now you don't have to use all of them.
T : I don't know where to put that in. [Pointing to the DNA card]
SD: Okay. Then we'll just put this one to the side. And if you don't want 
to use it, don't use it. I just want you to explain how you understand it.
T : Okay. Well I guess you could put it in here [before the first brown 
rabbit card]. So.
SD: Would you put it in there?
T : Because something had to happen genetically for a brown rabbit to 
happen .. . .
SD: Okay. So you put this here, so that's where the brown rabbits came 
from?
T : Right. . . . Uhm, uhm, do you want me to go through it?
SD: Yeah. Would you?
T : Yeah, okay. So all white rabbits up here and no hawk. And 
something happens genetically 
SD: Do you know a word for that?
T : Ahm, like a mutation?
SD: Yeah, that might explain it, yeah.
T : Uhm, cross breeding? I don't know .. . .  But a brown rabbit occurs.
And here the hawk discovers the white rabbits. He likes to eat them more 
than the brown rabbits, well there's just a couple of them n o w .. . .  Well 
let's see. He's eating more white rabbits. And the white rabbits are 
diminishing and the brown rabbits, there's more of them.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : 'Cause it's easier for them to survive because there is more of their 
kind and less of the white rabbits.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : And here's he's eaten all of the white ones but one.
SD: So if you could predict what would happen the next generation what 
do you think it would look like?
T : It'd be all brown.
SD: Yeah? Ah.
T: 'Cause obviously they can't survive with the hawk around.
SD: Yeah. So would you call that evolution ?
T: Uh, uh. (Yes)
SD: Uh, uh? (Yes) Here's a question. You have something happening to 
make the first brown rabbit that's here. Ahm, do you think this happening 
has anything to do with the hawk?
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T: Ahm, (long pause), not really.
SD: Okay.
T: Well I guess yes. 'Cause somehow the genes were mixed up and more 
brown rabbits were produced 
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : while the hawk was eating the white ones.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: And then more brown rabbits became dominant. It's because the 
hawk ate the white rabbits that probably the brown rabbits started 
becoming dominant.
SD: Dominant, okay. When you use that word dominant, are you talking 
like ah you know you talk about genetics?
T: Genetics, yeah.
SD: Genetics, yeah? Okay. So something about the hawk being there 
makes that brown gene dominant?
T: Yeah. Right.
SD: Okay. Ahm, so what do you think about these guys, the two brown 
ones. Do you think that this has to keep happening over and over to get 
more brown ones? You know, like it happened.
T : It happened here, but then if these two ah 
SD: She's pointing to the brown ones.
T: Yeah the two brown ones have offspring they’re more likely to be 
brown.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : So, do yeah, it does have to happen a few more times to the white 
ones. But once there are a few more brown ones 
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: They'll produce offspring which will most likely be brown. And then 
they'll just naturally happen. (C 77-79)
This passage represents Tyler's first use of the concept of mutation in an explanation of
evolutionary change. She also suggested crossbreeding, which she understood to be a
type of hybridization, as a source of variation. Tyler used these possibilities, mutation
and cross breeding, because they satisfied the genetic requirements she recognized as
necessary to make her explanation plausible. This requirement was not met by any of
her previously suggested mechanisms. Each of the two conceptions, mutation and
crossbreeding, were then encorporated intoTyler's previously existing framework for
evolutionary change.
Also of interest is Tyler's incorporation of this genetic change into her Mendelian
understanding of inheritance of discrete traits. She understood changes to "become
dominant" in a population and that dominance to be passed down to the next
generation. Like Stephanie, Tyler has equated genetic dominance with ecological
dominance. This new conception was again encorportated in her pre-existing 
conceptual structure.
Other biological knowledge.
As demonstrated in the previous passage, Tyler had a firm understanding o f the
genetic basis of inherited traits, and she used a Mendelian conception of genetic
inheritance. But like the students in the study by (Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985a),
Tyler's firm Mendelian conception wavered under certain conditions as shown in the
prediction interview (PI-2, initial):
SD: [Two rats who have recently lost their tails meet and breed. What 
will their offspring look like?]
T : I think their offspring will have a long tail. I don't see how cutting 
off a tail has anything to do with the genes they had originally. . . .
SD: If they were very young when this happened, like they were just 
bom and something cut off their tails, would that change your answer?
T: Gosh, probably so. 'Cause they would have to grow up. [Pause]
Ah it's kind of contradicting myself, but they would have to grow up 
without a tail. And it's just like they were bom without a tail pretty 
m u c h .. . .Gosh, but it it did come from the gene, then their offspring 
probably would have long tail. I don't know. (C 124-125)
Other conceptions Tyler used in understanding evolution were involved with her 
understanding of the origin of traits. She understood organisms to be capable of 
conscious decisions, not only in behavioral modifications (running faster) but also in 
physiological processes (immunity to DDT). In part, these naive conceptions may be 
attributed to Tyler's aesthetic view of nature. As mentioned previously, Tyler had 
never considered possible explanations for adaptations, so when pressed, she 
responded with simple, somewhat anthropomorphic responses.
Human evolution.
Tyler was most aware of the differences between the scientific conception and 
her personal understanding in the group of conceptions for human evolution. Tyler 
understood the scientific conception of evolution to explain that humans have evolved 
from "animals, monkeys, and apes and stuff." This view of evolution as directed 
toward human evolution was supported in Tyler's interview about instances (IAI-1,
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initial). When shown a graphic with three species of bears, she discussed the specific
characteristics of each of the bears. But when shown a graphic depicting a gorilla, a
chimpanzee, and a human, she smiled and responded, "evolution." (C 93)
Tyler's understanding of the scientific conception of evolution differed from her
personal explanation that humans were "just put on the earth" by God and all other
species have evolved. (C 27) However, by the second interview, she began to
question the validity of her personal understanding, "How can I believe that just man
was put on the earth?" (C 27) This question remained unresolved through the initial
interview period.
SD: What would you like to know if you could have any piece of 
knowledge that would help you understand evolution?
T: [ Pause 1 I would like to know. [Pause] I would like to know how, I 
would like to know how humans were developed. I don't, I don't, I 
don't know. (C 28)
Related to this, Tyler was ambivalent about the relationship between humans,
primates, and other animals.
T : I just don't, I don't consider myself related to an ape.
[Both laugh]
T : I don't know. 'Cause they just, they do seem kind of crude. And I 
don't know.
SD: So, ah, do you think we are related to anything?
T : I think we are related to them.
SD: You do? . . .
T : Oh, I think we are related to them. Yeah.
SD: Yeah?
T : I guess I shouldn't.
SD: Would you have said that before this year?
T : Ahm, not like four or five years ago, but in the last two or three 
years, yes.
SD: Okay. What do you think made that change?
T : Well just seeing, actually hearing a lo t . . .  And it seems like I went 
to ahm the Smithsonian in Washington.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : And saw all that stuff about evolution.. . .  And I don't know, just 
different things that I've seen. And just looking at the apes this year.
SD: Yeah?
T : Has made me think that they are more human like than I once 
thought. (C 97)
The issue o f human relationships is one which depicts the process through which 
students make theoretical choices. Tyler's ambivalence is evident in this passage.
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Personally she did not like the implications of a human/ape relationship, but factors
continue to suggest that this is more plausible than she once thought. Notably, Tyler
explained that this change began before this year and was catalyzed by a trip to a
natural history museum and Ms. Hurston's unit on animal behavior. It is interesting to
note that Tyler's hesitancy in accepting a human/ape relationship does not extend to a
human/animal relationship:
SD: So do you have trouble classifying us as animals? What do you 
think about that statement?
T: No because I've always thought we're mammals.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : And animals are mammals.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: So that doesn't bother me.
SD: So we could be animals or we could be mammals. That's 
understood. But we've gone beyond primate?. We're something else 
now?
T: Not totally.
SD: Oh, okay. Where do you, can you expand on the not totally?
T: Yeah because we still have a lot of the same characteristics.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: That are the same but we are different obviously. (C 112)
Evolutionary relationships.
Tyler's species concept was not entirely typological or entirely a neo-Darwinian 
population conception. She recognizes a species as a group of organisms that shared 
"some qualities" and are "related to one another." (C 90-91) This is a recognition of a 
species in a typological manner, a common alternative conception. However, she also 
recognized the presents of considerable variation of characters within one species, a 
major feature o f populational thinking and a feature o f the Darwinian species concept. 
However, she made no mention o f the ability to breed within a species and instead 
stressed a common core o f characteristics as a sign of a species.
Evidence for evolution.
As an authority seeker, evidence supporting or refuting the theory o f evolution 
was not a major feature of Tyler's conceptual framework. Tyler understood the 
"development" she perceived in natural organisms as a form o f evidence for evolution.
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But this was a vague conception, "I don't know, things have progressed, and they've 
just become more developed." (C 26) Related to this vague conception of 
development, Tyler explained that human anatomical similarities to other organisms is 
a persuasive form of evidence supporting evolution. Not surprisingly, Tyler 
understood the most important evidence refuting evolutionary theory as also focused 
on humans:
SD: How about some evidence that doesn't support [evolution], that
refutes it? . . .
T: Goah! Ahm, we talk. And nothing else does. . .  .
SD: So you think that, that kind of separates us from the other animals?
T: Right. Uh, uh. (Yes)
SD: And you think that biology needs to explain that somehow?
T: Uh, uh. (Yes) Yeah, because no other animal has a language like
ours. (C 149)
Broad evolutionary theories.
As was reflected in her conceptions of human evolution, Tyler recognized the 
theory of evolution in terms of a theory of human evolution.
SD: Okay, so evolution produced man?
T: Right. That's what I've always thought what evolution meant. (C
50)
The theory of the creation of the earth never emerged as an important aspect of Tyler's 
understanding of evolution; instead she understood evolution's importance to be 
fundamentally concerned with the creation and changes within humans. She did not 
view the theory o f evolution to be an integral part of biology.
Tyler's semester exam taken at the end of the initial interview period 
demonstrates that she had a conception of broad evolutionary theories such as the 
extinction of dinosaurs. In this exam she gave a thorough explanation of the major, 
competing extinction theories and identified the one she found to be the most 
reasonable explanation. However, unlike Stephanie and Brian, these broad 
evolutionary theories did not appear in Tyler's interviews. She did not use these 
theories in her everyday understanding of evolution. Because this evidence is found in 
an exam (Artifact-3), it is probable that Tyler acquired this knowledge shortly before
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the exam, and so it did not play a major role in her conceptual framework for 
evolution.
Natural history.
Like Stephanie, Tyler demonstrated a very shallow knowledge of the natural 
history of historical or recent organisms. While Tyler was interested in nature, 
signified by her attitude in class when discussing organismal biology and her love of 
nature programs, she retained very little information regarding natural history. As has 
been discussed, she did not view organisms in mechanistic terms, and this view may 
have limited her construction of knowledge in this area. Coupled with the lack of 
natural history knowledge, Tyler demonstrated a sound understanding o f taxonomy. 
While she was not familiar with many of the organisms discussed in the interviews 
about instances (LAI-1, initial), she could accurately categorize these animals and cite 
the reasons for this classification. She explained that she learned much of this material 
in her sixth grade biology class. Despite this taxonomic knowledge, Tyler had no 
conception of the evolutionary relationships of large taxa of organisms.
History of evolutionary theory.
Tyler made no mention of the history of evolutionary theory within the first 
segment of interviews. This does not indicate that she did not have these conceptions 
as part of her conceptual framework, but it does indicate that this was not a facet of her 
framework that she frequently used and applied. Tyler seemed to compartmentalize 
her knowledge. As shown in the previous passages related to Tyler's belief in 
evolution, she did not synthesize different conceptions as she was asked to do. Based 
on this, it is plausible that Tyler's conceptual framework contained historical 
conceptions, but, because the interviews did not overtly question this topic, she did not 
draw on his knowledge.
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Belief system.
As has been outlined, Tyler's belief in evolutionary theory was undergoing a
change in this initial period, a change that had begun some time before this class.
Tyler understood the scientific explanation of evolution to describe the creation and
changes of the human lineage. Her own initial beliefs described evolutionary changes
for all other groups o f organisms except humans, who were an isolated creation of
God. But toward the end of the initial interviews, Tyler began to accept the scientific
view of human relationships and their implication for human origins:
[Tyler looks over a graphic which shows a human boy, a gorilla, and a 
chimpanzee]
T: You have two monkeys and a little boy. [Laughs]
SD: [Laughs] So what do you think about that? You're laughing.
T: I don't kn o w .. . .  Ahm, it's kind of like he's [the boy] just another 
ape. [Laughsl
SD: So what do you think about that? You’re laughing as you say it.
T : Ahm, well, I guess they're all in the same big family.
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes] Do you think that really?
T: Yeah.
SD: You're frowning a little bit.
T : Well we've talked about that.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: Yeah, I think they are. [Pause] Even though they don't look too 
much alike. [Small laugh] . . .
SD: So ahm, do you think humans can be classified the same way 
animals can be classified? . . .
T: Yeah.
SD: Okay, so we could be. So you don't have any problems calling us 
primates? . . .
T: Well I guess not, if I think about it that way. I mean I just like to 
call us humans, I wouldn't say.
SD: But can you say or are you comfortable saying that humans are 
primates? I sense some discomfort with that, like Yeeeeah. Like 
maybe?
T: Yeah. Well what I think is maybe ahm, a long time ago we were 
more primates. [Small laugh]
SD: Okay, so really you, you would be more comfortable saying our 
ancestors were primates?
T : Right, it's like we've developed into something a little bit different 
than primates. (C 112)
The tenor of this exchange was slightly different than the meaning taken from a 
reading. While Tyler could recognize the plausibility o f the scientific explanation, she 
was still very hesitant in accepting a human/ape relationship. This reluctance could be
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based on the implications that such a relationship would have for her religious beliefs.
In any case, the conceptual change for this issue remained a tentative one at the end of 
the initial interviews.
See Figure 16 for a summary of Tyler's initial conceptual framework.
H um an  Evolution
Humans are animals
Humans are primates (R)
C harac te ris tics o f Evolutionary  
C hanges
Evolution includes slow, constant 
changes
Evolution is a progression to 
more advanced organisms
B road E volu tionary  Theories
Evolution includes creation o f  
first life and subsequent changes 
in humans and animals (R)
Evolution includes only  
changes w ithin ta xa  other than  
hum ans
Humans are a product o f  evolution
(R)
Evolutionary changes are based 
on need
H um ans are product o f  separate 
creation
Adaptations include all changes 
in response to environmental 
conditions
H istorical A spects o f T heo ry
Evidence for Evolution M echanism
Development o f organisms
Similarities o f humans to other 
organisms
Variation caused by conscious 
decision, use/disuse and need 
Variation caused by mutation or 
cross-breeding
N atural H istory 
Knowledge of animal taxonomy
Development o f human evolution Evolving populations are variable
Natural selection works through 
death o f unfit individuals
E volutionary  R elationships
R elated Biological K now ledge Collage conception of fitness Species is a taxonomic group
Mendelian genetics Evolution includes an increase in 
the quality of a trait
Relation describes physical 
similarities
Anthropomorphic approach to 
production o f  variation
Dinosaurs gave rise to birds and
crocodiles
Note. Italics indicate instances of conceptual change.
Shaded block indicates conceptions based on belief.
Solid block indicates academic conception.
(R) indicates rejection of conception.
Figure 16




The most prominent changes which occurred in Tyler's conceptual framework 
for evolution during the mid-year period may actually represent a change in her 
conceptual ecology. At the beginning of this mid-year interview period, Tyler 
demonstrated a construction of a science/religion dichotomy that was not previously 
present:
[A homework question]: Explain the difference in the types of answer 
you should expect when asking these two questions:
(a) How did Homo sapiens come to inhabit the Earth?
(b) Why did Homo sapiens come to inhabit the Earth?
[Tyler's written response]
T: For question a, a scientific answer would be given, evolution
explains how. But why is explained by something
other than science—religion. God wanted us to be here on earth.
(Artifact 4)
This new conception was also reflected in her interviews:
T: I think science can prove that we have evolved.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) Would that mean anything to you? If we, if we did 
prove that we have evolved?
T: Yeah. (C212)
T : Science just tells you how it works. It just explains how things are. .
. . But religion you believe in. I mean, you have to learn what religion 
is, but it's just belief 'cause there is nothing there, I mean you can't put 
your hand on something in religion like you can science.. . .  I guess 
both of them could be right they just explain different things. (C 197)
T : So the answer to creationism is just faith.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : I don't, there is never gonna’ be any physical evidence to prove that 
one. (C212)
Although Tyler had begun to establish a dichotomy between scientific and religious 
knowledge, she did recognize that there were points of overlap between the two ways 
of knowing. The use of this dichotomy allowed Tyler to be more explicit about the 
differences she perceived in her own, personal understandings of evolution and those 
of science. These differences will be discussed in the following sections.
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Nature of evolutionary changes.
Tyler explained her personal understanding of evolutionary change to include
small changes within a group. When shown three graphics depicting different
phylogenetic trees, (a) evolution shown as a change of color within a group of
butterflies, (b) evolution as a change leading to the creation of many vertebrate groups,
and (c) evolution as a set of vertical changes within a group of armadillos, Tyler picked
the vertical changes shown in (c) (IAI-2, midyear).
T : I would say this, the one with the armadillo.
SD: The one with the armadillo. Why?
T: Because they're basically a lik e .. . .
T: I like this because it's a simpler change. That's just what 1 think is 
evolution.
SD: Okay, like a simple change?
T : Maybe it's not simple it you take it from the very beginning to the 
very e n d .. . . But all the stages in between are pretty simple. (C 167)
Her personal understanding o f evolutionary change described limited changes:
T : I think they [organisms] do change inside a group a lot
 but I don't think a whole new creature can come from one other
thing. (C 177)
Tyler also became more explicit about her rejection of part of the scientific 
conceptions:
SD: How do you think the process o f evolution works? . . .
T: Well, I still don't believe some of the things we learned about it 
[evolution],
SD: Okay, you don't?
T : No, not like the skipping. I don't remember the terms.
SD: Saltation?
T: Y eah .. . .  Gradualism, that's what I guess. . . .  I think that's 
believable. (C 205)
Tyler understood gradual evolutionary changes as a process that increased the 
complexity of organisms, as shown in her concept map constructed mid-year (CM-2, 
mid-year). She did not understand complexity to be equivalent with perfection.
Instead she understood complexity as a closer "fit" of an organism to its environment 
(C 210), as in "An amoeba might be perfect in his little world." (C 164) But Tyler 
continued to view the most complex organisms to be humans.
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Tyler also understood evolutionary changes to be ordered, but without a direct
design. Instead, she understood the order as a pathway toward "development" of
complexity. (C 224) Related to this understanding of order, Tyler rejected randomness
in her personal conception of evolutionary change.
T: Chance. I don't know. 'Cause I don't under. I don't know. Yeah, 
chance because things are made by chance.. . .  In evolution.
SD: Okay.
T : But I don't believe all this skipping. You know what I'm talking 
about?
SD: The saltation stuff?
T : Yeah. [C 221]
Tyler understood random and chance to causing large, drastic changes. While she
understood this to be an aspect of the scientific conception of evolutionary change, she
could not reconcile these characteristics to her personal conceptions.
During the mid-year, Tyler began to understand all evolutionary changes as a
form of adaptation:
T: Evolution is a change in the population.
SD: Ah, and where does the change come from?
T : [Pause] Changes come from, comes from, come from living in the 
environment. It comes from 
SD: Okay.
T: Adapting. (C 214)
This conception of evolution is congruent with Tyler's rejection of the random aspect
of evolutionary changes. Instead, Tyler understood evolutionary changes as largely
determined by the organism's environment.
Despite her conceptions of evolution as being slow, subtle, and ordered, Tyler
explained that evolutionary changes could never be predicted. But Tyler understood
the unpredictability to be caused by an ever changing earth and not through the
inclusion of mutations.
T : The world just don't stay in one state. It's never gonna' be the same.
(C 161)
T: [Evolutionary changes] will never be the same because the earth is 




As suggested by her understanding of evolutionary changes as adaptations, 
Tyler's conception of the mechanism of evolutionary change revolved around need.
SD: So what causes mutations? Do you know?
T : When something changes outside . . . that effects them . . . and they
have to change to adapt to that.
SD: Okay, ahm, so if an organism has like a need to adapt to the
environm ent,. . . ,  a mutation will happen?
T: Yeah. (C 226)
Tyler retained the use of need in her conception, but the conception of mutation as a 
source of variation was introduced into her pre-existing explanation for the mechanism 
of evolutionary change.
Tyler's understanding of need as an integral conception in an explanation of 
mechanism was also signified by her response to the interview about instances which 
tested her understanding of harmful and beneficial mutations (PI-1, mid-year). Tyler 
recognized only beneficial mutations as possibilities for mutation. This choice is 
congruent with her need-based conception of the process of evolutionary changes along 
with her rejection of randomness and chance as characteristics of evolutionary change. 
As is suggested by this conceptual framework, during the mid-year period, Tyler had 
no conception o f genetic drift as a mechanism of evolutionary change.
Shown in her concept map constructed in response to the request, "map your 
understanding o f the process of evolution," Tyler's understanding of mechanism 
became much more complex and differentiated during the mid-year period (CM-2, 
mid-year). (See Appendix G for this concept map.) She used eight concepts for this 
map which described the process as a result of natural selection operating in a 
population. While the basis of this conception was not a great deal different from her 
initial framework, she was capable of using conceptions of natural selection in a much 
more direct and explicit manner.
Although Tyler understood natural selection to be the most important aspect of 
the mechanism of evolution, she did understand mutations to be a component of the
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overall process. But she did not view them as an essential aspect. Her concept map of 
process did not include mutation as a conception. When asked to construct a map of 
her understanding of the process using seed concepts (CM-3, mid-year), Tyler included 
mutation only at the bottom of the map. Tyler incorporated mutation in a superficial 
manner by placing it within the confines of a pre-existing conceptual framework of 
operation of natural selection. This was also demonstrated in Tyler's response to the 
DNA card on the sorting task (ST, mid-year):
T : The mutation [that produced the brown trait] may have happened
more so because of the hawk. The rabbits needed to change. (C217)
Using natural selection, Tyler maintained her conception of the importance of variation 
in a population, but she remained unable to account for the original production of that 
variation.
Human evolution.
While Tyler resolved much of the conflict which had existed between science 
and religion, she continued to be perplexed by the question of human evolution during 
the mid-year period. Personally, she believed that humans were created by God. 
However, she understood the scientific conception to include the evolution of humans 
from an ancestral species. While it appeared that Tyler had established a strict 
dichotomy to allow her use o f both of these conceptions, there were signs that the 
conflict remained, explaining "It seems like there should be an answer for both." (C 
2 1 1 )
Natural history.
SD: How old do you think the earth is? . . .
T : Billions of years.
SD: Billions? Why do you say that?
T: Well, we've been on it for tons of years. But then all the dinosaurs.
I mean I don't know if they were millions or billions but.
SD: Can you differentiate between those two?
T: No.
SD: No?
T: Because something could have happened before dinosaurs, I don't
know. . . .
SD: So now you're thinking that dinosaurs were the first things to live?
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T: Uh, uh. (Yes) but the earth could have existed a long time before
that. (C 157-158)
This passage demonstrates Tyler's conceptions of:
(a) the extreme age of the earth as well as her inability to distinguish between
large magnitudes,
(b) dinosaurs and humans being the only notable life forms,
(c) dinosaurs as the initial life forms.
The inability to distinguish large amounts of time was also documented in Stephanie 
case study as well as in a study by Renner et al. (1981). Despite her recognition of a 
changing earth, the other aspects of this portion of her conceptual framework suggest a 
naivete about the historical record of organisms. Her recognition of humans and 
dinosaurs as the only major groups of organisms suggests that Tyler was not interested 
in this aspect of natural history.
Evolutionary relationships.
Tyler's conceptions of evolutionary relationships remained largely unchanged 
in this mid-year period. However, her species concept did undergo a subtle alteration. 
While she continued to use a largely typological species concept, she introduced the 
ability to successfully reproduce as another characteristic of a species. This is not yet a 
scientific species concept, but it does represent a change toward the construction of a 
scientific conception.
Other biological knowledge.
While Tyler's conceptual framework for the other aspects of related biological 
knowledge remained largely unchanged, one aspect was highlighted during the mid­
year period. During the initial interviews, Tyler referred to the ability of organisms to 
learn behaviors. During the mid-year period, this conception was further displayed 
when Tyler discussed the ability of plants to bend toward a light source:
SD: Okay, ah, think about a plant. You know they move to the light?
After a couple of days their stems will turn around and orient toward the
light.
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T: Uh, uh. (Yes)
SD: Do you think that is a learned thing or an automatic sort of thing?
T: I would say it's learned.
SD: Learned?
T: Yeah.
SD: How does a plant leam to do something?
T: Well it wouldn't ah, it just knows what it has to do to survive.
SD: Okay.
T: It wouldn't be there . . .  if it didn't learn to do those things. I don't 
think a plant is made. Well I guess they are. But I don't think a plant is 
made to automatically turning toward the sun. (C 191)
Once again Tyler's understanding of learning provides evidence that students can be
very anthropomorphic in their understanding of biological organisms. While this
passage reflects Tyler's anthropomorphic conceptions of biological processes, it
remains to be determined if the mode of communication simply reflects this conception
or if it actually creates or changes a conception.
The other groups of conceptions, including the historical aspect of the theory,
the use of broad evolutionary theories, and Tyler's choice of evolutionary evidence,
were retained unchanged during the mid-year period.




By the end of the school year, Tyler had resolved the conflict between her 
personal beliefs and what she understood as the scientific conception of evolution. 
When shown the graphic depicting the gorilla, the chimpanzee, and the human child, 
Tyler commented:
T: They're all related.
SD: Are they, really? You know you can talk to me.
T: I know.
[Both laugh]
T: Yeah, somehow they are. Well obviously these two are. [She points 
the picture of the chimpanzee and gorilla]
SD: Why obviously those two? Because they look kind of different? .
T: Cause ahm, they're the same animal. They, they're just the same, the 
same, basically the same.
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Figure 17
Summary of Tyler's mid-year conceptual framework for evolution 
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: They're both sitting on their behinds with their long arms. All 
brown and hair all over them. And he's not the same animal. [Pointing 
to the human boy] . . .  But 
SD: But what?
T: But somehow he traces back to th ese .. . .  I think it could be 
explained scientifically somehow.
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SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) So are you still uncomfortable with it?
T: [Pause] No. (C 239)
This resolution resulted in Tyler's use of a gradual creationist conception of human and
biological diversity, a conception which explains that God put the original "creatures"
on the earth, and evolution occurred within those creatures (Nelson, 1986).
Nature of evolutionary changes.
During the mid-year period, Tyler rejected the possibility of large scale 
evolutionary changes, but the concept map drawn at the end of the study indicates that 
this conception had changed by the year-end. At this point, she understood 
evolutionary changes as being both "radical and minor." (See Appendix G for CM-2, 
year-end.)
Tyler also expanded her conception of evolution to include changes in both
humans and other organisms. This conception is demonstrated in her answers to the
posttest question "What is your personal opinion of the theory of evolution?":
T : [Written answer] Evolution is a change in a species over a long 
period of time. Evolution began when the earth was created, but it still 
is happening today. Not only did evolution occur in humans, but it can 
occur in any species alive. (Posttest #9)
Despite these expanded conceptions, Tyler continued to view evolutionary 
changes as leading toward "complexity" which she understood as greater "detail" and 
"advancement." (C 287) While Tyler continued to understand humans as the most 
complex of all biological organisms, by year-end, she understood evolution to 
described the change of all organisms.
The final area of change within Tyler’s conceptual framework for the nature of 
evolutionary changes was in her conception of adaptations. In the mid-year period, 
Tyler understood adaptations as including any changes in an organism in response to 
their environment. By the year-end period, Tyler had streamlined this broad 
conception:
SD: You used the word adaptation, like they adapt to their 
environment. What does that mean?
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T : Learn to survive in it. Ah.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: It's like getting used to . . .  something.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : It's not like, no. It’s not like you can teach it to a . . .  It's just from
being there you leam what things are like.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) So it's kind of a thing you gain from experience?
T: Yeah.
SD: Okay, so what causes adaptation?
T: When something changes. When the environment changes.. . .
SD: Okay. Do you know if adaptations are linked at all to mutation?
T: Ah, I don't know. (C 242-243)
As demonstrated here, Tyler used adaptations in their proximal sense of a rapid change 
in an individual in response to a change in the environment. Unlike Brian and 
Stephanie, Tyler failed to recognize the multiple meanings of biological adaptation 
(Lucas, 1971). This narrow conception of adaptation is interesting when it is 
considered that Tyler understood all evolutionary changes to occur through 
adaptations. As has described by Cummins and Remsen (1992), Tyler demonstrated a 
difficulty in distinguishing proximate and ultimate changes. This difficulty is 
particularly prominent in Tyler's inability to recognize the linkage of mutations and 
adaptations.
Mechanism.
Tyler demonstrated use of a more integrated conception o f the role of mutations 
in the mechanism of evolution by year-end. As reflected in her concept map (CM-2, 
year-end), Tyler understood the role of mutation as being essential to the actions of 
natural selection. This conception was also seen in her response to the sorting task 
(ST, year-end) in which she explained that both mutations and natural selection must 
occur in order for an evolutionary change to come about.
While Tyler began to understand mutation as being a necessity in the process of 
evolution, her conceptions o f mutations continued to be very different from the 
scientific conception. As demonstrated in her response to the bear mutation graphic 
(PI-1, year-end), Tyler understood mutations as occurring largely because they are 
beneficial to a population:
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SD: So you don’t think a mutation to [lose all body hair] would 
happen?
T : I mean, well it doesn't seem logical to me.
SD: It doesn't seem logical. Do you think it would, it could happen?
T: I'm sure it could, it seems like anything could happen now. [Small 
laugh] . . .  I’m sure it could but I don't think it would. (C 269)
But the conception Tyler applied differed from her more formally expressed
conception of mutations:
SD: Do you think that the majority of mutations that happen in a group 
are beneficial?
T: Ah, the majority yes, all no. (C 269)
In the same interview session in which Tyler defined mutations as random
events, she also explained that only beneficial mutations were probable. When the
logical inconsistency of these two explanations was brought to Tyler's attention, she
recognized no need to change her answers saying "I have no problem with that."
(C 229) As mentioned in the descriptive section, Tyler often compartmentalized her
knowledge and, unlike Stephanie or Brian, she was not typically driven to reconcile
conflicting knowledge claims. Tyler was capable of providing a rote description of
mutation, but the conception she used and applied was very different. Using the
definition of meaningful learning provided by Smith et al. (1993), Tyler did not
understand the conception o f mutation in a meaningful manner.
Not surprisingly, Tyler did not often apply any conception of mutation,
scientific or alternative, toward understanding an evolutionary event. In the posttest,
Tyler did not use mutation in her explanation of the evolution of speed in cheetahs and
she used it in a very tentative answer in the question referring to the evolution of
blindness in cave salamanders:
T: [Written answer] Either a mutation could have happened that caused 
their blindness
or
since they have no use for their eyes, their vision could have gotten 
worse and worse. Eventually they lost all sight. (Posttest #8)
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This answer indicates that while Tyler recognized the applicability of the conception of
mutation, she continued to judge it to be a less plausible response than the use/disuse
explanation for the origin of a trait.
Tyler's posttest responses taken with her response to the class final exam
provide some insight into her alternative conception of mutation. When asked to the
comment on the evolutionary implications of a cartoon depicting the morphological
change in a stick figure, Tyler responded:
T : A mutation definitely occurred in the beginning of the evolutionary 
process. This creature went from having no limbs to having four limbs 
in one step. . . . (Artifact 7, #4)
Tyler's conception of mutation was as a source of drastic change, such as a sudden
occurrence of "having four limbs." In other instances, such as what she perceived as
the gradual evolution of speed in cheetahs or blindness in salamanders or immunity in
mosquitoes, she understood her pre-existing, alternative conceptions to be more
applicable. While she constructed a conception for mutation, this conception was one
of such severe change that she found few instances where itcould be successfully
applied.
Tyler used a conception of evolutionary events as gradual changes or drastic 
changes:
T : Evolution is a change through natural selection and mutation over 
time in a species.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: Ahm, [pause], species, they can it's like they can totally change or 
they can change to fit their environment. . . .
SD: You put down here that change can be radical or it can be minor.
T: Yeah. (C 286)
This acceptance of radical change was a recent phenomena, as described in the 
preceding section, and obviously was one which Tyler had yet to become comfortable.
While she recognized that sudden changes could occur through mutations, she did not 
recognize this type of evolution as being very common. Instead, Tyler understood 
most evolutionary changes to occur through the gradual change in the quality of a trait
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which was quietly magnified in each generation, "It just seemed like that when [a 
species is evolving] that each generation would get a little bit more [of a trait]. (C 289) 
Human evolution.
As was discussed in the section on beliefs, by the end of the school year, Tyler 
had begun to understand humans to be the result of evolution from an ancestral 
primate.
T: [ Written answer] Studying evolution this year has really made me 
reconsider what I have always believed about our origin. Actually, the 
knowledge confused me a lot because I was tom between what to 
believe. I was always set on creationism because I have never known 
anything else. But after learning much about evolution this year I 
realize the facts and discoveries made cannot be disputed. Evolution 
occurred and is still occurring today. I can answer many questions that 
would have not been answered other wise. The knowledge I gained in 
our anthropology unit has further supported my belief in evolution. The 
idea that we descended from gorillas is fascinating and quite important.
And studying the skulls of the first creatures found million of years ago 
through the skulls of today, it is obvious to me that we do stem from one 
common origin. . . . (Artifact 7, # 1)
The latter portions of this passage indicate that Tyler used the alternative 
conception that humans stemmed from a currently existing species of primates ("we 
descended from gorillas"). Despite its obvious logical limitations, she continued to 
accept the plausibility of this conception. Her acceptance was due more to what she 
perceived as the theory's scientific authority than to its logical coherence.
Natural history.
Most aspects of Tyler's conceptual framework for natural history were retained
at year-end. However, these interviews demonstrated that Tyler had begun to apply her
knowledge of evolution to understand variation within organisms. Looking at a
graphic of three species of bears, she commented:
T: They're very different [because] they live in different places.
SD: Yeah?
T : And they had to [pause] adapt to those places you know, and that 
changes them I'm sure. (C 238)
236
While this passage demonstrates that Tyler was capable of a more mechanistic
approach to understanding nature, she continued to use a largely aesthetic view of the
natural world:
SD: Do you see [nature] as competitive?
T : Competitive? It's never been a word I've thought of.
SD: No? Okay.
T: No.
SD: So how would you characterize it?
T : Nature? I just think o f nature as being just wonderful.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: Just so peaceful. (C 266)
Broad evolutionary theories.
Although most aspects of Tyler's conceptual framework for broad evolutionary
theories were retained, subtle differences were seen. One difference was in her
perception of the scope of the evolutionary theory.
T: I used to think of evolution as just when we came to be. . . .  I think 
it is now the change in a species. . . . And I think it's going on all the 
time.
SD: Okay, so it [evolution] would include both the creation of life and 
T: Change now. (C 267)
Even though she recognized the production of life as an aspect of evolutionary 
theory, Tyler never discussed the strength or weaknesses of the scientific explanation 
of this event. Judging from her comments, Tyler understood the most important 
question in the theory of evolution to be "Are humans related to primates?" The 
question of the original creation of life was less influential.
In the final exam Tyler wrote:
T : The most important theory we have learned about this year is the 
theory of evolution. This explains our origin and why we are what we 
are today. . . . (Artifact 7, #1)
Once again, while it can be argued that a student’s response to an exam may reflect
only her/his scientific conceptions, it is important to recognize that Tyler's scientific
conceptual framework for biology placed so much emphasis on evolutionary theory.
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The other groups of conceptions, the historical aspect of evolutionary theory, 
her choice o f evolutionary evidence, and her related biological knowledge were 
retained unchanged at year-end.
See Figure 18 for a summary of Tyler's year-end conceptual framework for 
evolution.
Summary of year long conceptual change
Tyler's case study provides valuable insight into the influences of a learner's 
conceptual ecology when it is compared with Stephanie's. Like Stephanie, Tyler could 
be considered to be a gradual creationist. But, unlike Stephanie, Tyler displayed 
extreme personal discomfort when discussing topics in which scientific knowledge and 
religious belief differed. Tyler understood the most important issue of this conflict to 
be the question of human speciation. Because Tyler approached biology as an 
authority seeker, she often attempted to resolve scientific and religious conflict through 
eliciting outside advice. Tyler, as the authority seeker, achieved a resolution of her 
perceived conflict. This resolution took the form of Tyler's acceptance of her 
conception of human speciation and a personal rejection of the special creation of 
humans. Accompanying this shift in Tyler's conceptual ecology, she also experienced 
conceptual change toward the scientific explanations of evolutionary change. The 
most important of these changes was her construction of the random aspects of 
evolution as introduced through mutation and a simultaneous rejection of need as the 
driving mechanism for evolutionary change. Despite these changes, at the end of the 
school year, Tyler was still involved in the process of learning evolution. She 
continued to apply her previous existing conceptions of evolutionary change in 
addition to her newly constructed conceptions.
While Tyler's conceptions for the process of evolutionary change underwent 
substantial change, it could be argued that these changes were based on an uninformed 
acceptance of a partial scientific framework. Uninformed is used here because
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Figure 18
Summary of Tyler's year-end conceptual framework for evolution 
important aspects of a fundamental understanding of evolutionary change were not 
present in Tyler's conceptual framework. She had no conception o f the competitive 
aspects of natural systems. Likewise, she had an alternative view of the process of 
speciation, as was demonstrated in her explanation of human speciation.
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Despite these missing components, Tyler was becoming more mechanistic in her 
approach to biological problems. Her aesthetic orientation was undergoing a shift 
toward a more scientific one.
Meredith: Biologist as Pragmatist 
Meredith was selected for participation in the interview process for a variety of 
reasons: (a) she used several alternative conceptions o f evolutionary theory as 
demonstrated in her answers to the Bishop and Anderson (1985) exam, (b) she 
considered herself to be religious, but she had constructed a science/religion dichotomy 
before the outset of the course, and (c) she was not overly interested in biology. These 
characteristics made Meredith distinctly different from each o f the other three students, 
and it was judged that her participation would contribute toward an understanding of 
the process of conceptual change.
Meredith was a senior girl who sat toward the front of Hurston's Biology II 
class. Like Tyler, Meredith seldom offered an answer in the whole class discussions 
unless she was directly called upon by the teacher. Also like Tyler, once the large 
group fractured into the typical small, working groups, Meredith was very vocal and 
she often asked questions of her co-workers and the teacher. I had a comfortable 
relationship with Meredith from the outset, and in laboratory situations she would often 
ask for my guidance so I worked with her small group frequently. Because of our close 
classroom relationship, the interviews with Meredith were very congenial. But unlike 
Tyler, Meredith's answers were direct and succinct; she followed very few tangents in 
conversation. While Meredith always appeared to be engaged in our talks, she seldom 
mused over her answers; once given, Meredith would not alter her answers or refer 
back to earlier questions during an interview.
1 understood Meredith to approach to biology in a very pragmatic fashion, as 
shown in the following passage:
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M: And, ahm, what I'm talking about creationism is that Genesis in the 
Bible is just saying ahm why, why everything was created and not how.
And, I think a lot of people don't realize that that's what it's saying. . . .
SD: Have you always thought this or is this something you've worked 
out for yourself later on?
M: Ahm, no, I mean, what, what do you mean?
SD: You know, that, that the thing that Genesis is the why and the 
science is the how? Is that
M: Oh. . . . Yeah, that, ah, that's something I, I've not thought all my 
life. I mean,
SD: Uh hum.
M: Once I started reading the Bible more, that's what I realized.
SD: Uh hum. So that's something that you've
M: I've never read
SD: worked out for yourself?
M: Yeah, I never really thought much about it before.
SD: Uh uh. (Yes)
M: I used to not, I very rarely think about it [laughter] to tell you the 
truth. (A 29)
Unlike Brian and Stephanie, Meredith did not commonly attempt to relate one theory
to another. Instead, she understood a topic only in its application to her schoolwork.
While Meredith worked hard in the biology class, she wasn't interested in biology as
much as she was interested in doing well in school:
SD: Ahm do you think biology is real useful to you out of the 
classroom? What you learn in biology, do you use it more than just in 
school? . . .
M: No, I mean, not too much. . . . It's not something that I use 
everyday.. . .  I've never really been benefited by it other than tests and 
things like that. But, ahm, I mean it's just, you need to know that kind 
of thing just to 
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: to be educated. (A 150-151)
Perhaps the pragmatism that characterized Meredith's approach to biology was 
forced on her by her demands of school. Talks with Meredith were constantly 
peppered with comments of exams, assignments, and grades. Both Meredith and her 
parents explained that her time away from school was spent completing homework 
assignments and college applications. Because of this, she watched little television and 
enjoyed no leisure reading. "I only have time to read what's required." [S #7]
However, she made time for the track team and in past years had played basketball. 
While Meredith worked diligently on her school work, this seemed to take a form of
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socialization for her. She was a member of a small group of senior girls who 
completed assignments together after school hours.
During classroom observations, I repeatedly observed Meredith consulting her 
oversized calendar which contained all her school assignments. Despite her diligence, 
Meredith was often forced to finish assignments during her classes. She was struggling 
to achieve the grades necessary for a college scholarship, and because of this struggle 
the quality of both her personal and intellectual life was sacrificed. While Meredith did 
not reflect on her biological knowledge, she participated in little reflection on any 
academic topic.
Meredith's father explained, "I don't know that she has a great academic interest 
in anything." (A 330) Despite her concentration, no single subject captured her 
attention. Her favorite subjects were mathematics and English, because both of these 
"came easy" for her. (A 48) However, during the year of the study Meredith 
particularly enjoyed her World History class because of the teacher's intriguing 
lectures.
At the outset of the study, Meredith had planned to become a medical doctor.
During two previous summers she volunteered in hospitals and found that she enjoyed 
working in health care. Meredith enrolled in the Biology II course because she knew 
that she would need many science courses in college in order to pursue her career. But 
during the course of the study, Meredith decided to study nursing. She explained she 
made this change because nursing requires a short time of preparation, and the schools 
are not extremely competitive. This career choice was also selected because of the 
many scholarships available to nursing students. She understood that nursing would 
allow her to work in health-care in the role of a caretaker. Keeping in mind later 
family plans, Meredith understood the lower salary of nursing to be outweighed by the 
life-style benefits of this career.
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Meredith's Conceptual Ecology
The most striking aspect of Meredith's conceptual ecology was found in the
intersection of her scientific epistemology and religious orientation. While both
science and religion were very meaningful to her, she understood them to be
completely separate in their goals and methods:
M: [Science] allows us to see how thing are working. How the world 
around us is you know 
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: Operating and all those thing. It doesn't necessarily tell us why.
SD: What does? . . .
M: Religion, it's more the, the why's.
SD: Do you see science and religion has having some amount of 
overlap? Or, do you see them as completely separate? In your mind.
M: Ahm, well, I think that they're separate in that ahm one of 'em you 
know is explaining how things are happening and the other one is telling 
why. But, ahm, there’s overlap in that these are dealing sometimes with 
the, dealing with the same th in g .. . .
SD: So how do you separate the two? . . .
M: Well, ahm, the way well religion is you know a faith that you have.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: And ah, you can say, you know, the the earth was created through 
faith, but not ahm. The way I separate it, I think, is that in science I 
have you know facts just to base evolution on.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: And all that kind of thing you know. [Science] is more hard facts.
But religion is more, it's more of a belief through faith.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) And faith being? How would you describe what 
faith is?
M: Ahm it's hard to explain. But it's a belief that you have not it's not, 
it can't necessarily always ahm be based on tangible th in g .. . .
SD: So you think things are
M: Yeah, I think they are pretty separate. (A 203-205)
Before the study began, Meredith applied this dichotomy to the area of evolution and
resolved any of the conflicts that might have occurred:
M: [Reading her answer to the pretest questions regarding her opinion 
of the theory of evolution.] I do believe that animals had evolved from 
their forefathers while I believe in creationism also. I feel we have a lot 
of proof for evolution that I think comes into play. What, what I wasn't 
really clear with my answer here.
SD: Okay.
M: Ah, I mean, evolution is, I mean, I definitely believe in evolution.
And I think we just have too much evidence for someone not to believe 
it.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
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M: What I'm talking about creationism is that Genesis in the Bible is 
just saying ahm why, why everything was created and not how.
Evolution is how everything was created. (A 27-28)
From the outset of the course, Meredith used a theistic understanding of
evolution in which evolution is understood as the mechanism through which a creator
operates (Nelson, 1986). Meredith accepted evolution as a valid biological process
producing a firm historical record, and she understood that the study of this process and
its record as being a scientific endeavor. However, the existence of God was not
something Meredith recognized as requiring tangible support, because she understood
religious and scientific knowledge as being distinctly separate.
Meredith described herself as a religious person; she and her family regularly
attended a Presbyterian church in the city. While it was evident in our conversations
that Meredith did ponder religious matters, religion did not appear to be a focal point of
Meredith's energies. Recently her church related activities had been drastically
curtailed by her school responsibilities. She explained, "I just don't have time for that
anymore." (A 142) Congruent with her understanding of the limits of religious belief,
Meredith used a metaphysical or religious world view only in regard to human
activities. While she understood human life to have a fundamental meaning and plan,
this understanding did not extend toward the natural world.
Although Meredith did not have a strong religious orientation, neither she did
have a strong scientific orientation. Meredith enrolled in this science class because she
felt she learned very little biology in her previous biology class, and she realized that
this discipline was needed in college. Her father explained that Meredith was "not so
much interested science as she is interested in nursing." (A 330) For Meredith,
science was a means to an end. She enjoyed Ms. Hurston's class, but this was not her
favorite class or favorite subject. As was discussed in her description, Meredith did not
feel biology was a subject that she applied in her life, instead it was a subject to master
in order to "be educated." (A 151)
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While Meredith did not have a strong scientific orientation, she was typically
very rational in her consideration o f natural topics. Like Brian, Stephanie, and Tyler,
Meredith was not interested in pseudoscientific topics. She dismissed these topics as
"National Inquirer sorts of things." (A 52) When she considered the natural world, she
used a naturalistic world view, understanding natural phenomena in terms of cause and
effects and looking for the mechanisms behind occurrences (Cobem, 1993).
Meredith used a realist epistemology of scientific knowledge, but she
understood scientific knowledge to have a tentative, contextual nature.
M: Aspects of science can change.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: Like ahm you know, like through more ahm study and 
experimentation, maybe new things will be ah found and discovered . . .
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: that would change what was once believed. And I mean, that's how 
it could change. (A 79)
While Meredith was a realist, she was not a naive realist.
Meredith also had a scientific conception of the relative importance of facts,
hypotheses, and theories in science.
M: [ An] hypothesis would be what you ah expect to happen. You really 
haven't ahm you know, you've done some research and everything, but 
you kinda' think this is what's gonna' happen.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: I think a theory more comes out of ahm, testing your hypothesis.
SD: Okay, so how about the difference between a scientific theory and 
scientific facts?
M: Ahm I’d say t ha t . . .  theory, you know, it can be changed through 
more study and everything. But, facts, I mean, they're not gonna' 
change. It's either it's true or it's not true.
SD: So which one, you know, which one do you think has more weight 
in science? Has more importance?
M: Ahm, well, probably ahm like I would say maybe the theory 
because ahm, no you can’t, if all you have was [sic] facts, there wouldn't 
be anything to work with. (A 78)
While her parents described Meredith as a student who was not very interested 
in biology, it became evident during our discussions that Meredith had a knowledge of 
biology that was gained from outside the classroom. When discussing the organisms in 
the interviews about instances, Meredith would augment her explanations with
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examples taken from local natural flora and fauna. For instance, she knew that the
local oak trees included several different species, and she could recite many of their
common names. When questioned about this knowledge, she explained that her father
is a "nature nut." Because of this, family vacations centered around hiking in state
parks and trips to natural history museums. While Meredith seemed mildly interested
in this sort of knowledge, nature did not hold the attraction for her as it did her father.
M 's father: She's receptive to that sort of thing, but she won't initiate it, 
and she probably won't pursue i t . . . .  She's not one to go wandering 
outside, looking at things. (A 333)
Although Meredith was not keenly interested in nature, the influence of
families activities was reflected in her scope of knowledge. Toward the end o f the
semester, we discussed her views on human population. She felt that humans should
be limited to two children per couple because of the stress overpopulation places on
natural systems. This view was one she shared with her parents, and this topic was
often discussed at her dinner table.
Her parents, particularly her father, were very instrumental in shaping
Meredith's negotiation between science and religion. When the conflict between the
scientific conception of evolution and the religious explanation of creation became an
important issue in her World History course, she discussed her conflicting
understandings with her father:
M 's father: I tried to get her to see that people make a big mistake when they 
try to get science out of the bible. (A 337)
By the time we first broached this issue, Meredith seemed to have fully incorporated
her father's use of the dichotomy between scientific knowledge and religious
knowledge.
Aside from the actual declarative knowledge, Meredith gained from her 
family's activities and discussions, it is possible that her mechanistic outlook, her use 
of the scientific habit of seeking mechanisms and causality in natural systems, was
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gained at home. While it is difficult to establish what determined Meredith's view of 
nature and biology, the influence of her home activities cannot be discounted.
Meredith's Conceptual Framework for Evolution 
Initial framework
Based upon Meredith's use of a strict science/religion dichotomy, there was 
little interaction between her personal religious beliefs and her conceptions of the 
scientific explanation for evolutionary changes. Meredith, unlike Stephanie and Tyler, 
continually used what she understood as the scientific conception for evolution as her 
own, personal explanation.
Meredith's conceptual framework of evolution used at the outset of the study is 
demonstrated well by her first concept map. (See Appendix G for Meredith's C M -1, 
initial.) Meredith's understanding of evolution emphasized the nature of evolutionary 
changes. She did not refer to the history of evolutionary theory, the scope of the 
theory, to possible religious conflicts, or the process through which evolutionary 
changes occur. As discussed for the other participants, Meredith's omission of these 
topics from her map does not indicate that these topics were not a feature of her 
conceptual framework for evolution; instead they were not important aspects.
The omission of possible religious conflict is not surprising, as explained by 
Meredith's use of a strict dichotomy between science and religion. The omission of the 
process of evolutionary changes is more perplexing, however. Like Brian, Meredith 
understood nature in terms o f cause and effect. It might be expected that this 
mechanistic world view would promote construction of a conception for process. But 
when Meredith was questioned directly, "How do evolutionary changes happen?," she 
responded, "I don't know." (A 49)
Nature of evolutionary change.
As expressed in Meredith's concept map shown above (CM-1, initial), her 
conceptions of the nature of evolution changes included evolution as (a) a change in
247
the features o f an organism, (b) a change in a group o f organisms, (c) a change 
requiring a very long time period, and (d) a change increasing the group's ability to 
survive.
The only one of the four conceptions that requires further discussion is her
understanding that evolution is a change which increases the group's ability to survive.
Meredith understood all evolutionary changes to be directional in order to satisfy the
needs of an organism:
M: [Written response in reference to the evolution of blindness in cave 
salamanders] Cave salamanders, living in a dark environment, did not 
need to see. Over the years they evolved to lose this unnecessary 
function. (Pretest # 8)
Her description of all evolutionary changes as the acquisition of beneficial traits
or the loss of non-beneficial traits provides no evidence that Meredith recognized the
random aspect of evolutionary change. She understood evolution to be a directional,
gradual change toward a beneficial trait needed by an organism. However, Meredith's
conception of beneficial changed over the course of the initial interviews. In the
second interview, she explained that evolution is a species becoming "more advanced."
[A 30] While advanced could be used in a vague manner, Meredith understood this
term to signify a much more specific meaning:
M: What I mean by more advanced is that ahm, [they become] more 
suitable for where they live. (A 30)
In later interviews, Meredith used more biologically appropriate terminology to express
her understanding of the direction of evolutionary change:
SD: What happens when things evolve?
M: Producing a change to a more fit species.. . .
SD: And what is that?
M: Most able to survive. I guess, you ahm you can just kinda' say the 
strongest in a sense. . . .
SD: Okay, and is strength and survival, is that related in any way?
M: Yes.
SD: Ahm, how? . . .
M: Strength enables survival and ahm fit increases survival. (A 64-66)
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The change in terminology from advanced (suitable) to fittest may be explained by our 
discussion of the pretest. The pretest contained an exercise in which the student had to 
select the fittest lion (in biological terms). It appears that this term, fitness, was 
appropriated by Meredith for use in describing the directionality o f evolutionary 
change. This appropriation occurred in the two weeks that passed between the second 
and third interviews, and the term was appropriated into Meredith's preexisting 
conception. However, as the last passage indicates, Meredith used the alternative 
conception of fitness as being strength.
Mechanism.
As mentioned previously, an understanding of the mechanism of evolutionary 
change was not a major feature of Meredith's conceptual framework. When asked 
specifically to map her understanding of the process of evolutionary change, Meredith's 
map closely resembled her first map which described the nature o f evolutionary 
changes. [See Appendix G for the concept map (CM-2, initial.)] Meredith recognized 
the gap in her understanding:
SD: Could you concept map how evolution works?
M: That's what I don't know. [Laughter] (A 63)
This lack of knowledge was also shown on Meredith's first hesitant attempts in the 
sorting task (ST, initial).
While Meredith explained that she had no knowledge of the process of 
evolution, this was not the case. Structured and open-ended interviews with Meredith 
revealed her use of several conceptions linked to the process of evolutionary change, 
but these conceptions differed dramatically from comparable scientific conceptions. 
Some of these alternative conceptions include: (a) need as causal agent in the origin of 
variation, (b) the lack of recognition of the importance of variation in a population, (c) 
natural selection as operating only through the death o f unfit individuals, (d) the 
strength conception o f fitness, and (e) the vague conception o f the unit of evolutionary 
change.
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The most striking of these alternative conceptions and one which underwent a
change in the initial interview period was the conception of need. As demonstrated by
her answers to the pretest questions, Meredith understood that new variations were
produced in a population because of a need for a beneficial change:
M: [Written response in reference to the evolution of speed in 
cheetahs] Obviously, cheetahs needed to run faster. Perhaps, it was 
necessary for them to catch their prey and to survive. This occurred 
because of a need for adaptation. (Pretest # 7)
Meredith's rejection of mutation further signifies the prominence of need in her
conceptual framework:
M: [Discussing the evolution of webbed feet in ducks] Well, ahm, 
webbed feet allows, I mean, ah, better, for better swimming. Ah, it was 
something that ahm, it was an evolved trait wasn't it?
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: And, it’s not a chance mutation. It was something that was 
necessary.
SD: Okay, so ahm, so how do things evolve?
M: Well, ahm, it's mainly as far as when they need to ah adapt to 
certain conditions. (A 19)
Meredith's use of need as the factor responsible for the production of variation excludes
the random aspect of mutation.
But in later questions, Meredith introduced the term "mutation" into her
explanation for the production of variation:
M: [Reading her answer to a pretest question about the formation of 
webbed feet in ducks] Ahm, number 4. The population o f ducks 
evolved webbed feet because, [pause] Okay. I, I didn't answer this 
question. I, I put something in to explain. I said the population of 
ducks evolved webbed feet because of the need to change to fit the 
environment. I mean, thus a mutation occurred .. . .
SD: So what is a mutation? How does that fit into all this?
M: It's, it's the change that, ahm, ah , an organism or you can call it an 
organism goes though to ahm become more suited for the environment 
that they live in.
SD: Ah, ahm, how did, how did that happen? How do mutations 
happen?
M: Ahm, I'm not too sure. (A 21)
Mutation was incorporated into Meredith's pre-existing conception, but this 
introduction occurred without an understanding of the term. This introduction was
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made necessary as Meredith recognized need to be an inappropriate causal mechanism
for the production of variation.
M: [Reading her answer to the pretest questions about the evolution of 
speed in cheetahs] I said that ah, they needed to run faster perhaps it was 
necessary for them to catch their prey to survive. Ahm, it occurred 
because of the need for an adaptation. Ahm, I'm really, I'm not sure 
about that.
SD: Okay, So, like this, try to think out loud. How do you think it 
would happen? . . .
M: Ahm, I don't know. I mean, this is that, obviously, I mean, it was 
necessar—. It needed to run faster, but I don't know how this happens. I 
mean.
SD: Yeah.
M: That's kinda' what you’re asking, is how, what causes it and how it 
happens and I don’t know that.
SD: Okay. You don’t know.
M: I know it happens. I know it's one answer or something, but I don't 
know that it is. [Laughter] (A 24-25)
Meredith continued to use need as the ultimate driving force of evolution, but she
began to recognize its inability to serve as a mechanism for that change.
Two weeks later, Meredith reflected on the question of the origin of variation
(ST, initial):
SD: So how did those rabbits get like that [a brown color]?
M: Ahm, I guess it's some kind of genetic change. I mean, I guess it's 
[she points to the card depicting DNA].
SD: If you don’t, if you don't want to use that card, you don't have to.
M: Oh, yeah, I don't want to use it. (A 69)
This passage demonstrates that Meredith began to recognize that the production of new
variation in a population must have a genetic basis. But it is difficult to gauge whether
her recognition was something which occurred before the interview, during our
discussion, or if it was triggered by the presence of the card depicting a strand of DNA.
In any case, this was a relatively new recognition, and at this point Meredith was
hesitant in fully incorporating this feature in her explanation of the evolutionary event
represented by the sorting task.
Meredith had a conception of natural selection, although she did not use this
term to refer to her explanation. During the pretest, Meredith explained that if
organisms "aren't well suited for the conditions they live in, they won't make it." (A
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20) Natural selection was not a strong component of her understanding of the process
of evolutionary change. Her tentative usage of this conception is also signified by her
failure to recognize the importance of variation in a population. Meredith
demonstrated this alternative conception during the interviews about instances showing
a graphic of a litter of kittens (IAI-1, initial):
SD: Is it a bad thing to have variation in a litter? Or in a population?
M: Yeah, I think it's a good thing, for ahm, nothing to do with. It's 
something that we like as hum ans.. . .  I think, I think it's good to have 
variations. But I can't think of what, why I think that.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M : But that we should have it there. (A 94)
As discussed in the previous section, the nature of evolutionary changes,
Meredith's conceptions of fitness underwent change during the initial interview period.
At the outset, Meredith used a collage conception of fitness:
M: [Reading her pretest explanation of the fittest lion] Spot fathered a 
large number of cubs with a large percentage of them surviving to 
adulthood. Spot is adaptable, as shown by his ability to support himself 
and move to another location.
SD: So what is fitness? What does it mean?
M: It's ahm it's being ah, [pause] well-suited for where you live. Being 
able to you know, provide offspring and be successful in raising young 
and all that kind of thing. (A 24)
This explanation changed to a more refined and focused conception as shown in the
interview one week later:
SD: What does fit measure?
M: Ability to survive. (A 49)
And this conception again changed in the following week:
M: Evolution is a change occurring in a species becoming more fit, 
resulting in strength.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: And strength enables survival and ah, fit increases survival. (A 66)
The changes described above should not be taken as instances of conceptual 
change, as Meredith did not appear to be seriously comparing conceptions. Instead, 
she was searching for a plausible alternative to use in the explanation she was 
constructing. But the narrowing o f scope o f the conception is notable. At the outset,
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Meredith used all the information at her disposal to determine fitness. In later 
instances, Meredith equated fitness with survivability, and in the last instance strength 
was a factor which increased survivability.
The final conception of interest in this group was Meredith's recognition of the 
unit of evolutionary change. She explained that evolution occurs in a group or 
organism as opposed to an individual. But it is unclear whether Meredith understood 
evolutionary changes to include a gradual change in the quality of a trait in an entire 
population or a gradual change in the percentage of the population with a distinct trait: 
SD: So what do you think evolution is?
M: Ahm. [Pause] I just, I think it's just ahm, you know, I don't know 
much about it. But I just think that it's a change ahm over eons of time 
that ahm allows ahm a species, usually they become more advanced, 
you know.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: Like in the ape, you know, the man-like ape evolving into man and 
all that kind of thing. It's just the species becomes more advanced, ahm, 
more suitable, ahm, that's about all I know about it. (A 30)
All Meredith's explanations of evolutionary changes took this form, so it is difficult to
ascertain her conceptions of the unit of evolutionary change. But with need as the most
fundamental agent in the production of variation, Meredith had no constraints upon the
unit she could select. If need caused variation, entire populations could change
incrementally each generation. Another possibility is that at this point, Meredith had
not yet considered the appropriate unit, and so this conception did not appear in her
interview data.
Human evolution.
It is notable that, unlike the other interview participants, Meredith did not
include humans in her answer to the question "What is your personal opinion of the
theory of evolution?"
M: Ah, I mean, evolution is, I mean, I definitely believe in evolution.
And I think we just have too much evidence for someone not to believe 
it.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
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M: What I'm talking about creationism is that Genesis in the Bible is 
just saying ahm why, why everything was created and not how.
Evolution is how everything was created. (A 27-28)
The omission of humans in her answer may reflect Meredith's personal resolution of
the issue of human evolution. From the outset of the study, Meredith understood
humans to be the product of evolutionary change. The evidence she recognized as
supporting human evolution was found in the similarities between humans and other
primates:
M: [In a discussion of gorillas] They have a lot of characteristics of 
humans. (A 54)
Meredith understood humans to be evolutionarily related to primates, a conception that
she felt was strongly reinforced by the animal behavior unit. Despite this recognition,
Meredith rejected the classification of humans as primates (LAI-1, initial):
[When shown a graphic of a human boy, a gorilla, and a chimpanzee]
M: All right, two primates and a little boy




SD: [Laughter] [Said to tape recorder.] Her face is really screwed up.
[Said to M.] You think that's a pretty obvious question? With a pretty 
obvious answer about primates? Are they animals?
M: Ahm, no.
SD: No.
M: I mean, what, no, we're, we're not animals. (A 116)
Meredith went on to explain that humans were related to animals and related to 
primates, but "it's such a distant thing" that we could no longer be taxonomically 
classified in the same manner as primates and animals. (A 117) It should be pointed 
out that Meredith understood this to be the scientific conception of the classification of 
humans.
Evolutionary relationships.
Other than human/primate and human/animal relationships, the only other 
evolutionary lineage that surfaced during the initial interviews was that of 
dinosaurs/birds. In the interview about instances, when shown a graphic of a heron.
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Meredith commented on the recent research that was discussed in class suggesting
dinosaurs as the ancestors of birds:
M: I could see, I mean there were some pretty convincing research 
done on it, b u t . .  . you know, I don't think I know enough yet to. . . .  I 
mean, I can see how that would, I mean it's very possible. (A 83)
Like Brian and Stephanie, Meredith had begun to apply some of the ideas she had
learned in class to her understanding of biological organisms. But unlike the other two,
Meredith's comments remained very tentative and noncommittal, as if she were just
beginning to investigate the implications and possibilities of this theory.
Species concepts were not an integral feature of Meredith's conception of
evolutionary change. While she responded that evolution occurs in groups of
organisms, her comments remained very unclear as to the boundaries of this group.
When directly asked about species during the interview about instances, Meredith
replied with a very informal definition (LAI-1, initial):
| In response to a graphic depicting three different species o f bears] SD:
So what does it mean to be of a different species?
M: Ahm it's like ahm a different ahm, if. How can I put this into 
words? Ahm, like ahm, you, they, they produce certain offspring but 
they're all within the bear, whatever the name of their family is. (A 96)
When questioned further, Meredith explained that each of the three species o f bears
could successfully interbreed if their ranges overlapped. Her explanations were so
unclear that it was difficult to identify the species concept she applied. Meredith's
recognition of variation in a species was identified in the earlier section on process, but
she failed to recognize the significance of this variation.
Natural history.
Meredith understood animals in terms of their evolutionary adaptations perhaps
more strongly than any of the other three participants, as shown in this passage from an
interview about instances (IAI-1, initial):
[When shown a graphic depicting an octopus ]
M: Okay, we have an octopus.
SD: W hat can you tell me about octopus-es? . . .
M: Ahm, well, they, ahm, you know they live in the ocean.
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SD: Ah, ah. (Yes)
M: 1 don't know a whole lot about them.
SD: Do you know what they eat?
M: Probably algae and plankton and. Although that's kind of small. I 
don't know what they do e a t . . . .
SD: I think they eat crabs and stuff. What else can you tell me?
M: Ahm, well obviously there is ahm this ahm enables them to ahm 
best capture you know ah their meal. [She points to the tentacles.]
SD: Uh, uh. (Y es). .  . You say best catch?
M: Well, it makes them more fitted. I mean, if you if maybe they've 
ahm you know didn't do st-- Ahm you know, like I said a couple of 
interviews before, I think an organism will die unless they, ahm can be 
ah a successful predator.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: And, ahm, maybe these, ahm if it wasn't like ah you know made up
like this. If it didn't have the the legs like this and not the legs but the
ahm the ahm it couldn't catch its meal.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: I mean.
SD: So you think they're well, pretty well 
M: Pretty well adapted.
SD: Yeah.
M: And well suited for, I would think so, I mean it wouldn't be around 
if it wasn't. (A 87)
This understanding also was evident in Meredith's reaction to the flower graphic. Here 
she responded in terms of the reproductive function of the flower as well as the 
energetic expense of the structure. Most similar to Brian, Meredith was easily capable 
of reacting to biological organisms in terms of the function and evolutionary adaptation 
o f various structures.
Meredith was also notable in terms of her biological vocabulary. She typically 
used terms such as herbivore, nocturnal, predator, and cross pollination in her 
responses to the interviews about instances (IAI-1, initial). Like her mechanistic 
explanations of biological phenomena, the use of such a biological vocabulary may not 
signify a deeper understanding of the content of biology, but this may be a reflection of 
her ease in using the forms of discourse accepted in biology classrooms. Meredith may 




Meredith's understanding of the scope of evolutionary theory is not clearly 
described in her interview data. However, this passage provides some insight into her 
conceptions:
M: There's [sic] some people who ahm believe that creationism is how 
the world was created. And so they ahm, they don't believe. Like some,
I think there are a lot of, people that they want to believe that, that's 
what Genesis was explaining, how everything was created. They 
wouldn't believe in evolution. (A 28)
Meredith understood scientific evolutionary theory to encompass the explanation for
the creation of the earth as well as subsequent changes in species. It is notable,
however, that Meredith never broached this topic in our open-ended interviews. This
may be a reflection of Meredith's approach to biology. Meredith the pragmatist dealt
only with issues of immediate concern (i.e., issues I introduced). She seldom identified
areas of difficulty herself.
As described previously, Meredith applied very little of her biological
knowledge outside of the classroom. Because of this, she understood the importance of
evolution to be limited to the theoretical considerations of biological topics. But within
this realm, Meredith was articulate about the applications of evolutionary knowledge:
M: I think that when you're, that when you're doing, running 
experiments, and you're you know concerned with animals and plans 
and all
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: that kind of thing, that you, you have to consider evolution. But 
that it's not necess-I wouldn't say that it's necessarily more or less 
important [than some other biological theory],
SD: Okay.
M: I think it's just something, it's off to itself and it's something that 
needs to be considered when doing 
SD: Okay.
M: things. It's an additional bit of information that you consider when 
you look at plants or animals. (A 154-154)
Meredith understood evolution to be a common thread running throughout biology
which provided additional information about any biological phenomenon. However,
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she did not recognize the relative importance of the theory. At this point in the year,
Meredith understood evolution to be informative but unimportant:
M: I mean, I think it helps you, that you understand evolution, but not 
everything that you do in biology requires that you have an 
understanding. (A 156)
Evidence for evolution.
Evidence supporting or refuting evolutionary theory was not a prominent aspect 
o f Meredith's conceptual framework for evolution. Like each of the other participants, 
Meredith recognized fossil evidence as the most important form of evidence supporting 
evolution. Meredith also cited similarities between humans and primates as another 
importance piece of evidence supporting the theory of evolution. However, Meredith’s 
acceptance of evolution theory was so complete that she could not identify any type of 
evidence that contradicted evolution.
Other biological knowledge.
Like each o f the other interview participants, Meredith was familiar with the
genetic basis of inherited traits. This conception was first revealed in the sorting task
(ST, initial) and was further elaborated on during the prediction interviews. In the
prediction interviews, Meredith was found to consistently apply the Mendelian
conception of independently assorting traits. She also introduced the conception of
sexual dimorphism into her predictions. She used the conception of sexual dimorphism
to predict the inheritance of color in a clutch of ducks, and she accompanied her
explanation for this prediction with an example from nature:
M: Ahm, well, I think that, that if the, the ahm, if the male is gonna1 be 
black like this one and the female will be like this one [she points to the 
white duck on the card).
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: If they meet. I don't think it's gonna' be a blend of the two of them 
you know. It's gonna', if it's a male it will grow the black, dark feathers.
And
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: And the female will grow the white feathers. It's kinda'like the you 
know, the cardinal. The same kind of thing.
SD: Do you think ahm. Okay. Let's see. Tell me about cardinals.
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M: The males are the bright vibrant color and the female is kinda' dull 
looking. I think, you know, I think they're the same species and 
everything. K inda'like the ducks. (A 135)
Other aspects of Meredith's biological knowledge included her familiarity with
animal taxonomy. She often applied this knowledge in the interviews about instances
(IAI-1, initial). Like each of the other interview participants, Meredith was able to
categorize animals into their appropriate higher level taxa, although often she was not
able to provide a justification for this classification.
[In response to a graphic depicting a young sea turtle on sand ]
SD: Can you tell me anything about turtles? [Pause]
SD: Any neat things about them. What do you know about them?
M: Ahm. [Laughter]
SD: Are they amphibians? Are they reptiles? Are they mammals?
Birds?
M: No. [Laughter] Ahm, do they fall under reptiles?
SD: Yeah.
M: That's what I thought. Okay.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) Do you th in k ,. .  ., what makes you think it's a 
reptile? Why we would put it into the reptile?
M: It has something to do with, you know, I don't know what the 
different, the reasons why 
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: I can just, generally if you know if I see something that I can say 
you know.
SD: Okay.
M: I can't necessarily tell you all the things that make it. (A 110-111)
The final aspect of Meredith's biological knowledge was her understanding of a
competitive natural world. When shown a graphic of an elephant reaching into a tree
in order to eat from the branches, she remarked (IAI-1, initial):
M: The, ahm those elephants are competing for food.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: and the, one some of 'em, of course they won't, probably won't, 
might not survive. (A 89)
Historical aspects of the theory.
During the initial interviews, Meredith made no mention of the history of the 
development of evolutionary theory. As has been mentioned previously, this omission 
should not be taken as a lack of knowledge, but should be understood to signify the
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relative lack of importance Meredith placed on this aspect of her conceptual framework 
for evolution.
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Figure 19
Summary of Meredith's initial conceptual framework for evolution 
Mid-year framework
Nature of evolutionary changes.
While some aspects o f Meredith's conception o f the nature o f evolutionary 
changes remained intact during the mid-year period, other aspects were first 
documented during this period, and still others underwent conceptual change. 
Conceptions which remained intact included evolution as (a) a change in the features of
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an organism, (b) a change occurring in a group of organisms, and (c) a change 
requiring a very long period o f time.
Several different conceptions surfaced during this mid-year period. This group of 
conceptions do not represent a conceptual change from the initial period, instead these 
conceptions could have been a pre-existing feature of Meredith's conceptual framework 
which were not measured in the initial period. The first of this group is Meredith's 
conception of evolution as a continuous process. During an open-ended interview, 
Meredith explained that evolution occurs at all times within all groups o f organisms, 
including humans.
During this period it also became evident that Meredith understood evolution as 
a series of gradually occurring, subtle changes that cause vertical alterations within a 
single group of organisms. When she was shown three graphics depicting different 
phylogenetic trees, (a) evolution shown as a change of color within a group of 
butterflies, (b) evolution as a change leading to the creation of several vertebrate 
groups, and (c) evolution as a set of vertical changes within a group of armadillos, 
Meredith picked the vertical changes shown in (c) as best representing the process of 
evolution. (IAI-2, mid-year). This selection was based on Meredith's rejection of 
evolution as change resulting in differentiation within a species, as she understood to 
be represented by the color change in the butterflies. She also rejected the 
characterization of evolution as a series of wide, drastic changes which produced 
radically different taxa, as she explained was represented by the graphic depicting 
several vertebrate groups. Instead, Meredith explained that evolution:
M: It's not a drastic process. It's more of a subtle thing. So you don't
really notice what's going on. It takes so many, you know, eons of time.
(A 243)
The mid-year interviews also revealed that Meredith understood evolution to be 
a basically unplanned process that results in changes, "It's always occurring but it's 
nothing that's planned to happen this way." (A 183) While she denied that evolution
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was planned, she used the conception that the process was predictable. When she
explained that given constant environmental conditions, the changes that result from
evolution could be predicted, Meredith signified her conception of evolution as process
bound by environmental conditions. At this point, Meredith seemed to have no
recognition of the random aspect of evolution.
Meredith's conception of evolution as a fundamentally predictable process
underwent a subtle change as reflected in an interview just one week later:
M: I think every--A lot of things have a something, you know a random 
component to 'em.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: and it’s not necessarily always one way. And no—nothing is gonna' 
occur the same way each time. . . .
SD: So do you see change as being a big part of evolution through 
natural selection?
M: Well, I guess chance in the sense that ahm, you know, depends on 
what the, kinda' what the environment is like and . . . and some of those 
things I guess can happen by chance.
SD: Okay.
M: Not planned out that this is gonna' happen that way. (A 194-195)
Meredith continued to understand evolution was inextricable from environmental
changes, but she now explained that these environmental factors were a source of
randomness and unpredictability for the process. In an interview conducted three
weeks later, Meredith's conception of randomness changed again. This change is seen
in the following passage, as Meredith explained her selection of the term random in the
word sort (WS, mid-year):
M: Yeah, keep random [on the evolution side of the sorting table].
Because you have ahm, I guess it refers, referring to the ahm mutations 
or whatever or the, the changes that occur. That you know, that cause 
evolution.
SD: Okay.
M: And it's not something ordered. It's not planned to be that way. (A 
243)
Later she placed the term chance beside random:
M: C hance.. . .  I'd probably just, I'd probably leave that because it's 
ahm you know, it's by chance that these ahm mutations occur. (A 244)
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Initially, Meredith understood evolution to be a directed, predictable process. 
But in this mid-year period, Meredith began to recognize the random aspect of 
evolutionary changes. This recognition was first introduced through the 
unpredictability of environmental conditions which she understood to control the 
direction of evolutionary change. In this last interview for this mid-year period, 
Meredith maintained this recognition, but she understood the random component to 
stem from mutations and not environmental factors.
It is notable that Meredith first recognized the random aspect of evolution 
during the same interval that she first rejected need as a controlling component of 
evolutionary change. She was not outspoken concerning the rationale behind this 
rejection, simply commenting, "Need. I don't know. I really don't see how that fits in 
(to evolution)." (A 244) Again, it is difficult to determine the causality behind these 
changes. But it is noteworthy that the two logically competing conceptions of 
evolution, need driven and random based, underwent diametrically opposed changes 
during the same time period. Meredith's tentative recognition of the random aspect of 
evolution was also accompanied by a change in her understanding of evolutionary 
mechanisms which will be described in the next section.
Another conception that underwent subtle changes included Meredith's 
understanding of the end product of evolution. While previously she understood 
evolution to be a directional change toward a beneficial trait, during the mid-year 
period Meredith explained that evolution was driven toward the "specialization" of a 
group of organisms. (A 180) However, she continued to understand the overall result 
o f any evolutionary change to increase the success o f a species. Her conception of 




The most remarkable instances of conceptual change that occurred in the mid­
year period were found in the group of conceptions describing the mechanism of 
evolutionary change. At the outset of the study, Meredith's conceptions in this group 
were a muted aspect of her conceptual framework. This situation radically altered 
during the mid-year period. Toward the end of this interval, Meredith easily applied 
many scientific explanations for the process through which evolution operates. Not 
surprisingly, this conceptual restructuring accompanied her changing conceptions of 
the nature of evolutionary modifications. But some aspects of her conceptual 
framework for this group of conceptions were retained. These more static conceptions 
included her lack of recognition of the importance of the variation in a population and 
her strength conception of fitness.
The most striking example of conceptual change was found in Meredith's 
understanding of the origin o f variation. This conception changed tentatively as she 
began to recognize that need could not be a viable mechanism of evolutionary change. 
After this initial recognition, she referred to mutations as the origin of variation, but 
this was a tentative usage of the conception as she had no actual understanding of 
mutations. Her responses for the sorting task conducted at the end o f this interview 
period signified her incorporation of this conception as she discussed that the origin of 
variation must have included some sort of genetic change.
Related to her changing conception of need, Meredith's conception of mutation 
also underwent a significant change. She began to use mutation as a central component 
of her understanding of the process of evolution. Her concept map constructed during 
this period features mutations on the second row of the hierarchy (CM-2, mid-year). 
During our discussion of this map, she explained:




M: Because it's the whole thing that, that ahm, I mean you couldn't 
have evolution if you didn't have a mutation that produced the variation.
(A 229)
She also used this conception in her explanation o f the evolutionary change shown in
her journal entry for artifact 5 and in the sorting task (ST, mid-year):
SD: How did those rabbits get there? These brown ones?
M: There was a mutation. (A 233)
(See Appendix G for CM-2, mid-year.)
As this conception was being more firmly incorporated into her framework for
the process of evolutionary change, Meredith's conception o f mutation became more
differentiated. During this period, she described mutations as genetic changes that
could be both harmful and beneficial.
SD: Do you know what caused those mutations?
M: It's just ahm, I think, by change that happens. (A 230)
In the word sort conducted in the mid-year period, she explained (ST, mid-year):
M: Change? Ahm, I'd probably just, I'd probably leave that because it's 
ahm, you know, it's by chance that these ahm mutations occur. (A 244)
However, while she could explain the random component of mutations in response to
direct questions, Meredith had difficulty applying this conception to a biological
phenomena. When discussing the bear mutations graphic, Meredith explained that the
only possible mutation was that providing longer hair length (PI-1, mid-year).
M: Well since the, the ahm, the temperatures are becoming colder it is 
not ahm you're not gonna' have something losing, losing its hair. That 
would not be a beneficial mutation. (A 245)
While Meredith could describe mutations as random events, she also explained that
only beneficial mutations were probable. This conflict signifies that conceptual change
was not yet complete. While she had made some connections, she had not yet begun to
apply this changing conception.
Accompanying her construction of a random process for the origin of variation,
Meredith had begun to separate the actions of natural selection from the origin of
variation.
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M : Natural selection increases the individuals of a population with a 
trait. (A 228)
This passage also demonstrates that Meredith used the scientific conception of the unit
of evolutionary change to be the percentage of the population with a trait.
As has been shown, Meredith's conceptual system for the process of
evolutionary change underwent radical changes toward a scientific understanding. It is
important to note that this change accompanied very similar changes in her conception
of the nature of evolutionary change. Such conceptual change would be expected due
to Meredith's mechanistic approach to scientific knowledge. Meredith recognized the
gains she made during this period and we discussed this:
SD: Where did you learn all this?
M: [Laughter] I don't know.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: I love it. Ahm, a lot of it, a lot of stuff I knew. But for me to have to 
sit down and then rattle it all out,
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: I don't do very well.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: It's ahm sometimes it takes me, I have to stop and think about it, you 
know? I don't know. We really haven't, all we've done on it is read that 
article.
SD: The article, that one on the new svnthesis-that article?
M: Uh, uh. (Yes) (A 228)
Natural history.
In our discussions of the geological history of the earth, Meredith described a 
very old, changing earth. She explained that the earth was "billions o f years old," and 
that life was created long after the first creation of the earth. (A 170) After that time, 
the continents had drifted, the climates had changed, and species underwent evolution. 
She understood humans to have been present only in the last 7,000 years. In the time 
line she drew depicting the history of life on earth, Meredith included, in this order, the 
origins of: (a) the earth, (b) "microorganisms such as bacteria and protozoa," (c) 
shellfish, (d) amphibians, (e) mammals, and (e) humans. After she drew the time line, 
Meredith laughingly explained, "I've got some gaps in my knowledge here." (A 189)
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Like Brian in her understandings o f natural history, Meredith did not focus solely on 
the creation of humans. Instead, she recognized that many events occurred before 
humans evolved.
Other biological knowledge.
In our discussions of intentionality in nature, Meredith was explicit in her
rejection of anthropomorphic explanations for the actions of organisms and natural
processes. However, she used a sophisticated understanding of this conception in
which she did not reject the possibly of thought in any organism. When more
advanced vertebrates were discussed, she explained that these organism were capable
of thought and planning. She explained that a beaver was "probably intentional" when
building a lodge and a prairie dog could learn to open a nut. (A 195)
Another conception which was revealed in the mid-year period had to do with
Meredith’s conception of the process of the inheritance of physical traits. Like her
previous conceptions of the nature of the evolutionary process, she viewed inheritance
as fundamentally a very ordered process. She demonstrated no recognition of the
randomness of the process of meiosis and the subsequent variation it introduced.
Other aspects of Meredith's conceptual framework for evolution, including her
conceptions of human evolution, evidence for evolution, evolutionary relationships,
broad evolutionary theories, and the historical aspects of evolutionary theory
underwent no changes in the mid-year period.
See Figure 20 for a summary of Meredith's mid-year conceptual framework.
Year-end framework
By the last interview it became evident to both of us that Meredith had learned
a great deal about evolutionary theory during the school year. We discussed the
possible reasons for this:
M: Like whenever we've talked about it in class I probably paid more 
attention than you know ahm, I’ve paid careful attention because you 
know, it's something that we're talking about each week.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
267
M: And, you know, it's something that I'm interested in, you know? 
Wondering, wondering why and how and whatever. I 
think that maybe if we hadn't been doing this I wouldn't have been, you 
know, trying to find out or whatever. Just tune into it in class. (A 316)
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Figure 20
Summary of Meredith's mid-year conceptual framework for evolution
M echanism.
The greatest gains made by Meredith were found in her conceptions of the 
process of evolutionary change as signified by Meredith's last concept map. (See
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knowledge of the nature of evolutionary change, this map revolved around her
understanding of the process o f evolutionary change. During the year, Meredith
constructed a system of conceptions for evolution which were largely scientific,
although several minor alternative conceptions did remain. Conceptions for her
understanding of process that were retained include: (a) mutations as the source of
variation, (b) a separation of the action of natural selection and the origin of variation,
and (c) a lack of recognition o f the importance o f variation in a population.
There were some interesting components of M eredith’s conception of mutation.
As was seen during the mid-year period, Meredith had an unresolved understanding of
the nature of mutations. While she could formally describe mutations as random
events, this understanding was not applied in the interviews about instances about a
mutation event in a hypothetical population of bears. When her conflicting answers
were brought to her attention, Meredith was unable to recognize the conflict:
SD: When you first saw [the mutation graphic], you said, okay, he 
could become hairy because of a gene mutation. Ah, the burrowing, 
thought, is probably explained
M: Well, I said you couldn't do that because of ice. You can't 
SD: Yeah?
M: Burrow in that.
SD: Okay, and you said [losing hair] is a mutation that wouldn't 
happen.
M: Right. Because that wouldn't be beneficial.
SD: Okay. Ahm, I'm gonna ask you something to see ahm if you 
recognize anything. Earlier the same time, the same day, we had talked 
about how mutations are random events.
M: Uh, uh. (Yes)
SD: And you described them that way. Do you see any conflicts 
between your answer on this bear question and the idea that mutations 
are random events?
M: No. I, I don't see why that would be, why that couldn't, why this 
[pointing to the long hair mutation] couldn't be random. (A 252)
Faced with logically conflicting responses, Meredith could not recognize the
inconsistency.
The discussion shown above occurred during the initial interview of the year- 
end period. In an interview two weeks later, Meredith explicitly discussed the varied 
nature of mutations during the construction of her concept map:
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M: Well I want to say that ah, ah, beneficial ah, you know, you have 
both non beneficial and beneficial mutations. But it's the ones that are 
beneficial that will be successful. (A 298)
This passage signifies that her the random aspect of mutation was further incorporated
into her understanding o f the process of evolution.
Meredith's incorporation of mutation into her understanding of the process of
evolutionary changes is also signified by her understanding of the production of
adaptation through mutations:
SD: How does that happen, that birds' beaks are kinda suited to their, 
what food they eat?
M: It's just that ahm, mutation once ag a in .. . .
SD: So what is an adaptation?
M: It's just ahm when an animal becomes ahm, changes to be most 
suited for its environment.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) And ahm, how is that related ahm to mutation?
M: Because ahm, mutations are changes and ahm those changes will 
reproduce to produce animals that are, that are better suited for their 
environment, better adapted. (A 264)
While Meredith used many scientific conceptions in her understanding of 
evolutionary change, she retained some alternative conceptions. On the posttest, 
Meredith explained that evolutionary changes include a small increase in the quality of 
a trait but only within a percentage of the population. This conception represents a 
blend of scientific and alternative conceptions. While she understood that mutations 
would occur and be passed down through an increase in the proportion of the 
population, she also understood evolutionary changes to be an accretion of small 
mutation events.
Another alternative conception used by Meredith at the conclusion of the study
involved her conception of fitness. While this conception had been undergoing slight
changes throughout the study, at year-end, Meredith used the common alternative
conception o f fitness to involve "adaptability:"
M: I think Spot is ah, the fittest because ah, he's, he's able to ah, you 
know, he seems pretty adaptable. (A 314)
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The final important aspect of Meredith's conceptual framework for evolutionary
processes was seen in her written answers for the posttest. While her use of a largely
scientific understanding of evolution change was evident in our interviews, this
conceptual framework was not demonstrated in her written answers:
M: [A written response regarding the evolution of speed in cheetahs] Well I 
guess it was necessary for the cheetahs to run this fast in order to catch their 
prey. At 20mph, they were not successful at this. (Posttest #7)
M: [A written response regarding the evolution of blindness in cave 
salamanders] After living in a cave for a period of time, eyes would serve no 
function any longer. These salamanders evolved in such as way to "get rid of" 
this nonfunctional feature. (Posttest 8)
In our interview about this test, she expanded a great deal on the salamander question:
M: You know, you'd have a mutation but after you you ah live in a cave 
for a period o f time and ahm ah eyes don't serve any function.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: They're no longer needed and so if there is a mutation that produces 
blindness in the salamanders then that's, you know, that certainly, you 
know, isn't necessary. It, it would do away with the function that's not 
needed and so it doesn't hurt the salamanders 
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: That have that mutation. (A 315)
It is evident that Meredith’s written answers do not reflect what she knew of the process
of evolutionary change. The difference between students' conceptions and their written
statements has been documented in past research in this area (Brumby, 1984; Hallden,
1988).
Nature of evolutionary change.
All aspects of Meredith's conceptual system for the nature of evolutionary 
changes were retained. However, there was growth in her knowledge of adaptations.
As was discussed in the preceding section, Meredith had begun to successfully link the 
process of mutation to the production o f adaptations in an organism. She began to 
understand adaptation as a means of becoming "better suited" for a particular 
environment. (A 264) She further explained that a long time span is required for an 
adaptation to become firmly lodged in a population. While she did make significant 
changes in her conception of adaptation, Meredith's conception of adaptation remained
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very broad in its scope. She linked adaptations to mutations, but she did not recognize 
all adaptations as having a genetic basis, instead referring to any changes by an 
organism to fit its environment as being adaptations. She could not differentiate 
between the fundamentally different processes of behavioral changes, physiological 
changes, and evolutionary changes within a population.
Evolutionary relationships.
Meredith's undefined species concept was retained through the end of the year.
This species conception is congruent with her continued failure to recognize the
importance of variation in a population:
SD: So ah, do you think it's good or bad for litters like these kitties to be 
different colors and sizes like that?
M: Ahm.
SD: Could there be any benefits or any ahm
M: I can't think of any offhand. I just know that it’s good to have
variation but I don't know why. (A 262)
Her conception of variation in a species is difficult to align with her conception 
of a species as a group with similar characteristics. This recognition of the presence of 
variation precludes her species concept from being labeled typological, but her failure 
to understand the importance of variation precludes her species concept from being 
labeled as populational in its origins. Instead her species concept remained as an 
alternative amalgam o f these two conceptions.
Broad evolutionary theories.
Meredith summed up her understanding of the application of this evolutionary
theory on her final exam:
M: Evolution is also considered a major theory in Biology. It is a 
powerful one that seeks to explain why organisms have the particular 
traits that they have. This theory is a reasonable one as to how life has 
changed over geological time. (Artifact 7, #1)
This answer reflects two aspects of her knowledge of the broad applications of
evolution. The first is that she considered evolution as a means for understanding
organisms' adaptations, a conception that she had held throughout the study. The
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second concerned her conception of the scope of this theory. At year end, she 
understood evolution to involve only the changes that occur within organisms and not 
the initial creation of the earth or life.
Other aspects o f her conceptual ecology, including her knowledge of natural 
history, human evolution, historical aspects of evolutionary theory, other biological 
knowledge, and the evidence she accepted for evolution theory, were retained 
unchanged during the year-end interview period.
See Figure 21 for a summary of Meredith's year-end conceptual framework. 
Summary of year long conceptual change
Meredith had achieved what Tyler strived for, establishment of a useful 
separation of scientific and religious knowledge. Because of this, the issue of 
evolution was not an emotional topic for Meredith. In this regard Meredith was similar 
to Brian, although she did not value scientific knowledge to the same degree. It is 
significant to note that Meredith accepted the plausibility of evolutionary theory long 
before she understood it. Like the students described by Lawson and Weser (1990), 
and similar to Tyler, Meredith had judged the theory based on sociological 
considerations and not logical coherence. Despite this difficult beginning, Meredith 
experienced profound conceptual change toward a scientific conceptual framework for 
evolution during the course o f the study. Most significant of these changes is her 
knowledge of the nature and process of evolutionary changes.
Summary of the Four Participants' Conceptual Change in Evolution 
The following section will summarize the participants' conceptual 
frameworks as well the conceptual change they experienced in relation to their 
personal characteristics. The applications these findings have for the conceptual 
change theory will be further described in Chapter 7.
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Culture, Conceptual Ecologies, and Conceptual Change 
From the outset of the study, Hurston and I selected specific student 
participants in order to provide the maximum variation in personal characteristics in
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Evolution is unplanned but 
predictable_________
Evolutionary Relationships
Populational and typological 
species concept*___________
Mechanism
M utations as origin o f  genetic 
variation
No importance placed on 
variation in a species*
Vague conception of unit of 
evolutionary change*
Natural selection operates 
through differential reproduction
Strength concept for fitness*
Evolutionary Metatheories
Evolution includes creation of life 
and changes since primordial 
soup*
Evolution is not essential in 
biology*
Historical Aspects of Theory
Natural History
Much knowlege of recent natural 
history o f animals*
Old, changing earth*
Knowledge o f  animal taxonomy 
for larger taxa*
Note. Italics indicate instances of conceptual change.
* indicates retention o f conception from previous description.
Solid block indicates academic conception.
Figure 21
Summary of Meredith's year-end conceptual framework for evolution 
an effort to better understand the process of conceptual change. However, the four 
participants were shaped by the culture of the biology class and so they shared some 
important personal characteristics. Each of the four participants accepted the 
importance of academic knowledge and expected that this knowlege would be 
meaningful. This disposition to the formal knowledge of school was also reflected in
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the culture of the classroom as evidenced by the theme of Talking Academic. A 
favorable academic orientation may have played a very significant role in the 
conceptual change which occurred, although this study's design prohibited pursuit of 
this line of investigation (as will be further discussed in Chapter 7).
The conceptual ecologies of the four interview participants differed markedly 
in terms of their conceptual frameworks, epistemological commitments, scientific 
and religious orientations, and acceptance of evolution theory. Because of these 
differences, the conceptual change experienced by these four participants offers 
insight into the actions o f a learner's conceptual ecology on the process of knowledge 
restructuring.
Brian-B iologist as Scientific Theorist
Brian's approach to biology can best be expressed as "Biologist as Scientific 
Theorist." This label is used to signify his deeply held, favorable scientific 
orientation and his realist epistemological approach to scientific knowledge. 
Typically, Brian searched for an overview of what was being discussed soon after he 
constructed a basic understanding of the physical phenomenon. His consideration of 
any natural phenomena took that pattern of searching for any possible theory to 
describe the physical causality, understanding the operation of the mechanism, 
logical assessment of rival theories and their applications, and logical selection of the 
single most probable explanation. While Brian did not interpret his personal life or 
knowledge through a religious framework, neither did he reject the existence of a 
"greater being." He explained that conflicts that resulted from the overlap of 
scientific and religious knowledge were necessary for the advancement of the 
boundaries of what scientists understand. From the outset of our study, Brian 
understood that scientific truths must be independent of religious assumptions and he 
used a non-theistic approach to evolution (Nelson, 1986). From the beginning of the
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study Brian displayed no conflicts in what he understood about evolutionary theory 
and what he believed.
Brian’s scientific orientation is evidenced in his early conceptual framework 
for evolution. In the beginning of the study, a scientific understanding of the 
mechanism of evolutionary change was central to his framework. As the study 
progressed, this basic scientific understanding was refined and in his last few 
interviews he used a sophisticated understanding of biological adaptation, the view of 
the random aspect of mutations operating within biological controls, and the 
differential reproduction aspect of natural selection. He approached evolution as he 
did many topics and his foundational understanding evidenced at the beginning 
changed into a more holistic view of evolution as he considered the mechanisms, the 
patterns formed by these mechanisms, and the various theories which explicate facets 
of this theoretical framework.
At the close of the study, Brian used the most scientifically appropriate 
framework for evolution of any of the four participants. The foundation of much of 
this framework was in place from the beginning. However, Brian's strong scientific 
orientation negated many of the conflicts the other participants experienced. This 
orientation allowed him to focus on select areas of conceptual difficulties. Brian was 
not attempting to determine all the possible theoretical alternatives for a 
phenomenon; instead he was looking for the most scientifically appropriate 
alternative. Because Brian’s epistemology followed traditional scientific lines, his 
conceptual change was linear, logical, and predictable.
Stephanie—Biologist as Multidisciplinary Realist
Stephanie's approach to biology can best be expressed as "Biologist as 
Multidisciplinary Realist." With an appreciation for many disciplines such as 
literature, philosophy, science, and world religions, she often changed the context 
through which she understood natural phenomena. Multiple interviews and interview
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techniques indicated that Stephanie could use an assortment of approaches to 
understand any biological topic. One week she would explain evolutionary theory 
from a social-cultural perspective. The next week she could approach the same 
material with a scientific, mechanistic approach. However, Stephanie rejected using 
a relativist label to describe herself because she continually referred to the natural 
world for confirmation of her conceptions. Based on this, I refer to Stephanie as a 
multidisciplinary realist because she needed to use the knowledge of many 
disciplines and ways of knowing in order to construct her understanding of reality.
The strength of Stephanie's religious orientation is another important feature 
of her conceptual ecology. She understood life to have a fundamental theistic 
component. At the outset of the study, Stephanie's rejection of the existence of wide- 
scale evolution was in part based on her theistic beliefs and in part based on her 
perception of the implausibility of the mechanism. Instead, she understood evolution 
in progressive creationist terms and she understood only slight changes to occur 
within groups of organisms. This situation became more complex as we consider 
Stephanie's strong interest in anthropology that made her keenly interested in such 
questions. Based upon these diverse interests, Stephanie experienced a great deal of 
conflict in trying to negotiate the intersection of her religious beliefs and her 
scientific knowledge. However, one characteristic o f her fluid episteomological 
stance was that it allowed her to recognize attributes of theories that she did not 
personally accept. Coupled with this, Stephanie enjoyed the exercise of intellectual 
debate, and so she enjoyed the inherent ambiguity of her episteomological position.
At the outset of the study, Stephanie used many alternative conceptions in her 
understanding of the evolutionary change accepted by science. She understood 
science to describe drastic wholesale changes between groups of organisms driven by 
Lamarckian forces. She personally rejected these conceptions. Stephanie's strong
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religious and anthropological interest formed the basis of her early frameworks and 
these were the lenses she most frequently used to understand evolutionary issues.
During the scope of the study, Stephanie’s understanding o f evolutionary 
mechanisms underwent drastic changes and she was capable of applying 
sophisticated scientific explanations for the mechanisms and implications of 
evolutionary theory, much like Brian, by the end of the study. While she continued 
to accept the existence of only small-scale changes within groups even at the end of 
the study, what she took to be "small scale" and "within a group" underwent drastic 
changes. By the end of the study, Stephanie accepted as fact many many instances of 
biological evolution. However, her interest in human evolution and the religious 
implications of such changes remained a focal point of her conceptual framework.
Stephanie's conceptual change is of particular interest because of her lack of a 
wholesale scientific focus. In Stephanie we can see pattern for the resolution of 
conflicts caused by opposing knowledge frameworks. While Stephanie was largely 
successful in constructing a scientific framework for the mechanism of evolutionary 
change, this change was accomplished without a corresponding change in belief. 
Thus, under specific conditions, it is clear a student can learn topics which she ^ e  
does not believe using a religious framework. However, aspects of Stephanie's 
conceptual ecology may have had her uniquely suited to this situation. Her 
multidisciplinary perspective made her keenly interested in many knowledge claims. 
With Stephanie, we also see other aspects of a learner's conceptual ecology in play. 
For Stephanie, portions of evolutionary theory had to be validated because of her 
strong anthropological interest. Stephanie's case demonstrates that conceptual 
change does not always follow traditional logical patterns, but can remain within the 
bounds of rationality.
278
Tvler—Biologist as Authority Seeker
Tyler's approach to all academic topics, including biology, can best be termed 
"authority seeker." This label reflects the end result of many of her academic 
endeavors. Tyler often compartmentalized her knowledge. When this 
compartmentalization broke down, such as during the process of classroom activities, 
discussions, or simple conversations, Tyler was thrown into conflict as she attempted 
to reconcile competing knowledge claims. Tyler then would seek knowledge from 
an authority figure in order to negotiate this conflict. This situation was complicated 
by her epistemological understanding of science as a body of static, sure knowledge. 
Taken together these chracteristics made Tyler the most unsure of all the participants. 
Tyler’s religious oreintation coupled with her personal insecurity created a great deal 
of anxiety for Tyler during the scope of the study. While she articulated a partial 
resolution of science-religion conflict regarding evolution and used a theistic 
understanding of the process of gradual creation, she continued to be uncomfortable 
with this tension (Nelson, 1986).
Tyler was interested in science but she did not use a mechanistic 
understanding of the natural world. Instead, she understood the natural world in 
terms of aesthetics. Tyler's aesthetic view of the natural world is reflected in her 
conceptual framework at the outset of the study. She did not view organisms in 
mechanistic terms but in terms of aesthetic qualities such as beauty, order, and 
symmetry. Her early conceptual framework for evolution was dominated by a vague 
description of the patterns of evolutionary changes and revolved around the issue of 
human evolution. Within her aesthetic approach to the topic, Tyler used many 
alternative conceptions to describe evolutionary patterns. When pressed, she 
hesitantly offered several alternative conceptions of the mechanisms of such a 
change. So while Tyler was capable of mechanistic thought, this was not her first 
approach to a biological topic.
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Tyler's case study provides valuable insight as it is compared to Stephanie's. 
Like Stephanie, Tyler entered the study as using a progressive creationist approach to 
evolution, although for Tyler this was an issue filled with anxiety as her own 
understandings conflicted with those of science. During the course of the study,
Tyler constructed a partial resolution of this perceived conflict through an acceptance 
of human speciation and a personal rejection of the special creation of humans.
Thus, during the study, Tyler shifted from a progressive creationist approach to a 
tentative application of theistic evolution. However, her focal point of human 
speciation was retained throughout the school year.
Accompanying the shift in her conceptual ecology, Tyler also experienced 
conceptual change toward the scientific explanation of evolutionary change.
However, Tyler's year-end conceptual framework could not be considered completely 
scientific. Unlike Brian, Tyler was not searching for the single most plausible 
answer and she continued to use dual constructions to explain a single phenomenon. 
Additionally, Tyler had little understanding of the competitive aspects of natural 
systems and many of her scientific conceptions for the mechanism of evolutionary 
change had little logical basis. Due to Tyler's aesthetic orientation and unquestioning 
reliance on authority, much o f her conceptual change was fragmentary, 
discontinuant, and extra-logical.
Meredith—Biologist as Pragmatist
Meredith's approach to biology can best be expressed as "Biologist as 
Pragmatist." This label signifies Meredith's tendency to value only topics that she 
understood as having a practical importance in her education. She valued knowledge 
for "education sake" but understood much of her classroom knowledge to have little 
personal importance. Unlike Brian and Stephanie, Meredith related to knowledge 
only as it was presented in the classroom and she did not attempt to relate one theory 
to another on her own. Although she was religious, Meredith had pragmatically
achieved a successful negotiation of the science-religion conflict through the 
consistent use of a strict dichotomy separating the two forms o f knowledge. Using 
this dichotomy, she accepted evolutionary theory. Meredith used a theistic 
understanding in which evolution was understood as the mechanism through which a 
creator operates. Thus, Meredith, unlike Tyler and Meredith, continually used what 
she understood as the scientific explanation of evolutionary change as her own 
personal explanation.
Unlike Tyler, Meredith's early interviews were nearly devoid of religious 
reference. This omission may reflect Meredith's early separation of science and 
religion. Meredith's initial conceptual framework emphasized the nature of 
evolutionary changes and consisted of many alternative conceptions for the process 
of evolutionary change, much like Tyler's early conceptions. As the study 
progressed, many of Meredith's alternative conceptions were replaced with their 
scientific counterparts. Pragmatically, she became conversant with enough 
evolutionary theory to be at ease during our conversations. However, her conceptual 
framework stopped at this level of application. Evolutionary metatheories never 
formed a significant portion of Meredith's framework. At the close of the study, 
Meredith had a basic, scientific conceptual framework for evolutionary theory in 
which the nature and process of evolutionary changes were stressed. Meredith, like 
Brian, was notable in the lack of conflict these new constructions caused. Her case 
study is also notable in that Meredith believed in evolution long before she had a 
scientific framework for this topic. Like the students described by Lawson and 
Weser (1990), Meredith's early acceptance was based more on sociological 
considerations than the logical coherence o f the theory. While the construction of 
individual conceptions followed a linear, logical pattern for Meredith, when the 
whole of the framework is taken into account, much of Meredith's conceptual change 
was initiated by extra-logical factors.
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Conceptual Frameworks for Evolution 
While each interview participant entered the study with differing conceptual 
frameworks, there were some commonalties in their conceptual frameworks.
Conceptions reported in this category include only alternative conceptions about 
scientific topics. Nonscientific beliefs, "conceptions that cannot be accepted or 
rejected on the basis of scientific evidence," are not addressed in this section (Smith &
Siegel, 1993, p. 599). Many alternative conceptions used by the four interview 
participants had been documented previously in the science education literature. These 
common alternative conceptions and an example of the literature which describes them 
can be found in Table 7. Other alternative conceptions were documented in this study 
but have not been previously described in the science education literature. These are 
discussed in Chapter 7.
Need. Anthropomorphism, and Teleology
Three of the alternative conceptions found in Table 7 warrant further discussion. 
Students' use of need as the origin of variation and their reliance on teleology and 
anthropomorphism for explanations of evolutionary events have been well described in 
the literature. It has been discussed that these three conceptions may be an artifact of 
verbal and written communication ( Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985b; Hallden, 1988; 
Jungwirth, 1975b). The data reported in this study only partially support this assertion. 
Meredith's final exam responses demonstrate that students can rely on the 
uncomplicated response of need as a means of expressing a far more complex 
conceptual framework for an evolutionary event. In contrast, as was seen in the early 
interviews with Tyler, high school students can also understand need to be the 
mechanism that is responsible for the production o f variation and subsequent changes 
in a population. In Tyler's case, the use of need was not an artifact of communication, 
instead it was an accurate reflection of her conception for the origin of variation.
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These findings support Brumby's (1984) assertion that students' "intuitive 
Lamarckism" is a real conception which must be addressed by science educators.
The situation is similar to students' use of anthropomorphism in their 
explanations of evolutionary events. As was made clear by Tyler's interviews and 
other students' in-class questions, many students are capable of understanding 
organisms to be able to complete physiological changes and subsequent evolutionary 
events through conscious means. This demonstrates that anthropomorphism is not 
used solely as a means to ease
Table 7
Alternative conceptions used by the interview participants 




Unit of evolutionary change
All individuals in a population undergo an 
evolutionary change 
A single individual in a population 






Origin of variation blended with natural 
selection
Other categories
No distinction between adaptations
Genetic dominance equated with 
phenotypic characters 
Anthropomorphism*
Bishop & Anderson, 1990; 
Greene, 1990; Settlage, in press
Bishop & Anderson, 1990 
Demastes & Good, 1993 
Demastes & Good, 1993
Deadman & Kelly, 1978; 
Demastes & Good, 1993; 
Jimenez, 1992 
Demastes & Good, 1993: 
Hallden, 1988 
Brumby, 1984 
Tamir & Zohar, 1991 
Bishop & Anderson, 1990; 
Demastes & Good, 1993
Brumby, 1984; Lucas, 1971; 
Kargobo et al., 1980 
Clough & Wood-Robinson, 
1985b
Hallden, 1988
*Note. Conceptions marked with an asterisk will be further discussed in the text.
communication or as a heuristic device as was suggested by several researchers 
(Hallden, 1988; Jungwirth, 1975b). Instead, like need, anthropomorphic responses can 
be an accurate reflection of a student's conceptions.
Unfortunately, these findings do not simplify the researcher's labors. As was 
seen in Meredith's and Stephanie's verbal explanations of their exam responses, need 
and anthropomorphism can also be used as a heuristic device as has been tentatively 
suggested in the literature. Given only written expressions of conceptions of need and 
anthropomorphism, it is very difficult to determine the conditions of the student's use 
of these conceptions. As has been suggested by White and Gunstone (1992), mode 
validity of research findings are of great importance in such questions and multiple 
means of data collection are necessary to ensure this validity.
Teleological responses are difficult to address given the data from this study. 
While Stephanie was teleological in her initial conceptions of patterns of evolutionary 
change, this conception became far less prominent in her later interviews. During this 
same time period, Stephanie was undergoing significant conceptual change regarding 
the process of evolutionary events. While generalizations become less meaningful 
when such limited data are available, these data do suggest that teleological expressions 
can be replaced by more mechanistic conceptions.
What is not answered by these data is the issue of the influence of the use of 
need, anthropomorphism, and teleology. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest that the 
use of common metaphors and analogies serve to shape conceptions, instead of acting 
as simple expressions o f conceptions. Do students use need, anthropomorphism, and 
teleology as a means of expressing their pre-existing conceptions? Or, does the early 
use of such responses act to shape and further embed these conceptions? This study 
cannot answer the question of the influence of these metaphors.
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
I learned several things from this research, such as the real importance of the 
mode validity of findings of educational research, the ways in which the tone and 
structure of interviews must change over time, and the insight students can have in 
their own reasoning and learning processes. However, the knowledge I most value 
concerns my understanding of the process of conceptual change.
At the outset, the conceptual change theory attracted my attention because it 
included an understandable and historically based mechanism to model learning. This 
model emphasized the importance of students' conceptual frameworks in the learning 
process. Because of this emphasis, interest in students' prior knowledge became a 
legitimate avenue of research. Something many science educators always felt was 
important now assumed a central role in learning theory.
As it was originally proposed, the conceptual change as described by Posner et 
al. (1982) has some very specific characteristics, some of which are absolute 
requirements of the theory and others which are implied by the theory's mechanism. 
Whether overtly or tacitly, these characteristics have shaped science educators' 
conceptions of science learning. But based on my research findings, my understanding 
of the process of conceptual change has undergone a series of meaningful changes.
In order to better frame my current description of the process of conceptual 
change in evolution, I will first illustrate my former interpretation of the conceptual 
change theory. As described by Posner et al. (1982), the conceptual change theory 
requires that four conditions must be met in order for a learner to undergo large scale 
accommodation of a pre-existing conceptual framework. These four conditions 
include:




2. The new conception must be found to be intelligible by the learner,
3. The new conception must be found to be plausible by the learner (that is, the
new conception must solve all the problems the pre-existing conception 
could not answer), and
4. The new conception must be found to be fruitful (that is, the new conception
must open other avenues for research).
Along with these four conditions for conceptual change, a learner's conceptual 
ecology is understood to control the change which can occur. As discussed previously 
in Chapter 2, this ecology is said to include the learner's epistemological commitments, 
metaphysical beliefs, the criteria a learner uses to control the recognition of anomalous 
data and knowledge taken from outside the field.
Based on this brief description, I understood the conceptual change described 
by Posner et al. (1982) to have several specific characteristics and/or limitations.
These included:
1. The conceptual change theory was useful in describing the change of major, 
organizing conceptions. It was not meant to describe the change o f small or 
minor conceptions.
2. Conceptual change was understood to be wholesale, so that the prior 
conception was completely discarded in favor of the new conception.
3. Conceptual change was a rational process in which evidence is logically 
analyzed and competing conceptions are compared on rational grounds. 
Based on this characteristic, I expected conceptual change to proceed in a 
linear, orderly fashion.
4. Stemming from the influence of the learner's conceptual ecology, belief was 
understood to influence the conceptual change which occurs.
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Implicit in this description is that conceptual change, as described by Posner et 
al. (1982), is fundamentally a scientifically rational process in which conceptions are 
judged using logical evaluation of available evidence. In this description, the terms 
scientific and rational become important signifiers to the current conception of 
learning. For many, the term scientific implies the familiar image of wholesale 
disproof, objective and precise observations, and a simplicity and elegance of 
explanations derived through deductive logic. Using this understanding, a scientific 
framework would include a set of linear explanations which are not exclusive nor 
reduntant. A learner using a scientific framework would search for the single most 
valid and widely applicable explanation for a natural phenomenon. The term rational 
also carries with it a host of implied meanings. Rational judgments are understood to 
be solely within the cognitive realm. Traditionally, rational judgments (and so 
conceptual change) are said to be conscious decisions which exclude the influence of 
affective or motivational concerns.
The data for this research conflict with the traditional interpretation of learning 
using the conceptual change theory, as I will outline in the following chapter. While I 
support limiting use of the term conceptual change to describe the change of major 
organizing conceptions, I now understand the process of conceptual change in 
evolution in much broader terms than those outlined by Posner et al. (1982). Ways in 
which my description differs from the initial theory include:
1. The conceptual change described in this study included the wholesale 
pathway predicted by Posner et al. (1982); however, two other pathways of 
conceptual change were also identified in my study. These patterns 
illustrate that the change of major conceptions is not always holistic.
2. Despite directed instruction, conceptual change is not always along a 
pathway leading toward the construction o f a more scientific framework. 
Conceptual change must include any restructuring of a learner's conceptual
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framework (as evidenced by the pre- and posttest data from the entire 
class).
3. The conceptual change experienced by the four participants was often 
driven by extra-logical factors (rational factors, but not within traditional 
notions of rationality). Thus, the patterns of conceptual change were 
neither completely linear nor orderly.
4. Data from this study suggest that the role o f a learner's conceptual ecology 
is far more important and intricate than suggested in the original conceptual 
change theory.
Based on these factors, I now understand conceptual change in evolution to include 
wholesale, fragmented, and dual constructions patterns which are controlled by both 
rational (both logical and extra-logical) and extra-rational components (motivational 
and affective concerns). The following chapter will further detail these and other 
conclusions and highlight the most salient aspects of this research.
Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from the data and discussion included in the 
previous three chapters. The most important of these include: (a) alternative 
conceptions unique to this study, (b) further description of the process of conceptual 
change and suggested refinements of the theory, (c) factors influencing conceptual 
change, (d) a description of the degree of biological literacy of the four student 
participants, and (d) the question o f student participation and its influence on 
conceptual change.
Conceptions Unique to This Study
While the majority of alternative conceptions documented in this study have 
been described in previous science education research, a number are new or were 
documented previously in a superficial manner. These new conceptions include:
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Conceptions of species
1. Hybridization between animal species is a natural source of variation,
2. The term species is a completely artificial category,
3. The species construct is dependent on several criteria (amalgam species
concept),*
Conceptions of evolutionary process
4. All mutations are beneficial,
5. Collage conception of fitness,*
6. Evolution is an incremental change in the quality of a trait caused by
mutation within the entire population,*
Other related conceptions
7. The theory of evolution should account for the origin of the earth, initial
production of life and subsequent changes in natural populations,
8. Humans are not primates nor animals, and
9 Evolutionary events are predictable.
O f these nine conceptions, the three designated by an asterisk are particularly 
meaningful. The three conceptions indicate that learners often blend their pre-existing 
alternative conceptions with scientific conceptions in an effort to construct useful 
explanations for natural phenomena. This new, broad conception is then applied and 
further modified. This fragmented process of blending and subsequently modifying 
conceptions conflicts with the wholesale conceptual change described by Posner et al. 
(1992).
The conflict between the conceptual change documented in these three 
instances and that described by the conceptual change theory serves to reinforce the 
intended scope of the conceptual change theory. As was suggested in the original 
paper, the conceptual change theory should be applied to only major, organizing 
conceptions which is not the case in the three (*) conceptions discussed here (Posner et
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al., 1982). However, other science education researchers have strained to apply 
conceptual change theory to almost all instances of learning and have thus ignored the 
intended constraints. While this over-application mirrors the growth of almost all 
scientific theories (Duschl, 1990), these data indicate that researchers must remember 
the intended scope of this theory.
Conceptual Change
The data can be used to address four broad areas describing the process of 
conceptual change for biological evolution. These include:
1. The impact of the learner's conceptual ecology on the process of conceptual
change.
2. The importance of threshold questions on the process of conceptual change.
3. The patterns of conceptual change.
4. Actions of competing conceptions.
Conceptual Ecology and Conceptual Change
Tyler, Meredith, Stephanie, and Brian were not only participants in this study; 
they were students in a specific classroom, situated in a unique educational setting and 
influenced by a myriad of factors. An important aspect of the understanding that I 
have constructed in this study revolves around my interpretation of their school and 
classroom culture. To understand how the conceptual frameworks o f the participants 
changed is, in part, to understand the influence of culture on this process.
At the outset of this section, it must be noted that each of the four interview 
participants had one important characteristic in common--each had a very favorable 
attitude toward almost all academic work. In this regard, these participants were not 
radically different from their classmates. An important feature of the classroom 
culture was a positive orientation toward academic knowledge and academic 
achievement. Dreyfus, Jungwirth, and Eliovitch (1990) describe this level of 
engagement as one of the most important considerations for conceptual change. Strike
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and Posner (1992), too, have recently described the potential influence of learners' 
motives and goals on the process of conceptual change. The results of a conceptual 
change study by Lee and Anderson (1993) demonstrates the interactions o f students' 
motivational and affective orientations and their knowledge and achievement. 
Unfortunately, a positive orientation to classroom science is not commonly found in 
our nation's students. The influence of this unusual characteristic may be one of the 
most fundamental factors controlling the conceptual change documented in this study; 
however, no comparison is possible as it is a characteristic that each interview 
participant shared.
Features of the participants' conceptual ecologies found to play important roles 
in the conceptual change which occurred included the learner's orientation toward 
science, other sources o f academic knowledge, and religion. As was particularly 
stressed in the multidisciplinary realist’s case study (Stephanie), a learner's 
epistemology and goals for the learning process can also play a major role in 
controlling the conceptual change that can occur.
Overall, the data support Posner et al.'s (1982) assertion of the importance of 
the learner's conceptual ecology on the process of conceptual change. However, the 
most significant finding within this category was the documentation of significant 
conceptual change in the absence of a corresponding change in belief. As was seen in 
Stephanie's case study, a learner who personally rejects the truthfulness of evolution 
can experience considerable change toward a scientific conceptual framework for this 
topic.
The documentation o f a disjunction between academic understanding and 
personal belief conflicts with the common perception of some evolution educators 
(Nelson, 1986). However, these data support the quantitative findings of Bishop and 
Anderson (1990) and Demastes et al. (in press) who failed to document a strong
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association o f students' beliefs and their ability to apply a scientific conception for an 
issue of evolutionary theory.
It could be argued that Stephanie was able to construct a largely scientific 
conceptual framework for the process of evolution despite her disbelief because of her 
multidisciplinary epistemological approach. Unlike many students who use a 
creationist view, Stephanie was able to appreciate the value of evolutionary theory 
regardless o f her belief in the topic. While she did not regard this theory as true, she 
did consider it to be worthy o f academic consideration. This may have placed 
Stephanie in a unique position allowing learning to occur under typically adverse 
circumstances.
Stephanie's case study becomes more informative as it is compared to Tyler's.
Tyler was not as adamant in her rejection of evolutionary theory as Stephanie, yet her 
discomfort and confusion were often obvious. It may not be coincidental that the 
student (Tyler) who had the most difficulty in constructing scientific conceptions for 
evolutionary mechanisms was also the student involved in the greatest amount of 
personal turmoil regarding this topic. The resolution o f the teacher’s and learner's 
anxieties in regard to evolutionary theory has been addressed in a systematic research 
program (Scharmann & Harris, 1992). The comparison of Stephanie and Tyler 
suggests that the most influential factor inhibiting scientific conceptual change is not 
belief, but the learner's feelings of disturbance and conflict as learning occurs.
In contrast to Stephanie's case study, Meredith accepted evolutionary theory 
long before she had a scientific conception for the process of this theory. This is not an 
unusual situation. In a survey reported by Lord and Marino (1992), while 75% of the 
college students polled reported that they believed evolution, most failed to understand 
the process. Like Tyler and the students in Lawson and Weser (1990), Meredith's 
acceptance was based on her perception o f the academic authority o f this theory and
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the persons teaching this theory instead of the intrinsic intelligibility, plausibility, or 
fruitfulness of the theory itself.
It could also be argued that the learning documented in Stephanie’s case study 
is not a typical example of conceptual change. Using the criteria of Posner et al. 
(1982), because she did not reject her existing conceptual framework for this topic, 
Stephanie could be said to have undergone only the initial process of finding the theory 
intelligible and plausible. However, portions of Stephanie's larger conceptual 
framework did undergo a definite change away from her initial conceptions.
A learner's conceptual ecology also includes the student's approach to scientific 
topics. A comparison the authority seeker's (Tyler) case studies to the other cases of 
the other three participants reveals that the learner's overall approach to understanding 
natural phenomena (her/his world view) can play an important role in aiding or 
hindering the construction o f a scientific conceptual framework. Brian, Meredith, and 
Stephanie, were capable of a very mechanistic, naturalistic approach to scientific 
topics. Each of these three made considerable gains toward the construction of a 
scientific conceptual framework for evolution. However, Tyler who used a more 
aesthetic approach to understanding natural phenomena retained the use of many of her 
prior alternative conceptions for much of evolutionary theory at the end of the study 
(Cobern, 1993). Unfortunately, Tyler's additional reliance on academic authorities and 
her personal turmoil complicate this analysis.
When the conceptual frameworks and conceptual change of the participants' are 
analyzed, areas of difficulties emerge which reflect the particular cultural context of 
these learners. These sites of struggle may reflect basic assumptions of western culture 
which must be overcome in order to construct a scientific conceptual framework for 
evolution. These three sites include (a) humans as separate from nature, (b) the 
Aristotelian notion of a ladder of life, and (c) the inherent predictability of physical 
mechanisms. These issues proved to be very important features of the learner's
conceptual ecologies and took the form of barriers to be overcome in the conceptual 
change of Meredith, Tyler, and to a lesser degree Stephanie.
Students' Threshold Questions about Evolutionary Theory
The original description of conceptual change theory outlined the importance of a 
theory's (a) intelligibility, (b) plausibility, and (c) fruitfulness. Related to this, the data 
from this study support the prominent role of particular issues, which can be called 
threshold questions, in the process of conceptual change in evolution. The term 
threshold questions was selected because it describes the actions of such information.
If the learner obtained the correct answer to such a question, she/he could proceed with 
the construction and acceptance of the new conception. If the learner could not obtain 
this information, further learning was blocked.
This sequence of events is demonstrated as Stephanie's case is followed. When 
she entered the class, she had the alternative conception of "interbreeding for 
dominance" as being the only source of new variation. However, this explanation was 
not often applied and it was clear this conception was not central to her conception of 
the process of evolutionary change.
(When asked about the origin of variation)
ST : I have a hard time forming opinions about this. I really don't think we can 
form something just because we need it.
[D 15]
After she learned that mutations are the source of variation, an entire sequence of 
changes were made possible for her understanding of the process of evolutionary 
change. This conception made the explanation of the process of evolutionary change 
plausible for Stephanie. The subsequent conceptual changes can be found in the 
description of her mid-year conceptions.
Other threshold questions documented in this study include:
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Threshold Questions of Intelligibility:
1. How could two different species stem from one original?
2. Why haven't all species evolved into a similar, better organism? (Or, why 
does evolution stop?)
3. How does evolution explain the creation of the earth?
Threshold Questions of Plausibility:
1. Have humans evolved?
2. What is the origin of variation in a population?
Threshold Questions of Fruitfulness:
1. Can evolution explain similarities and differences between organisms?
2. Can evolution be used to explained structural peculiarities between 
organisms?
As these questions are reviewed, it should be remembered that the actions of 
such knowledge vary from learner to learner. It is also important to note that these 
threshold questions do not have to be answered in a logical manner. As emphasized by 
Tyler's case study, the most important question which allowed evolution to become 
plausible was the issue of human evolution. Having answered that, she never raised 
questions concerning the patterns or modes of speciation.
Evidence Needed for Conceptual Change
Closely related to the idea of threshold questions is the evidence required by 
learners for conceptual change. As recalled in the discussion of conceptual change 
teaching provided by Duschl and Gitomer (1991, p. 847), "what counts [as evidence] is 
affected by what knowledge we choose to embrace." The participants in this study did 
not always select evidence based only on rational, logical reasons. Instead, 
idiosyncratic, measures were often used. An example of this was seen in Stephanie's 
case study. She understood and constructed a conception of small scale evolutionary 
changes because of her interests in anthropology. For Stephanie, the process of small
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scale evolutionary events needed to become plausible to justify her affective concerns 
and her extensive prior knowledge in anthropology. A similar example was seen in 
Tyler, who understood the world to have a very long history only because of her 
perception of the existence o f dinosaurs. For Tyler, the world was old, not because of 
an array of supporting evidence, but because it had to be old in order for dinosaurs to 
have existed.
The understanding that all conceptual change in a learner is not logically driven 
is not in conflict with the description o f conceptual change in science as provided by 
Lakatos (1970), Toulmin (1972), and Kuhn (1970). Toulmin (1972) describes the 
rationality driving theoretical change in science as often being outside the boundaries 
of formal logic and instead being a systematic analysis of the practical considerations 
o f the function and adaptation of the new theory. It should not be surprising that much 
of the conceptual change documented in this study was not driven by logical 
considerations but was still based on a rational evaluation of the function and 
implications of the new conception.
Patterns o f Conceptual Change 
Change in one conception
As seen many times in the data of this study, the initial stages of the change of 
a single conception were characterized by the student's use o f a new term within a 
previously constructed explanation. Often, the initial use was not accompanied by a 
full, scientific understanding, but instead an almost rote mimic of an earlier use. This 
process was seen in Meredith's initial use of mutation in her explanation of the process 
of evolutionary change. She first mentioned the term after reading it on a pretest. It 
was clear that Meredith did not understand what this term signified, but instead used it 
to fill a gap in her previous understanding of evolutionary change. In later interviews 
Meredith began to apply this term in more of her explanations that gradually narrowed 
the scope of mutation's actions as she more closely defined the term. It was not until
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the mid-year and year-end interview periods that Meredith constructed a scientific 
conception of the process of mutations and its actions. However, this conception came 
long after her initial use of this conception in response to her own dissatisfaction.
Another trend seen in a single instance of conceptual change was the change in 
the students’ use of a conception. As was seen in all four interview participants, 
students' initial applications of a conception were often tentative and took the form of 
rapid but unsure responses to interview questions. Later applications of the new 
conception were made with more assurance as the students began to link the new 
conception with other aspects of their knowledge. Links between conceptions were 
reflected in students' concept maps (as the new conceptions were placed higher in the 
map's hierarchy) and in their frequent use of such responses in interview responses. 
Tentative beginnings characterized conceptions constructed in response to learner 
dissatisfaction with current conceptions.
Change in related conceptions
Often the change of one conception allowed a sequence of conceptual changes 
to occur. An example of this was demonstrated in Stephanie's and Meredith's use of 
need as the origin of variation. While this alternative conception remained in place, 
other associated conceptions also remained in an alternative state. But a change in the 
controlling conception allowed for a cascade of associated changes. A tentative 
sequence of this cascade was as follows:
1. Need was replaced by mutation as the origin of variation.
2. The conception of patterns of evolution as tied to the environment was
replaced by a conception of evolutionary patterns has having a more 
random component.
3. The conception of an inextricable action of natural selection and production
of variation was replaced with a conception of the separate actions of these 
two processes.
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4. The conception of the unit of evolutionary change as being the entire 
population was replaced by a percentage of the entire population.
It is difficult to determine the exact sequence of each of these conceptual 
changes because the cascade always occurred over a short time span. More work is 
required to tease out the actual controlling conception. However, previous work 
indicates need as the controlling conception of this cascade (Demastes & Good, 1993). 
Aside from identification of the controlling conception, documentation of this series of 
changes is insightful. Millar (1989) suggests that a model o f knowledge fragments 
instead of conceptual frameworks may be a more fruitful model for students' 
understandings. The data collected in this study lend partial support to this model. 
Students' conceptions of the many facets under a broad theoretical base can change 
with little alterations of the other portions o f the framework. For example, Stephanie's 
knowledge o f the mechanism of evolution changed while her historical knowledge was 
retained intact. However, some of the data conflict with Millar's model. The 
conceptions which describe related biological phenomena often change in a very 
interconnected fashion, as is described by the cascade of changes. Based on this 
study, Millar's model of knowledge fragments is only applicable within specific 
instances in evolution education.
Conceptual change versus change in formal knowledge statements
Another characteristic of most instances of conceptual change was that the 
actual conceptions applied by the learner would undergo an alteration, but their 
overarching, descriptive explanation would be retained unchanged. Stephanie's case 
study best demonstrates this characteristic. At the outset of the study, Stephanie 
recognized "subtle changes within a group" of organisms as the only plausible 
description of evolutionary change. Using this conception, she rejected all large scale 
examples of speciation. However, during the latter stages of the study, Stephanie 
accepted and applied evolutionary theory to account for changes "within" a group
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encompassing dinosaurs and birds and reptiles. She retained the use of the formal 
definition of evolutionary change, but the meaning she attributed to this statement 
varied.
Documentation of such subtle conceptual change calls into question the
wholesale change described by Posner et al. (1982). Stephanie's understanding of the
scope o f evolutionary changes is a large, organizing conception. Yet, in the instances
described above, Stephanie was not consciously selecting one conception over another
based on issues o f intelligibility, plausibility, and fruitfulness. Instead, her previous
conception was undergoing a series of subtle changes in order to envelop the new
information she was learning. Such piecemeal and gradual conceptual change is
similar to the pattern described by Nussbaum (1989, p. 538):
[Conceptual change] forms a pattern in which the student maintains substantial 
elements o f the old conception w'hile gradually incorporating individual 
elements from the new ones.
Gradual conceptual change has also been documented by Metz (1991) in her study of
change in students' physics knowledge. In this study she described both wholesale
conceptual change and an incremental pattern. Within the incremental pattern,
students' pre-existing conceptions are transformed and serve as the basis for new
conceptions.
Recognition of conceptual change
Within the conceptual change theory, a learner compares two competing 
conceptions and elects to use one conception based upon the criteria described 
previously. If such comparison is common, a researcher might expect to see signs of a 
learner's recognition of the process of conceptual change. This prediction is supported 
by many of the data of this study. Particularly true in Stephanie's and Meredith's case 
studies, they recognized and could propose reasons for the conceptual change that 
occurred during this study.
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The trend of recognition of conceptual change did not hold true for all 
conceptual change, however. As demonstrated by Stephanie's changing conception of 
evolution as "subtle changes within a group,” learners often are not consciously aware 
of the conceptual changes which occur. Just as a recognition of this process supports 
Posner et al.’s (1982) description, the lack of recognition calls into question the limits 
of this theory. As was suggested in the previous section, change of an organizing 
conception is not always through the overt process of comparison and rejection.
Instead, as has been recently suggested by Strike and Posner (1992), conceptual change 
is often a more fragmented, extra-logical process that is guided by the learner's prior 
knowledge and affective considerations of this knowledge.
Actions of Competing Conceptions
During two instances in the study, students failed to recognize their application 
of two logically incompatible conceptions. This was seen in Meredith's and Tyler's 
recognition of the random aspect of mutation combined with their application of only 
beneficial mutations. After the initial documentation of this event, I took measures to 
ensure that these two students were applying these conceptions and not simply stating 
a rote answer. Once this was established, I questioned them as to this inconsistency. 
Neither participant was able to recognize the incompatibility of these responses. 
Additionally, it is important to note that each one of the conflicting responses was 
elicited by a different interview question. Inconsistent knowledge frameworks are well 
known in science education literature (Carey, 1985; Clough & Driver, 1986; Gilbert, 
Watts, & Osborne, 1982), and have been previously described for students' 
conceptions of evolution (Lawson & Thompson, 1988). The data from this study and 
the literature suggest that occasionally conceptual change can include the construction 
of a second equivalent but competing conception.
Lawson and Thompson (1988) suggest that students fail to recognize the 
inconsistency of the competing conceptions and fail to experience wholesale
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conceptual change in these instances because they do not have the required reasoning 
skills. Other authors have noted these dual constructions are elicited through different 
activities (Carey, 1985; Clough & Driver, 1986). In any case, based on these data, the 
dual construction and application is a common event in the process of conceptual 
change. Holland et al. (1986) use the default hierarchy model of cognition to explain 
learners' selection of one conception to use from a dual construction. However, the 
extra-logical pattern of concept selection used by Meredith, Tyler, and Stephanie 
makes the use of this computer metaphor problematic.
Summary of Patterns of Conceptual Change
Currently, two metaphors for conceptual change are commonly accepted. One 
describes that a learner's conception can undergo subtle changes in the form of 
assimilation and the second describes the process of whole sale accommodation as 
conflicting information is encountered. The conceptual change theory of Posner et al. 
(1982) was designed to address only instances of accommodation for major, organizing 
conceptions. The data from this study conflict with this narrow description. These 
data describe three patterns of change for major conceptions: (a) wholesale, as 
suggested by Posner et al. (1982), (b) fragmented and gradual, as suggested by 
Nussbaum (1989) and Metz (1991), and (c) dual, as the discussion shown above 
illustrates.
Factors Influencing Conceptual Change
A Comparison
When the conceptual change of the interview participants is compared with that 
experienced by the entire class, a considerable discrepancy emerges. Not surprisingly, 
a comparison o f the pre- and posttest responses of the participants and their classmates 
reveals that the participants learned a great deal more evolutionary theory than their 
classmates. This difference could be attributed to several factors stemming from the 
interview process. The interview participants were involved in a conversation
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regarding evolutionary theory on a weekly basis. The sheer frequency of our 
discussions could have been responsible for the greater degree of learning found in the 
interview participants. Also due to these conversations, evolution gained an 
importance for the participants that was lacking in the larger class. As Meredith 
explained:
M: Like whenever we've talked about it [evolution] in class I probably paid 
more attention than you know ahm, I've paid careful attention because you 
know, it's something that we're talking about each week. (A 313)
Dole and Niederhauser (1990, p. 309) suggest that a learner's "personal need to
know" plays a very large role in initiating and guiding the process of conceptual
change. They suggest that the interest an issue holds for a student increases the
possibility of conceptual change. This view is supported by West and Pines (1983)
who argue that affective considerations of learning should not be excluded in the
research of conceptual change. Certainly, the four interview participants learned to
care about the theory of evolution because "it's something that we’re talking about each
week," and that interest enhanced the learning that occurred.
Additionally, the interview process clearly demonstrated the gaps in a
participant's explanation of an evolutionary event. Such explicit knowledge allowed
for learner dissatisfaction and caused the participant to search for other more suitable
answers both in class and in our later interviews. Related to the issue of
dissatisfaction, the structured interview activities provided a means through which the
participants could explore the implications of their current conceptions. Jimenez
(1992) demonstrates that such explanation is an essential aspect of conceptual change.
Again, this opportunity for dissatisfaction was not afforded the larger class of students.
Based on the comparison of data from the whole class with the interview participants,
it is evident that the interviews served as a learning medium.
The other source of discrepancy between the conceptual change documented in
the interview participants and the larger class lies in the means of data collection used
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for whole class. Like previous studies, whole class conceptual change was studied 
using written data for pre- and posttesting. As was demonstrated in the posttest data in 
both Meredith's and Tyler’s case studies, written explanations often do not adequately 
reflect the learner's true conceptual framework. It is possible that the conceptions used 
by the whole class were different than those expressed in their pre- and posttest 
responses. To clearly isolate differences between interview participants and the whole 
class, another means of data collection must be used.
Classroom Activities Affecting Conceptual Change
Many of the classroom activities employed by Ms. Hurston were instrumental 
in triggering the process of conceptual change. The most influential activities/units 
can be found in Table 8.
Table 8
Most influential teaching activities/units for targeted evolutionary conceptions




Science 82 reading 
Exams questions
Human and primate relationships
Humans and primate relationships
Applications of evolution
Scope and process of evolution
Extinction/human and primate 
relationships
O f the activities or instructional units listed in Table 8, it is surprising that the 
activity with the greatest amount of influence on the interview participants was the 
Science 82 reading. Entitled, "Evolution since Darwin" (Rensberger, 1982), this brief 
article addressed basic tenants with Darwin's theory of evolution, provided a historical 
overview of the theory, discussed current controversies, and described various theories 
of the scientists working within this framework. After reading the article for 
homework, each of the interview participants applied the concepts described in the
article during research sessions. Some of these concepts remained embedded in the 
participants' frameworks of evolution throughout the remainder of the course. Perhaps 
such an application would have occurred after a simple reading, but Hurston lead a 
vigorous discussion of the article during a later class session. It should also be noted 
that the participants were aware o f the deficiencies in their explanation before reading 
the article. This recognition may have been the factor responsible for making the 
article a particularly powerful teaching tool.
Classroom Discussions and Conceptual Change
Implicit in Hurston's teaching habits and my own observations and descriptions 
of her classroom is our expectation that overt participation in discussions encourage 
students' conceptual change. This view of conceptual change is shared by other 
researchers in the field who stress the importance of discussion in the assessment of 
rival conceptions (Duschl & Gitomer, 1991). However, it is not only within the 
conceptual change theory that discussions are valued. The current constructivist view 
of learning relies heavily on Vygotsky's work in his emphasis of the importance of 
social interaction in a learner's construction of knowledge (Rogoff, 1990). Similar to 
Hurston and tp my own interpretation, it is clear from many of the current studies that 
Vygotsky's social interaction has been interpreted as an active, vocal participation in 
conversations. The AAUW (1992) quantified the relative amount of time boys and 
girls, as well as majority and minority students, overtly participated in classroom 
discussions. Researchers concerned with male "domination" of science classrooms 
often quantify the amount of time a student talks in class or overtly participates in 
classroom demonstrations (Tobin & Garnett, 1987).
During my classroom observations, I was concerned that so few of the girls in 
Hurston's class chose to participate in the frequent discussion Hurston often relied on 
for teaching. Given my interpretation of the conceptual change theory, I understood 
overt participation to be an essential component of a learner's consideration and
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eventual change of conceptions. Based on my assumption, I predicted that the female 
members of the classroom and other silent class participants would experience less 
conceptual change than those members who took part in classroom discussions. Like 
other researchers, I expected the silent learner to experience less conceptual change.
Unfortunately, based on the methods of my study, the influence of gender and 
participation on conceptual change could not be investigated. As explained in the 
preceding section, my study constituted an intervention in which weekly discussions 
with my more silent participants, (Meredith, Tyler, and Stephanie), provided these 
learners an opportunity to assess their conceptions. Other girls in the study did not 
have this avenue, and using current interpretations o f the conceptual change theory we 
might expect them to have experienced a lesser degree of conceptual change than the 
boys in the classroom.
However, the prediction that less vocal participation would result in lower 
degrees of conceptual change is not as indisputable as it first appears. In our 
conversations, Stephanie explained that she often learned through listen to class 
discussions. Her observations are supported by Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and 
Tarule (1986) who suggest that often women do not participate in group discussions 
because they learn best through observation and listening. These individuals learn 
through "hearing themselves think" (p. 85). This seemingly less participatory learning 
style allows women to compare their own thoughts with those being expressed in the 
classroom. While the description of women's modes of communication and learning 
described by Belenky et al. (1986) are far too lengthy to describe here, Stephanie's 
comments made throughout the study lend support to this description of active, yet 
silent learning. Stephanie frequently commented that she "was learning" during a 
discussion in which she made no comment.
As educators, we should not make the mistake of assuming that all students 
learn science the same way. Perhaps science educators should be less concerned with
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"enlisting" the overt participation of the girls and more concerned with ensuring that 
such discussions become a valued and meaningful aspect o f teaching and learning.
Biological Literacy
Regardless of the effects of the research process and instructional activities 
listed in Table 8, the influence of Hurston's integrated approach to teaching evolution 
cannot be discounted. As reflected in Appendix F, Hurston touched on the 
evolutionary concepts throughout the biology II course. Evolutionary theory grounded 
her teaching, and this foundation is reflected in her selection of instructional units and 
in her examinations. While most students in her class as a whole did not demonstrate 
significant conceptual change regarding the process of evolution, they made 
noteworthy gains in learning to apply this theory to biological data. The research of 
Cummins et al. (in press) also suggests that Hurston's teaching was particularly 
successful in developing students' abilities and tendencies toward application o f this 
theory. While Hurston's style of questioning and discussion does not closely adhere to 
the conceptual change teaching environment described by Smith et al. (1993), these 
very characteristics may be largely responsibility for her success in eliciting student 
participation in the learning process, a participation which allowed for student driven 
development and application o f theories. Students in Hurston's class were encouraged 
to weave together the various aspects of evolutionary theory into a coherent mental 
model, which could then be used to understand the ultimate actions of evolution 
(Anderson, 1984). In this manner her teaching does resemble the conceptual change 
teaching environment described by Duschl and Gitomer (1991). Additionally, these 
activities could be described has moving students toward a multidimensional degree of 
biological literacy because of Hurston's emphasis of the application of diverse 
knowledge to real-world problem solving.
It is perplexing that most students in the class developed an ability to apply a 
concept of evolution without developing a fundamentally scientific understanding of
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the process. Students in Hurston's class could use the theory to explain biological 
situations, but they did not understand the process through which evolution operates. 
This situation was not reflected in my interview participants. These students 
experienced an increasingly scientific understanding of the mechanism of evolution 
combined with a changing conceptual ecologies. These changes were accompanied by 
more acute expectations that such a theory could and would explain biological data.
Implications
The findings of this study have several implications, both for science teaching 
and other science education research. These include (a) students' abilities to learn 
aspects of evolutionary theory, (b) patterns of and influences on the processes of 
conceptual change in evolution, (c) unanswered questions concerning students' use of 
teleology and anthropomorphism in the content area of evolution, and (d) 
methodological implications of the study's reflexivity.
Students' Abilities to Learn Evolutionary Theory
The first implication of the research is illuminated by a comparison of the 
students' knowledge upon entering the course and their knowledge as the course ended. 
In their groundbreaking study linking conceptual change theory with the learning of 
evolution, Bishop and Anderson (1990) noted that learning this topic is a very difficult 
process. The findings of the present study support this assertion. As Wandersee et al.
(1993) suggest, a change in a learner's conceptual framework becomes even more 
difficult when that framework has many links to other aspects of a learner's prior 
knowledge, that is, their alternative conceptions. This difficulty is demonstrated in the 
whole class performance on pre- and posttesting. Despite the concentrated, 
mechanistic, and integrated instruction of evolution the juniors were exposed to in a 
previous course, many of these same students retained use of prominent alternative 
conceptions for the mechanism of evolutionary change.
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The intrinsic difficulty of learning in evolution was also demonstrated by the 
modest-to-negative changes seen in students' pre- and posttest performance. However, 
echoing the findings of Settlage (in press) and Jimenez (1992), this study demonstrates 
that high school students can be successful in the construction of scientific conceptions 
for facets of evolutionary theory. As was seen in two students in this study, high 
school students can achieve multidimensional biological literacy for this biological 
concept. Clearly, the content of evolutionary theory is not beyond students' reasoning 
abilities. However, as was seen with the interview participants, the instructional means 
used to nurture such conceptual change must be intensive, engaging, and of long 
duradon.
Patterns of and Influences on Conceptual Change 
Patterns for Minor Conceptions
This research also has theoretical implications for the conceptual change theory 
as it is applied to science learning. As was demonstrated by the participants' changing 
conceptions regarding subtle aspects of evolutionary theory (i.e., species concept, 
fitness, unit of evolutionary change), conceptual restructuring of minor conceptions 
does not follow the wholesale pattern described by the conceptual change theory of 
Posner et al. (1982). Instead, these examples serve to confirm and emphasize the 
limitations of this theory as a description of the restructuring of major, organizing 
conceptions.
Patterns for Maior Conceptions
Even within major, organizing conceptions, the findings of this research 
suggest a need to change the current model of conceptual restructuring described by 
the conceptual change theory. While the pattern described by the Posner et al. (1982) 
model was identified in the conceptions of the interview participants, other patterns of 
conceptual change were also seen. The patterns of conceptual change for major, 
organizing conceptions of evolutionary theory identified in this study include (a)
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wholesale, as suggested by Posner et al. (1982), (b) fragmented and gradual, as 
suggested by Nussbaum (1989) and Metz (1991), and (c) dual, as competing 
conceptions are constructed and use of the prior conception is partially retained. The 
presence of these three patterns illustrate a need to broaden the description of the actual 
patterns of conceptual change and to narrow the applications of the present conceptual 
change theory to describe only instances of holistic conceptual change.
Further research is needed to investigate the patterns of conceptual 
restructuring within other theoretical frameworks both in biology and other science 
disciplines. Are the three patterns described in this research exhaustive of all 
conceptual restructuring of major, organizing conceptions? Are the patterns of change 
identical for both minor and major conceptions?
The patterns of conceptual change have implications for the classroom teacher. 
Because a student's conceptual framework can undergo the construction of dual 
conception, the role of the science teacher can be understood to take two paths. A 
teacher may need to teach the reasoning strategies necessary to select the scientifically 
appropriate conception, or the teacher's role may be to establish classroom activities 
that consistently and frequently use cues (classroom situations) that are successful in 
eliciting the scientific conception. Further work is required to further investigate the 
presence of the dual constructions and their classroom implications.
Patterns of Related Conceptions
The data from this study reflect the complexity needed for a useful description 
of conceptual change within a conceptual framework as broad as biological evolution. 
The conceptual change described in this study can simultaneously be referred to as 
interwoven and independent. As suggested by Millar (1989), in some cases, 
conceptual change can occur in a very independent fashion, with change in one 
conception having no effect on another conception within the same framework. 
However, for related conceptions, change was seen to occur in a cascade, with one
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conception having direct implications for another as suggested by Nussbaum (1989). 
The first of these two possibilities is liberating for the classroom teacher. In this case, 
teaching does not need to be tightly orchestrated or sequential. However, in the latter 
case, teaching should follow a planned sequence, allowing for a built-in pattern of 
related, gradual change. Further work is required to identify both related and 
independent conceptions in order to devise the most appropriate means of instruction. 
Conceptual Ecology
Perhaps the most important theoretical finding of this work is that the actions 
and structure of a learner's conceptual ecology vary with each individual. Strike and 
Posner (1992) describe the influence of conceptual ecologies as interactionist. a term 
which signifies the complex, fluid relationship between ecologies and conceptual 
change.
This interactive nature makes predictions of a learner's potential to construct a 
scientific framework in this area difficult. For some learners, her/his epistemological 
approach to science may be the strongest controlling factor. Recently, Linn, Songer, 
and Lewis (1991) have discussed the growing recognition science educators have for 
the influence of a learner's epistemology of science on their ability to learn science. 
For others, epistemology may play a secondary role to the personal emotions a learner 
has invested in the topic. As suggested by Lee and Anderson (1993), research into 
conceptual change should examine not only cognitive factors; instead, conceptual 
change research must begin to examine the influence of a learner's motivational and 
affective orientations in science learning. Also seen seen in this study, a learner's 
world view may play the pivotal role in controlling conceptual change. Several 
instances in this study demonstrate the limitations of the use of logical evaluation of 
conceptions described by the conceptual change theory. Instead, conceptual change 
was frequently less rational than the current model suggests, with the learner's 
selection of a conception directed by extra-logical, affective considerations.
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This study also demonstrates that it is ill-advised to design teaching strategies 
solely on the basis of a learner's self-professed belief in evolutionary theory. As was 
seen, belief does not signify or ensure understanding and, alternatively, disbelief does 
not preclude or prevent understanding. Instead, many other aspects of a learner's 
conceptual ecology must also be addressed.
The question of belief introduces an important issue. Should science educators 
seek to change basic belief structures? Or should we seek to make academic 
conceptions intelligible and plausible to the learners in such complex conceptual area 
as evolution? On this point I agree with the arguments of Smith and Siegel (1993) who 
side with the latter approach and explain that science teachers should also prepare 
students to critically examine biological evidence. The fate of conflicting belief 
structures should then be left to the learners.
Teleology and Anthropomorphism 
O f all the research questions proposed at the outset of the study, students' use of 
anthropomorphism and teleology remains the least well understood question at the 
close of the study. The data demonstrate that students' use of need may be a 
controlling factor in a cascade of changes regarding the mechanism of evolutionary 
change. However, the means through which teleology and anthropomorphism 
influence the constructions o f conceptions remains unclear. The broad scope of this 
study precluded an exhaustive treatment of this topic. Further detailed research is 
required to illuminate the questions of the actions of the teleology and 
anthropomorphism.
Methodological Implications of Reflexivity 
In the third chapter, I discussed the implications of researcher-participant 
reflexivity in this study. Certainly, my voice and that of the participants played a role 
in shaping the research findings as well as the methods through which the data were 
collected. The actions of such reflexivity have been well documented in previous
qualitative studies (Munro, 1991; Roman, 1989; Stacy, 1988). However, the actions of 
this relationship become even more marked as the conceptual change of the research 
participants is compared to that of the students in the whole class. The four student 
participants were far more successful in constructing a scientific conceptual framework 
for evolution than those students enrolled in the course but not participating in the 
interviews. This discrepancy suggests that the interviews themselves became 
inadvertent but effective teaching instruments. This is a case in which more careful 
study formed a treatment of sorts. Thus, my study is not a description of how a typical 
high school student constructs a framework for evolution as much as it is a description 
of how a research participant situated an ideal learning situation constructs a 
framework. As conceptual change research moves toward the detailed and intensive 
study of individual learners, the effects of such research must be recognized. 
Additionally, later studies should move on from investigations of ideal conditions to 
describe the conceptual change which characterizes more typical classroom situations.
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APPENDIX A
STUDENT BACKGROUND AND BIOLOGICAL LITERACY QUESTIONNAIRE3
Student Survey
This survey is to help me become familiar with the students in the 
class. Feel free to ask questions and to use extra space to provide 
answers.
Name____________________________ Age_________ Grade___
1. Where were you bom? How long have you lived in Baton Rouge?
2. How long have you attended this school?
3. What are your plans about your career after graduation?
4. Why did you enroll in this biology II class?
5. Do you watch science-related TV programs at home? (Shows like Nature, the 
Discovery Channel. National Geographic.) If so, how many hours per week?
6. Do you read about any science related topics outside of school? If so, please name 
any of the titles.
7. Do you read books or watch programs that are based on science fiction? If so, 
please name some of your favorite titles.
8. What has been your favorite subject in school? Please explain why its your 
favorite.
9. What are your hobbies outside o f school?
10. Does any of your family work in science-related fields? If yes, please explain what 
they do.
11. Describe what you think a biologist does at work.




SAMPLES OF THE OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
B -l: Student Participants
In terv iew  1—School: P ersonal In fo rm atio n : T each ing
1. Tell me about this school.
2. How long have you been here?
3. Where did you go to school before?
4. How do you like it here?
5. What do your folks do?
6. Why did you come to school here?
7. How do you get into school here?
8. What other extra-curricular activities do you do?
9. Where do you think you'd like to go to college?
10. How did you pick those?
11. What do you want to do at those schools?
12. What do you think influenced that decision?
13. Okay, so talk me through a typical day.
14. Which class is your favorite?
13. What's your idea of a good teacher?
16. What do you think your responsibilities at school are?
17. What do you think is the function of high school?
In terv iew  2--E vo lu tion : M u ta tio n : Science/B iology
1. What do you think evolutionary theory is talking about?
2. Who taught you that?
3. So, what do you think evolution is? When we say something evolved, what does 
that mean?
4. Does that happen on an individual level or what? Like what evolved?
5. So individuals can't evolve?
6. Okay, do you know what makes evolution work?
7. Could you tell me what a science is?
8. How does biology differ from English?
9. Why did you take this biology class?
10. So what is biology about?
In terv iew  3--A nim al B ehav io r: P seudoscience
1. Did you like that unit on animal behavior?
2. Did you learn anything that you didn't know beforehand?
3. Do you think you view primates differently now than you did before you started
the unit?
4. So, what do you think about the LockNess monster?
5. What do you think about Big Foot?
6. You don't think that's true either? Why?
7. So, what would it take for you to believe it?
8. So is that, is that how you equate truth, if it's a scientific thing?
In terv iew  4 —W orld  View
1. Science and religion, do you think of them as antagonistic, or ah, do you see them 
as one helping to explain the other?
2. When you think about how the world works, what are your ideas?
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3. Do things happen because there is a plan, or do things just happen?
4. So for you think things will always turn out. Well, do you extend that to other 
areas, like the natural world?
5. Let’s say a species went extinct. Do you thing that happened because of some 
scientific reason, or some other driving force?
6. So these scientific reasons, do they apply to people? Do they apply only the natural 
world?
In te rv iew  5—Scien tific  th e o rie s
1. Could you tell me what a scientific theory is?
2. What's the difference between a theory and a hypothesis?
3. Are theories true?
4. What would they be called if they had been proven?
5. Can you prove things right? I mean, like right all the time?
6. Which one has more weight in science a fact or a theory?
7. So if we prove a theory right, like 20 times, 30 times, will it ever become a fact?
8. They way we think an atom is built, with nucleus and moving electrons, do you 
think that is a fact or a theory?
9. So what do you think the job of a scientist is?
10. Could you give me instances of rival theories?
In terv iew  6—H um an  T axonom y
1. Do you think humans should be classified as apes?
2. Do you think that really?
3. So what can you tell me about primates? What makes something a primate?
4. So, do you think humans can be classified the same way animals can be classified? 
You know, we use that taxonomic system, kingdom, phylum, class, order, you 
know?
5. Can you say, or are you comfortable saying that humans are primates?
6. Do you have any trouble classifying us as animals?
In terv iew  7—H olidays: R elig ion: Fam ily  H ab its
1. Are holidays a big event around your house?
2. What are your plans for Thanksgiving? Christmas?
3. Do you have much homework assigned over Christmas?
4. Will your family be here?
5. What do you usually do Christmas? Like Christmas eve and Christmas day?
6. What church do you go to?
7. So is church a big part of your holiday?
In terv iew  8 —Biology: E volu tion  as  B iological T heory :
Evidence fo r E volu tion : A pplication  for E volu tion
1. Tell me what you think biology is.
2. All right, make that definition sound more human, like you were actually talking to 
someone, explaining biology.
3. Could you give me some of the most important concepts in biology?
4. Ahm, do you use your knowledge that you get in biology class outside of the 
classroom often? I mean, can you use what you know in everyday life?
5. How? Could you give me some examples?
6. Do you have any pets?
7. Ahm, okay, do you think evolution is an important part of biology?
8. So you think the best part of knowing evolution is just having a general 
understanding of science?
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9. Can you think of evidence that supports evolution? That refutes evolution?
10. Do you think that the theory of evolution has any application to other areas outside 
of biology?
Interview 9—Age of Earth: Successful Species: Comparison
of Species: Predictability of Evolution
1. How old do you think the earth is?
2. Why would you say closer to 4 million?
3. Can you differentiate between [million and billion)? I mean, we're talking about a 
lot.
4. Do you think they way the earth looks now has changed a lot during that time?
5. Do you see any other changes? I mean, can you think of any other changes that
happened?
6. So if you were to look at our world now, then say it is, and then you go forward
about a million years from now. What do you think the earth would look like?
What kind of changes do you see?
7. Where did you learn all this?
8. You think earth science as a whole is kind of boring? Why?
9. What would you say is a successful species?
10. So how would a species endanger itself?
11. Could you give me an example of that?
12. Would you say that we're in danger of messing ourselves up, I mean humans as a 
species?
13. What do you think of as a failure of a species?
14. Do you think of extinction as a natural process?
15. Do you think of humans as evolving?
16. Do you think things are getting more perfect as they evolve?
17. What do you mean when you say a species is getting more complex? Can you give
an example?
18. If we could stan the world over again, I mean the whole thing, and all the same 
natural events happened, and the same condition existed on this replication of the 
world as there existed then, do you think that the species that result would be the 
same as there are now?
19. What term would you use to characterize evolution, operating as an engineer or a 
tinkerer?
Interview 10—Natural Selection
1. Here's a statement, and I just want you to comment on it, one way or another. If 
you agree with it tell me why. Or if you disagree with it, tell me why. A man made 
the statement, "The probability that natural selection could build something as 
complex as an eye is equal to the probability that a tornado could go through a 
junkyard and build a 747."
Interview 11-Boundaries of Science, Religion, Philosophy
1. What do you think science allows you to talk about?
2. What do you think philosophy allows you to talk about?
3. How about religion?
4. If you had to group two o f those three thing together, science relation, and 
philosophy, what two do you think are more similar? Why is that?
5. What do you think accounts for the conflict between science and religion?
6. Do you see science and religion as between distinctly separate?
5 In terv iew  12—B iblical In te rp re ta tio n
1. So do you think that much of the bible can be treated as an analogy?
2. So, did you figure this out for yourself, or did someone help you with this?
3. When did you decide not to literally interpret the bible?
4. Do you discuss religious and scientific issues with your parents?
In te rv iew  13—Species: U n d e rs tan d in g  o f E volu tion
1. Can you tell me what a species is?
2. How can you tell if something is a species?
3. What does the phrase "closely related" mean?
4. Are all dogs one species?
5. How about ducks?
6. Do you think that a species is a natural kind of construct? I mean, is it something 
that exists in nature?
7. Scientifically, do you know the rules for writing a species name?
8. How is a species related to a population? To a genus?
9. Do you feel more comfortable discussing evolution now, more so than you did at 
the beginning of the school year?
10. If you were at a party and a bunch of people were discussing evolutionary theory, 
would you join in the discussion?
In terv iew  1 4 -A d a p ta tio n : M uta tion
1. We had talked before about adaptations. What do you think an adaptation is?
2. Could you give me an example of a biological adaptation?
3. Are all adaptations genetic?
4. Is getting a chill bump an example of a genetic adaptation? Why not?
5. Where do initial genetic adaptations come from?
In terv iew  15—P ersonal C h a ra c te ris tic s : View of R esearch
P ro c e s s
1. So, are you getting excited about the end of school?
2. What are you going to do this summer before college?
3. Is college a kind of scary thing?
4. Have you ever thought o f not going to college?
5. If you didn't go to college, what would you do? What kind of work?
6. Do you like your summer job?
7. Can you give me three phrases that describe your thoughts about 
U High?
8. Do you think you’re getting a good education here?
9. How do you think you learn the best? Under what conditions do you learn the 
most?
10. Do you parents help you much with your homework?
11. Do you know what your class position is?
12. Do you think your class position is important? Why?
13. What do you think about our research so far?
14. Do you mind talking about yourself?
15. Do you ever feel uncomfortable with my questions?
In terv iew  16—C om petition : L im its o f E vo lu tio n a ry  T heo ry :
D iffe ren tia l R ep ro d u c tio n
1. When you think about nature, do you think of it as being very competitive?
2. Can you give me an example?
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3. Let's think about it in the context of the ’possum you found yesterday. Could you 
explain that in competitive terms?
4. What are things competing for? Why do organisms compete?
5. Do you consider humans as being very competitive?
6. When we use the word biological evolution, how do you use the term? Do you use 
it just to refer to the changes that occur in a species, or does it also refer to the 
original production of life?
Interview 17—Biology Class
1. So, what did you think of the biology class?
2. Is there anything that you would like me to tell [Hurston] that could improve the 
class?
B-2: Parent Interview
1. Where do you work?
2. How long have you lived here?
3. How many children do you have?
4. What do they do?
5. Why did you decide to put [your child] in U High?
6. How does a parent go about enrolling their child in U High?
7. Do you think he/she likes it there?
8. If you could come up with three characteristics to describe U High, what would 
they be?
9. Do you know why your child enrolled in Hurston's biology II class?
10. What do you think she/he wants to do after graduation?
11. How do you feel about your child's career plans?
12. Has she/he always been interested in biology?
13. What are her/his hobbies?
14. Does she/he enjoy school?
15. Do you thing her/his interest came from things you might have done as a family?
16. Are you two interested in biology?
17. Does your family what nature shows on television?
18. Have you discussed what [your child] and I do for my research?
19. What's your opinion of this activity?
20. What are your thoughts on the theory of evolution?
B-3: Principal and Counselor Interview
1. Could you describe your student population?
2. You've said you "stay on top of" many problems with the student body. Do you 
think you can do that because your classes are a little smaller than the typical 
school?
3. Do you know if many o f your students come from families whose parents 
attended U High?
4. Can you tell me about the parents that send their kids to school here? Are they 
very active in school activities?
5. How are curricular decisions made?
6. Do you see it as a good or bad thing that you are linked to a large central office?
7. What are your admission procedures?
8. How many students apply each year?
9. How many can you accept?
10. Who decides which students get in?
11. What are the goals of the school?
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12. What factors are considered when hiring teachers?
13. How would you describe the teachers in the science department?
14. What are your impressions of Hurston's biology classes?
APPENDIX C
MATERIALS AND SAMPLES OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS/DIRECTIONS FOR
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW
C -l: Concept Mapping
General Directions for All Maps
1. [The topic statement is given.]
2. Write down some key concepts that you think you need to explain it, then map it.
3. I want you to tell me about those concepts as you list them.
4. I want you to keep it around no more than 10 concepts.
5. Now the next thing, I guess is sort these on you desk in some kind of hierarchy.
6. Now, you'll need linking words.
7. Read the map for me.
General Questions for All Maps
1. So are you happy with that arrangement?
2. Is that how you would best explain it?
3. So what's the difference between these branches?
•Concept mapping (CM-Indirections
What I want you to do today, the big thing is, is to do a concept map for me. 
And I want you to do it on your understanding of evolution to this point.
•Concept mapping (CM-2)-directions
I want you do draw a concept map about how evolution works.
•Concept mapping (CM-3)-directions
Using these five words, (evolution, mutation, change, population, natural 
selection), I want you to draw a map explaining how evolution works. You 
can add any terms you need.
C-2: Interview About Instances 
Adaptation. Taxonomy. Speciation. Species Concept. Natural History (LAI-1)
In this set of interviews, students were shown drawings and photographs. The 
students were asked to discuss anything that occurred to them as they observed the 
graphics.
The graphics used for the first interviews about instances included:
1. A common egret fishing in white, choppy water.
2. A red octopus.
3. An elephant foraging from a tall tree in an otherwise empty field.
4. A litter of kittens, all o f which are phenotypically different.
5. Three different bears: a grizzly, a brown bear, and a polar bear.
6. A purple wild flower.
7. A small, black sea turtle, walking over white sand.
8. A fruit eating bat feeding from a cactus.
9. A uniform population of cartoon rabbits.
10. Three different primates: a gorilla, a chimpanzee, a human.
11. A phylogeny of humans including primates from gibbons to humans entitled, "A 
puzzling family tree.”
12. A graphic depicting different species of Galapagos finches, their different bill 
structures, and food source.
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Sample directions/questions/probing remarks included:
1. What I want you to do is to look at the pictures and describe what you see and 
anything that pops into your mind about the organism.
2. Do you know anything about that kind of bird?
3. I think it's a common egret.
4. Do you know how they make their living?
5. What do you know about octopuses?
6. Can you think of anything else as you look at that picture?
7. Do you think those dogs are related?
8. What's it mean to be a dog? Are they both dogs? How?
9. Do you know what the term species means?
10. Do you think that all the variation in dogs is a natural thing or something we've 
done through breeding?
Evolutionary Patterns ('IAI-2')
In this set of interviews, students were shown groups of drawings. The students 
were asked to select the graphic from the group which best depicted what they thought of 
as evolution and to describe their selection and the reasoning behind this choice.
The sets of graphics included:
1. A. A phylogenetic tree o f primates including gibbons, orangutans, gorillas, pigmy 
chimpanzees, and humans. A member from each o f these groups is shown along 
the top of the graphic with a tree below them showing phylogenetic relationships. 
The branches from this tree are graphed according to the time scale when the 
branching occurred.
B. A line drawing depicting all the major branches of the entire animal kingdom, 
the result is a kind of bush with organisms at each of it branches. The organisms 
are depicted as well as their evolutionary relationships. The organisms shown 
included: ancestral protists, cnidarians, flatworms, roundworms, mollusks, 
annelids, crustaceans, insects, centipedes, mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, 
fish, tunicates, echinoderms, and sponges.
2. A. Three different butterflies, one at the bottom with an arrow leading to each of 
the other two which are at the top of the page.
B. An ancestral glyptodont shown at the bottom of the page with an arrow leading 
to an armadillo.
C. A salamander shown at the bottom of the page with an arrow leading up to a 
toad, which has an arrow leading up to a duck-billed platypus, which has an arrow 
leading up to a raccoon.
Sample questions for each of these two sets of graphics included:
1. Which one do you think best demonstrates what you think biologist talk about 
when they talk about evolution?
2. Why did you select that one?
Patterns of Evolutionary Change (IAI-31
In this set of interviews, students were shown a series of line drawings shown 
below. The students were asked to select which of the four branches best depicted their 





1. Which tree best depicts evolutionary changes as you understand them?
2. Okay, so why did you pick that one?
3. So what was the deciding factor for you?
C-3: Prediction Interviews 
Three series of graphics were used in these structured interviews. The students 
were the first graphic in the series, with an explanation the situation. Then they were 
asked to make a prediction based on their observations. This prediction was written 
down as well as stated verbally. Afterwards, the students were tshown the second 
graphic in that series and they were asked to make observations of the outcome o f the 
situation. Finally, they were asked to explain any differences between their prediction 
and the outcome of the situation.
Prediction interview for knowledge of genetics (PI-1)
The following were the graphics used and sample questions:
1. Here are two mice, one male and one female. Both of the mice had their tails run 
over by a cart when they were very young. These two mice mate. What will their 
offspring look like?
Here are their offspring. Notice they all have long tails. How can you explain 
this?
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2. Here are two mice, one male and one female. Notice one has a normal tail, while 
the other has no tail at all. This mouse was bom without a tail. These two mice 
mate. What will their offspring look like?
Here are their offspring. Notice that some have long tails and some have no tails 
at all. How can you explain this?
3. Here are two ducks. Notice the male is black and the female is white. These two 
ducks have a clutch o f offspring. What will their offspring look like?
Here are their offspring. Notice that some are black and some are white. How can 
you explain this?
Prediction interview for knowledge of mutation (PI-2)
The following were the graphics used and sample questions:
1. The following is a prototypical species of bear. Notice he has short hair and is a 
ground dweller. The ice age come to the place where this species lives. Of the 
three possible mutations seen here (becoming a cave dweller, gaining long hair, or 
losing all hair), which one or ones do you think are possible? Which one or ones 
are impossible? Why?
 All three mutations are possible. How does this coincide with your predictions?
C-4: Sorting Task
For this interview, the students were randomly presented six graphics. They 
were asked to use these graphics to explain an evolutionary event of color change in a 
population of rabbits. The students were instructed that they may use any of the card 
they wished, in any order, and that not all of the cards had to be used. As they were 
sorting, the students were reminded to talk aloud, and to voice as many of their thoughts 
as were possible.
Sample questions included:
1. So you think the rabbits pass on this trait of browness? How?
2. This genetic event, is it in any way tied to the arrival of the hawk?
3. Is there any other way you would like to explain this evolutionary event?
4. When you say dominance, is that a like of genetic dominance?
The graphics were:
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In this structured interview, the students were randomly presented a group of 
cards, each which contained a word. The students were instructed to select the terms 
which could be applied to evolutionary theory and those terms which could not. The 
students were reminded to talk as the sorted the terms and they were asked to explain 
their reasoning.




2. Is putting order on the outside somehow related to putting chance and random on 
the inside?
C-6: Drawing
For this structured interview, the participant was asked to "draw the time line of 
the history of life on earth." After drawing the time line, the participant was asked to 
explain the time line. Questions were asked after the drawing was made to elicit 
additional information about the participant's conception of natural history.
Sample questions included:
1. So, what do you say? What do you think happened?
2. Do you think there was a big time gap like you drew?
3. Speculate for me. What do you think went on in all that time between the
beginning of the earth and the origins of the dinosaurs?
4. So that's something you really don't care about one way or another?
5. So you would like to think there is just a gradual change from one group to
another?
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C-7: Bishop and Anderson (1985) Exam4
This exam was administered at the beginning and end of the year to all the 
participants in the class. The exam was administered as published by Bishop and 
Anderson (1985), except for the final questions. For this question, instead of asking 
about beliefs, the participants are asked for their opinions. The interview participants 
were asked to explain their pre- and posttest answers in structured interviews.
Name______________________
For the following questions, use the lettered statements listed and circle the letter 
which most closely corresponds to what you understand. Provide written 
explanations where your feel they are appropriate.
a--The statement on the left is the only correct statement.
b-T he statement on the left is more correct.
c-B oth statements are equally correct
d -T he statement on the right is more correct.
e--The statement on the right is the only correct statement.
D ucks a re  aquatic  birds. T h e ir feet a re  w ebbed and  this tra it  m akes them  
fast sw im m ers. B iologist believe th a t ducks evolved from  land  b ird s  
w hich d id  not have w ebbed feet.
1. The trait o f webbed feet in ducks:
Appeared in ancestral ducks 
because they lived in water a b c d e 
and needed to swim.
Explain:
2. While ducks were evolving webbed feet:
Appeared in ducks 
because of a chance 
mutation
With each generation, most
ducks had about the same a b c d e
amount of webbing on their
feet as their parents
Explain:
With each generation 
most ducks had a tiny 
bit more webbing on 
their feet than their 
parents
3. If a population of ducks were forced to live in an environment where water for 
swimming was not available:
Many ducks would die because 
their feet were poorly a b c d e 
adapted to this environment




4. The population of ducks evolved webbed feet because:
The more successful ducks
adapted to their aquatic a b c d e
environment
Explain:
The less successful 
ducks died without 
offspring
4 N ote. This is not the actual exam , but this includes the sam e questions in the sam e order as 
that administered during the research.
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5. Biologists often use the term "fitness" when speaking of evolution. Below are 
descriptions of four male lions. According to your understanding o f evolution, which 
lion would biologists consider the "fittest?"
Name "George" "Ben"  "Spot" "Sandy"
Size 10 feet 
175 lbs









19 25 20 20





15 14 14 19










When the area that 
Spot lived in was 
destroyed by fire, 
Spot was able to 
move his pride to a 
new area and change 
his feeding habits.
Sandy was 
killed by an 
infection 
resulting from 
a cut in his 
foot.
The "fittest" lion is:
a) George b) Ben c) Spot d) Sandy
Explain your answer:
6. A number of mosquito populations are today resistant to DDT, even though those 
species were not resistant to DDT when it was first introduced. Biologists believe 
that DDT resistance evolved in mosquitoes because: (choose the best answer)
a. Individual mosquitoes built up an immunity to DDT after being exposed to it.
b. Mosquitoes needed to be resistant to DDT in order to survive.
c. A few mosquitoes were probably resistant to DDT before it was ever used.
d. Mosquitoes learned to adapt to their environment.
e. Other, please explain._________________________________________________
7. Cheetahs (large African cats) are able to run faster than 60 miles per hour when 
chasing prey. How would a biologists explain how the ability to run fast evolved in 
cheetahs, assuming their ancestors could only run 20 miles per hour?
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8. Cave salamanders are blind (they have eyes which are nonfunctional). How would 
biologist explain how blind cave salamanders evolved from sighted ancestors?
9. What is your personal opinion of evolution?
Sample interview questions for the Bishop and Anderson (1985) exam included:
1. Where did you learn that?
2. What does that mean?
3. So do you think a lot o f things just pop up because o f mutations?
4. What's do difficult about that question, do you know?
5. What would happen if the ducks were juveniles, like real young?
6. What's natural selection?
7. So how does that happen?
8. Would the mutations have happened without the DDT?
9. Could that immunity be passed on to their offspring?
10. What does fittest mean?
11. What makes [that lion] fittest?
12. How would the cheetahs learn to run faster?
13. Would that be passed on to their offspring?
14. So how did that variation get there in the first place?
APPENDIX D
TEACHING MATERIALS/TEACHING PRACTICES
This appendix is a list o f the most common of teaching materials and teaching 
practices used by Ms. Hurston used throughout her biology II course. The categories of 
teaching materials and teaching practices are listed in a descending order o f their 
prevalence in Ms. Hurston's teaching. These categories include (1) laboratories, (2) 
videos and associated media, (3) student readings, (4) journal writing, and (5) student 
presentations. Listed with the categories are specific assignments, along with the date of 
the assignment, a rough estimation of the instructional time required by the assignment 
(if more than one day was commonly required for this the teaching material/practice), 
and the unit to which each assignment related. Note, the designation of instructional unit 
is an artificial one, because many assignments could pertain to a variety of teaching 
topics.
(I) Laboratories
Date Title Days of Unit
instruction
8/19/92 Pipetting and weighing repetitions 1 Laboratory 
techniques/ 
Nature of science





9/4/92 Animal behavior observations 1 Animal behavior
9/14/92 Meal worm observations 1 Animal behavior










9/29/92 Roly-poly observations 1 Animal behavior
10/2/92 Classroom animal observations 1 Animal behavior
10/8/92 Animal behavior experiments 1 Animal behavior
10/14/92 Zoo animal observations 1 Animal behavior
11/4/92 Electrophoresis 2 Genetic
techniques
11/13/92 Cloning exercise 1 Genetic
techniques
11/9/92 Pig dissection-external anatomy 1 Anatomy
11/10/92 Pig dissection-circulatory system 1 Anatomy
11/11/92 Pig dissection—digestive system 1 Anatomy
11/12/92 Pig dissection-urogenital system 1 Anatomy
11/13/92 Pig dissection—respiratory system 1 Anatomy
11/16/92 Pig dissection-review 1 Anatomy
11/17/92 Pig dissection--brain and review 1 Anatomy
11/18/93 Pig dissection-review 2 Anatomy
11/30/93 Pig dissection-surgery 1 Anatomy




12/2/92 Sampling 1 Laboratory
techniques/ 
Nature of science




and plant growth Anatomy/
Nature of science
1/27/93 Inductive reasoning: 3 Laboratory
Chromatography and observations techniques
Nature of science
2/11/93 Microbiology-introduction 1 Microbiology
techniques
2/12/93 Microbiology—rules, microscope 1 Microbiology
techniques
2/15/93 Microbiology-sterilization 1 Microbiology
t echniques
2/16/93 Microbiology-media 1 Microbiology
techniques
2/17/93 M icrobiology-sterile transfer, 








2/19/93 Microbiology—hay infusion, 
smear slides
1
3/1/93 M icrobiology-slide staining, smears 1 Microbiology
techniques




3/15/93 A model for neurotransmitter activity 
in the earthworm
3 Neurobiology
3/18/93 M icrobiology-catch up day 1 Microbiology
techniques
3/19/93 Visual physiology 1
Microbiology3/31/93 Microbiology-student experiments 2
techniques
4/1/93 Microbiology—unknowns 5 Microbiology
techniques








in humans: An aspect of variation
2
4/19/93 Anthropology-Characteristics of 
evolution: Patterns of change
3 Anthropology
4/21/93 Anthropology-Identification of age, 
sex, race and size of skull, skeleton, 
and cardboard cutout
2 Anthropology














8/19 Lee, Kenneth. Dinosaurs on mars.
National Inquirer.
8/25 Mulier, Richard, A. (1985). Did comets kill 
the dinosaurs? Reader’s Digest. March 24, 
98-105.
Recer, Paul. Crater in Mexico adds weight to 
theory of dinosaurs'death. (1992). Morning 
Advocate. Friday August (8/14/92),
9/1 Gould, S. J. (1984). Sex, Drugs, Disasters,
and the extinction of dinosaurs. Discover. 
March, 67-72.
9/2 The excavation of Jack Homer.
Natural Acts, 61-82.
10/7 Gould, S. J. (1987). The lesson of dinosaurs:
Evolution didn't inevitably lead to us.
March, p. 51.
Loebner, Linda. (1982). Surrogate human. 
Science 82. July/August, 33-39.
12/9 Marx, Jean, L. (1988). DNA
fingerprinting takes the witness stand.
Science. 17 June, 249, 1616-1618.
12/11 Hanson, Betsy. (1992). A bull's-eye in the
brain. Discover. October, 16.
1/22 Rensberger, Boyce. (1982). Evolution
since Darwin. Science 82. April, 40-45.
2/4 Face language: How to read it. (1979).
Family Circle. August 7, 1979, p. 30-35.

























4/20 Borst, Richard, A. (1986). Bring a skeleton 
to life. The Science Teacher. April, 42-46.
Anthropology
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4/22 Huyghe, Patrick. (1988). No bone unturned. 
Discover. December. 204-208.
Anthropology
4/23 Witness for the prosecution: DNA 
fingerprinting
Anthropology
4/29 Shreeve, James. (1992). The data game. 
Discover. September. 76-83.
Anthropology
4/30 Diamond, Jared. (1989). The great leap 
forward. Discover. Mav. 50-60.
Anthropology
5/2 Shipman, Pat. (1986). Baffling limb on the 
familv tree. Discover. September. 87-93.
Anthropology
5/3 Chapter 4: Preliminary. Sherry Demastes
Total-20 student reading
(3) Videos and associated media
[Date Titie's' " Unit |
8/21/92 "Galapagos Islands" Dinosaurs
9/2/92 "The Great Dinosaur Hunt" Dinosaurs
9/9/92 "The Case of the Flying Dinosaur" Dinosaurs
9/15/92 "People of the Forest" Animal behavior
9/18/92 "Life of an Urban Gorilla" Animal behavior
9/25/92 "Mountain Gorillas" Animal behavior
10/9/92 "Family of Chimps" Animal behavior
10/19/92 "So Like Us" Animal rights/ 
Animal behavior




10/27/92 "Wildlife Journey" Animal rights
11/19/92 "Cats: Caressing the Tiger" Animal behavior
12/7/92 "Human Tissue Implants" Genetic
techniques
1/7/93 "The New Genetics: Rights and Genetic
Responsibilities "(film strip) techniques
1/11/92 "On the Shoulders of Giants" Evolution/
Nature of science
1/20/93 "Patterns and Processes 
(video disk)
Evolution
1/22/93 "The Shape of Things" Evolution
3/12/93 "Wonders of the Brain" Neurophysiology
4/12/93 "The Mysteries of Mankind" Anthropology
T otal-20  videos/filmstrips/video disks.
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(4) Student journals
|Date Assignment Unit |
9/1/92 Sex, Drugs, Disasters, etc. Nature of
Stop. Write a journal type response to that plus Science/
the discussion we had about the "Dinosaurs on 
Mars" article.
Dinosaurs
9/18/92 Write down some behavioral characteristics of the




9/21/92 How have your attitudes about the great apes Animal
changed? behavior
9/30/92 Reports of your readings. Animal
What methods did they use?
How long did the study last?
Give some information about the animal 
Explain what was learned by the study
behavior
10/12/92 (Written after an oral reading of Through a Animal
Window. J. Goodall). Which one, nlav or war, 
played a bigger role in the evolution of man?
behavior
10/19/92 (Written after an oral reading of Through a Animal
Window. J. Goodall). What does this 
window have to do with biology?
behavior
11/18/92 Write how the anatomy of the pig relates to other 
animals dissected in other classes. Tell how 
studying the pig anatomy will benefit 
your understanding of human anatomy.
Dissection
12/3/92 Describe the pathway or the evolutionary Anatomy/
process that lead to human having an 
appendix and pigs having a cecum.
Evolution
1/25/93 What does "the Shape of Things" video 
have to do with evolution?
Evolution
2/9/93 Summary of essay. Nature of
What is the organism it was about or what 
action? What was the point o f the essay? 
(The author's messageas it were)
What is the value of a scientific essay?
Science
Total—10 student journal entries.
(5) Student Presentations
Date Topic Single or Group
Presentation
9/8 Reporting behavioral observations S(Single)
9/11 Summaries of Journal Articles S
10/15 Report of Zoo Observations S
10/27 Animal Rights Debate G(Group)
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12/7 Summary of Journal Articles
12/7 Explanation for Personal Checks
1/8 Moral Crisis in Genetics
2/1 Book Reports
2/8 Human Behavior Observations
4/21 Skeleton Assessment








LIST OF ALL EXAM QUESTIONS
First Quarter Exam
Answer the following questions (in complete sentences, with correct grammar and
spelling, of course) in 1/2 to 1 page each.
1. Describe some of the ways in which scientist study animals, and explain why 
anthropomorphism is a danger to their research.
2. Read the Gould essay "The Lessons o f The Dinosaurs” and focus on the next to the 
last paragraph. Discuss both the inevitability of extinction and your personal ideas 
about the extinction of dinosaurs.
3. What is science, and what are some things to keep in mind when planning an 
experiment?
4. (Bonus) From either articles you’ve read or videos you've seen, pick one fact 
about animal behavior that has given you a new outlook, perspective, or attitude 
and explain how you have changed you mind and why. (1/4-1/2 pg.)
Anatomy Laboratory Practical
[This was a practical laboratory exam in which student had to identify approximately
30 structures of the fetal pig anatomy.]
First Semester Final Exam
1. There are many controversies or differences of opinion about dinosaurs and their 
history. Discuss one of the controversial issues, explaining both sides and tell in 
your personal stance. (1/2-1 page)
2. Describe some of the different methods of studying animals. What are two 
similarities and two differences between primate behavior and that of homo sapiens 
[sic]? What was the most useful method of studying a primate at the zoo, and 
why? What were the most interesting things you learned by your own 
observations? (approx. one page.)
3. Read the attached article and write a short critique of it. (Skip the summary.) What 
is the importance of this article? (1/4-1/2 page)
4. What is the value of the scientific article critiques you have done throughout the
semester, or do they have value to you? (1/2 page)
Second Semester Final Exam 
Day One
Write on separate papers, using correct grammar and spelling. Answer each question
thoroughly.
1. What do you think are the most important ideas, themes, concepts, or theories in 
biology and why? (This question should take 1-2 pages to answer.)
2. What is the importance of measurements to biologists? We can perhaps understand 
how an engineer building a bridge needs to use careful measurements, but in 
biology it isn't that critical, is it? (1/4-1/2 page)
3. Of what value is an understanding of statistics and probability to a scientist or an 
ordinary citizen?
4. Look at the cartoon below and describe what real evolutionary concept are include 




Answer the questions completely on a separate piece of paper, using correct grammar
and spelling.
1. A. Give you critique of this course, commenting on the various units and activities. 
Tell your favorite and least favorite parts, as well as what you perceive to be the 
strong points and weak points of the course. B. If you were going to design a 
Biology II course, what would include, and why? (1-2 pages)
2. Suppose a number of U High students came down with a bacterial infection, and it 
was suspected that the source of infection was at school. Tell how you would 
investigate to determine possible sources of contamination, test them, and 
recommend procedures to stop the spread of the infection without shutting down 
the school. (1/2-1 page)
3. Our State Police Crime lab guide described forensic science as comparing 
unknowns to knowns. Explain what he meant, and tell if and how this relates to 
the rest of science. (1/2-1 page)
APPENDIX F
INSTRUCTIONAL EPISODE IN EVOLUTION LISTED BY ORDER OF
OCCURRENCE





8/17/92 Examination Bishop and Anderson exam Natural selection individual
Nature of 
science
8/21/92 Video Darwin and the Galapagos 
Islands





8/25/92 Discussion-loose triadic 
dialogue
Being a scientist Evidence for 
evolution
Whole
Dinosaurs 8/25/92 Reading "Did comets kill the 
Dinosaurs”
Disaster theory Individual
Dinosaurs 8/25/92 Reading "Crater in M exico adds 





Dinosaurs 8/31/93 Discussion-loose triadic 
dialogue
Extinction theories Extinction theories Whole
Dinosaurs 9/1/92 Journal entry "Sex, drugs, disasters, and the 
extinction of dinosaurs."
Extinction theories Individual






Dinosaurs 9/4/92 Discussion-loose triadic  
dialogue & teacher 
reading




Dinosaurs 9/8/92 "F arside" cartoon Primordial soup Creation of life Whole







Dinosaurs 9/11/93 Teacher exposition Land bridge extinction theory Adaptive radiation Whole





9/17/93 "What is it?" question Okapis Species concept Whole
Animal
behavior
9/28/92 Discussion-loose triadic 
dialogue
Summaries of primate 
behavior





9/29/92 Discussion-loose triadic 
dialogue
W orksheet-Cause and effect Anthropomorphis 
m and teleology
Whole
10/7/92 Exam firs t q u a r te r "The lessons of the 
dinosaurs: Evolution didn't 






10/12/92 Journal entry W ar and play and the 
evolution of humans
human evolution Individual
Animal rights 10/19/92 Discussion-loose triadic 
dialogue
Opinions on animal rights relation o f humans 
to other primates
Whole
Animal rights 10/29/92 Debate Animal experimentation Humans as animals Small group









organs, humans as 
animals
Individual
Evolution 12/7/92 Discussion--student cross 
discussion





12/11/92 Semester exam Controversies in dinosaur 
theories: similarities between 
humans and other primates: 







3 S o le . Instructional method shown in bold had evolution as the focal point of instruction. 
^ Note. Complete references for readings can be found in Appendix A.
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Evolution 1/15/93 T eacher exposition Formation of microfossils Whole
Evolution 1/20/93 D iscussion-loose 
triad ic  dialogue
Fossilized remains of 
dinosaur
Evidence for evolution
Evolution 1/20/93 D iscussion-loose 
triad ic  dialogue
Patterns and processes of 
sediment formation















Evolution 1/20/93 Q uestlons-hom ew ork
assignm ent
"Patterns in the 
Environment"




Evolution 1/22/93 Video "The shape of things" Patterns found in 
nature
Whole




Evolution 1/25/93 Jo u rn a l en try The role of natural patterns in 





Evolution 1/26/93 D iscussion -structu red  
triad ic  dialogue
The role of natural patterns in 




Evolution 1/26/93 D iscussion-loose triadic 
dialogue
About "Evolution science 
Darwin"
physical processes 




Evolution 2/2/93 Discussion—loose triadic 
dialogue
Evolution Natural selection: 





Evolution 2/3/03 Video Disk with 
discussion
Adaptive radiation Adaptive radiation 
and convergence
Whole
Evolution 2/3/93 Questions Adaptive radiation Adaptive radiation 
and convergence
Individual
Evolution 2/5/93 Discussion-structured 
triadic dialogue
Adaptive radiation questions Adaptive radiation 
and convergence
Whole
2/'10/93 Video & Discussion Animal communications Adaptation Whole
Anthropology 4/7/93 Questions "The scope o f anthropology: 
Introduction and overview"
Humans as animals Individuals
Anthropology 4/13/93 Laboratory "Fingerprints in humans: An 
aspect o f variation"
Function o f human 
adaptations
Small group
Anthropology 4/21/93 Discussion-loose triadic 
dialogue
Fingerprint laboratory Evolution of 
fingerprints
Whole





Anthropology 4/23/93 Discussion—loose triadic 
dialogue
Primate laboratory Function of human 
teeth
Whole
Anthropology 4/29/93 D iscussion-loose triadic 
dialogue











Anthropology 4/29/93 Reading "The data game" Theories of human 
lineage
Individual
Anthropology 4/30/93 Discussion-structured 
tnadic dialogue











triadic dialogue: Teacher 
exposition 
5/3/93 Worksheet
"The great leap forward": 
"The baffling limb on the 
family tree”
Discussion of readings
"The human past: Summary 
and review"
Theories of human 
lineage
Individual
Theories of human Whole 
lineage
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iwa î mvuls eKvfcV8wr^^>/< |WK
:*-vi oft
c,Wv&' \  










prim»ri\o.< Sô P jJ?"
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